Let’s all take a moment to thank Prime Minister Steve for his assistance in moving Canadian women backwards on the road to gender equality. Tell him how much you appreciate him making your life, the lives of our mothers, sisters and daughters, worse. Tell him we knew he could do it. And tell him we can hardly wait to see what he’ll do to us if he ever gets that sacred majority!
May it never come to fruition!
Canada slips from 14th to 18th place in world rankings on gender equality
GENEVA – Canada has slipped a little compared with the rest of the world in providing
gender equality, according to a study by the World Economic Forum released Thursday.Frank Jordans, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
The annual study ranking 128 countries found Canada had slipped four spots to 18th place
compared with last year.Nordic countries received the best marks for gender parity in education, employment,
health and politics.Sweden, which has more women then men holding high public office, topping the list. It
was following in order by Norway, Finland and Iceland.New Zealand, the Philippines, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, and Spain rounded out the top
10.The United States finished in 31st spot, down eight places from last year.
Based on a scale in which perfect equality was assigned a score of 1.0, Canada achieved
an overall mark of 0.72.That included almost perfect marks in the categories of educational attainment (0.999)
and health and survival (0.979).But it scored lower on economic participation and opportunity (0.74) and much lower
(0.159) on political empowerment, with women making up only 21 per cent of MPs and 23
per cent of cabinet posts in Parliament.
Full article
Politics'n'Poetry 
Geez that’s freakin pathetic and with a conservative government and a guy like Stephen “Dumb ars” Harper I don’t think it’ll get any better till he’s out of office.
Not only is Harper taking back women’s equality he is also delusional profiling those of us who make prima facie sexual harassment and sex discrimination complaints per my UN petition against Harper/Canada/Ontario/Ministry of Attorney General/Ex chief commissioner Mr. Norton. What I am experiencing from this pathetic boys club government is delusional profiling to shut me up which is not working! I am showing the UN violations by Canada particularly the Supreme Court of Canada elevating their rules and acts above human rights, the Charter and the UN treaty see court files #31438, #31517, and #31518. I currently have the Ont. HR Commission now investigating remaining complaint against Kinros when Mr. Norton obstructed justice with the Laurentide complaint in 2005 who owns Kinros and is my employer and has provide judges with defense statement stating they are my employer!!! The Commission removed another investigation on September 24th 2007 after my fax to the OHRC and the UN. My UN petition is so that no other women gets delusional profiled in Canada by this sick system of government.
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The Director of Mediation and Investigation, Neil Edwards discriminates and harasses any and every minority person especially Asians of Korean, Japanese, Chinese, Vietamese, and Taiwanese descent by making up fabricated stories in the form of documented evidence fabricated by himself to have their complaints dismissed without any settlements. He said you people drive BMW’s and can afford to pay $10,000.00 to judicial review us. Our lawyers will fabricate stories in divisional court like always. He said I am a nigger and we’ll use nigger lawyers to defend all Asian judicial reviews. We niggers hate asians. He said we a 70% niggers at the Commission and I make over $120,000.00 a year what are you going to go to the media. We have only 3% asians working at the Commisssion. He called me a Korean Kimchee and a Korean whore. He made a mistaken identity because I am a white woman. I told him that I was a white woman and he called me white trash. What do you make of him?
Where is Neil Edwards the Director of Mediation and Investigation? I don’t think the federal government has that responsibility…but it sounds like you do need a lawyer…
Neil Edwards is at the Ontario Human Rights Commission. http://www.ohrc.on.ca
Ontario Human Rights Code is Fraud per Tort of Deceit Court of Appeal File #C50990
The Ontario Human Rights Code as applied by Minister of Attorney General, Michael Bryant, in 2005 through his department at the Ontario Human Rights Commission is fraud per the tort of deceit with refusal to abide by the public policy of “everyone in Ontario is equal” the positive statement that is fraud in the preamble of the code. This fraud is also a refusal by the Ontario Government to abide by the code public policy to eliminate discrimination which cannot be done when the Minister of Attorney General refuses to manage his department at the Commission and Tribunal, and Judges in our Court System to abide by the policy “everyone in Ontario is equal” and ignores the measures to codify sections 5 to 10 of the code and stare decisis to Human Rights case laws. This includes section 7 that any woman exposed to pornography in the work place has a prima facie complaint of sexual harassment. What the Minister is offering through his departments at the Commission and Judicial Courts System with discretion to decision makers instead of discretion to stare decisis and “everyone is equal” public policy is an image Human Rights Process: It does not matter about the truth it only matters that we provide a process so when they say we disadvantage them we say we provide a process.
The Minister of Attorney General, Michael Bryant, through the MAG Act is responsible for all justice in Ontario this includes Judges as well as the Commission and part of this management includes training his staff to abide by the United Nations Treaty for women to eliminate discrimination. In open court during the Rule 21 motion that is being appealed the Hamilton Court Justice Lofchik advised me he does not have to abide by the UN Treaty and he refused my arguments using the UN Treaty and left out of his endorsement required any analysis to the UN Treaty. This Judge also stated in open court that the Commission does not have to abide by stare decisis of section 7 of the Code that everyone exposed to pornography has a prima facie complaint made of sexual harassment due to discretion which is one of the material issue in dispute for this Appeal since I was exposed to pornography at my employers place of employment like other successful HR complainants and my complaint was dismissed due to fettering of discretion. Thus the current Minister of Attorney General and pass are responsible for this discriminatory attitude coming from Justice Lofchik and other judges refusing to abide by our equality laws and the UN Treaty. The material issue in this appeal is fettering discretion by Minister of Attorney General, Michael Bryant, in 2005 and his staff at the commission and the judges in our courts refusing to abide by the top law in Canada and public policy of “everyone is equal” to eliminate discrimination and also the UN Treaty.
I will be arguing for this appeal that the Minister of Attorney General and staff have committed the tort of deceit in that they are not managing the Human Rights process to meet their abligation of the positive statement in the preamble of “everyone is equal” intentionally by refusing to abide by stare decisis that any woman exposed to pornagraphy in the workplace has a prima facie complaints.
I will also be arguing that the Minister of Attorney General and staff are refusing to be bound by the United Nations Treaty for Women which clearly says that our government must create laws to eliminate discrimination not just provide a process which discriminates the complainants to save money or due to cost allocation as I was told by judge Lofchik.
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL C50990
THE APPELLANT, CLAUDETTE LOSIER, APPEALS to the Court of Appeal of Ontario from the final judgment of Justice Lofchik dated August 21st, 2009, for the Crown Defendants (Ontario Human Rights Commission, Dina Waiks, Shannon Meadows-Lee, and Minister of Attorney General (Michael Bryant) only, made at the Superior Court of Justice at 45 Main St., Hamilton, Ontario, L8N 2B7.
THE APPELLANT ASKS that the judgment made by Justice Lofchik for the Crown Defendants be null and void, and reverse to an order allowing the plaintiff to continue and amend her claims against the Crown Defendants as joint tortfeasors with her employer defendants to these suits (04-13797 and 05-18500) be granted for intentional torts and causes of actions pleaded: Constitutional Tort, Misfeasance of Public Office, Deceit, Defamation, Conspiracy to injure and Intentional Inflection of Emotional Distress.
THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL are as follows:
1. Breach of Rule 21 Rule to dismiss Crown’s motion for delay in filing Rule 21 Motion;
2. Breach of Rule 21 “plain and obvious” test taking advantage of self represented litigants with no law training to write proper statement of claim and creating an unequal justice system;
3. Abuse of Discretion by Justice Lofchik and Crown Defendants per Discretion Principal of “an intangible principle that is used to bar proceedings that are inconsistent with the objectives of public policy” and that policy is per the Ontario Human Rights Code Preamble “that everyone in Ontario is equal”;
4. Violation of the United Nations Treaty the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and its Optional Protocol 2000 Article 2, a to f;
5. Breach of the Charter sections 15, 24, and 52;
6. Breach of Ontario Human Rights Code preamble that “everyone in Ontario is equal” and sections 5 to 10 the measures to codify;
7. Seneca College of Applied Arts and Technology v. Bhadauria SCC 1981
8. Kulyk para 41 – Sopinka J, 1996 S.C.R. Mooring v. Canada (National Parole Board) that stare decisis of human rights cases applies
9. The Longley v. Revenue Canada case dated 1999 refers to Supreme Court case of Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General) dated 1997 that nullifies all of the Crown’s case authorities particularly Bhadauria case dated 1982 and clearly states that a person who is being discriminated by a government staff or institution or the legislation itself can rely on the Charter as a Constitutional Tort and sue for damages civilly;
10. Supreme Court of Canada precedent case of Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson dated 1989 after the 1982 Bhadauria case and also nullifies all of the Crown’s case authorities;
11. Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General) dated 1997 that nullifies the Bhadauria case and Justice Lofchik’s argument in Court left out of his endorsement record that the Commission has discretion to violate my human rights due to time and resources allocation problems;
12. Error in law in misapplying the common law principal of stare decisis that a judge should not give a judgment contrarory to that of another judge unless it is shown that some binding authority in case law or some relevant statute was not considered such as the United Nations Treaty and SCC’ case law on the United Nations Treaty application in our Justice System;
13. Error in law of misapplication of the common law principal of stare decisis such as the process referred to as “distinuishing the facts” of opposing precedents when Justice Lofchik ignores all of the applicant’s precedents that make the Crown’s precedents on discretion null and void;
14. Breach of Rule of Law;
15. Institutional Bias;
16. Preferred treatment to Crown evidence of Institional Bias re: Justice Lofchik allowing me to amend my statement of claims against Employers but not the Crown defendants when they are joint tort feasores per principal of joint tortfeasors for tort of Conspiracy and defamation;
17. Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record is not a proper endorsement record and analysis of material issue in dispute with absolutely no references to my alleged pleadings that he claims are in error per the example of Justice Crane’s endorsement record in KRP Enterprises Inc., et al and Corporation of Haldimand County, et al, [2007] (pg 4 to 6 thumbnail chronology from Statement of Claim, para 25 page 15 facts from statement, para 30 page 18/19, para 33 page 20/21/22 ), and Hunt v. Carey;
18. Refusing my request to amend my claims with additional facts and continuation of wrong doing through the courts is evidence of discrimination by Justice Lofchik via differential treatment per Crown’s authority HVK pg 16 para 56 Himel J’s decision in rule 21 motion: “in that the pleadings contain bald assertions, I order that particulars be provided with respect to paragraphs 51 to 57 of the claim within 30 days of this decision”
19. KRP Endorsement record from Justice Crane para 29 page 17: does not contain the typically pleaded essential elements of this cause of action.
20. Breach of rules of natural justice per Cashin case law by Crown defendants, Justice Lofchik, Divisional Court and Ontario Court of Appeal for 2006 Judicial Review: fair hearing, and impartiality;
21. Breach of Human Rights Case decision that all provincial and federal human rights legislation is relevant to the interpretation of one human rights statute;
22. No pleadings of Natural Justice cause of action in statement of claim identified by Justice Lofchik with specific paragraph, because the paragraph pleads breach of natural justice as improper purpose for tort of Misfeasance of Public Office;
23. Breach of fair hearing as Justice Jofchik on July 2 and 3rd 2009 refused me to submit my rebuttals of the Crown’s argument pleaded no facts to show Justice Lofchik where the facts where pleaded so that he can say in his endorsement no facts pleaded;
24. Elements of Tort of Misfeasance of Public Office met per Roncarelli v. Duplessis 1959 SCR case para 169 “fraud, malice, collusion…” pleaded sufficiently for improper purpose;
25. No pleadings of tort of negligence only pleadings of Intentional Torts: Conspiracy to Injure, Deceit, Defamation, Constitional Tort, Misfeasance of Public Office, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress;
26. Authority of Starline Entertainment Centre Inc. v. Ciccarelli (1995) that no special immunities when public officers act beyond the powers which are accorded to them, and common law court remedies allowed for civil causes of action and not via a Judicial Review;
27. Bad Faith pleaded sufficiently;
28. That the precedent case of Westlake set in 1971 was an unconsidered decision prior to the United Nations’ Treaty where there is no immunity for Human Rights Violations, and the Charter in 1982 which the decision in White v. OHRC was based on. The facts and causes of action in Westlake are not similar to this case;
29. Error in law by not applying the common law principle of “declining jurisdiction” which in turn leads to “exceeding jurisdiction” which removes immunity and allows the Crown Defendants to be sued. That is the principle in law that judicial immunity is lifted if act maliciously in order to harm claimants;
30. Error in law by not applying the common law principle that of the normal rights of the injured individual can be applied to pursue intentional tort remedies against the administrator: such as Conspiracy to injure, deceit, defamation, Constitutional Tort, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress;
31. Pleaded sufficiently for the Tort of Conspiracy per precedent case authorities: Cement Lafarge, Chahal v. Khalsa Community School (2000), Hunt v. Carey and Crown’s Authority;
32. Pleaded sufficiently for tort of defamation per Klar’s Tort law authority;
33. I have a cause of action for the tort of deceit as the code’s preamble “that everyone is equal in Ontario” is a false positive respresentation and the Ministers of Attorney General are responsible for this fraudulant law in Ontario per the MAG Act;
34. I have pleaded sufficiently for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress per Clark vs. Canada, and Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse;
35. I have a valid claim against the ex Minister of Attorney General and the current one per the United Nations Treaty, MAG Act, and case of KRP with continuing causes of actions and damages after date of statements of claims, and the 05 matter clearly stated I was intending to ammend my claim;
36. Supreme Court of Canada Practice is that they are not a court of error submitted to Justice Lofchik with comment that this results in corruption by lower court judges knowing their decision won’t be overturned;
37. Institutional bias by Supreme Court of Canada on refused leave to appeal per law clerks’ memo’s on line for my 3 files #31438, #31518, and #31517 due to Ex Minister of Attorney General had connections at the Supreme Court of Canada per recent news events state he use to be a law clerk at the Supreme Court of Canada in 1997 and to protect the career of a political star Mr. Micheal Bryant;
38. And any other argument that arises before the appeal.
THE BASIS OF THE APPELLATE COURT’S JURISDICTIONS IS: is the Courts of Justice Act section 6(1)(b), Rules of Civil procedure 61 to 61.12. The judgment appealed from is final. Leave to appeal is not required.
The Appellant requests that this appeal be heard at the Court of Appeal for Ontario, Osgoode Hall, 130 Queen Street West, Toronto, Ontario, M5H 2N5.
Ontario Court of Appeal C50990 factum filed May 2010 – Crown commits fraud via Human Rights Code
PART IV – THE ISSUES AND THE LAW
ISSUE 1: The Court Below erred in law applying the Crown’s definition of discretion based on case law and broadly not narrowly per the OHR Code which shows that the Crown is applying discretion wihout authority of Statute per preamble that “everyone in Ontario is equal” resulting in fraud, with measures to codify per sections 5 to 10 and prima facie HR case laws similar to appellant, with balance, fair and thorough investigations and JR of all of the facts that includes providing appellant investigation documents per her request and interviewing her witnesses. Therefore the Crown is acting without the authority of the Charter and United Nations (“UN”) Treaty per the SCC’s decisions which includes no imunity for HR damages against any institution or organization. As a result the Crown have lost or decline jurisdiction and immunity, and can be sued per intentional torts pleaded, and discretion and immunity does not protect the Crown for intentional torts such as Conspiracy and Defamation per joint tortfeasers legal principal and SCC case authorities.
ISSUE 2: The Court Below erred in law for Rule 21 analysis by completely ignoring the “plain and obvious test” that facts are to be taken as true, allowance for inadequacies due to drafting deficiencies for unrepresented litigant with no law training, and refusal to dismiss the Crown’s Motion per Rule 21 failure to file motion on timely basis. That this test includes the pleadings of the Employers’ facts in HR complaints, OHRC intentionally flawed investigation and reports pleaded sufficiently and with particularity per CT which can be reviewed in Civil Courts for tort damages against the Crown not in JR Courts and is not an abuse of process for re-litigation per Crown’s case HVK. The Intentional Torts such as Misfeasance of Public Office allows the public legitimate right to Civil Courts against the Crown for abuses of how they did their job including in Bad Faith resulting in damages.
ISSUE 3: The Court Below erred in law by breaching rule of law by misapplying the common law principle of “stare decisis” by ignoring all of the appellant’s stare decisis authorities including the UN Treaty that he is bound by that voids all of the Crown Defendants’ authorities including the immunity for Commission, and this order is Unconstitutional, instituional bias, and fettering discretion to protect the Crown defendants not save by section 1 of the Charter. The MAG, Michael Bryant, can be sued for various intentional torts per KRP case in his own right for violation of s. 5(b) of the MAG Act and the Code; and the Commission is responsible to this Minister for the administration of the Code per s. 27(2) therefore controlled test met for Crown Agency. The Queen can be added to suit for continuance of action and now again with Justice Lofchik’s conduct.
Factum C50990 cont…
6. The discretion that is given to all of the Crown defendants (CT 220-224, 566-71),
Justice Lofchik and all Courts is narrowly and per Charter “access to justice” with
allowances for drafting deficiencies to unrepresented litigants with no law training how to
write proper claim (CT 550-51), and the Code preamble that “everyone in Ontario is
equal” with measures to codify section 5 to 10 to eliminate discrimination in Ontario as
great as the UN treaty (CT 160-162, 329-39, 844-45, 848-857) which includes judges and
legislation abolishing all discrimintarory laws, practices, orders and reports that infringe
the Charter and UN Treaty (CT 745-48, 848-857, 863). Justice Lofchik’s order can be
set aside per his arguments para #51 to #56 and #61 to 63 when per his agreement the
facts pleaded is based on personal knowledge of facts in HR’s complaints’ Employment
events (CT 192-93, 749-757, 758, 759-788), the facts from the Crown’s entire conduct up
to trial of intentional flawed investigation tactics per reports with regards to all the facts
in complaints, and new facts of flawed JR appeals by refusing to weigh all the evidence
and facts (CT 81, 443) and abide by sections 5 to 10 of the Code which are sufficient
facts not bald allegations of misconduct for the intentional causes of actions pleaded and
improper purpose for Misfeasance of Public Office, that removes jurisdiction and
immunity (CT 194-96, 345, 572-73, 615-620, 640-649, 668-729, 740). Justice Lofchik
errorred at para #52, and #53 when he stated apart from the HR internal reports there is
insufficient facts for intentional torts so that he can claim I pleaded no facts only bald
assertions at #54 when I only need the facts of HR reports and complaints for questions
of fact to show how the defendants abused their job resulting in damages sufficient when
defendants have already pleaded in response which internal documents was sufficient as
facts for tort of deceit in Derry case (CT 868-889) and for defamation/libel in Botiuk
SCC (CT 742, 777-788, 831-35) and Longley case, for Constitutional Tort in HVK case,
and report for Misfeasance of Public Office in SCC case of Roncarelli to refuse license
by a Commission.
Justice Lofchik errored that HR complaints litigated in JR HR’s jurisdiction where the
court refused to weigh evidence (CT pg 443, 891-899) is a claim for damages against the
Crown (CT pgs 187-479) therefore abuse of process to litigate same facts in claim in civil
jurisdiction at para #64 and is an attempt to circumvent intentional torts and legitimate
rights to civil suit that includes statutory breaches when Crown acts in bad faith causing
damages and that my claim is not similar to Deep v. Ontario (CT pgs 186, 604-05, 714,
725, 779-793, 803-04). In Court Justice Lofchik clearly stated “if you’re seeking
damages for torts…it’s in a proceeding such as this and not judicial review” (CT pg 604),
therefore this claim is not abuse of process or relitigation of same issues per endorsement
paras #64, 60, #62, #64 and #45 raised in JR for discrimination damages since the Crown
were not respondents for those damages. These claims are my first civil suits against the
Crown for fundamental omissons where a Trial judge will make a determination of the
facts in HR complaints and reports by weighing the facts with evidence, witnesses and
cross examinations, and is allowed for civil tort law per Kulyk, Starline, HVK, Botiuk,
Hunt, Longley, Roncarelli, Odhavji, and SCC (CT 888-889, 897-98. Justice Lofchik’s
unconstitutional one sided endorsement record refusing to be bound by the UN Treaty per
SCC is institutional bias of intervening in hearing to favour the Crown (CT 581) and
evidence that the MAG personally and the Queen Her Majesty refuses to administrate
justice in Ontario in accordance with the UN Treaty and equality laws for women through
the HR and Courts jurisdictions per my factum arguments paras #30 to #79 and Court
Transcript. Justice Lofchik’s order is inconsistent with the purpose of the UN Treaty,
Charter, and the Code and all are acting without authority, therefore the order and HR
reports are of no force or effect per the following:
“WHEREAS recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights
of all of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the
world and is in accord with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as
proclaimed by the United Nations; AND WHEREAS it is public policy in Ontario to
recognize the dignity and worth of every person and to provide for equal rights and
opportunities without discrimination that is contrary to law, and having as its aim the
creation of a climate of understanding and mutual respect for the dignity and worth
of each person so that each person feels a part of the community and able to
contribute fully to the development and well-being of the community and the
Province;
“The Ontario Human Rights Code should receive an interpretation which advances
the broad purposes set out in its preamble.”
“Rights should be interpreted broadly and legislated exceptions to the exercise of
these rights should be interpreted narrowly.”
“Justice Sopinka in the case of Mooring v. Canada (National Parole Board) in 1996
argued this point that Human Rights Boards are bound by stare decisis because
human rights are an equality issue”
“In this case the question of the motive which prompted the council to act as it did
is a question of fact and is one which should be decided at trial. There is a
developing tort consisting of the infliction of damage by the deliberate abuse of
public office or authority…which by necessary implication permits a plaintiff…if
it sustains damages as a result of such an abuse, to come to a common law court
for its remedy and not necessarily rely on the remedies afforded through judicial
review of such action.”
“There are numerous previous legal proceedings relating to the children, including the Crown wardship case brought under the Child and Family Services Act, the custody applications brought under the Children’s Law Reform Act, the Director’s review under s. 68 of the Child and Family Services Act, the costs hearing, the stay motion, the appeal and an application for judicial review. None of these proceedings involved claims for damages.”
“Although the defendant possessed the power to deprive certain persons from
participating in the election, he did not have the power to do so for an improper
purpose.”
“the mere fact that the alleged misconduct also constitutes a breach of statute is
insufficient to exempt the officer from civil liability.”
“In the leading case on the tort of deceit Derry v. Peek, the deceit was contained in a
company’s written prospectus”
“all those who participated in or were responsible for the original publication and its distribution must be joined as joint tortfeasors in the original cause of action.”
“Malice in the proper sense is simply acting for a reason and purpose knowingly foreign to the administration, to which was added here the element of intentional punishment by what was virtually vocation outlawry.”
“ (b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where
appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women; (c) To establish legal
protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through
competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of
women against any act of discrimination; (d) To refrain from engaging in any act or
practice of discrimination against women and to ensure that public authorities and
institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation; (e) To take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization, or
enterprise; (f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or
abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute
discrimination against women”
“The Constitution is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent
with its provisions is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. It is
thus impossible to interpret legislation conferring discretion as conferring a power
to infringe the Charter, unless, of course, that power is expressly conferred or
necessarily implied. Such an interpretation would require this Court to declare
the legislation to be of no force or effect, unless it could be justified under s. 1 of
the Charter. It follows that an adjudicator, who exercises delegated powers, does
not have the power to make an order that would result in an infringement of the
Charter.”
“As was said in Oakes, supra, at p.136, among the underlying values essential to
our free and democratic society are “the inherent dignity of the human person”
and “commitment to social justice and equality”. Especially in light of Canada’s
ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966), and commitment therein to protect, inter alia, the right to work in
its various dimensions found in Article 6 of that treaty, it cannot be doubted that
the objective in this case is a very important one. In Reference Re Public Service
Employee Relations Act (Alta.), supra, I had occasion to say at p. 349: The
content of Canada’s international human rights obligations is, in my view, an
important indicia of the meaning of the “full benefit of the Charter’s protection”.
I believe that the Charter should generally be presumed to provide protection at
least as great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human rights
documents which Canada has ratified.”
“This Court has repeatedly held that once the state does provide a benefit, it is
obliged to do so in a non-discriminatory manner.”
“In the present case, the government has manifestly failed to demonstrate that it
had a reasonable basis for concluding that a total denial of medical interpretation
services for the deaf constituted a minimum impairment of their rights.”
“the government has not made a “reasonable accommodation” of the appellants’
disability” and “it has not accommodated the appellants’ needs to the point of
“undue hardship”
“5(i) shall superintend all matters connected with judicial offices;”
The 2005 and 2009 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, pgs 1, 2, 3,
140, and 201, Book of Authorities, Tab 2
Kulyk v. Toronto (City) Board of Education (1996), 24 C.C.E.L (2d) 63,
para 29, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41 and 42 (Sopinka J, 1996 S.C.R. Mooring v.
Canada (National Parole Board), 50-55, Book of Authorities, Tab 15
Starline Entertainment Centre Inc. V. Ciccarelli, [1995] 25 O.R. (3d), 765, pg 14, Book of Authorities, Tab 22
H.V.K. v. Children’s Aid Society of Haldimand-Norfolk, [2003] O.J. No 1572, paras 15, 20, 25, 26, 28, 30, 32, 33, 55, 56, and 57, Book of Authorities, Tab 10
Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263, paras 15, 16, 18 20, 21, 24, 37, 31, 40, and 41, Book of Authorities, Tab 17
Klar, “Tort Law”, 2003, Thomson Carswell, pages 289, 295, 601, 603, 605 and 682-3, Book of Authorities, Tab 13
Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121, pgs 123, 140, 141-43, 155-59, 167, 169, and 184-86, Book of Authorities, Tab 19
The UN Treaty the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women and its Optional Protocol 2000 Article 2 (b) to (f), pg 5 Book of Authority, Tab 25
Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, pgs 2, 18 and 19, Book of Authorities, Tab 21
Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), paras 58, 73, 85, 87, 94, Book of Authorities, Tab 9
Ministry of the Attorney General Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.17, section 5(i)
JL’s endorsement record, Motion Factums 04 matter paras 3, 5, Issue 3, #30 to #79 and 05 matter paras #33 to #89, Canadian Press Article, and CT (see above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 1, 6, and 8
7. Justice Lofchik order can be set aside as facts in HR complaints and the case analyses
reports are sufficient for full particulars for all torts per Roncarelli, Ashley, Deery,
Longley, Botiuk, Hunt, Deputy Judge Nairn, and rule of civil procedure 25.06 (2) and (8)
and I requested adding other facts allowed per HVK with a low threshold (CT 191-94,
217, 294-99, 581, 615-20, 640-49, 737-40, 789-796). These HR facts pleaded were
allegedly investigated and have been proven in similar HR cases therefore they are not
baldly pleaded. The Charter, Code, UN treaty and SCC clearly states the Crown does
have a duty to the public policy of “everyone is equal” to proceed with every prime facie
complaint in a “non-discriminatory manner” to Tribunal per factum arguments for 04
matter at paras #47, 48, 51, 54, 57-60, 62, 63, 65-68, 70-76, 78, and 79, and similarly for
05 matter that makes all complainants equal so long as the prohibited ground forms one
of the reasons such as MMP’s rebuttal “long absense”.
The Code and SCC cases at para #6 invalidates the Crowns section 34 cases of Way and
Gismondi on discretion when complaint is prima facie made out per the Code: repetitive
of sexual harassment, exposure to any form of pornography or sexual representation or
sex solicitation, failure of six elements HR’s test, insurance plan that limits benefits for
mental disabilities (MMP, and Lyman), firing employee without making inquiries and
accommodation (MMP), perceived disability discimination, and firing after making
internal complaints for reprisal. The Crown defendants are personally suable for acting
in an discriminatory manner of differential treatment by fabricating insufficient evidence
refusing to look at all facts with intentional flawed investigation and JR into 2010
sufficient for improper purpose that oust jurisdiction and immunity not protected by
Charter section 1 (CT 124-26, 237, 745-48, 857). My pleadings of facts show that
respondents made clear statement concerning one of the grounds which forms one of the
reasons for their conduct per the code unlawfully ignored by Crown to defame me with
incompentency falsehoods not baldy pleaded per Deep para 46 and the following:
“For example, a party might state simply that the party was defamed by the
other party without stating what the other party said that was defamatory.”
“A prima facie case of discrimination…is one which covers the allegations
made and which, if they are believed, is complete and sufficient to justify a
verdict in the complainant’s favour in the absence of an answer from the
respondent employer.”
“the fact that “disability” played some role in the decision taints the entire
decision.”
“the law is clear that the prohibitive ground of discrimination need not be the
only reason for the action taken, so long as it forms one of the reasons.”
“The Tribunal holds that discrimination occurred when the sole director and officer of the respondents, Albright Drycleaners Ltd., fired Ms. Williams-Wilson without making inquiries into the status of her mental state and without giving her the chance to request accomodation.”
Rules of Civil Procedure 25.06(2)
Deep v. Ontario, {2004} O.J. No. 2734, paras 20, 22, 35, 44, 46, 57, 68, and 83, Book of Authorities, Tab 7
Starline, supra, pg 14 (25.06(8)), Book of Authorities, Tab 22
The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, pg 201, 43, 59 and 361,
Book of Authorities, Tab 2
Margaretta Williams-Wilson v. Albright Drycleaners Ltd (1997), 32
C.H.R.R., summary paragraph, Book of Authority, Tab 27
International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local 50 v. Otis Canada Inc., 2004 CanLII 49773 (ON L.R.B.), paras 47, 54, 60, 61, 62, 66, 77, and 79, Book of Authorities, Tab 12
Statement of Claims #04 paras 8 and 110, motion factum (04 matter para 27, 56, and 58), OHRC documents (showing Respondents collaborative evidence forming one of the reasons), Deputy Judge’s Nairns endorsement record for Lyman’s failed rule 21 2004 motion), and CT (see above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tabs 3, 6, 7, and 10
8. Justice Lofchik’s order can be set aside because the discretionary power to not deal
with a complaint is per the Code s. 36 after an investigation not included in his bias analysis at #44 from Crown’s s. 34 case of Way in their factum at page 9 para #30 and #31 (see first quotation below) with changed words from this case (second quotation) which is intervening to favour the Crown. The Way and Gismondi cases with duty under s. 34 to not proceed to investigations are not similar to my case and therefore is an
illegitimate reason for dismissing investigated complaints under s. 36 by Crown proving intentional unlawful conduct and acting without authority. Justice Lofchik errored in his endorsement at #60 as the Code under s. 34 and 36 does not include statement of
discretion per endorsement record and Way, nor to breach stare decisis of sections 5 to 10 and Human Rights Case laws similar to my prima facie complaints, or deprived complainants of thorough and full investigation of every fact with lots of fundamental omissions explicitely disregarding facts (CT pgs 130-32, 160-63, 165-185, 199-209,
218, 263–275-286, 294-99, 345, 363-89, 393-96, 640-49, 754-768) per Odhavji a non Human Rights case not similar to my claim with HR violations; and requires non-discriminatory reason per #6 above, and JR courts to weigh the evidence and order
production of investigation documents in question when challenged by complainants. All
are facts of intentional not negligent conduct by all Crown Defendants acting beyond
powers of the Code’s preamble into 2010 per the following after first three quotations:
“It is respectfully submitted that the legislation clearly establishes the discretionary
nature of the Commission’s powers. In fact, the Court has recognized that the
Commission is not under a public duty to proceed with every complaint placed
before it.”
“The Commission is not under a duty to investigate every complaint”
“34. (1) (b) the subject-matter of the complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or
made in bad faith;”
“36 (2) Notice of decision not to appoint inquiry – Where the Commission decides not to refer the subject-matter of a complaint to the Tribunal, it shall advise the complainant and the person complained against in writing of the decision and the
reasons therefore”
“its duty is to decide if, under the provisions of the Act, an inquiry is warranted having regard to all the facts.”
“an investigation had to be at least thorough and neutral for the Commission to have a fair basis on which to evaluate”
“that where the completeness of the investigation or report is challenged, the underlying investigation documents are relevant and subject to production”
“If the investigation is flawed to the point where a court can reasonably conclude
the evidence reported by the investigator is incomplete or inadequate, the court
must intervene.”
“She failed to interview the applicant nor any of her witnesses. The Commission
realized this was a flaw and asked the investigator to interview the applicant’s
witnesses.”
“Furthermore, two supplemental witness statements, dated February 15 and 16,
2001, from CIC’s main witnesses in response to questions put by the investigator to
CIC were not disclosed.”
“Ms. Huneault made a clear statement concerning one of the grounds upon which
the applicant based her discrimination and harassment claims. However, the
investigator failed to address this issue any further in his report. This omission
might constitute a “fundamental” omission.”
Affidavit of Plaintiff, Claims 04-13797 and 05-18300, Motion Factum of the Respondents pg 9 para #30 and #31, Motion Factum 04 matter paras #30 to #79, CT (see above), OHRC documents, Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7
Way v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [2003] O.J. No. 5099
(S.C.J.) at para 7, Book of Authorities, Tab 26
The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, supra, pgs 172, and 184, Book of Authorities, Tab 2
Ruckpaul v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 149 (CanLII), analysis pgs 7 to 11 particularly paras 42, 45-50, 52-58, 62-
71 and 75, Book of Authorities, Tab 20
9. Justice Lofchik’s order and the Crown’s case analyses reports can be set aside for
fettering discretion acting outside of their jurisdiction when their decision is inconsistent with all equality laws at paras #6 to #8 above infringing the Charter
and “access to justice” and breaches the principle of stare decisis by refusing to consider all of the appellant’s binding authority. This includes joint tortfeasors doctrine that no judge can ignore per motion arguments that invalidates the Crown’s authorities and is intervening in hearing to favour the Crown institutional bias when MAG appoints Ontario Judges like Justice Lochik per CT ( pgs 161, 179, 218-24, 296, 323, 564, 571, 581, 588-89, 620, 749-
58, 772-780, 786-87, 793, 817, 825-28, 857) and the following:
“A judge should not give a judgment contrary to that of another judge of the same court unless at least one of the following situations exists: (1) subsequent decisions have affected the validity of the impugned judgment; (2) it is shown that some binding authority in case law or some relevant statute was not considered;”
“The fundamental rule in the exercise of discretion is that the choices made must be
consistent with the purpose of the statute and within its wording.”
“When officials rule out options that the law requires them to consider they are said
said to be fettering their discretion.”
“If the official considering the application ignored the criteria that he was required to apply in making the decision and decided to deny access to the services, the
individual might be able to successfully challenge the decision in the courts on the
grounds that the official was acting outside his jurisdiction.”
“A tribunal may appear to have a built-in bias where one of the parties that appears
before it is a government department that approves its budget, appoints its members,
provides its staff, or exercises control in other ways that may suggest that the department has influence over the tribunal’s decisions.” This kind of built-in bias is called institutional bias.”
“The kinds of activities, conduct, interests, relationships, and associations of a decision maker that may give rise to an appearance of bias includes: intervenes in the hearing process in a way that persistently favours one party over another.”
Justice Lofchik’s May 14th 2008 order, Affidavit of Plaintiff, Deputy Judge Mongeon’s Endorsement Record for file #1178/04 para 21 and 28,
and CT (see above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 1, 2 and 10
Administrative Law: Principals and Advocacy, pg 5, 50, 51, 54, 58, 68, 93 and 94, Book of Authorities, Tab 23
10. Justice Lofchik’s order can be set aside for ignoring pleadings in claims discussed in
motion hearing for the Tort of Deceit (CT 149-155, 242-43, 868-889) and Constitutional Tort (CT 240, 244-249, 251, 253-324 disability ground, 323-39, 349-89, 404-07, 567-79-89, 609-611) as there is no analysis per endorsement paras #4 and #51 for these causes of actions which means they were sufficiently pleaded. The Tort of Deceit is per factum para #71 and includes: verbal and written positive misrepresentations one being the Code’s
preamble “everyone is equal” and sections 5 to 10 and HR cases for prima facie complaints; and the second that my complaints were being “investigated” fairly to mislead me; when there was no fair investigation of every fact which has to include
complainant’s witnesses and prima facie collaborative evidence from respondents in
reports and JR weighing all the evidence and facts per Ruckpaul JR case; and the Crown
defendants knew I would act upon my rights per the Code resulting in damages.
The Constitutional Tort is per motion factum #66, HVK and Longley cases that includes:
breaching the Charter, UN Treaty, and the Code per public policy of “everyone in Ontario is equal” with measures to codify section 5 to 10 and HR case laws not save under section 1 of the Charter; and Queen/MAG’s refusal to provide a non-discriminatory Human Rights process which the law requires including JR appeals; discrimination per Charter with differential treatment and retaliation by dismissing prima facie complaints with intentional flawed investigation tactics of all facts in HR complaints to fabricate
insufficient evidence in case analyses pleaded in claim 04 matter such as paras 17, 26, 28,
29, 32 (facts at para #36 to #142), and 33, and similarly for 05 matter, and JR Appeals; and additional motive of reprisal for suit #1178/04 filed in Spring against OHRC and
Intake Staff before December 2004 reports. The fact “unfit to work had I return” in MMP’s case analysis at para #30 is libel and disability discriminatory statement not bald assertion and sufficient for suit per internal report cases at para #6 above. The Crown defendants have lost jurisdiction and immunity, and can be sued civilly for breaching the
Code’s preamble objective per intentional torts with no pleadings of negligence in claim
CT 81, 123, 132, 134-35, 156-62, 195-197, 206-216):
“the tort of deceit involves a false statement of fact made by the defendant directly to the plaintiff. This positive misrepresentation can be in either verbal or written
form. In the leading case on the tort of deceit Derry v. Peek, the deceit was contained in a company’s written prospectus.”
“the defendants were liable for fraud based
upon “active non-disclosure.”
“Transit told the media that Dixon was dismissed after a performance review. That statement was deliberately misleading because it failed to say that it was after a performance review that failed to disclose any cause for dismissal.”
“Secondly, the Charter may be infringed, not by the legislation itself, but by the
actions of a delegated decision-maker in applying it. In such cases, the legislation
remains valid, but a remedy for the unconstitutional action may be sought
pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter.”
“In R. v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933, Lamer C.J.C. set out the fundamental approach to s. 15(1) at p. 922 as follows: The court must first determine whether the claimant has shown that one of the four basic equality rights has been denied (i.e. equality before the law, equality under the law, equal protection of the law and equal benefit of the law).”
“…an adjudicator exercising delegated powers does not have the power to make an order that would result in an infringement of the Charter, and he exceeds his jurisdiction if he does so.”
“the Charter applies and that, “A Society and a social worker preparing a Society’s case are obvious instruments of government within the meaning of subsection 32(1). In my view, a children’s aid society is an arm of the state and where there are breaches of the charter by the Society, it may be held responsible. Actions of directors or employees as agents of the society are, therefore, subject to scrutiny under the Charter.”
Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record paras 4, 51, and 54, Affidavit of Plaintiff, Claims 04-13797 (paras 22, 27, 26, 28, 29, 32, and 33) and 05-18300 (4, 15, 30, 33, 36, 40, and 41), Motion Factum, CT (See above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6
Klar, supra, pages 601, 603, 605, Book of Authorities, Tab 13
Dixon v. British Columbia Transit (1995), 9 B.C.L.R. (3d), front page, paras 37, 39, 40, 41, 58, 66, 69, and 76-81, Book of Authority, Tab 8
Longley v. Minister of Revenue SCC case and (Slaight Communications
Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, paras 82, 83, 92-95, 97-100, 108- 109, 115-117, 135-37, and 141, Book of Authorities, Tab 16
H.V.K., supra, page 2 para 2, para 32, Book of Authorities, Tab 10
11. Justice Lofchik’s order can be set aside for fettering discretion as there is no absolute immunity per Westlake, White and Smith for the Commission a Crown Agency under
control of MAG per section 27 of the Code when in suit for possessing powers contrary
to Code’s purpose “everyone in Ontario is equal” with personal staff of OHRC, it is only
immune if sued by its self in its own rightper Smith and Starline (CT pgs 63-88-91-99,
327-30). The Court errored that Starline dismiss Major and Commission for absolute
immunity per Westlake or that Major had shared immunity with Commission when they
were dismissed for failure to serve notice to Crown (CT 88-91, 100-09, 110-112). Justice
Lofchik affirms in his endorsement record paras #45-#54 that I pleaded “they acted
deliberately” with “quality of the investigation” of unlawful conduct of staff selecting
only facts and evidence unfairly with bias to Employers in the reports and not
investigating or including all the facts per HR law and refusing to provide me with their evidence into 2010 with improper purpose to discriminate and defame and breach Natural
Justice in Bad Faith with malice that declines jusisdiction per Ruckpaul and Cashin, and
for collatoral advantage (CT 142, 162, 194-97).
These are questions of motive prompting these Crown Defendants to act as they did for improper purpose to breach natural justice and statute (CT 296-306, 345) and is a question of fact per intentional torts not negligence with no special immunities to be determined at a Trial not Rule 21 motion per SCC’s decision in Roncarrelli, Berardinelli, Nelles, Starline and other cases per factum arguments at paras #35 to #79 (CT 95-328), the UN Treaty and section 5(2) and 23 of the Proceedings Against the Crown. These authorities give right to sue for intentional conduct with other improper motives of
collusion, discrimination and defamation with respondents that is contrary to public purpose in Code’s preamble, section 36, and Charter which invalidates Justice Lofchik’s argument at #49 and #50 base on Lacosse and Oren Nimelman and JR when my claims are not similar (CT 206-207, 234-36, 572-73, 592-99, 603-05, 626-27, 640-49, 706, 745-
48) per the following:
“The Commission is responsible to the Minister for the administration of this Act.”
“All provincial and federal human rights legislation is relevant to the
interpretation of one human rights statute.”
“Instead, the courts examine the relationship between that body and the Crown, as
represented by the ministers of the Crown. If that relationship is one of control by a
minister, then the controlled body is an agent of the Crown.”
“Section 5 of the Public Authorities Protection Act makes it clear that the Crown can be liable in tort if its servants or agents have committed a tort. It is also clear
that Crown agencies are included under the Act.”
“public bodies must not use their powers for purposes incompatible with the purposes envisaged by the statutes”
“It would appear on the basis of the authorities cited that, in general terms public
officers are entitled to no special immunities or privileges when they act beyond the
powers which are accorded to them by law in their official capacities. It would
follow, then, that where a public officer, a servant for the Crown exceeds the powers
of his office or acts improperly in fraud of his duties and powers, or acts with malice in the discharge of his duties, he does not have immunity from civil suit and where, by reason of such excess of power or improper motive, he causes damage he may be civilly liable in damages. This, indeed, seems clear as far at least as it may concern public servants who act in administrative capacities.”
“should be resolved in favour of the person whose right of action is being truncated”
“proceeding in tort in respect of such act or omission may be brought against that servant or agent or the personal representatitve of the servant or agent.”
“23. Where this Act conflicts with any other Act, this Act governs”
“To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by
any person, organization, or enterprise.”
“serious and obvious errors also oust jusidiction and hence remove the immunity”
“The Court allows Cashin’s application and refers the matter back to the
Canadian Human Rights Commission because Cashin was not afforded the opportunity to know the specific evidence against her and to answer it. The Court finds that the requirements of natural justice were not met.”
“its duty is to decide if, under the provisions of the Act, an inquiry is warranted having regard to all the facts.”
“There was no need for giving a notice of action as required by art. 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as the act done by the defendant was quite beyond the scope of any function or duty committed to him”
The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, pgs preamble, 1, 2, 43, 53, 58-60, 62-64, 67, 68, 74, 140-42, 146, 149, 172, 184, 191, 201, 302, 359, 361, 447, 448, and 468; and The 2009 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, pg 2 and 3, Book of Authorities, Tab 2
Starline Entertainment Centre Inc. v. Ciccarelli, supra, pg 1, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 14, 15 and 16, Book of Authorites, Tab 22
Crown Agency Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.48
Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, ss. 1, 5 (1) and
(2), and 23
UN Treaty, surpa, Article 2 (e), Book of Authority, Tab 25
Klar, supra, pg 289, Book of Authority, Tab 13
Roseann Cashin v. Canadian Human Rights Commission (1984), 5 C.H.H.R. D/2234, paras summary, 18875-78, Book of Authority, Tab 4
Ruckpaul v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 149 (CanLII), analysis pgs 7 to 11 particularly paras 42, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49,
50, 52-58, 62-71 and 75, Book of Authorities, Tab 20
Roncarelli, supra, pgs 123, 140, 141-43, 155-59, 167, 169, and 184-86, Book of Authorities, Tab 19
Statement of Claim 04-13797 para #24, Motion Factum 04 matter paras #35-43 (42 JR), and 44-79, CT (See above), Appeal Book and
Compendium, Tabs 3, 4, and 6
12. Justice Lofchik’s order can be set aside for error in law at his paras #30, #45, #51-54,
#57, #62 and #66 alleging: 1) that complainants do not have right to thorough investigation of all facts (CT pgs 754-68) or suit for improper purpose of breach of statute with unlawful discretion without authority or intent of Code; 2)
that “obstruction of justice” and “breach of natural justice” were pleaded as causes of actions in themselves rather than to support torts (CT pgs 258-261, 296-99, 605-607, 620-25, 706); and (3) that my pleadings for intentional torts that includes words of deliberate conduct of
fabrication of insufficient evidence, sham investigation, slanting the case analysis, distorting and imaging the truth, controlling witnesses, concealing evidence, colluding, defaming, “targeted malice”, obstruction of justice and breach of Code is the law of negligence, can only be question through a JR, are inflamatory and not allowed when they are appropriate words to plead for deliberate conduct per conspiracy cases of Chahal, SCC case of Hunt and others. The pleadings at para #20 in 2004 claim denote unlawful and bad faith conduct equated with dishonesty for refusal to acknowledge prima facie facts and evidence sufficient for improper purpose for abuse of office per SCC cases of Roncarelli and Longley, Ruckpaul at para #8 above and HVK case para #56, and is not negligently
making innocent mistake. I pleaded them as the deliberate and improper conduct for the
cause of action of Misfeasance of Public Office (Ct pgs 124-189-224, 232-393, 394-407, 408-420, 789), Discrimination and other intentional torts (CT pgs 135-37, 163-64, 640-49, 779-889) allowed per Odhavji similar to breach of statute (CT pg 394).
Justice Lofchik agrees that I pleaded the intentional torts per his para #51 and #54 with
“they acted deliberately”; and he intentionally ignores my pleadings with motives at para
20 in 04 matter and para #6 and #31 in 05 matter that I had filed suit against commission
and intake staff #1178/04 in Spring 2004 and received case analyses in December 2004
sufficient for reprisal and collateral advantage motive, and campaign to induce mental
illness of delusional disorder and/or depression which are sufficient pleadings per
intentional tort law (CT 704-729, 754-68, 793-818). Justice Lofchik is breaching the
authority of SCC cases of Roncarelli and Longley similar to mine in that the Crown
knowingly misleads complainant as to the legality of prima facie complaints by
fabricating insufficient evidence in case analyses, and I pleaded at para #24 “targeted
malice” with reckless disregard for the truth (CT 877-878) per Uni-Jet all sufficient per
motion factum para #47 to #79 that allows suits against the Crown and Justice Lofchik’s
order can be set aside per the following:
“I plead that the facts as stated in Shannon Meadows-Lee from the investigation office at the commission in her December 2004 MMP case analysis are injurious falsehoods and the tort of deceit from the commission colluding with now MMP Limited to protect Watts Reprisal campaign from being exposed by concealing evidence and controlling witnesses who would provide adverse outcome to the facts presented in these case analyses.”
“The concealment of evidence is the concealment of the material facts in this statement listed from #36 to #142.”
“a conspiracy to injure me with a mental illness of the type of “people out to get me”
#20 “fraudulently, deceitfully or negligently suppressing, distorting and misrepresenting the results of medical and scientific research on the disease-causing effects of asbestos.”
“Just as a public officer who breaches a statute might be liable for negligence, so too might a public officer who breaches a statute be liable for misfeasance in a public office. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool would only be relevant to this motion if the appellants had pleaded no more than a failure to discharge a statutory obligation.”
“In light of the allegation that the Chief’s failure to segregate the officers was delibersate, this is not a sufficient basis on which to strike the pleading.”
“Malice has been described as “improper purpose”. That it has a wider meaning than spite, ill-will or a spirit of vengeance, and includes any other improper purpose, such as to gain a private collateral advantage.”
“bad faith” is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather it implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with a furtive design or ill will.”
“Persons exercising such quasi-judicial powers…in the absence of fraud, collusion or malice, are not liable to any civil action at the suit of any person aggrieved by their decisions.”
“Minister of National Revenue was liable for the tort when officials in its department knowingly misled the plaintiff by refusing to acknowledge the legality of a tax avoidance scheme that the plaintiff had concocted. The court held that the defendant had therefore knowingly acted outside of its statutory authority where damage to the plaintiff was probable satisfying the second form of the tort.”
“Good faith” in this context…means carrying out the statute according to its intent and purpose; it means good faith in acting with a rational appreciation of that intent and purpose and not with an improper intent and alien purpose”
Statement of Claim #04-131797 paras 6-10, 13, 20-22, 24-26, 28, 30-33, 118-140, and #05-18300 paras 3, 6, 10-16, 22, 24, and 30-45, Motion Factum 04 matter para #47 to 79, and CT (see above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 3, 4, and 6
Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959 (S.C.C.), paras 4 (#19 and #20), 8, 9, 21, 23, 26-39, 46, 47, 52, 54 and 57, Book of Authorities, Tab
11
Odhavji, supra, para 31 and 37, Book of Authorities, Tab 17
Starline, supra, pg 12, Book of Authorities, Tab 22
The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, supra, page 302, Book of Authority, Tab 2
Roncarelli, supra, pgs 123, 140, 141-43, 155-59, 167, 169, and 184-86, Book of Authorities, Tab 19
Longley, supra, pg 446, paras 82, 83, 85, and 86, Book of Authorities, Tab 16
13. Justice Lofchik’s order can be set aside for breaching stare decisis of my authorities per my factum paras #31 to #85 per HR facts (CT pgs 777-877-899). My pleadings are sufficient for defamation/libel tort with 2 employers’ injurious falsehoods of incompetency being repeated by Crown plus falsehoods of insufficient evidence of Code violations for prima facie facts, and MAG approving it through the Appeal Courts; thus they all have made the libel per SCC case of Hill. Lawful discretion does not protect the Crown under the Tort of Conspiracy (CT pgs 174-193, 253-290, 305-24, 420-427, 640-49, 704-729, 793-818), Defamation (CT pgs 112-118, 119-20, 154-155, 238-241, 252, 342, 742, 818-836), and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (CT pgs 397-99, 836-862-868) per my motion factum, in court arguments and the following:
“Any act or omission done or made by a public official in the purported performance of the functions of the office can found an action for misfeasance of public office.”
“At the pleadings stage, it is sufficient that the statement of claim alleges that the plaintiffs have suffered mental distress, anger, depression and anxiety as a consequence of the alleged misconduct.”
“Sekhon persisted in his unjustified allegations of the plaintiff’s misbehaviour with teachers it was a basis for terminating the plaintiff. This according to Varner v. Morton supra, is an overt act of conspiracy.”
“The manner and the orchestration of the termination is evidence thereof as well as the defendants purpose of terminating the plaintiff on spurious causes and the defamation of the plaintiff at the May 18th meeting and subsequent are all conduct that is tortious in itself.”
“A second form of actionable conspiracy exists when two or more combine to injure a third person by unlawful means – eg. the commission of a crime or tort, or the infringement of a guaranteed constitutional right…In such a case it is irrelevant that the objects of the conspirators in using those means may be legitimate…Hence a conspiracy may be actionable if either the end or the means, or both, are unlawful.”
“to do unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means”
“Mr. Hunt had suffered personal injury…suppress information the defendants had created a foreseable risk of causing harm which he in fact suffered.”
“the violation of the right itself is sufficient injury.”
“The so-called “single publication rule” does not apply to concurrent tortfeasors, who can be defined as persons whose torts concur, or run together, to produce the same damage.”
“three instances: agency, vicarious liability, and concerted action.”
“As set out in Hill, supra, “if one person writes a libel, another repeats it, and a third approves what is written, they all have made the defamatory libel.”
“The Declaration and Report are by their terms inextricably interrelated. By their actions, the appellants become joint tortfeasors. Further, they, as lawyers, signed the Declaration without undertaking any investigation. For Lawyers to act in this way constituted reckless behaviour.”
Odhavji, supra, para 18, 20, and 41, Book of Authorities, Tab 17
Chahal v. Khalsa Community School (2000), 2 C.C.E.L. (3d), paras 110-115, 118, 119, 122, and 124, Book of Authorities, Tab 5
Canada Cement Lafarge Ltd. v. British Columbia Lightweight Aggregate Ltd., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 452, pgs 8 to 12, Book of Authority, Tab 3
Hunt, supra, paras 4 (#19 and #20), 8, 9, 21, 23, 26-39, 46, 47, 52, 54 and 57, Book of Authority, Tab 11
Klar, supra, pgs 289, 293, 294, 601, 603, 605, 628, 636, 672, 682 and 683,Book of Authority, Tab 13
Botiuk v. Toronto Free Press Publications Ltd. 1995, 126 D.L.R. (4th), paras 38, 39, 42, 43, 47, 48, 53, 61, 62, 69, 73, 74, 76-80, 98, 99, 103, Book of Authorities, Tab 1
Clark v. Canada (1994), 20 C.C.L.T. (2d), pg 241/42, and paras. 4-8, 15, 18, 23, 27, 58, 59-65, Book of Authorities, Tab 6
Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record; Affidavit of Plaintif; 04-13797 claim para 141; Motion Factum paras #31 to 85; MMP’s HR rebutal and 3 defence statements with no incompetence allegations (2 after case analysis); CT (see above); Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7
14. The appellant has a valid cause of action against the MAG personally and Her Majesty the Queen similar to the KRP case for intentionally refusing to properly enforce the Code their duty to act to prevent discrimination like the police’s duty to act to prevent crime (CT 220) by mismanagement of the departments under their control per sections 27(2) and 29 para #11 above, and the Appeal courts per MAG Act when MAG appoints
Ontario Judges with concerted action of dismissing everything to avoid trial resulting in
damages that includes benefits of making me whole per the Code per motion factum paras 2 -5, 16, Issue 3, 24-26, 28, 37-39, 43, 45-49, 53, 54, 58, 59, and 75-79 and CT.
My pleadings against the MAG/Queen are all the paras dealing with the unlawful
investigation by Crown defendants and HR facts, and now includes the JR Courts
refusing to weigh evidence per their legal duty, approving a written libel, and part of the
discovery rule of additional facts of misconduct with all now acting without statutory
authority of the MAG Act, OHR’s Code, UN Treaty and Charter (CT pgs 148, 220 (broadly discretion error) -224, 250, 323-43 390-92, 689-700 and 777-899). Justice
Lofchik’s order can be set aside per the following:
“The plaintiffs pleaded that this acquiescence was a violation of s. 5(b) of the MAG Act. Section 5(b) of the MAG Act states that the Attorney General shall see that the administration of public affairs is in accordance with the law.”
“alleged OPP failure to enforce the Henco injunction depriving them the benefits of their contracts”
“(b) shall see that the administration of public affairs is in accordance with the law;
(c) shall superintend all matters connected with the administration of justice in
Ontario;”
“The court refused to summarily dismiss a defamation action as limitation-barred, applying the “discoverability rule” to the alleged defamation.”
“An amendment will be granted after commencement of trial unless there is prejudice.”
KRP, supra, Justice Crane’s endorsement record paras 7, 10, 12, 14, 23,
28, 29, 30, 33, Crown’s Factum, paras 18, 23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 31, 38, 40, book of Authorities, Tab 14
Ministry of the Attorney General Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.17, s. 5 (b)
Rules of Civil Procedure 21.03 pgs 525 and 531, and 26.01 pg 612
Affidavit of Plaintiff; Motion Factum 04 matter para 2, 7, 16, Issue 3, 24, 26, 38, 45, 48, 49, and 53; Article on Bryant as MAG; and CT (see above),
Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 2, 6, and 8
15. Justice Lofchik’s paras #36 and #59 that “allegations based on assumptions and speculations” not to be taken as true is based on “exception to the Rule” from the Crown’s factum page 11 para 39 of SCC case of Operation Dismantle Inc. of speculation
of future event of testing cruise missiles because damages could not be proven. Violence
is done to Rule 21 where allegations of pass events of fabricated insufficient evidence
from flawed investigations in 2004 are capable of proof per trial case of Chahal. The
correct Rule 21 test to apply is the “plain and obvious” per SCC of Hunt v. Carey pages 7
to 15 dated 1990 that includes this Appeal Court’s decision and references Operation Dismantle 1985 case but not the exception to the rule used by Justice Lofchik’s (CT pgs 148, 217, 250, 628-631, 633-660, 704-729, and 777-900).
Justice Lofchik’s order can be set aside for breaching rule 21, Hunt and KRP cases that state a judge is required by law to read generously with allowance for the plaintiff’s drafting deficincies due to no law training on how to write a proper statement of claim
per my factum paras 50 to 55. His arguments from para #1 to #70 are all due to drafting
dificiencies which includes not properly expressing the elements of each tort clearly but
rather repeating them throughout the whole claims. Deputy Judge Nairn’s Rule 21 endorsement dismissing Lyman’s 2004 Rule 21 motion is a proper analysis of the law for same facts against Lyman for Small Claims matter dropped for claim 05-18300. Justice Lofchik admits to my inadequacies in his endorsement para #30, CT and his May 14th
2008 order. His order can be set aside for refusing to order amendment of claim for Crown defendants who are joint tortfeasors with Employer defendants which is bias to
intervene in the hearing process to favour Crown Defendants, as is refusing to dismiss their motion for delay in filing in 2008 when they received the claims in 2005:
“We are not, in my opinion, required by the principle enunciated in Inuit Tapirisat, supra, to take as true the appellant’s allegations concerning the possible consequences of the testing of the cruise missile. The rule that the material facts is a statement of claim must be taken as true for the purpose of determining whether it discloses a reasonable cause of action does not require that allegations based on assumptions and speculations be taken as true. The very nature of such an allegation is that it cannot be proven to be true by the adduction of evidence. It would, therefore, be improper to accept that such an allegation is true. No violence is done to the rule where allegations, incapable of proof, are not taken as proven.”
“The Plaintiff in this case is unrepresented and there are clearly deficiencies in the drafting of her Statements of Claim. That being said however, I do not believe it would be appropriate to strike out these claims at this point because of the Plaintiff’s lack of legal training or her inability to express herself concisely. Reviewing the material that she has provided, I cannot conclude that her claims are “ridiculous” or
“incapable of proof”. While she may characterize the Defendants’ conduct using a variety of terms, in essence she has alleged that her co-workers have acted improperly and as a result, she is entitled to damages.”
“I indicated at the outset that the Statement of Claim in both actions, as drafted, cannot stand and should be struck out with leave to deliver fresh statements of claims, which comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure.”
“Delay in bringing a Rule 21 motion is a sufficient ground to dismiss the motion, and not merely a matter affecting costs.”
“I had occasion to affirm this proposition in Operation Dismantle Inc. v R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, 12 Admin. L.R. 16, 13 C.R.R. 287, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 481, 59 N.R. 1 Fed.]. At pp. 486-87 I provided the following summary of the law in this area (with which the rest of the court concurred): “The law then would appear to be clear. The facts pleaded are to be taken as proved. When so taken, the question is do they disclose a reasonable cause of action ie a cause of action with some chance of success.”
“The test remained whether the outcome of the case was “plain and obvious” or “beyond reasonable doubt”
“In my view, these arguments go to form as opposed to substance. In accordance with the guidelines set out by Dickson J. (as he then was) in Operation Dismantle, supra, the claim must be read as generously as possible, with a view to accommodating any inadequacies in the form of the allegations due to drafting deficiencies. With this principle in mind, I am satisfied that these pleadings may stand.”
“I am required to read the Statement of Claim so as to see the substance from the form.”
“the Court will apply principles that are informed by Charter values of access to justice”
Operation Dismantle Inc. v. R. (1985), 18 D.L.R. (4th) 481 (S.C.C.) pg 9, Book of Authorities, Tab 18
Justice Lofchik’s May 14th 2008 order and August 21st 2009 endorsement record para 30, 36 and 59; Affidavit of Plaintiff; Statement of claims; Crown’s motion factum page 11 para 39; Plaintiff’s 04 factum para 27, 50 to 57; documents of October 11 cancel motion hearing by Defendants; Deputy Judge Nairn’s endorsement for Lyman’s failed Rule 21 Motion; and CT (see above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tabs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, and 10
Rules of Civil Procedure 2005, page 525, Tab
Hunt, supra, paras 4 (#19 and #20), 8, 9, 21, 23, 26-39, 46, 47, 52, 54 and
57, Book of Authorites, Tab 11
KRP Enterprises Inc, et al and Corporation of Haldimand County, et al, [2007], O.J. No. 114/2006-CP. paras 8, 10, 14, and 30, and MAG’s factum for KRP suit, page 10 para 23, Book of Authorities, Tab 14
16. The Minister of Attorney General, Michael Bryant, was a law clerk at the SCC prior to 1999 which is sufficient evidence of apprehension of bias with connections with Law
Clerks who decide what is placed before the Judges per the SCC practice rules which was
not my appeal application documents or appeal argument per my factum para #37 and #38 but their memorandum resulting in refuse leave to appeal in January 2007. The SCC practice (CT pgs 890-899) results in abuse of lower courts breaching rule of law per
the following:
“provided with an objective summary and a memorandum prepared by staff lawyers which contain analysis of the issues in order to ferret out the issue of public importance.”
“We are not a court of error”
Supreme Court of Canada Practice 2005, Thomson Carswell, pgs 381 and 383, Book of Authorities, Tab
Affidavit of Plaintiff; Motion Factum para 37 and 38; SCC Appeal Documents; News Articles on Bryant; CT (see above); Appeal Book and Compendium, Tabs 2, 6, and 8
PART V – RELIEF SOUGHT
17. The appellant seeks the order to amend her statement of claim with the Crown Defendants, including the Commission, Mag and Queen, for discriminatory application of the Code, and as joint tortfeasors per Justice Lofchik’s 2008 order for Employer Defendants. The appellant request the August 21th 2009 order be voided and cost on a substantial indemnity basis be charged to the Crown respondents.
April 26, 2010
ALL OF WHICH RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED BY: Claudette Losier (Appellant)
Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC
1. During the 8 day motion hearing Justice Lofchik’s comments was evidence of
Discriminatory attitude, bias and intervening in the hearing process in a way that persistly favours the Crown and acting as trier of fact which also includes his argument in his endorsement record that I pleaded no facts. In Court Justice Lofchik admits I pleaded facts. Justice Lofchik’s arguments presented to me for refusing to be bound by the United Nations Treaty per SCC Slaight case, joint tortfeasors defamation legal doctrine, Crown Agency Act, and others are not based on law. For some of his arguments he refuses my right to provide me with the law so that I had an opportunity to defend my claims and is a breach of natural justice. These comments are found in the Court Transcripts per the following:
a) Pg 89 breach of natural justice by JL: “Well, I’m still not sure that the Human Rights Commission fits the description of a Crown Commission, or a Crown agent or Grown agency. The authority is there; whether the authority applies to the Human Rights Commission is the thing that I’m not…” “So how do we figure that out to make sure that we are sure?” “I’ll tell you what I decide.” “Bu I need to have an opportunity to argue whatever…” “Well, I thought you had.” “No, because you’re saying…” “I’ve heard your argument. I’m going to take what you said, I’m going to look at this, and I am going to make a decision. I don’t intend to debate this for the next two days.” “Yeah, but the Crown Agency applies.” “Well, that’s what I’m saying, as I’m not sure it does on the interpretation of the Act.” “What part of the interpretation? A Crown Agency is in all purpose of an agent fo Her Majesty and its powers may be exercised…”
Ontario Human Rights Code section 27 says the authority applies to the Commission Body and this Judge is ignoring the code to protect Minister of AG who superintends his office:
(1) The Ontario Human Rights Commission is continued under the name Ontario Human Rights Commission in English and Commission ontarienne des droits de la personne in French and shall be composed of such persons, being not fewer than seven, as are appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council.
(2) The Commission is responsible to the Minister for the administration of this Act.
(3) The Lieutenant Governor in Council shall designate a member of the Commission as chair, and a member as vice-chair.
(4) The Lieutenant Governor in Council may fix the renumeration and allowance for expenses of the chair, vice-chair and members of the Commission.
(5) The employees of the Commission shall be appointed under the Public Service Act.
Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC
b) Pg 90 JL not applying Code s. 27 which clearly says Lieutenant Governor and Minister: “I’m not sure that the Human Rights Commission is a commission operated by Her Majesty or the government of Ontario or under the authority of the legislature or the lieutenant governor in council.” “It is owned by the Ontario government.” “Well, I’m not sure it is.” “Then who owns it?” “I don’t think it’s owned by anybody. It’s an independent board.” “It’s owned by somebody.” “I’m not sure it is, just as this court isn’t owned by anybody.”
Ontario Human Rights Code section 27 says the authority applies to the Commission Body and this Judge is ignoring the code to protect Minister of AG who superintends his office:
(1) The Ontario Human Rights Commission is continued under the name Ontario Human Rights Commission in English and Commission ontarienne des droits de la personne in French and shall be composed of such persons, being not fewer than seven, as are appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council.
(2) The Commission is responsible to the Minister for the administration of this Act.
(3) The Lieutenant Governor in Council shall designate a member of the Commission as chair, and a member as vice-chair.
(4) The Lieutenant Governor in Council may fix the renumeration and allowance for expenses of the chair, vice-chair and members of the Commission.
(5) The employees of the Commission shall be appointed under the Public Service Act.
Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC
Pg 94 “But you are also bound by section 23 of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.” Justice Lofchik “Well, I’ve heard your argument on that. Let’s carry on. You’ve got your – I’m at paragraph 43 of your factum now. I can tell you that the United Nations as far as I’m concerned, a great organization, they do good work, but they have no binding affect on me so I am not going to pay any attention to that argument.”
Pg 221 evidence J. Lofchik is making up the law when UN treaty part of Code preamble and SCC cases “Okay, but the board also operates under the United Treaty, which says that they do have a duty to eleminate discrimination against women.” “I am not going to go there. The United Nations Treaty just become operative on courts and boards when they become law passed by the legislature. The government can trot around and sign all the treaties it wants but until they are enacted into law they don’t affect you and I as citizens necessarily.”
Pg 856 J. Lofchik making up the rules again re: SCC’s decision HR as high as UN treaty: “I understand your position to be, he wasn’t doing it in compliance with the Human Rights Code – or they weren’t doing it in compliance with the Code, they were deviating from the duties under the Code, and that’s what caused the mental suffering.” “If that’s the case, then I don’t think we need to get into all this Human Rights – United Nations stuff, because I’m presuming that the Code is valid legislation for the purposesm of this lawsuit.” Losier “My reference to this is the overt statement which I argued yesterday, which is at number 30 in the MMP case…” Losier “…is not allowed, per discretion, to make a libelous and discriminatory statement that I was unfit to work opinion by…” J. Lofchik “Well, all right…” “…the investigation statement.” “…I understand – all right, I take that point.” “I still don’t know where the United Nations Treaties on Human Rights and all that comes into play with respect to that. But…” Losier “…per the United Nations Treaty, it says to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practice which constitute discrimination against women. That includes these discriminatory comments by a Commission staff. And…” J. Lofchik “All right; I have that point.” Losier “…there’s also – the United Nations also refers to that it is against – that I can have a Human Rights complaint or suit against any person, any organization, any enterprise. That includes the Crown, there is no immunity. That’s how it relates…” J. Lofchik “Well, all right, I don’t think United Nations Charters overrule Canadian law; so, let’s get on with it.”
Losier ”Well, the Supreme Court says that it does.” J. Lofchik “Well, that’s not how I read it.”
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Slaight says Justice Lofchik and the Crown are to apply the Human Rights Code and Charter as high as the United Nations Treaty:
“As was said in Oakes, supra, at p.136, among the underlying values essential to
our free and democratic society are “the inherent dignity of the human person” and “commitment to social justice and equality”. Especially in light of Canada’s
ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), and commitment therein to protect, inter alia, the right to work in its various dimensions found in Article 6 of that treaty, it cannot be doubted that the objective in this case is a very important one. In Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), supra, I had occasion to say at p. 349: The content of Canada’s international human rights obligations is, in my view, an important indicia of the meaning of the “full benefit of the Charter’s protection”. I believe that the Charter should generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human rights documents which Canada has ratified.”
Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC
Court Transcript Pg 123: j. Lofchik “Well, I take it your point is that your claim against the employees of the Commission is not just in negligence. You are claiming misfeasance. “I’m not – I’m not claiming any negligence.” “All right. Then you are claiming misfeasance.”
Pg 142 “I accept the proposition that if a government employee exceeds the bounds of their office or acts with malice to cause, deliberately cause somebody harm, contrary to their duties under that public office then that’s not negligence, it’s a separate tort. So I don’t know what else you’re getting at here.” Losier “My argument was that my friend here was stating that that was
negligence…” J. Lofchik “Well, all right, I…” Losier “ …which is the material issue in dispute and that’s to be decided at trial and not in a motion hearing.” J. Lofchik “All right.”
Pg 155 J. Lofchik “All right. So your point here is that there was in affect information withheld in the Commission’s report, or information didn’t go in there that you feel should have gone in there.” Losier “That were intentionally omitted.” J. Lofchik “All right, intentionally omitted, and that that causes – that gives rise to the tort of deceit.” Losier “Deceit, and misfeasance of public office, conspiracy, injurious falsehoods, and defamation of character, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The case analysis does state I got the dollar raise. If I got the dollar raise there was no incompetency per common law on employment law.”
Pg 160-161 Losier “Any omission, and I wouldn’t be here today if it was just one omission, but we’re taking – we’re talking about a lof of omission, serious ommissions. Not just serious omissions but an act of pretend execution of the Ontario Human Rights Code which I discussed earlier as both Mackay and the case analysis admit I was exposed to a sex picture on March 8th, I believe, the 2nd day of work. It was a pornographic faxed image of a couple copulating from behind. They admit that. That is sufficient evidence, a violation of code five and seven. I don’t need any more evidence other than that.” J Lofchik “Ah, that’s not quite the same thing. The tribunal doesn’t hear every case. They have a discretion as to which cases to hear. That doesn’t mean there wasn’t a violation, it just means that given the amount of time and resources they have, they have to chose which cases they feel are serious enough to deal with.” Losier “They have to apply the code per the code. The code says a pornographic image, which I already referred to Your Honour…” J. Lofchik “Well, that – but, and there is not question about that, but they still have to make a qualitative decision. They don’t prosecute every case. I think there is case law that says that they are not obliged to prosecute every case. They can pick the cases that they in effect feel are serious, enough to prosecute. Otherwise, every time a mechanic puts up a Playboy calender up on his back wall there is a case before the Human Rights Commission and that just – the system will crumble under the weight of what they have to do.” (Discriminatory attitude by this judge)
Losier “Well that’s not eliminating discrimination against women and according to the United Treaty.” J. Lofchik “No, it’s not, and it may very well not be, but the question is does not prosecuting every case amount to a tort of misfeasance in public office? That’s the real issue that we have here.”
***Justice Lofchik is making up the rules stated there are case laws but refusing to provide me copies of these laws he is basing his decision which he refuses also to review what the Human Rights Code says and the preamble says “everyone in Ontario” not just some complainants in Ontario!
Pg 192 J Lofchik acting as trier of fact: “All right. So the issue is how does the pleading of those facts prove collussion as opposed to mere negligence?” Losier “Well, we’re not here to prove.” J. Lofchik “Well, you say it proves.” Losier “We are here to say that those facts, the wording, is collusion, obstruction of justice, slanting this analysis, that’s not a pleading in negligence. That is a pleading in misfeasance for improper purpose, and the improper purpose is…”
Pg 194-95 J. Lofchik “The difficulty of having a statement of claim that reads more like a novel then a statement of claim is that it’s hard to pick out the important stuff from narrative…” Losier “Yes. If you look at the back part, Your Honour, there are from 122 to about 142 I go through the case analysis point by point and show the error made, which is fabrication or incorrectly stating the facts. An additional proof of that, Your Honour, if I may, is that if you go to my tab four…” Losier “If you look at number one; “The defendant pleading denies the allegations contained in paragraphs two throug 134 of the statement of claim.” Losier “So they are denying even the rebuttal to the Commission. They are denying even the validated sexual harassment, two complaints that I made internally. Those are facts they are to admit per the rule 25.07(3) I believe, and because they are not admitting them there are costs consequences at another rule, 57.” J. Lofchik “Again, that’s another – that’s for another time and place.” Losier “Okay, but this validates my claim that they are not being truthful, that I have a valid claim against all parties. We went through bad faith, okay. Yesterday my friend said that negligence refers to anything I say. Regardless of anything that Ms. Losiers calls, it is all negligence…” Losier “…which is an error in law, as we’ve already gone through, that an omission is not the tort of negligence, it is the tort of misfeasance of public office.” J. Lofchik “Well, that’s not quite true either, but you can have negligence through omission or commission.”
Error by Justice Lofchik per Human Rights Case law of Ruckpaul that all facts are to be investigated and also the complainant’s witnesses and for appeal c50990 no complainant witnesses were interviewed:
“its duty is to decide if, under the provisions of the Act, an inquiry is warranted having regard to all the facts.”
“an investigation had to be at least thorough and neutral for the Commission to have a fair basis on which to evaluate”
“that where the completeness of the investigation or report is challenged, the
underlying investigation documents are relevant and subject to production”
“If the investigation is flawed to the point where a court can reasonably conclude
the evidence reported by the investigator is incomplete or inadequate, the court
must intervene.”
“She failed to interview the applicant nor any of her witnesses. The Commission
realized this was a flaw and asked the investigator to interview the applicant’s
witnesses.”
“Furthermore, two supplemental witness statements, dated February 15 and 16,
2001, from CIC’s main witnesses in response to questions put by the investigator to
CIC were not disclosed.”
“Ms. Huneault made a clear statement concerning one of the grounds upon which
the applicant based her discrimination and harassment claims. However, the
investigator failed to address this issue any further in his report. This omission
might constitute a “fundamental” omission.”
Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC
Court Transcript:
j) Pg 196-97 J Lofchik acting as trier of fact based on Crown’s defence that all is negligence when I clearly pleaded deliberate to injure: “No, but failure to record a complaint properly or accurately may or may not be negligence. It could be negligence just she wrote it down wrong, or she developed the wrong attitude toward it, she misunderstood, and number of things. It can be negligence…” “…or it can be deliberate act of misfeasance, and we’re gone around this mulberry bush a lot of times now and it seems to me the law says, subject to what counsel has to say, that an act of negligence is in effect not suable but an act of deliberate misfeasance with intent to injure is. We don’t – we’ve gone around that mulberry bush…” Justice Lofchik “…so that the issue is, and I understand your argument, that you are characterizing these actions as deliberate acts of misfeasance with effectively a deliberate attempt to cause you injury.”
k) Pg 220 discretion duty per preamble and s. 29(d) with Crown Defendants duty to eliminate discrimination, and Crown’s discretion is to be narrowly interpreted not broadly per Code Book pg 3 which contradicts J Lofchik’s comment of: “The difficulty is that there is a considerable body of case law that supports that proposition, that is that they are not obliged to forward every case to the tribunal, that they have a discretion. In fact, there are cases that say that the Commission is in effect a gatekeeper to the Tribunal and they have a broad discretion as to –the difference being this. The police have a duty to prevent crime. They have a duty to act. They must; I mean, that’s part of their raison d’etre. That’s why they’re there. That’s not the function of the board. It doesn’t have a duty, statutory duty, to forward every case to the tribunal. In fact, it’s statutory duty is otherwise. The statute gives it, under section 34 and 36, the right to say it stops here, so factually the proposition that Justice Crane rejects doesn’t have an awful lot do do with the statute that the board operates under.”
***Problem – judges ignoring the code and basing decision on case law and for this rule 21 only 4 cases were presented which had to do with section 34 not section 36 per my 4 prima facie complaints not properly investigated
l) Pg 221 evidence JL is making up the law when UN treaty part of Code preamble and SCC case: Losier “Okay, but the board also operates under the United Treaty, which says that they do have a duty to eleminate discrimination against women.” J. Lofchik “I am not going to go there. The United Nations Treaty just become operative on courts and boards when they become law passed by the legislature. The government can trot around and sign all the treaties it wants but until they are enacted into law they don’t affect you and I as citizens necessarily.”
m) Pg 223 favouring the Crown per J Lofchik’s comment: Losier “My last argument, I think, is almost my last argument, per KRP, courts can review discretion of police staff and the Minister of Attorney General, so therefore they can also review a discretion, abuse of discretion, by staff at the Commission.” J. Lofchik “That’s what we call judicial review.” Losier “That’s what we call misfeasance of public office that the courts can review.” Losier “But Justice Crane said that they also could be reviewed by a court in a civil matter, and this is a civil matter, KRP, not a judicial review matter.” J. Lofchik “oh, I see what you are saying.”
Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC
Court Transcript:
n) Pg 224 J Lofchik trying to deny me right to argue other torts: Lofchik “ Well, I thought that you were making those allegations with respect to those torts. I think we’ve – you mentioned conspiracy.” Losier “I haven’t mentioned my case law for conspiracy and all the other elements.” Lofchik “You mean what constitutes Conspiracy?” Losier “Yeah.” Lofchik “I don’t think we have to go there.” Losier “But the employers are going there and my friend here has offered a case on that matter, so those are the improper purpose for the misfeasance of public office. That’s what I’m referring to.” Lofchik “Okay”
o) Pg 249-50 Lofchik “All I’m saying is, as I indicated at the outset, I think your statement of claim will ultimately have to be redrafted for these reasons.”
***Rule 21 allows plaintiffs to amend claims for drafting deficiencies and here Lofchik admits but later writes up order to dismiss!
p) Pg 267-276 Lofchik “Now what facts are there any facts pleaded with respect to the conclusion that the defendants have no honest belief in their statement of gross incompetence?”
***termination letter with no allegations of gross incompetence plus $1.00 raise at 3 mth probation and no warning letter plus 3 defence statement by MMP with no similar fact of incompetence per the fabricated case analysis by the OHRC!
q) Pg 275-76 JL acting as trier of fact again (sufficient for pleadings per Ruckpaul case of distorting the truth and flawed investigations) : J. Lofchik “Well, it’s not so much distorting facts as coming to an improper conclusion on the facts or ignoring the facts, perhaps.” Losier “For distorting the facts, because they leave out the other three incidents afterwards.” Lofchik “Well, distorting the facts to me means the facts are one thing and then they say another; nothing to do with the conclusion drawn from the facts.” Lofchik “Did the report indicate that the people at Mackay admitted that they did whatever you say they did?” Losier “Yes.” Lofchik “The report says that.” Losier “Yes” Lofchik “So then it’s not distorting that fact.” Losier “No, but the distortion is saying that those facts are insufficient evidence.” Lofchik “Well, my – and you can correct me if I’m wrong, but my understanding of distorting the facts is, in effect, saying that the facts are something other than what they are, not from the point of view of a legal conclusion but just from the point of view of statement of fact.”
***distorting end result via fabricating insufficient evidence by ignoring some of the facts and not interviewing any of the plaintiff’s witnesses is wrongful distorting the facts per Human Rights Case of Ruckpaul:
“its duty is to decide if, under the provisions of the Act, an inquiry is warranted having regard to all the facts.”
“an investigation had to be at least thorough and neutral for the Commission to have a fair basis on which to evaluate”
“that where the completeness of the investigation or report is challenged, the
underlying investigation documents are relevant and subject to production”
“If the investigation is flawed to the point where a court can reasonably conclude
the evidence reported by the investigator is incomplete or inadequate, the court
must intervene.”
“She failed to interview the applicant nor any of her witnesses. The Commission
realized this was a flaw and asked the investigator to interview the applicant’s
witnesses.”
“Furthermore, two supplemental witness statements, dated February 15 and 16,
2001, from CIC’s main witnesses in response to questions put by the investigator to
CIC were not disclosed.”
“Ms. Huneault made a clear statement concerning one of the grounds upon which
the applicant based her discrimination and harassment claims. However, the
investigator failed to address this issue any further in his report. This omission
might constitute a “fundamental” omission.”
r) Pg 285 Lofchik “Well, that’s right, and my question to you is, other than saying, look at there’s other evidence that they didn’t accept my version of the facts, apart from that, are there facts pleaded that show conspiracy or collussion or are you saying because they only accepted the employer’s version of the facts and ignored mine, there must be collussion and there must be a conspiracy. Does your pleading to beyond that?”
***Ruckpaul Human Rights Case clearly shows OHRC has to investigate all facts and include them in their report and have to interview all of plaintiff’s witnesses and provide their investigation documents when challenged which should have been during the reconsideration application in 2004/2005
s) Pg 296 Losier “Yeah, I repeat those facts when I say the facts listed between – my material facts are listed between 36 to 142.” Lofchik “That doesn’t count for very much, does it?” Losier “Well, it’s dated, it’s logical, it’s by date order. And I also pleaded in paragraph 23, the first statement of claim 45.
***Here Lofchik ignores paras 36 to 142 written same as case of Hunt v. Carry as to the invents and list the who, what, when, where and how particulars
Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC
Court Transcript:
t) Pg 323 Lofchik “Same thing. That’s a complaint against the process. What I’m asking, what I’m looking for is facts pleaded wherein these employees, facts that support an allegation of misfeasance in public office” Losier “Well, 32, Your Honour, I do list the material facts listed at 36 to 142. If you’d like we can go through those facts.” Lofchik “Well, yeah, but…” Losier “They include the two sexual harassment complaints, they include my termination…” Lofchik “All right. No, no, 32 I have and I think it’s all in a nutshell. Really your complaint is the last sentence, I think, on that first paragraph, I have that, that they violate your Charter rights because of misfeasance by providing sham investigation, et cetera.” Losier “Yeah” Lofchik “I have that.”
***In pleading stage I only have to plead that their behaviour was deliberate which per Lofchik’s comment here is sufficient to not dismiss the Crown defendants’ from this suit
u) Pg 564 Losier “So there may be a statute for the Minister of the Attorney General.” Lofchik “Well, the onus is on you to find it.”
***The onus is on the Crown and Lofchik to apply the law properly particularly when faced with litigants who are unrepresented and have not gone to law school otherwise the Minister of AG has created an unequal justice system to take advantage of us who cant afford lawyers particularly when we sue the Minister of AG
v) Pg 571 Lofchik “All right. So maybe the way we’ll have to deal with this is I’ll render my decision in this case. And I am going to order that the statement of claim be amended to comply with the rules. But I am – I still don’t see any harm in doing it twice. One step at a time. Let’s get this part right.”
***Error the Crown defendants are joint tortefeasors per defamation and conspiracy tort law so makes no sence to separate the rule 21 motions for the Crown from the employer defendants particularly when allowing me to amend claim for employer defendants not crown!
w) Pg 578-579 J Lofchik ignored the Constitutional tort in his endorsement: Losier “Well, the legislation, I agree, but the constitutional torts against the staff is not just because of the legislation; it’s because of the conduct of those staff.” Losier “That I am being discriminated against.” Lofchik “Well, and that’s part of your claim for damages here.” “I understand that.” Lofchik “And the other road is a claim for damages for people acting for the Commission under the statute as it exists. It’s got nothing to do with the wording of the statute or anything. Your complaint is their actions…” Lofchik “…are discriminatory, no matter how the statute is written.”
***Lofchik admits my claims for tort of constitution here as pleaded sufficiently for trial yet dismisses the Crown defendants and in his endorsement record no analysis at all of this tort!
x) Pg 581 Losier “Same set of facts.” Lofchik “Well, same facts but maybe different liabilities and different responsibilities.” Losier “Yeah, so then there are facts.”
y) Pg 586-90 JL acting as trier of fact again Lofchik “The fabrication of incompetency. The fabrication…” Lofchik “Well, again, it’s – the facts are – they make a comment that you disagree with, and therefore, you say ‘because I don’t agree with what they said, that must be fabricated.’” Losier “They’re not allowed to fabricate.” Lofchik “No, they’re not allowed to fabricate…” Lofchik “…to make some evaluation of the evidence.” Lofchik “And my point is that other than the fact that you disagree with what they said, what facts are there to show that those are fabricated? Number one, it could be a mistake, they misapprehended the evidence.” Losier “The allegations of incompetency is a fabrication. I’ve provided you evidence with the defendant’s Mackay’s statement of defence where they’re not using those same allegations, disarray of books…”
Losier ”If it was not a fabrication, it would have been in Mackay’s statement of defence, plus their affidavit of documents that I’ve already received with absolutely no documents relied upon for those disarray of books to prove allegations of incompetency. So to me, the whole…” Lofchik “But could that not be something as simple as someone from the Commission going to Mackay’s and being told, ‘Look at this, this place is a mess. Her workplace was a mess. She wasn’t doing her job.’ The Commission person accepts that. It might be wrong, it might even be a lie. But does that make it a fabrication on the part of the Commission person?” Losier “That’s the issue here. We need – and I have a right to a trial to decide that. Not through a Rule 21 motion. We’re arguing items here that I feel that are for the trial judge to decide.” Losier “And it can be proven.” Lofchik “And you heard arguments yesterday to say, well, no, you don’t accept those allegations as true. That’s something I’m going to have to analyze.” Losier “The other argument that I have, too, is some of those after-the-fact arguments were not in Mackay’s rebuttal to the Commission, the original rebuttal. Therefore, it’s quite possibly that they didn’t interview anybody, I mean, because that’s just right now he said/she said, Mrs. Meadows-Lee saying that, “Yeah, we interviewed those people.” There’s no corroborating evidence to say that they actually did interview those people.” Lofchik “…to decide what it takes for an allegation in a statement of claim to be accepted at face value. That’s really what it comes down to.
Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC
Court Transcript:
z) Pg 604 evidence of favouring Crown per endoresment record alleging my claim is abuse of process when in court J Lofchik said: Losier “But she’s lumping all these other torts as well, it can only be through a judicial review.” Losier “And that’s not the correct jurisdiction for these courts. And I’ve given you factums, in my factum arguments.” Lofchik “I don’t need to go there. I accept your submission that…” Lofchik “…if you’re seeking damages for torts…” Lofchik “..it’s in a proceeding such as this and not judicial review. You don’t have to argue that.”
***Lofchik’s endorsement reasoning to dismiss was abuse of process that this claim was the same as the Judicial Review when the Crown were not respondants in the JUdicial REview
aa) Pg 615-19 J Lofchik acting as trier of fact again: Losier “It mentions here, “It’s no longer sufficient to make bald allegations of malice in the statement of claim. The extension of this rule is consistent with its purpose.” And then it says something here that it is important to allege to the wrongdoer, to be able to understand what is to the wrongdoer, to be able to understand what is alleged of him and her with precision and be placed in a position that allows a response. Well, fabrication of insufficient evidence in the case analysis…” Losier “…does fit that.” “…it’s still an allegation of…” “Fact. That my fact differs from their fact, that they didn’t fabricate.” Lofchik “Well, I guess that’s the issue, or is it a conclusion? Because you disagree with what they find, you say it’s a fabrication.” Losier “Then they’re facts in there is also a conclusion. Because they say that’s the truth.” Lofchik “Well, no, there’s no question they draw conclusions. But all I’m saying is there’s a distinction between an erroneous conclusion made in the course of doing whatever they do and deliberately fabricating. And you use this term, what is it, fabrication of lack of evidence?” Losier “Insufficient evidence.” Lofchik “Yeah. But fabricate, when I think of fabricate in the terms of evidence, I think of somebody making up evidence.” Losier “Exactly.” Lofchik “Well, what evidence have they made up?” Losier “They made up the incompetency allegations, the after-the-fact incompetency allegations. We went through that on the other day.” Lofchik “Well, that’s not – but that’s not fabrication of insufficient evidence. That’s fabrication of – that’s, in effect…” Losier “It’s tied into – the full case analysis, at the end of it, it says, “insufficient evidence of discrimination of reprisal of sexual harassment.” “Whatever you say is fabricated.” “The after-the-fact incompetency allegations that are in the case analysis…” “And most of them is the disarray of books…” “…that was not written in the original MMP rebuttal and is not in their defence, not in my termination statement.” Lofchik “So you’re saying since they don’t raise it in their defence, she couldn’t have been told that in her investigation? That’s your position?” Losier “So for the purpose of pleadings, it’s whether a defendant can properly defend themselves and according to those pleadings, it is quite easy for the defendant, Ms. Rue (ph) and Ms. Waik to properly defend, basically saying, ‘We didn’t fabricate.” Lofchik “Well, I would – that’s going to have to be re-written anyway, even if I agree with me.” Lofchik “I mean, it seems to me the reasonable way to deal with that is that Ms. Meadows – is it Meadows-lee – says in her report, stated that she was told this, this and this by the Defendants, when in fact she was not told this, this and this and that she fabricated those facts. Nowhere succintly does your pleading set that out. I suppose if we pick through it, we can ultimately find those bits and pieces and put them together, but it’s not very well put, let’s put it that way, even if it’s sustainable.” Losier “Yeah, but my argument is that I’m deficient in writing.” Lofchik “Oh well, yeah, I appreaciate that. All I’m saying is that it’s going to have to be rewritten anyway.” Losier “yep, yep. And I have no argument.” Losier “And you’re – you say you should have the opportunity to re-write it, as long as the bare bones are there.” (HVK allows for rambling deficiencies of bits and pieces!)
***Ruckpaul HR Cases and Botiuk SCC on defamation clearly shows that the investigation staff cannot provide the type of investigation that Justice Lofchik is arguing that Crown is allowed to provide complainants in this motion!
bb) Pg 620 evidence J Lofchik did not read the statement of claim paragraphs 36 to 140 which can be read by all: Losier “The concealment of evidence is the concealment of the material facts in the statement listed.” There’s where the material facts are, point 36 to 140 total.” Lofchik “Okay, Well, I can tell you that when you re-write this pleading, you should set out those specific facts because anybody who’s reading this statement of claim isn’t going to have 36 to 42 in front of them, so they have no idea what you’re talking about.”
***Anyone reading my claim as paras 1 to 142 in front of them and can read #36 to 42(s/b 142)!
cc) Pg 754 Lofchik “Now, as I understand, this last argument is, well, there are relevant facts that might be made by way of amendment. I think the argument should be more focused on the issue of facts supporting the allegation of breach of statutory duty, because it seems to me that becomes the crux of the claim against the Human Rights Commissioner.” (HVK and Deep allows for amendments)
dd) Pg 754 J Lofchik’s arguments on discretion not based on law but him making it up (I query) and refusal to provide me with his case law breaching natural justice again as I have a right to defend/argue against his law authority (as a given), and lack of resources argument not sufficient per SCC: Lofchik “Obviously they have a discretion…” LOfchik “…in the way they carry out their duties.” Lofchik “The fact that there are – how shall I put this – I guess I can’t put it any other way – the fact that there are facts supporting your claim that may or may not have been investigated as thoroughly as you wish might very well have much to do with the claim against the other employers, and whether there are sufficient facts pleaded to maintain the claims against them.” Lofchik “Now, there’s a duty ot investigate. However, there’s a great deal of discretion on how an investigation is carried out. And I query whether there’s a statutory duty to investigate every lead, every fact, every aspect of every complaint.”
I request these authorities and J Lofchik responds “Well, I can tell you, I’m taking that as a given, based on all kinds of case law that says that there’s a great discretion on the way they carry out their investigation; and indeed whether they recommend that any particular case go the Tribunal.”
***This is breach of natural justice as I have a right to these case laws that Lofchik is basing his decision on to read them and make sure they are accurate and not Lofchik making up the law to protect the Minister of AG and Crown defendants!
Lofchik “They also have a discretion as to, ‘We only have so many resources and we can only pursue so many complaints, and therefore, we pick and choose the ones that we’re going to recommend and send to the Commission.”
***Discretion is per the Code section 36, 27, 29, preamble “everyone in Ontario is equal”, and it is broadly per complainants point of view and narrowly per Crown’s discretion which I found out after this Rule 21
ee) Pg 757 accepting uncorroborated he said she said evidence is breach of statutory duty J Lofchik’s response Lofchik “Okay; that can be said in one sentence. Let’s carry on.” Lofchik “All right; but here’s the point: rather than going through all of the facts that you say weren’t properly investigated, et cetera, if your point is the breach of statutory duty here is failing to follow up every fact and accepting some evidence as uncorroborated, that can be said in, as I say, a sentence or two, rather than going through your whole statement of claim pointing out instances where that happened.”
***Lofchik refusing me right to show him the facts in claim so that he can write in his endorsement there are no facts pleaded to dismiss crown defendants
ff) Pg 758 Lochik “Well, you’ve pleaded lots of facts.” Lofchik “But the issue is, a lot of those facts relate to your alleged complaints against the former employers and their employees. And the issue then becomes, how does that relate to the claim against the Human Rights Commission? And you’ve in one sentence really, it seems to me, dealt with that, unless there are other issues. And that is, failure to follow up all of these facts, or to merely accept the evidence of statement of people by – and without further investigation, is what you say is the breach of statutory duty.” Lofchik “I mean, I know you’ve pleaded lots of facts here. And if the basis of your complaint against the Commission is merely accepting people’s statements as to the truth or untruth of your allegations with respect to those facts, if that’s what you say is breach of statutory duty, that seems to me is dealt with in that part of the argument.”
***LOfchik’s endorsement analysis that complainant’s do not have right to suit for how the Crown did their job based on internal reports which is contradicted by tort case law particularly Botiuk defamation SCC case and Roncarreli Misfeasance of public office case
Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC
Court Transcript:
gg) Pg 759 J. Lofchik “…haven’t said in your statement of claim is – you say, ‘Well they didn’t talk to everybody.’ What you don’t say is, ‘If they’d talked to Sam he would’ve said something else.” “The suggestion is that there’s somebody out there who might have given evidence or information contrary to what was told to the investigator.” Losier “I said it right here on paragraph – page 77-61” “If they had spoken to Les directly…”
***Evidence Justice Lofchik did not read my statement of claim and is making things up
hh) Pg 760 Tony Millington’s address to Claude J. Lofchik’s response “But he may not have said that” ***is favouring the Crown and JL acting as trier of fact in a rule 21 motion not allowed
ii) Pg 761-4 J. Lofchik “What I said was, that there have been facts pleaded with respect to the alleged harassment and incidents involving former employers and their employees.” J. Lofchik “And what I tried to suggest is, point me at the pleadings of facts that support, you say support your allegation of breach of statutory duty.” J. Lofchik “And now you’ve said to me in your argument that failure to carry a balanced, out a balanced investigation by not interviewing witnesses who you think maybe would’ve been favourable to you is part of the breach of the statutory duty. That’s what I take from what we’ve just been talking about.” Losier “Yes, not one witness.” Losier “They only interviewed me. Okay; so that was paragraph 21. Then my friend went to paragraph 24 – oh, I should maybe just go back to 21.” Losier “…image perception because Shannon Meadows-Lee worked on the next two employers case analysis showing I started…” Losier “And then I state clearly where the breach of statutory duty is. Shannon Meadows-Lee on behalf of the OHR – in her own words demonstrates image perception of perceived impairment at 30. It appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position.” Losier “That is a fact, a statement made; that is the what. And the where is that the Commission, in the case analysis, that is a breach of statutory duty – ‘cause this here is defamation. That’s not it in complete detail, but we’d have to actually look at the copy of the case analysis. But I’ve written it in several paragraphs that particular phrase that was in the case analysis.” Losier “The Commission and any members of the justice system do not have the right per discretion to libel people. And then I go on to say that this is imaging behaviour, because Shannon Meadows-Lee worked on the next two employers case analysis showing that Xentel and Lyman – showing I started part-time position on January 10th, 2003 – incompetiency issues to do with sales not accounting – or alleged incompetency – and a full-time position on February 10, 2003, no incompetency issues.” Losier “I worked at two places of employment, full-time and a part-time job, showing I was fully capable of handling the position had I gone back to MMP. And I had previously stated that this particular argument is what my friend here calls speculation and conclusion, which Ms. Meadows-Lee cannot prove because I never returned back to MMP.” Losier “But I can prove, as a basis for breach of statutory duty, collusion, defamation, libel, tort of deceit and misfeasance of public office, abuse of discretion. They did not have the right to fabricate facts or make libel statements.” Losier “And I also noted at the bottom half here of this paragraph 21, also the statement at 30 alone represents discrimination by the Ontairo Human Rights Commission of a perceived disability which leads to refusal of doing their statutory duty – there’s the breach – of proper investigating the facts and evidence that led to the decision to refuse referring my prima facie complaint to the tribunal.”
***Ruckpaul Human Rights Case clearly shows how Commissions are to do a proper investigation of all the facts!
jj) Pg 771-777 the following represents J. Lofchik overstepping his boundary and acting as trier of fact: “Might I suggest, that rather than go through all that – in a nutshell, your position is, I have pleaded facts that justifies my claim against the employers. These were facts that I made known to the investigators for the Commission. They didn’t properly investigate them. That’s really where you’re at, isn’t it?” Losier “Not just that they did not properly investigate them, Your Honour, they fabricated.” J. Lofchik “Well, I suppose that’s arguable, in the sense that they told by some of your former employers that you weren’t doing the job, and they accepted that at face value without investigating it further.” Losier “No, Your Honour” J. Lofchik “You mean, they just made it up out of the blue?” Losier “Yes, Your Honour.” Losier “The facts in my statement of claim says that the employer allegedly told the Commission.” Losier “But the facts also show in my statement of claim that the employer gave me three defence statements for this suit with absolutely no same allegations…
”…that the Commission is stating is in the case analysis.” J. Lofchik “…doesn’t that still come down to what I just said, that there were allegations by the employers that they took at face value and they didn’t investigate them further. And that’s really an improper investigation.” Losier “Improper purpose” J. Lofchik “So, all I’m saying is, I don’t know whether we need to go through every paragraph of your statement of claim where you’re pointing to me where there are allegations against your former employers, and then setting out why you think that there was an improper investigation, or fabrication, whatever you want to call it.” J. Lofchik “Your position is set out in the nutshell that I put to you, I think. The facts that you plead with respect to the improper investigation are really the fact that there’s another side to the story which you plead in your statement of claim, which they didn’t investigate. Is that fair?” Losier “No” J. LOfchik “Well, you say “fabricating”, but they’re not – “fabricating” to me means there’s absolutely no evidence from anybody that they can either choose to accept or not accept, but that they’ve been making something up out of the blue.” J. Lofchik “I don’t see that as what comes out of your statement of claim. What I see comes out of the statement of claim is, there are statements being made which you say are untrue by the employer. So, maybe the employers are fabricating, and the investigators are accepting these things at face value without going behind them or testing the truth of those statements.” J. Lofchik “Now, that to me doesn’t mean that the investigator is fabricating, it just means that he’s maybe – or she – are accepting what you say is a fabrication by the employers.” J. Lofchik “And the fabrication on the part of the employers is part of your claim against them, which we’re not really dealing with here. We’re dealing with breach of statutory duty of the investigators. Whether it’s fabrication or not by the employers, misleading the investigators is for another day.” Losier “Not according to this argument that I presented Your Honour earlier by Dixon on page 55 of my factum. Their assessment requires the consideration by the jury of the entire conduct of the defendant prior to the publication…” J. Lofchik “Well, yeah, but that’s the test of what goes on at a jury trial, not the test of what an investigator is supposed to do.” Losier “My claim of breach of statutory duty, and to do with the facts of the incompetency, are also the tort of libel and defamation, therefore…” J. Lofchik “And I picked up on that” Losier “…therefore, it is the entire conduct continuing through to trial. Which includes my – the Crown defendants receiving statement of defence – three of them – from MacKay, MacKay, and Peters, with absolutely no allegations of these so-called incompetency facts that are written up in the case analysis…” J. Lofchik “All right; no, I picked up on that. Part of your claim is, again, there’s these allegations made which they’ve picked up on, haven’t properly investigated and then repeated in their report, which you say are libelous. That hasn’t escaped me.” Losier “No, no, you didn’t understand my point. My point is that, information has come to light to them of defence statements from MMP saying there was no allegations of incompetency.” Ms. K. “MMP’s legal positioning with respect to a statement of defence is not relevant in this matter.” J Lofchik “And that’s an unproven allegation, at best.” (same applies to Crown defendants alleged investigation that is unproven) J. Lofchik “I mean, that can be a situation where there was an allegation of incompetency,, it was repeated by the investigator; and now the people at MMP realize they’re out on a limb and decide to deny it in a statement of defence. That’s not proven that it wasn’t made.” Losier “But my argument is, Your Honour…” J. Lofchik “Well, your argument…” J. Lofchik “…that’s part…” J. Lofchik “…it was repeated…” Losier “…no, no, no, no, my argument is that for my statement of claim to continue on, that not only do I get to include that fact, but I also get to include the fact that that has become – made to light for the Crown defendants.” Losier “And according to laws and rules, that once new evidence has come into light, that some true statement was made false, then they are to do what is right, not just to continue the fabrication of the incompetency in this motion trial and in the appeal process.” Losier “And two of these defence statements were given to the Crown after the case analysis; and that includes all the way up to the Supreme Court.” J. Lofchik “But their statement’s in a statement of defence. That doesn’t…” Losier “That there was no incompetency…” J. Lofchik “…but that doesn’t mean they’re true, which I think is counsel’s point.” Losier “Yes, and that’s right. And it’s a matter of the trial judge, not a motion judge, to decide what is true.”
****J. Lofchik acting as trial judge in Rule 21 motion
***SCC case of Botium for defamation clearly shows that the Commission investigation staff being members of law are to properly investigate the facts and per Human Rights Case of Ruckpaul they are to investigate all the facts and all of the complainant’s witnesses:
“The Declaration and Report are by their terms inextricably interrelated. By their actions, the appellants become joint tortfeasors. Further, they, as lawyers, signed the Declaration without undertaking any investigation. For Lawyers to act in this way constituted reckless behaviour.”
***The Crown’s investigation of my 4 prima facie complaints under section 36 was reckless!
Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC
Court Transcript:
***The Crown’s investigation of my 4 prima facie complaints under section 36 was reckless!
Proof: $1.00 raise at 3 month probation and no warning written letter per Employment law means no incompetence – Crown ignores this fact which they are not allowed to do per Ruckpaul and Botiuk
kk) Pg 777-792 same as Botiuk case and therefore I have proper pleaded facts and cause of action against the Crown per J Lofchik’s comments of “Because your point is that, as I say, that they were accepted by investigators and repeated by investigators without properly being investigated and considered. Fine; I have that point.” J. Lofchik “Frankly, that could all be dealt with, in so far as the Commission is concerned, in a relatively short paragraph or two in the statement of claim. What you’re doing here is pleading evidence. And, as I indicated way back at the beginning, that’s not what a statement of claim is all about.” Losier “I’m pleading facts…” J. Lofchik “Well, you’re…” Losier “…the evidence are of physical documents.” J. Lofchik “But the facts you rely on so far as the Commission is concerned, is that they took statements from the employers at face value without properly investigating them; repeated them in their report; and some of those statements are libelous. As I say, that – in a statement of claim, that’s all that’s required. What you’re pleading, all this other stuff here is what you do at trial to prove those claims. And that’s why, as I indicated to you at the outset, this statement of claim has to go.”
***Per Justice Lofchik’s statement here in the transcript I pleaded sufficiently for tort of defamation then he writes up unconstitutional order to dismiss the Crown to protect them because the Minister of Attorney General superintends his office!
J. Lofchik “The only issue is whether the Commissioner stays in as a defendant or not, because it’s not a proper statement of claim.” J. Lofchik “Because the Commissioner obviously is vicariously liable for the staff.” J. Lofchik “Well, it’s the facts, it’s the facts with respect to the Commission, not the facts with respect to your other employers and the other defendants that are relevant to me here.”
***The facts of the employers are relevant to the Crown Defendants because it shows how they abused their job per tort of Misfeasance of Public Office allowed per Botiuk, Roncarreli, and other cases, and Justice Lofchik is making up the rules here
J. Lofchik “And I think that argument still is that, so far as the Commission is concerned, you haven’t pleaded – as I understand the argument, you haven’t pleaded facts to support the claim of collusion and breach of statutory duty.”
***I did plead facts, employer facts in all of my human rights complaints which the Crown were to proper investigate all facts per Human Rights Case law of Ruckpaul – here J. Lofchik is again making up the rule to ignore all my facts from employment in human rights complaints – this does not make any sense other then institutional bias to protect the Minister of Attorney General’s wrong doing at the Commission
J. Lofchik “You’ve pleaded lots of facts so far as what you say the other employers did and said, there’s no question about that.” Losier “Well, I have, according to my authorities in the law. Again, I’ll go – repeat Chahal and also Dixon; it’s the publication of libel continuing through to the conclusion of trial. “Libel includes those libelous statements by the defendant employers.” Losier “And the Crown.” J Lofchik “Yes.” J. Lofchik “If they’re repeated in the report.” J. Lofchik “Or if they make statements that you say are libelous. The issue then becomes, though, if they’re made in good faith, as opposed to – of an intent to, in effect, harm you…” J. Lofchik “…then they’re probably protected by their statutory duty. So, it really then comes back to, again, what are the facts that take them out of the realm of the …” J. Lofchik “Of good faith.” J. Lofchik “…protection of the statutory protection.”
***In Rule 21 all I have to do is plead it which I did not prove it here again J. Lofchik is acting as trier of fact to protect the Crown and Minister of Attorney General
Losier “And I have provided Your Honour with those arguments as well.” j. Lofchik “Well, you have; but I don’t know that you’ve done that this morning.”
Losier “Okay. According to Deep, paragraph 64 in the defendant’s authority book: Bad Faith is a legal conclusion. It has been held to involve an allegation of an intent to deceive or to make someone believe what is false.” Losier “So, this point at number 30 in the case analysis, this fact that the case – number 30 by Shannon Meadows-Lee…” Losier “It appears that even if the complainant returns with a decision after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position” Losier “This is a fact of behaviour of manipulating the case analysis to discredit the complainant. It has nothing to do with the defendants at MMP giving her any facts that she investigated, this is Shannon Meadows-Lee making a libelous, opinionated statement.” Losier “And that is sufficient evidence of bad faith.” J. Lofchik “All right. Well, we’ve already looked at that and you’ve made the argument.” Losier “Okay, I’m just – bad faith, it has been held to involve an allegation of intent to deceive to make someone believe what is false. This is Ms. Meadows-Lee – if she wrote that one statement, then I have the right to prove that all the other statements were an intent to deceive and were not investigated, were just her writing up comments. My pleadings of fabrication of insufficient evidence, incompetency and sham investigation to image the truth is that allegation of an intent to deceive or make someone believe what is false by the Crown defendants that led to the following believe what is false solely by – as being Crown staff – and nothing else.” Losier “Mr. Norton and judges in the appeal courts have now attempted to make Justice Lofchik believe what is false by dismissing my claims against them. Where a plaintiff claims – includes an allegation of bad faith, the pleading must support sufficient particulars that support a legal conclusion of bad faith.” Losier “That particular statement, plus the incompetency allegation, is an example of bad faith. My pleadings of bad faith – and I’m getting to it – termination letter by MMP – okay, my pleadings of bad faith temination by MMP defendants warning the Wallace damage – and I won’t go through that case ‘cause Your Honour said that you’re very familiar with Wallace damages.” Losier “Is sufficient per the Supreme Court case of Wallace v. United Grain Growers that the Crown defendants by association ignoring the legal doctrine of bad faith for the employer in Wallace case, where an employer must be honest at the time of termination as to the reason for termination to the employee and by changing their reason for cause have demonstrated beyond bad faith, particularly when their defence statement after the – their defence statement after the date of the fabricated Human Rights case analysis dated December 2004 does not use the defence of incompetence that they have – and they’re co-conspirators with the Crown defendants – are using in the Human Rights jurisdiction. These facts are sufficiently pleaded.” Losier “Page 88 – these are relevant facts against the Crown as well as MMP.” Losier “it is my paragraph 107. On or about January 29th, 2003, I received a courier at my home – a termination letter signed by Mrs. Page stating cause to be: We have received and reviewed the report from Workplace Safety and Insurance Board that does not substantiate your allegation. The employment standard claim for overime hours was in process and not decided upon as of January 20th, 2003 termination letter. I went on sick leave August 14th; I was terminated on January 20th, sufficient time for the defendants to put in their statement of claim (s/b termination letter) all the allegations of incompetency that are in the case analysis – this is relevant. This is relevant also to the tort – or the bad faith intent to deceive or make someone believe what is false. According to Wallace, at the time of termination, the employer is to be honest – reason of termination to the employee, and changing the reason for cause have demonstrated beyond doubt particularly when their defense statement – after the date of the fabricated case analysis dated summer 2004 does not have the defence of incompetency that they and their conspiractors – the Crown defendants – are using in the Human Rights jurisdiction. These two facs are sufficiently pleaded. These two facts are relevant to all of the torts against the Crown as the defendants; as well as the principle of bad faith. The Crown accepting MMP’s bad faith termination reason, ignoring the Supreme Court case, are demonstrating their bad faith, and these facts have been pleaded numerous times in a sufficient particularity. Other examples of bad faith are: the particulars need to be added, as the Crown defendants accepting Mrs. Page’s uncorroborated he said-she said witness statement, when she has demonstred bad faith per termination reasons in the Wallace case legal doctrine.”
Ms. K “Your Honour, again we’re getting into an area where Ms. Losier claims to want to add facts, as opposed to describing what is contained in the existing pleading which we’re dealing with today” (KRP & Deep has rebuttal allowed to add facts if supports cause of action) Losier “Yes; and they’re relevant to the bad faith argument. And if I have a cause of action with these other particulars, then I have the right to amend my statement of claim. And the reason why I didn’t add them, because I had no legal knowledge or training. Had I had that legal knowledge and training – how to write a proper statement of claim – they would’ve been included.”
J. Lofchik “Well, that argument only gets you so far. Ultimately, I still look at the statement of claim to see whether it discloses a cause of action. Now, I hear what you’re saying and I’ll take that into consideration. Let’s just get on with it.”
***Another error by Justice Lofchik per Rule 21 litigants with no law training and are unrepresented have a right to amend their pleadings otherwise we have lawyers taking advantage and creating an equal justice system for all Canadians and this is unconstitutional
Losier “Another example of bad faith, only interviewing respondent’s witnesses, two persons who did not work with me at the time of employment, and no witness for the plaintiff.” J. Lofchik “I thought from our earlier discussions I made it clear to you that I understand that’s part of your claim.”
Losier “But I didn’t make that in reference to bad faith.” Losier “That’s why I’m, I’m dealing with right now bad faith.” Losier “And it’s relevant to that.
***Here J. Jofchik agrees that I pleaded this fact and it is sufficient for the torts pleaded per Human Rights case of Ruckpaul and Botiuk Supreme Court of Canada case for defamation
Losier “As well as not interviewing any of my witnesses, because that demonstrates bias, unbalanced investigation and part of the fabrication of insufficient evidence by controlling the – or the plaintiff’s witnesses which also form a – there’s also a form of concealing evidence by not interviewing anybody; which to me are all a part of my allegations of bad faith conduct. Again, that definition is, an attempt to deceive or make someone else believe what is false.” Losier “In the ’05 matter, it’s fabricating insufficient evidence of sexual harassment when the Commission staff did not interview any of the sexual harassers; plus, left out of the case analysis validated and corroborated sexual harassment and internal complaints validated by Xentel and Lyman in their rebuttals to the Commission. All of my allegations that they validated; and with Lyman there were several. This too represents bad faith, an attempt to deceive or make someone believer what is false.”
***Ruckpaul Judicial Review case clearly shows these facts I pleaded above to be improper investigation and the Crown to carry on that they have discretion to behave like this from 2004 till now 2010 is a show of recklessness and absolute power corrupts and no auditing of the Minister of Attorney General and his departments Commission and Justice System:
“She failed to interview the applicant nor any of her witnesses. The Commission
realized this was a flaw and asked the investigator to interview the applicant’s
witnesses.”
“Furthermore, two supplemental witness statements, dated February 15 and 16,
2001, from CIC’s main witnesses in response to questions put by the investigator to
CIC were not disclosed.”
“Ms. Huneault made a clear statement concerning one of the grounds upon which
the applicant based her discrimination and harassment claims. However, the
investigator failed to address this issue any further in his report. This omission
might constitute a “fundamental” omission.”
ll) Pg 792-3 Losier “And according to this case of Chahal, it’s a meeting; so therefore, if there really was an investigation, that is where the collusion between MMP and the Crown comes in: to orchestrate those facts of incompetency during the Human Rights process; to orchestrate injurious falsehoods of gross incompetency – because it wasn’t – it wasn’t before the Human Rights process that they came out and not after are they coming out – by fabricating facts during the employment and after employment, refusing to provide the plaintiff with the specific evidence of these allegations – such as the disarray of books – both in the Human Rights process and in MMP’s affidavit of documents and the Crown’s affidavit of documents; ignoring the dollar raise, a fact that’s in my statement of claim; termination letter for cause of WSIB denying non-incompetency to avoid referral to the tribunal.” J. Lofchik “I think you should move on…”
***J. Lofchik refusing to acknowledge these facts sufficient for claim for damages against the Crown
Losier “But I’m just responding to the Crown’s allegations that there is bald allegation and no facts.” J. Lofchik “Well, yeah, but you’ve done that before too.” Losier “There are facts. And I want to make sure that Your Honour is aware of them, and how they’re meant to be read per the allegations.” J. Lofchik “Yes, all right; I have your point.”
mm) pg 817 tort of conspiracy J. Lofchik “Well, I don’t doubt that you pleaded facts with respect to that issue; so just carry on.”
***J. Lofchik’s endorsement record ignores this comment that I pleaded facts to that issue to dismiss the Crown Defendants
mn) Pg 823 J Lofchik’s argument re: tort of libel is not based on any law as he refuse to give me his authorities and is a breach of natural justice not allowing me to review his authorities to defend my claim:
J. Lofchik “If the investigator is under a duty to report – a legal duty to report, then query whether that doesn’t raise an issue of qualified privilege on the part of the investigator” and
J. Lofchik “But if the report is solely internal within the Commission under a duty to report, then query that’s
considered to be a publication of the libel.”
***J. Lofchik again making up the law not based on defamation law ignoring my arguments that internal docuements sufficient based on Supreme Court of Canada case law of Botiuk for defamation, and for tort of deceit:
“In the leading case on the tort of deceit Derry v. Peek, the deceit was contained in a company’s written prospectus”
“all those who participated in or were responsible for the original publication and its distribution must be joined as joint tortfeasors in the original cause of action.”
mm) Pg 824 J Lofchik’s argument re: tort of libel is not based on any law as he refuse to give me his authorities and is a breach of natural justice not allowing me to review his authorities to defend my claim:
J. Lofchik “Well, I suppose what I’m saying is, I’m not sure that this is a totally accurate statement of the law” and I request a copy of what is he responds with “I’m sure I do somewhere, but not here today, Carry on.” (he never provided me with his copy of law)
nn) Pg 828 tort of libel on joint tortfeasors J. Lofchik’s comment making up the rules again “All right; that’s trite law, we don’t need to get into that. I mean you’re just repeating what you said before.” Losier “Well, no, this is back to the reading of that other one whether – it it’s reproduced, who is responsible for it. So, here it’s saying each time defamatory material is communicated to a new person, it is a fresh and actionable defamation.” J Lofchik “There’s no quarrel with that.”
***fact of incompetence written in case analysis, each time a defamatory material is communicated to a new person, it is a fresh actionable defamation – and J. Lofchik’s ignores this law and fact and dismisses the Crown
oo) Pg 846 J. Lofchik “All right; so your point is what? That departure from the standards is an infliction of …” Losier “Emotional Distress” J. Lofchik “All right I have your point.”
pp) Pg 856 J Lofchik making up the rules again re: SCC’s decision HR as high as UN treaty: J. Lofchik “I understand your position to be, he wasn’t doing it in compliance with the Human Rights Code – or they weren’t doing it in compliance with the Code, they were deviating from the duties under the Code, and that’s what caused the mental suffering.” J. Lofchik “If that’s the case, then I don’t think we need to get into all this Human Rights – United Nations stuff, because I’m presuming that the Code is valid legislation for the purpose of this lawsuit.” Losier “My reference to this is the overt statement which I argued yesterday, which is at number 30 in the MMP case…” Losier “…is not allowed, per discretion, to make a libelous and discriminatory statement that I was unfit to work opinion by…” J. Lofchik “Well, all right…” Losier “…the investigation statement.” J. Lofchik “…I understand – all right, I take that point.” J. Lofchik “I still don’t know where the United Nations Treaties on Human Rights and all that comes into play with respect to that. But…” Losier “…per the United Nations Treaty, it says to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practice which constitute discrimination against women. That includes these discriminatory comments by a Commission staff. And…” J. Lofchik “All right; I have that point.” Losier “…there’s also – the United Nations also refers to that it is against – that I can have a Human Rights complaint or suit against any person, any organization, any enterprise. That includes the Crown, there is no immunity. That’s how it relates…” J. Lofchik “Well, all right, I don’t think United Nations Charters overrule Canadian law; so, let’s get on with it.”
Losier ”Well, the Supreme Court says that it does.” J. Lofchik “Well, that’s not how I read it.”
***Again Justice Lofchik making up the law and ignoring Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Slaight Communications Inc case of the following which clearly states the Charter as high as International treaty:
“As was said in Oakes, supra, at p.136, among the underlying values essential to our free and democratic society are “the inherent dignity of the human person” and “commitment to social justice and equality”. Especially in light of Canada’s
ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), and commitment therein to protect, inter alia, the right to work in
its various dimensions found in Article 6 of that treaty, it cannot be doubted that the objective in this case is a very important one. In Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), supra, I had occasion to say at p. 349: The content of Canada’s international human rights obligations is, in my view, an
important indicia of the meaning of the “full benefit of the Charter’s protection”.
I believe that the Charter should generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human rights
documents which Canada has ratified.”
***Justice Lofchik’s arguments in court is evidence that the Minister of Attorney General and Queen’s Park are not fullfilling their obligation to the United Nations Treaty and our Charter as they are to educate judges like Lofchik of the correct human rights law to eliminate the Crown’s discriminatory attitude towards human rights complainants, practices, rules and laws
Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC
Court Transcript:
qq) Pg 862 J. Lofchik “And so, as far as the statement of claim in respect of your claim for damages – that is, your claim you were harmed by these actions – as far as that’s concerned, I’m satisfied that there’s pleading in there to that effect.” J. Lofchik
“Because I’m content that you’ve pleaded in your statement of claim that the actions of the defendant caused you emotional harm. And that’s all this is dealing with.”
***Therefore per this comment in court left out of Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record I have pleaded a cause of action and his dismissal order is for improper purpose to protect the Minister of Attorney General
rr) Pg 888 Losier “And also my friend here, the Crown made submissions that – earlier that it was her versions of facts – or her version of events was the actual words she used – which events are facts – and therefore admitting I have pleaded facts. And that her version of events are the material issue in dispute.” J. Lofchik “Right” Losier “Your Honour’s discretion in this Rule 21 is to – not to decide the question of fact motive which prompted the Commission staff to act – being to write deceitful facts in case analysis based on uncorroborated he said-she said evidence…” J. Lofchik “No, my job is to decide wheter the statement of claim…” J. Lofchik “…pleads sufficient material facts to establish the basis of a cause of action in a claim. That’s my job.” Losier “And in my factum I had also pleaded at page 43, paragraph 59, that ommissions were done in bad faith.”
J. Lofchik “Yes” Losier “or by unlawful means.” Losier
“Unlawful means also includes accepting uncorroborated he said-she said evidence by respondents. Which is collusion, a one-sided investigation, per my facts, stated facts.”
***And per Ruckpaul Judicial Review Human Rights Case law:
“its duty is to decide if, under the provisions of the Act, an inquiry is warranted having regard to all the facts.”
“an investigation had to be at least thorough and neutral for the Commission to have a fair basis on which to evaluate”
“that where the completeness of the investigation or report is challenged, the
underlying investigation documents are relevant and subject to production”
“If the investigation is flawed to the point where a court can reasonably conclude
the evidence reported by the investigator is incomplete or inadequate, the court
must intervene.”
“She failed to interview the applicant nor any of her witnesses. The Commission
realized this was a flaw and asked the investigator to interview the applicant’s
witnesses.”
“Furthermore, two supplemental witness statements, dated February 15 and 16,
2001, from CIC’s main witnesses in response to questions put by the investigator to
CIC were not disclosed.”
“Ms. Huneault made a clear statement concerning one of the grounds upon which
the applicant based her discrimination and harassment claims. However, the
investigator failed to address this issue any further in his report. This omission
might constitute a “fundamental” omission.”
***Another rule made up by Justice Lofchik is that the Crown has a “broad” discretion which is not so per the Annotated Human Rights Code book which he never bothered to refer to in court or in his endorsement record:
“Rights should be interpreted broadly and legislated exceptions to the exercise of these rights should be interpreted narrowly.”
The 2005 and 2009 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, pgs 1, 2, 3, 140, and 201, Book of Authorities, Tab 2
Therefore Human Rights complainants’ rights are to be broadly applied and the Crown’s discretion narrowly applied!
Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC
Court Transcript:
Mr. Norton and the Ontario Human Rights Commission and Minister of Attorney General through Judicial Review and Appeal Court in 2005 to 2006 have denied my rights to see their investigation evidence. It is my position this refusal is because there was no investigation only imaging an investigation. Anyone can write up the case analysis reports that Shannon wrote up by picking facts here and there in the complain and rebuttal. The Ruckpaul Judicial Review case has paragraph where the Commission in that matter notice a flaw and immediately tried to rectify it. THis is not the case with the ONtario Human Rights Commission who continued one wrong doing after another. So Justice Lofchik’s arguments for negligence doing their job does not stand as they are continuing the wrong doing into trial and now this motion order dismissing the Crown from suit.
Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC
Court Transcript:
MMP and Xentel DM Incorporated defamation is incompentency allegations that the Crown defendants approved and repeated in case analysis, section 37 report, and Appeals which per Supreme Court of Canada in Hill is all libelous defamation when per MMP $1.00 raise at 3 month probation and Xentel Termination with severance pay means there was no incompetency:
“The so-called “single publication rule” does not apply to concurrent tortfeasors, who can be defined as persons whose torts concur, or run together, to produce the same damage.”
“three instances: agency, vicarious liability, and concerted action.”
“As set out in Hill, supra, “if one person writes a libel, another repeats it, and a third approves what is written, they all have made the defamatory libel.”
“The Declaration and Report are by their terms inextricably interrelated. By their actions, the appellants become joint tortfeasors. Further, they, as lawyers, signed the Declaration without undertaking any investigation. For Lawyers to act in this way constituted reckless behaviour.”
***For investigators and Minister of Attorney General to ignore facts of a raise and severance pay when they are members of the law society is reckless behaviour!
Botiuk v. Toronto Free Press Publications Ltd. 1995, 126 D.L.R. (4th), paras 38, 39, 42, 43, 47, 48, 53, 61, 62, 69, 73, 74, 76-80, 98, 99, 103, Book of Authorities, Tab 1
Ontario Court of Appeal C50990 September 22nd 2010 update
posted on Saturday, May 1st 2010
July 8th, 2010
Court of Appeal For Ontario
Osgood Hall
130 Queen Street West
Toronto, Ontario
M5H 2N5
Attn.: Sandra Leal
File: C50990 – Losier v. MMP Limited et al (appeal against the Crown Defendants
only) ? Appeal date September 22nd 2010
Fax: 416-327-6256
Dear Ms. Leal,
Per our conversation the other day I am sending you my fax request for Motion by Conference to List Judge for more time for oral arguments as per my factum certificate approximately 20 hours is required to appeal an 8 day Rule 21 Motion hearing by Justice Lofchik.
Your standard letter only gives 20 minutes and is insufficient time for an unrepresented appellant with no law school training to appeal an 8 day Rule 21 Motion Hearing with more than one issue to be discussed: discretion without authority of the Code, no immunity and loss of jurisdiction, the correct plain and obvious rule 21 test, Human Rights Employer complaints and case analysis facts pleaded sufficient for particularity in pleadings for all intentional torts pleaded, court transcript, no negligence tort pleaded, Minister of Attorney General can be sued in his own right without vicarious liability legal doctrine, and then the six intentional torts pleaded in claim.
This standard time of 20 minutes barely gives me time to plead part IV the issues and law and maybe paragraph #6 in my factum particularly if the judges interrupt and ask questions, and 20 minutes seriously disadvantages my appeal. I respectfully request more time per my factum certificate. My position is that 20 minutes is prejudicial to my appeal, unconstitutional, and favours the Crown Respondents particularly the Minister of Attorney General who superintends all judicial offices in Ontario.
I look forward to hearing from you. Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated.
Sincerely,
Ms. Claudette Losier
Copy: Maria Kotsopoulos Fax: 416-593-5437
My Appeal C50990 includes the Crown applying the Code fraudulantly with the positive misrepresentation being the Code’s preamble and purpose that “Everyone In Ontario Is Equal” with measures to codify per stare decisis of section 5 to 10 of the code being completely ignored by the Crown’s Human Rights process in both jurisdicition human rights and … See Morejudicially. My appeal includes the Crown acting without authority of the Code applying section 34 (no investigation) alleged rules of discretion to dismissed 4 complaints under section 36 (investigation) prima facie complaints made out without investigating any of complainant’s witnesses. My Appeal has been set for September 22nd in Toronto allowing insufficient time of 20 minutes to argue 8 day Rule 21 Unconstitutional Motion order that includes judge refusing to abide by the UN Treaty and you can read my factum arguments for Women’s Human Rights at:Gender Equality : Canada slips from 14th to 18th place ” Politics’n’PoetryComment by Claudette Losier ? November 9, 2007 @ 10:04 pm | Reply … THE APPELLANT, CLAUDETTE LOSIER, APPEALS to the Court of Appeal of Ontario from … politicsnpoetry.wordpress.com/2007/11/08/gender-equality-canada-sli… – 211k – CachedThank you for your support
July 8th, 2010
Court of Appeal For Ontario
Osgood Hall
130 Queen Street West
Toronto, Ontario
M5H 2N5
Attn.: Sandra Leal
File: C50990 – Losier v. MMP Limited et al (appeal against the Crown Defendants
only) – Appeal date September 22nd 2010
Fax: 416-327-6256
Dear Ms. Leal,
Per our conversation the other day I am sending you my fax request for Motion by Conference to List Judge for more time for oral arguments as per my factum certificate approximately 20 hours is required to appeal an 8 day Rule 21 Motion hearing by Justice Lofchik.
Your standard letter only gives 20 minutes and is insufficient time for an unrepresented appellant with no law school training to appeal an 8 day Rule 21 Motion Hearing with more than one issue to be discussed: discretion without authority of the Code, no immunity and loss of jurisdiction, the correct plain and obvious rule 21 test, Human Rights Employer complaints and case analysis facts pleaded sufficient for particularity in pleadings for all intentional torts pleaded, court transcript, no negligence tort pleaded, Minister of Attorney General can be sued in his own right without vicarious liability legal doctrine, and then the six intentional torts pleaded in claim.
This standard time of 20 minutes barely gives me time to plead part IV the issues and law and maybe paragraph #6 in my factum particularly if the judges interrupt and ask questions, and 20 minutes seriously disadvantages my appeal. I respectfully request more time per my factum certificate. My position is that 20 minutes is prejudicial to my appeal, unconstitutional, and favours the Crown Respondents particularly the Minister of Attorney General who superintends all judicial offices in Ontario.
I look forward to hearing from you. Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated.
Sincerely,
Ms. Claudette Losier
Copy: Maria Kotsopoulos Fax: 416-593-5437
The Court of Appeal responded with conference call for this Thursday July 22nd at 9:00 for me to argue for more time than 20 minutes for this appeal set for September 22nd in Toronto.
Go to Canlii(google) website to read Justice Lofchik’s bias endorsement record where there is no references to any of my pleadings made to substantiate his analyses as in other Rule 21 cases such as SCC case of Hunt v. Carey and Crown’s case of Deep. He does not write or refer specifically to any paras in my pleadings to show where I am deficient like Hunt and Deep and all other Rule 21 motions presented by the Crown because my pleadings are sufficient and he did not want to draw attention to that fact! Nor did the Crown defendants in their factum for the Rule 21 Motion and this here Appeal as compared to the Factum found in case of KRP against the same Minister. This is called imaging the truth.
Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21
Superior Court of Justice — Ontario
allegations — suable — pleading — complaints — judicial review
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27.Go to Canlii(google) website to read Justice Lofchik’s bias endorsement record where there is no references to any of my pleadings made to substantiate his analyses as in other Rule 21 cases such as SCC case of Hunt v. Carey and Crown’s case of Deep. He does not write or refer specifically to any paras in my pleadings to show where I am deficient like Hunt and Deep and all other Rule 21 motions presented by the Crown because my pleadings are sufficient and he did not want to draw attention to that fact! Nor did the Crown defendants in their factum for the Rule 21 Motion and this here Appeal as compared to the Factum found in case of KRP against the same Minister. This is called imaging the truth.
Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21
Appeal C50990
Crown’s Authorities:
Crown’s factum pg 9 para24.: subsection 30(1) of the Code further provided that no person who is a member of the Commission was required to give testimony in a civil suit or any proceeding as to information obtained in the course of an investigation under this Act. Dudnik v. York Condominium Corp. No. 216, (1990), 12 CHRR D/325 at para. 75, reversed on other grounds (1991), 14 CHRR D/406 (Decision June 20th 1990)
Dudnik v. York Condominium para 75:
In our view, s. 29(1) prohibits the Chief Commissioner and any other Commissioner from being required to give testimony in an inquiry or to produce documents. However, s. 29(2) allows a Commission employee, other than a Commissioner, to be compelled to give testimony or produce documents in any inquiry. Documents produced in response to a subpoena issued to a human rights officer or other employee would be admissible so long as relevance was established by the respondent, and there was no sustainable ground of privilege claimed by the Commission.
Stare decisis legal doctrine says this 1990 ruling no longer applies because binding authority of new statute created in 1990 the Proceedings Against the Crown Act dated in 1990 s. gives litigants right to sue per sections 5, 8 and 23 which invalidates the Crown’s authority
Liability in tort
5. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, and despite section 71 of Part VI (Interpretation) of the Legislation Act, 2006, the Crown is subject to all liabilities in tort to which, if it were a person of full age and capacity, it would be subject,
(a) in respect of a tort committed by any of its servants or agents;
(d) under any statute, or under any regulation or by-law made or passed under the authority of any statute, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 5 (1); 2006, c. 21, Sched. F, s. 124.
Where proceedings in tort lie
(2) No proceeding shall be brought against the Crown under clause (1) (a) in respect of an act or omission of a servant or agent of the Crown unless a proceeding in tort in respect of such act or omission may be brought against that servant or agent or the personal representative of the servant or agent. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 5(2).
Discover
8. In a proceeding against the Crown, the rules of court as to discovery and inspection of documents and examination for discovery apply in the same manner as if the Crown were a corporation,
Conflict
23. Where this Act conflicts with any other Act, this Act governs. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 23.
***This includes the Human Rights Code Act s. 30(1) or 29(1)
Other argument is that section 30(1) is unconstitutional and violates my rights (see arguments in Wilson re: SCC Nells):
Pg 4 Para 18 “Lamer J., as he then was, speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court in Nelles concluded that these policy considerations, while possessing some merit, did not justify absolute immunity. They had to give way to the right of a private citizen to seek a remedy when a prosecutor acts “maliciously in fraud of his duties”.
Pg 5 para 20 “First, absolute immunity for prosecutors cannot be permitted. The existence of absolute immunity would be a threat to the individual rights of citizens who have been wrongly and maliciously prosecuted by agents of the Attorney General. It would be alarming if such wrongdoers, despite being persons from whom we expect the highest standard of conduct in exercising an important public trust, could not be held accountable to their victims.
Human Rights cases of Cashin 1984 and Ruckpaul 2004 allows for complainants to received Crown’s investigation evidence because it is a human and constitutional right
Region Plaza Inc. v. Corporation of the Regional Municipality of Hamilton-Wentworth et al. (Municipal law – Action against councilors)
Pg 751
“If the plaintiff does not at the outset have knowledge of facts that give rise to the conclusions of malice, breach of duty, conspiracy to injure, or abuse of power, then it is improper to make such bald allegations in the statement of claim. It was not sufficient to simply say that the supporting facts were within the knowledge of the defendants.”
***Not same as my claim where I plead and rely on all facts from employment human rights complaints and reports, and the only facts that are alleged within the defendants knowledge on the investigation witness statements from Mrs. Page, Mr. Clarke and 2 others which I don’t need to prove breach of natural justice and can prove all torts with and/or without this evidence of Crown conspiring with MMP and a refusal to provide me with this evidence substantiates my pleadings of breach of natural justice per Cashin’s Federal Judicial Review case breached by Justice Lofchik and Appeal Courts which is Crown continuing cause of action Abuse of Office
***The facts within knowledge of Crown Defendants of their alleged investigation evidence and witness statements from Mrs. Page, Mr. Clark and 2 others I don’t need to proved fabrication of evidence and if the Crown does not want to show this evidence they cant prove there was an investigation and that it was fair so it’s the Crown that needs these facts and evidence as I can prove wrong doing with or without them and that is why all my legal matters is being dismissed and additional evidence that this is so is Justice Lofchik and the crown refusing to refer in writing in their endorsement record and factums any paragraphs of my pleadings in claims like all other Rule 21 motions and now the Appeal Court refusing my right to include the Court Transcripts as part of this appeal which includes my arguments based on my paragraph pleadings in claims pleaded sufficiently and with particularity
***Crown’s argument of Code to deny their evidence from investigation is overruled by the Proceedings Against the Crown Act sections 8 to provide their evidence just like a corporation has to and section 23 that conflicts with the Code this Act overrules the Code, and Judicial Review case laws clearly shows that the Code book rule that the Crown relies on is unconstitutional as other Human Rights Jurisdictions say the Commission has to give the complainant all of their evidence: Cashin & Ruckpaul Federal Courts, and that all of the complainants evidence and facts are to be investigated to show fair and unbias investigation per other Judicial Review cases Cashin, Ruckpaul, Lewis v. Standen,
Pg 752 – “The statement of claim as amended provided as follows: (list 2 to 19)
***Not same as Justice Lofchik’s Rule 21 motion with no references to stmt of claim pleadings and evidence of differential treatment and hiding my pleadings because they are sufficiently pleaded
Dawson v. Rexcraft Storage and Warehouse Inc. (1998), 164 D.L.R. (4th) 257 (C.A.) at para. 10 and contour argument para 11
Crown’s factum pg 11 para #28 “absence of a necessary element of the cause of action will constitute a defect” and refers to case of Dawson pg 10 para 10:
“In other cases, however, the statement of claim may be defective because it has failed to allege the necessary elements of a claim that, if properly pleaded, would constitute a reasonable cause of action”
Para #11 contours this argument and aligns with “plain and obvious” test that includes reading generously with allowances for inadequacies due to drafting deficiencies such as the plaintiff had no lawyer or law school training to plead like a lawyer and any missing element of a tort is an oversight and she is allowed to amend per Charter values of access to justice:
“To illustrate the second situation, suppose, for example, that P sues D for damages for malicious prosecution. To recover for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must establish these elements: institution of criminal proceedings by the defendant without reasonable and probable cause; an improper purpose in instituting the proceedings such as malice, or a primary purpose other than that of carrying the law into effect; termination of the criminal proceedings in favour of the plaintiff; and damages: J. Fleming, The Law of Torts (8th ed., 1992, The Law Book Co. Ltd.) at 610. If P fails to plead favourable termination of the criminal proceedings, D may move to strike out the statement of claim on the ground that P failed to allege a necessary element of the tort. P’s failure to plead favourable termination may simply be an oversight. If so, the court should allow P to amend the statement of claim to add this allegation, and the lawsuit will proceed. See AGF Canadian Equity Fund v. Transamerica Commercial Finance Corp. Canada (193), 14 O.R. (3d) 161 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 172-74 (Gen. Div.)
Way v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) – Application for Judicial Review not statement of claim
1st page
HR Discrimination reason – 1978 job interview for a teaching position told that she would be hired if she reconciled with her ex-husband – she applied for position repeatedly and never considered due to 1978 interview comments – Commission’s discretion is based on S. 34 not S. 36 for reasons of vexatious (no details as reason why vexatious) and brought outside the six-month limitation period
Code book page 301/302 measures/guidelines to codify vexatious are: instituted without sufficient/reasonable grounds, groundless, to embarrass or harass respondent, respondent makes reasonable offer of settlement and complainant refuses, apparent absurdity or manifestly has no basis in fact clear on the face of the complaint ie male alleging gender discrimination for interview job refused when all who were interviewed where male
*discretion to not refer complaint per this case is only if it is groundless and not prima facie complaint made out per other successful Human Rights cases as in my situation for 4 complaints dismissed under s. 36 by way of fabricating insufficient evidence from a unfair and bias investigation process: Watts reprisal, MMP, Xentel and Lyman
Para 6 and 7 s. 34(1) discretion – Commission pursuant s. 34(1)(b) and (d) – Section 34 of the Code permits the Commission to sift through complaints and remove a number of them from the time consuming process of investigation – The Commission is not under a duty to investigate every complaint
Para 8 vexatious for gender/marital status complaint – without reasonable or probable cause or excuse, not acting bona fide, not calculated to lead to any practical result
***Not same as my claim with 5 employer 4 in a row exposing me to sex picture and retaliation with termination after I make several internal complaints
Gismondi v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) Application for Judicial Review not a statement of claim
Commission dismissing his claim as being outside the limitation period (Age Discrimination)
Para 11 – Commission not satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith
Para 16 –
London (City) v. Ayerswood Development Corp., [2002] O.J. No. 4859, the Court of Appeal stated, at para 10:
“When considering an allegation of a denial of natural justice, a court need not engage in an assessment of the appropriate standard of review. Rather, the court is required to evaluate whether the rules of procedural fairness or the duty of fairness have been adhered to. The court does this by assessing the specific circumstances giving rise to the allegation and by determining what procedures and safeguards were required in those circumstances in order to comply with the duty to act fairly. See Moreau-Berube, (2002), 209 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.), at paras 74-75.
***My Judicial Review only used due deference to decision makers and violated my charter rights and said it was fair that the Commission not interview any of my witnesses or sexual harassers which is contradicted by Ruckpaul Case that not interviewing any of the complainants witnesses was a “Flaw” – the rules of procedural fairness or the duty of fairness was not adhered to by the Commission and by Judicial Review and Appeals Courts in Ontario per Cashin and Ruckpaul (Federal Courts) and Lewis v. Standen JR (BC Court) cases – this shows that the Human Rights Governmental abuses I am receiving is specific to Ontario’s Justice System and therefore the Queen and Minister of Attorney General in Ontario, not other provinces – the Supreme Court of Canada’s refuse leave is based on Minister of Attorney General Micheal Bryant used to work there and had connections with law clerks who were the ones who decided what when in the memo given to the judges to decide leave and did not give my documents but only their memo per SCC practice book
Para 23
U.E.S. Local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048, para 53 of her judgment, L’Heureux-Dube J. said:
The rule has been that decisions classified as discretionary may only be reviewed on limited grounds such as the bad faith of decision-makers, the exercise of discretion for an improper purpose, and the use of irrelevant considerations.
***Bad faith and improper purpose are elements for intentional torts Misfeasance of Public Office therefore abuse of discretion can be reviewed in civil courts not in judicial review courts
“that Discretionary decisions – must be made within the bounds of the jurisdiction conferred by the statute“
***such as statute preamble everyone in Ontario is equal and sections 5 to 10 including exposure to porn is automatic prima facie complaint of sexual harassment made out
“However, discretion must still be exercised in a manner that is within a reasonable interpretation of the margin of manoeuvre contemplated by the legislature, in accordance with the principles of the rule of law (Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [959] S.C.R. 121), in line with general principles of administrative law governing the exercise of discretion, and consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Slaight Communications Inc. V. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038).”
***This argument substantiates my appeal argument at #6 per discretion per Slaight that the Charter/Code’s protection is as great at that afforded in UN International Human Rights documents such as the UN Treaty article 2 for protection of women from all forms of discrimination including from our governments and Ministers of Attorney Generals and their staff Judges and Commission bodies and personals
***manoeuvre means measurements such as s. 34 a to d measures to prove without grounds, and s. 5 to 10 measures to prove grounds for next step investigation and referral to Tribunal***
Para 24 The fundamental purpose of the Code is to establish a legislative framework “to ensure that all members of our society enjoy the essential right to be free from discrimination on racial and other grounds” : Payne v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (2000), 192 D.L.R.
*Factum arguments #6
acting in an investigative and administrative screening capacity
*not judicial or quasi-judicial capacity
The combined effect provided by the legislature in s. 34 is to enable the Commission to sift through the complaints and remove a number of them from the time-consuming process of investigation.
*not refusal of referring to Tribunal as per J. Lofchik’s endorsement record and Crown’s factum analysis of law and not after s. 36 investigation with intentional flawed investigation tactics
***Para says “Commission is not under a public duty to proceed with every complaint” which is only in context with s. 34 to not investigate every complaint based on measures that the complaint is not based on any grounds or passed limitation period or refusal to accept a settlement offer that the Commission deemed appropriate
***Crown/Justice Lofchik did not provide any case law of section 36 dismissed complaints after investigation with discretion of “not under a public duty to proceed with every complaint” nor any section 36 judicial review complaints dismissed where the case analysis or the court’s endorsement records includes statement by Crown that the complainant had merit per the Code but were allowed to use discretion to refuse referral to Tribunal due money management of the commission department and this is justified under section 1 of the Charter per Oaks test and demonstrate that it had reasonable basis for concluding that total denial of benefits of making complainant whole is a minimum impairment of her rights and that it has accommodated the appellant’s needs to the point of “undue hardship”
Para 30 The analysis concluded that “it appears appropriate for the Commission to exercise its discretion, and to decide not to deal with the complaint pursuant to only Section 34(1)(d) of the Code” (i.e. the untimeliness provision)
Para 28 “natural justice arguments are not well founded” (age discrimination – s. 34 outside limitation period)
***per s.36 my breach of natural justice arguments are well founded in federal court law being ignored and breached by Ontario provincial courts per Cashin that includes refusal to provide me with the specifics of the alleged disarray of book into 2010 when this case says the Commission has to provide me with the specifics of all incompetence allegations that should include the following: which month the actual disarray of books took place and what part of the books was in disarray such as accounts receivable or payables or wages, and did I enter the source documents in their accounting soft ware or did prior hire Diana Hall or prior bookkeeper Karen Tarpos (who entered data in the books from my excel spreadsheets for receivables and payable monthly files) – Whose incompetency if there was any was it?
Para 37 Mr. Moore submits that where a tribunal is required to give reasons for its decision, those reasons must be responsive to the issues raised and must set out the analysis undertaken in connection with those issues. A mere statement of conclusion, or a bare recital of preconditions to the exercise of a discretionary power is not sufficient. See Leung v. Ontario (Criminal Injuries Compensation Board) (1995), 24 O.R. (3d) 530 (Div. Ct.) at 535-536
***Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record and Crown’s factums are nothing but bare recital of preconditions to the exercise of a discretionary power under s. 34 not s. 36 (for 4 complaints dismissed under s. 36 material issue in my claims) and Rule 21 motions and not responsive to issues raised by me in court: bound by UN Treaty in our Canadian Laws Code and SCC cases, joint tortfeasors legal doctrine, Justice Lofchik wrote order to allow amendment for employer defendants excluding crown when they are joint tortfeasors, defamation made out, tort of deceit and Constitutional Tort made out no analysis in endorsement record, Facts in Employment HR complaints sufficient for all torts as to how the Crown did their job, and no references to my paragraph pleadings to validate all of his analysis in his endorsement record per Hunt, KRP, and Crown’s cases for this appeal Deep, Dyce, etc.
Para 44 If the Commission were to proceed on a different recommendation or to base its decision on factors or considerations undisclosed to the complainant and the others there would be no opportunity to respond and the right to fairness would be infringed.
*Cashin and Ruckpaul – MMP no disclosure of disarray of books specifics to the complainant to defend her self, Xentel and Lyman complaints no reference to sexual harassment incidents in complaints, for all 4 s. 36 complaints/reports no complainant’s witnesses investigated
Para 48 The Commission has control over its screening process under s. 34(1) of the Code
*no such reference or authority provided by J. Lofchik and Crown for s. 36 investigation cases – whereas I have provided such case law: Cashtin & Ruckpaul & (Crown case of Lewis v. Standent of all evidences) ***Also Cashin argument “behind the back of the other” Ruckpaul’s argument “disclosure of documents”
Cashin paras 18875 and 18876 per argument from SCC Kane v. Board of Governors of U.B.C.:
“Whoever is to adjudicate must not hear evidence or receive representations from one side behind the back of the other”
and Cashin: “While the Applicant had the opportunity to tell her own story and clearly has a general motion of the points made against her, she was refused the actual evidence and had no opportunity to controvert specific evidence against her”
Para 52 Gismondi commenced civil action against the City but not the Commission or its staff
***not same as my claim
Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21 Ontario Court of Appeal file Appeal C50990 for September 22nd 2010
Lacasse v. Corporation of the City of Otttawa et al. (Union Local 502)
(unreported) 2003/04/15
Para 2 The Applicant seeks the following relief by way of an Application – Application dealing with Union not same as my statement of claim
*This is not a statement of claim or rule 21 motion to dismiss but an application not similar to my claim and therefore does not apply but rather other case laws such as SCC Hunt decision for tort of conspiracy and SCC Longley Case for defamation and Misfeasance of Public Office, Roncarelli applies
(d) Janet Barrett’s of the Commission, failure to properly review the file and her minimizing the serious allegations, some sort of wrongdoing by another Commission employee, Connie Cooper, some sort of misconduct against the Commission the Commission itself, and
*Not a statement of claim with pleadings based on torts such as Conspiracy, Deceit, Defamation/Libel, Misfeasance of Public Office, Constitutional Tort, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
*no mention if s. 36 or an investigation – 2001 Janet Barrett was my intake office to the Watts Industries settled 2001 complaint – failure to properly review the file per intake process
*Rule 21 not reason judge dismissed this application
*Commission staff are respondents not defendants in Lacasse Application
*not same as Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record says I pleaded “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation and apart from the facts of employment events” which is all that is required per intentional torts
Para 3 and general damages against the Commission for failing in “there (sic, their) fiduciary duty and denying me the benefit and protection of law.”
*also not similar to my claims of intentional torts with no pleadings of “fiduciary duty”
Para 4 At all times the Applicant was an employee, or former employee, of the city a member of Local 503, and was covered by the terms and conditions contained in a collective agreement between the union and the city.
*Application not a statement of claim with intentional torts after a fraudulent unfair and bias investigation with absolutely no interviews of sexual harassers other than Mrs. Page, and none of Complainant’s witnesses
Para 5 reasons why Application must be dismissed
(b) The claims pursued in this proceeding by the Applicant cannot be the subject matter of an Application. The claims made in this Application are not claims that are authorized by either a statute or by the rules of court.
(c) Given the confusing nature of the several claims and the other obstacles faced by the Applicant listed hereunder, I am not prepared to grant him leave to convert this proceeding into a proceeding “by action” (i.e. by a “statement of claim”) (See Rule 38.10)
(e) complaint to the Ontario Labour Relations Board – dismissed – issue estoppel
(f) Ontario Human Rights complaint against the city and its employees still pending before the Commission
*Also not same as mine with 4 prima facie complaints dismissed under s. 36 in 2004, and Judicial Review in 2006 and its now 2010
(g) The Ontario Labour Relations Board has exclusive statutory jurisdiction to entertain the Complaints
*not same as mine per Kulyk and the Commission’s privative clause for exclusive statutory jurisdiction was removed allowing right to sue the Commission and staff
(l) Proceedings to attack the conduct of, or the decisions of the Commission, must be made by way of an Application for Judicial Review (Judicial Review Procedure Act, Courts of Justice Act and the Rules). In any event, the complaints are still pending and no decision has been rendered. Therefore the proceedings against it are premature.
***Not same as my claims that were dismissed in 2005-2007 and the proceedings to attack the conduct of the Commission and staff that results in damages can be made only by way of Proceedings Against the Crown Act 1990 s. 5 (liability), s. 8 (the rules of court as to discovery and inspection of documents and examination for discovery apply in the same manner as if the Crown were a corporation), and s. 23 (where this Act conflicts with any other Act, this Act governs and this includes acts in conflict such as the Code act, Judicial Review Procedure Act, Courts of Justice Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure), Crown Agency Act 1990, and per 6 intentional torts: Misfeasance of Public Office, Defamation/Libel, Conspiracy, Deceit, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Constitutional Tort,
(n) Commission employees are not subject to being sued for damages caused by their alleged negligence
***not same as mine for their alleged intentional abuse of office per J. Lofchik’s endorsement record I pleaded “they acted deliberately with quality of the investigation” which includes serious flawed omissions of not interviewing any of the complainant’s witnesses nor all the sexual harassers and leaving out all the sexual harassment incidents out of 2 case analysis validated by respondents, Xentel and Lyman, to misinform the reader of the case analyses of the strength of the complainant’s prima facie complaints
(p) Although the Applicant relies on the Charter, no Charter breaches are detailed in the Application
***not similar to mine which references the Charter s. 7, 15, and 22/24 plus Human Rights Case Law per s. of Code 5 to 10 (legislative facts) proving prima facie facts in claim (04 Matter para 15, 26, 28, 29, 32, 33)
(r) No specific relief is claimed against the Respondents Barrett and Cooper
*not similar to a statement of claim when Crown are defendants not respondents and specific relief for damages per intentional torts for lost of wages/career/pension/make complainant whole, both infringement of right and defamation is at large, expenses for disability of anxiety with depressed moods that is acute of paxil and sleeping pills,
York Advertising Ltd. V. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) [2004]
Injunctions not a statement of claim or rule 21 motion to dismissed
Motion by York Advertising Limited and Murphy for an interlocutory injunction restraining the respondents, the Ontario Human Rights Commission, Doe, Hetherington and Richland Marketing Incorporated from publishing, disclosing, communicating, disseminating, distributing or circulating a decision of the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal.
Pg 9 para 23 (a) There is no evidence of real damage before the court – the damages are purely speculative.
*this is true per Operations Dismental’s exception to rule similar to future damages from misiles because until the event happens there is no damages
Exception to this rule that facts not to be accepted as true are only those facts that are speculative on future damages per the following 3 cases that are not similar to my claim per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement “apart from the facts of employment events” (Crown Factum pg 11 para #29):
a) Operations Dismantle of Future cruise missiles no damages till event happens
b) York Advertising v. OHRC case was for injunctions for potential damage in future from disclosing tribunal results against York and judge dismissed per Operations York Pg 9 para 23 (a) There is no evidence of real damage before the court – the damages are purely speculative.
c) in Region Plaza Inc pg 751 “It was not sufficient to simply say that the supporting facts were within the knowledge of the defendants” therefore the judge ruled it was speculative per Operations but allowed plaintiff to still amend claim
d) Dyce (fishing expedition): “The plaintiff frankly concedes that he has no other information because as he alleges he has been to unable to obtain it”
***Justice Lofchik and the Crown do not provide any case law that pass event facts from employment human right and commission investigation pass events are speculative, and they do not provide in their endorsement record or factum paras in claim of the facts that they alleged are speculative per Operations/York/Region therefore their analysis/argument is bald conclusion
Pg 12
Para 31. “The Commission is responsible to the Minister for the Administration of the Code. Members of the Commission and the Tribunal are appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council.
*Legal Capacity to sue the Commission Body as Crown Agent per Proceedings Against the Crown Act 1990 s. 5, 8, and 23, and per Crown Agency Act 1990
para 32 “Section 47 stipulates that the Code binds the Crown and every agency of the Crown.”
Para 33 “Section 5 of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act provides that, except as otherwise provided, the Crown is subject to all liabilities in tort to which, if it were a person of full age and capacity, it would be subject in respect of a number of matters. The listed matters do not encompass the type of claim with which we are here concerned.
*this case does not apply to mine
Pg 13
Para 36 “Nothing in the Code constitutes either the Commission or the Tribunal as a body corporate nor is there anything in the Code that provides that either is liable to suit. The Respondents rely on Houlden J.’s, as he then was, decision in Westlake et al. v. The Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario, 21 D.L.R. (3d) 129, aff’d 26 D.L.R. (3d) 273, (O.H.C.)(Q.L.) , where he noted that the Ontario Securities Commission, which was constituted by the Securities Act, did not have anything conferred upon it that would result in its being able to sue or be sued . At p. 133 of his decision he said:
There is nothing in the Securities Act, 1966 or the Labour Relations Act which confers upon the Commission or the Board the power to enter into contracts to acquire and hold property and to dispose of same, or to carry on any commercial activity.
***It still acts in providing a service to the public and can cause damages which makes its liable to those it harms by improper actions
If a statute confers powers of this type upon a non-corporate entity which it brings into existence, the as Taylor, J., pointed out in Bank of Montreal v. Bole, [1931] 1 W.W.R. 203, it flows as a necessary intendment from the enactment that the statutory body is to be amenable to the ordinary processes of Court.
Para 37 These Respondents also rely on the following at p. 135 of the Westlake decision:
In the present case, on a careful review of the powers conferred upon the Commission, I cannot imply that the Legislature intended the Commission to be subject to an action for damages.
(6) It will obvious from what has been said that there is a sixth category of statutory bodies and it is in this category that, in my opinion, the Ontario Securities Commission belongs. These are non-corporate bodies which are not by the terms of the statute incorporating them or by necessary implication liable to be sued in an action for damages, but who are legal entities in that their actions may be reviewed in proceedings brought against them by way of the extraordinary remedies or certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.
Pg 14 Para 38
In White v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [1999] O.J. No. 2034 (C.A.) (Q.L.) Catzman J. A., made the following endorsement:
The legal issue in this appeal is the question whether the Ontario Human Rights Commission is, in law, an entity that is capable of being sued. There are precedents in this court, in the Supreme Court of Canada and the New Brunswick Court of Appeal that uniformly establish the (legal principle that the Commission is not an entity that can be sued, and whatever sympathy we have for the appellate position, we are bound to apply the principle.
Para 39
In Smith v. New Brunswick (Human Rights Commission)(1997), 143 D.L.R. (4th) 251, [1997] N.B.J. No. 29 (C.A.) (O.L.), the New Brunswick Court of Appeal held that the New Brunswick Human Rights Commission was not a suable entity because it lacked the legal status and capacity required either by virtue of legislation or inference, i.e., it was essentially a statutory body exercising a quasi-judicial function. Bastarache J.A.., as he then was, followed Houlden J.’s reasoning by the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada and that the decision had been consistently followed.
Para 40
At Para. 19 of his decision, Bastarache J.A., said:
There is nothing in the governing legislation that establishes directly that the Commission has the legal status and capacity required. The powers of the Commission do not suggest that legal status and capacity required.
***Legal status and capacity exists as they provide service to public which can cause damages and therefore suable for those damages
***All cases for immunity and non suability 1999 White v OHRC and 1997 Smith v. NHRC all refer back to 1973 case of Westlake with following legal reasoning: 1) Nothing in the Code constitutes either the Commission or the Tribunal as a body corporate nor is there anything in the Code that provides that either is liable to suit, 2) Ontario Securities Commission, which was constituted by the Securities Act, did not have anything conferred upon it that would result in its being able to sue or be sued, 3) I cannot imply that the Legislature intended the Commission to be subject to an action for damages, 4) a sixth category of statutory bodies and it is in this category that, in my opinion, the Ontario Securities Commission belongs, 5) these are non-corporate bodies which are not by the terms of the statute incorporating them or by necessary implication liable to be sued in an action for damages, 6) not a suable entity because it lacked the legal status and capacity required either by virtue of legislation or inference, i.e., it was essentially a statutory body exercising a quasi-judicial function, and 7) there is nothing in the governing legislation that establishes directly that the Commission has the legal status and capacity required.
30.Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21 Ontario Court of Appeal file Appeal C50990 for September 22nd 2010
Error in Law there is legislation that establishes directly that a Commission Body has the legal status and capacity required to be sued:
1) Neither Westlake 1972/73, Smith v. NHRC 1997, White v. OHRC 1999, Oren 2002, and York Advertising Ltd v. OHRC, Wanxia and Zakaria refer to or analysis in their legal arguments for immunity two new legislation in 1990 that establishes that any Commission Body a Crown Agency has now legal status and capacity to be sued that nullifies all these cases as no longer valid per legal doctrine of stare decisis and all are evidence of institutional bias to protect the wrongdoing with the Commission of providing a discriminatory human rights process not allowed per discretion of the Code
2) The Ontario Human Rights Commission is not governed by the 1966 Securities Act but rather by the OHR Code Act
3)1990 Legislative Acts of The Proceeding Against the Crown Act and the Crown Agency Act and the Code plus the United Nations Treaty included in the Code’s preamble combine establishes legal capacity to be sued plus legal arguments found in Starline Case (pages 7 to 16) for the Commission Body as Crown Agent acting in administrative capacity and control test for minister control of commission and Human Rights Act as long as tortuous liability requirements are met such as the elements for Misfeasance of Public office or other intentional torts like defamation
4) The 1990 Crown Agency Act now replaces Westlakes’ definition of a commission as a sixth category of statutory bodies based on definition in the 1966 Securities Act not the Code and so Commissions now are agents and no longer a sixth category of statutory bodies and a Crown Agent can be sued per the Proceedings Against the Crown Act 1990 s. 5
5) Control Test states if Minister is responsible for the statutory body then it becomes an agent of the Crown
6) OHRC clearly establishes directly that the Commission has the legal status per s. 27 (2) because the Commission is responsible to the Minister for the administration of this Act, and s. 29 that they are to eliminate all forms of discrimination, and per the code make complainants whole as if there was no discrimination therefore compensable damages are available for wrong actions
7) The Proceedings Against the Crown Act establishes legal capacity to be sued per sections 5 liability, 8 as if the Crown were a corporation therefore all their evidence is available for suit, and 23 this act governs over all other acts in conflict with it that includes the Securities Act in Westlake,and the Code
8) United Nation Treaty the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and its Optional Protocol 2000 Article 2 (b to f) prohibiting all discrimination against women, effective protection of women against any act of discrimination, to refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation, eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization, or enterprise, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitutes discrimination against women
8) if a statute confers powers of this type upon a non-corporate entity which it brings into existence, the as Taylor, J., pointed out in Bank of Montreal v. Bole, [1931] 1 W.W.R. 203, it flows as a necessary intendment from the enactment that the statutory body is to be amenable to the ordinary processes of Court such as 1990’s Crown Agency Act and the Proceedings Against the Act
9) Starline Entertainment Centre Inc. v. Ciccarelli 1995 case Ontario Court Epstein J. arguments for no immunity: distinction drawn between public officials exercising judicial and administrative capacity, administrative capacity deserves additional scrutiny, issue of immunity a trial was required to be considered within a factual basis, no special immunities or privileges when they act beyond the powers which are accorded to them by law, acts in fraud of his duties and powers, or acts with malice, excess of power or improper motive he cause damages
10) new argument found in Wilson v. Toronto (Metropolitan) Police Service para 18, 19 and 20 – floodgate of litigation excuse used by Crown does not justify absolute immunity for Commission or its staff or Minsiter per Westlake, Smith, White and all other Crown authorities based on these 3 cases
Pg 14 para 42: In light of the foregoing precedents, I must, therefore, conclude that, indeed, neither the Commission nor the Tribunal is a suable entity and that, insofar as the Tribunal’s decision or the Commission’s conduct are concerned, the Moving Parties are compelled to challenged them through the process of judicial review, assuming that they are granted status.
Oren Nimelman by Next Friend Cheryl Katz et al. v. The Ontario Human Rights Commission, Nancy Pocock, Christopher McKinnon and Keith Norton (unreported) 2002
Rule 21 for an order striking out the Statement of Claim
Para 4 “there is no reason to consider that the analysis of the applicable principle in Westlake v. The Queen (1971) 21 D.L.R. 129 at 131 to 132 and 134 (Ont. H.C.) is not determinative of the issue as regards the Commission.
*not a proper analysis to my arguments as new statutes with the Code and UN treaty establishes capacity to be sued not address by Spence J.
Para 8 “The Statement of claim does not plead particular provisions of the Charter. Ms. Katz’s factum invokes s. 7, 9, 12, and 15 of the Charter but the statement of Claim does not plead any facts which would support a claim based on those sections.
Para 9 “The Statement of Claim invokes the Charter of Rights at the following paragraphs of the Statement dealing with the following allegations:
18: biased and flawed report
21: sending the complaints back
25: dismissal of the complaints
29: duty to remedy the wrong suffered by the plaintiffs
“None of these paragraphs supports a s. 7 claim in a self-evident way. No facts are alleged that would afford a basis for invoking s. 7.
***Not same as mine as Justice Lofchik makes no comments to my pleadings of Charter violations which is the Constitutional tort and validates facts “apart from facts from employment events” and that I pleaded “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation”
Para 10 “The plaintiffs claim for breach of statutory duty. The Ontario Human Rights Code does not provide for a civil cause of action for breach of statutory obligation. No basis is pleaded for the claim of breach of statutory duty. See Canada v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (1983), 143 D.L.R. (3d) 9 at 24 (S.C.C.)
***Error in Law per SCC decision in Odhavji corrected the misapplication by lower courts of their decision in Saskatchewan Wheat Pool that it does not establish that the breach of a statute cannot give rise to liability if the constituent elements of tortuous responsibility have been satisfied. Not same as mine pleadings for Misfeasance of Public Office & 5 other intentional torts, the tortuous responsibility, which breach of statute can be improper purpose and/or unlawful conduct per these torts and Justice Lofchik made no proper analysis with elements of these torts and my pleadings where I am deficient and validates that I pleaded “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation” and “apart from the facts of employment events”
Para 11 The plaintiffs claim for abuse of office and malicious conduct. Paragraph 33 of the Statement of Claim alleges, in respect of the defendants Pocock and McKinnon, malice or ulterior or improper motive as set out in that paragraph, i.e. (a) on the part of Pocock, as “payback” against Katz (b) on the part of McKinnon, to support Pocock and cover up her “wrongdoing and (c) on the part of both of them, to divert criticism away from themselves. The problem with this pleading as to motive is that it pleads inferences without pleading any facts that would support the inferences.
*Not same as my claim and Justice Lofchik does not substantiate his analysis that is by listing my paragragh in statement of claim same as this as he makes no mentions to any paragraphs in my statement of claim and validates I pleaded “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation” and “apart from the facts of employment events” which is all that is required per Rule 21 to continue suit against the Crown
04 Matter pleading para #20:
I plead that the facts as stated in Shannon Meadows-Lee from the investigation office at the commission in her December 2004 MMP case analysis are injurious falsehoods and the tort of deceit from the commission colluding with now MMP Limited to protect Watts Reprisal campaign from being exposed by concealing evidence and controlling witnesses who would provide adverse outcome to the facts presented in these case analyses. The concealment of evidence is the concealment of the material facts in this statement listed from #36 to #142. This concealment of evidence and material facts demonstrates a breach of fairness by the OHRC. I had already commenced a civil suit for misfeasance of public office against the commission for colluding with the third and fourth employers in this campaign in 2004 prior to receiving these case analyses. I infer the commission has a need to avoid the truth from being exposed at the Tribunal because of their participation with this campaign in 2003/2004 and this is the criminal action of accessory after the fact. The most obvious injurious falsehoods is the allegation of gross incompetence and the concealing of my termination letter in direct violation of the criminal code 425.1 by both MMP Limited and Shannon Meadows-Lee and Dina Waik (investigating officer) to obstruct natural justice of referring my prima facie complaint to the Tribunal were the evidence will contradict the commission’s finding of fact.
Para 12 “Paragraph 34 (b) alleges misfeasance and abuse of public office on the part of the defendants by neglecting to carry out their duties. This is a claim of negligence and not of intentional conduct, which is necessary for a claim of misfeasance in public office.
***Not same as mine as no where in my claim do I use the words negligence or neglecting rather I use deliberate words such as fabricating, distorting, imaging the truth
***Oren claim shows allowed to question decisions of Commission civilly for intentional torts such as Misfeasance of Public Office per the requirement for deliberate actions and its not collateral attacks for abuse of process rule
Para 13 “There are no other facts pleaded that would support a finding that any of the individual defendants acted otherwise than for the public purpose of their offices, so there is no basis for the pleadings of abuse and misfeasance.
Para 14 “The plaintiffs claim for negligence on the part of the individual defendants.
***Not same as mine per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement that I pleaded “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation” and Oren was not suing employer defendants with Crown defendants
Senechal v. Muskoka (District Municipality) 2003
Limitations of actions – actions against municipalities – liabilities of municipalities – negligence
Pg 2 Held: Application allowed in part. The actions were not statute-barred. Most of the allegations of negligence were struck out. The plaintiffs were given leave to amend their statements of claim through the provision of facts that would support their allegations of negligence.
Pg 4 para 15: The test governing the application of Rule 21.01(1)(a) is the same as that governing the application of Rule 21.01(1)(b) enunciated in Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959 at pp. 967-8 and 980, that is whether, on the facts as pleaded, and any evidence admitted, is it plain and obvious that the claim discloses no reasonable cause of action and cannot succeed: MacDonald v. Ontario Hydro (1994), 19 O.R. (3d) 529 (Gen. Div.); affirmed (1995), 86 O.A.C. 37 (Div. Ct.).
***on the facts as pleaded and any evidence admitted would include MMP’s defence statement that they deny they wrongly dismissed me with no such same allegations of incompetence per the Commission’s case analysis such as disarray of books and pleaded sufficiently!
Pg 9 para 50: A pleading must, at a minimum, disclose sufficient material facts, but not evidence, to enable the opposite party and the Court to ascertain precisely the issues in dispute and to enable the other party to respond to the allegations in its pleadings. It is improper to baldly plead conclusions without any supporting facts.
Pg 10 Para #52 borrows and repeats para 20 from George v. Harris [2000] O.J. No. 1762 (S.C.J.): A pleading that demonstrates a complete absence of material facts will be declared to be frivolous and vexatious.
***Not same as my claim or Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record without listing the paras of employment event facts to show they are deficient per Senechal para 53:
“The impugned pleadings against the Municipality are as follows: list pleadings a to l “
Pg 11 Para 54: The statement of claim contains only the following material facts specific to the Municipality :
(a) The Defendant [the Municipality] is a corporation duly constituted pursuant to the provisions of the [Act]. This Defendant and its predecessors, servants, agents, employees or contractors, for whom they are in law responsible, had jurisdiction, control and responsibility for the maintenance, supervision, construction, design, repair, signing and safety pertaining to the subject portion of Muskoka Road 118, at or near its intersection with Muskoka Road 7, in the Township of Muskoka Lakes, in the District Municipality or Muskoka, in the Province of Ontario; and
(b) The allegations in clauses (k) and (l) respecting the danger created by parked trucks and the absence of “no parking” and warning signs.
Plus paras 53 to 66 with additional analysis of specific paragraphs in plaintiff’s claims with analysis why they are deficient not same as my claim per Justice Lofchik’
Para 63 I do note that the Municipality was able to plead to the allegations of the plaintiffs without the need to ask for particulars under Rule 25.10.
***Crown in my case also was able to plead to the allegations per their motions records book that includes their defence statements and never once request for particulars per rule 25.10 a fact and law ignored by Justice Lofchik to favour the Crown Defendants and additional Institutional bias
Wilson v. Toronto (Metropolitan) Police Services 2001
Rule 21 Striking out statement of claim – damages for malicious prosecution, misfeasance of public office, conspiracy, wrongful imprisonment, negligence and several breaches under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
Held: It was not enough to plead that Barry negligently failed to learn facts that could have fixed him with the knowledge that reasonable and probable grounds did not exist. The claim against the Attorney General failed since it was based on vicarious liability for Barry’s actions.
Pg 4 Para 18 “Lamer J., as he then was, speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court in Nelles concluded that these policy considerations, while possessing some merit, did not justify absolute immunity. They had to give way to the right of a private citizen to seek a remedy when a prosecutor acts “maliciously in fraud of his duties”.
Para 19 In reaching this conclusion, Lamer J. paid particular attention to the “chilling effect” and “floodgates” arguments, and concluded that absolute immunity was not necessary to prevent a flood of litigation.
“This high threshold of liability is evidenced by the small number of malicious prosecution suits brought against police officers each year. In addition, since 1966, the Province of Quebec permits suits against the Attorney-General and Crown prosecutors without any evidence of a flood of claims. Therefore, I find unpersuasive the claim that absolute immunity is necessary to prevent a flood of litigation.
Pg 5 para 20 “First, absolute immunity for prosecutors cannot be permitted. The existence of absolute immunity would be a threat to the individual rights of citizens who have been wrongly and maliciously prosecuted by agents of the Attorney General. It would be alarming if such wrongdoers, despite being persons from whom we expect the highest standard of conduct in exercising an important public trust, could not be held accountable to their victims.
*** These 3 arguments from SCC also applies to Minister of Attorney General and his agents the Commission and staff and not reviewed in Crown’s authorities for immunity based on Westlake per stare decisis
pg 12 para 51 “A pleading that merely asserts a particular tort, without alleging material facts capable of supporting it, discloses no cause of action”
para 52 “I turn at last to the plaintiff’s pleadings respecting reasonable and probable cause. What does the plaintiff alleged in respect of this element of malicious prosecution? I would summarize his allegations as follows.” List pleadings from statement of claim from a. to p.
*Justice Lofchik does not list any pleadings and the specifics in them like this rule 21 motion
pg 14 para 57 “The question remains whether I should permit the pleading to be amended”
*Justice Lofchik allowing amendment due to deficiencies in claims against Employer defendants but not Crown is Institutional Bias to favour the Crown and shows I do have facts and causes of actions particularly in the joint tortfeasors torts such as conspiracy and defamation
pg 15 para 59 “malice would be made out if they were to find that:
…the respondents continued the prosecution either for an improper purpose, or in reckless disregard of evidence which would have disclosed the unreliability of the information provided by the [complainant], or or out of ill will, spite or for selfish purposes, or because [the complainant] wanted them to do so. (in my claim the complainant is the respondent wanted them to do so )
***reckless disregard of facts and evidence proving unreliability: 1) of MMP and Xentel’s evidence of incompetency is a termination letter from MMP 5 month after off on sick leave for depression with no allegations of incompetency plus $1.00 raise at 3 month probation and no sign warning letter at probation or during MMP employment, and for Xentel a termination letter with severance/notice and release form for notice and Xentel settled claim in 2007, and 2) no witnesses of the complainant’s interviewed at all and no sexual harassers interviewed at all for Lyman and Xentel complaints and only Ms. Page for her breast comment incident interviewed, and 3) no witnesses at all interviewed to prove or disprove Watts retaliation/delusional profiling campaign of contacting next employer and passing info in complaints
***There was no interview of my witness Karen Tarpos who was the one not Mrs. Page to train me on new duties and not retrain on the alleged old duties that I was incompetent on and is fundamental omission proving conspiracy to injure me with damages of refusal to refer to tribunal, injure me with personal injury of delusional disorder and to discredit me
31.30.Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21 Ontario Court of Appeal file Appeal C50990 for September 22nd 2010
para 60 “Lamer J. Stated , at p. 640 of Nelles, that to succeed in an action for malicious prosecution against the Attorney General or Crown counsel, the plaintiff would have to prove malice “in the form of a deliberate and improper use of the office of the Attorney-General or Crown Attorney, a use inconsistent with the Statute of “minister of justice”. He went on to say that in his view, this amounts to a requirement that the prosecutor “perpetrated a fraud on the process of criminal justice and in doing so has perverted or abused his office and the process of criminal justice.”
*like discretion by my Crown Defendants that discriminates against complainants with the only difference between me and other female complainants succeeding at Tribunal for exposure to porn in workplace is a misdiagnosis of a delusional disorder when Watts, MMP, and Lyman validated my sexual harassment complaints of exposure to porn in the workplace and Crown deliberately left that out of case analysis for Lyman and is fundamental omission to cause injury to plaintiff not an innocent mistake due to the Crown’s persistence into 2010 that they are allowed to live this prima facie fact and evidence out of case analysis per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record and in court comments per the Court Reports unlike the Commission in Ruckpaul who realized that not interviewing complainant’s witnesses is a flaw and corrected their wrongdoing
pg 16 para 62 “Borins J.A. noted, at paragraph 49, “that the core meaning of malice is the use of the criminal justice system for an improper purpose, the proper use of it being to bring before the Court a person whom the prosecutor has reasonable and probably cause to believe has committed a criminal offence.” He went on to say that:
“although the prosecutor may have reasonable and probable cause to commence a prosecution, if the prosecutor obtains information which suggests that the person probably did not commit the offence, or recklessly disregards advice that such information could be obtained through routine investigative steps, the prosecutor lacks reasonable and probable cause to continue the prosecution, and malice may be inferred.
*Same applies to the Commission and Staff and Minsiter responsible for the Code malice is the use of the human rights process both board and courts jurisdiction for not the proper purpose to eliminate discrimination per the Code, Charter and United Nations Treaty, and SCC cases making all complainants that is everyone is equal before the law per public policy in Ontario and Canada that includes the Crown accepting facts and evidence validating prima facie complaints and investigating it properly being all facts and evidence submitted by complainants including her witnesses
*Malice can be inferred by facts and evidence ignored by the Crown that proves prima facie complaints from Employer events listed in claims therefore per Justice Lofchik’s comment in endorsement record of “apart from the facts from Employer events there is nothing” I have pleaded valid facts and claims and right to amend by claims with Crown defendants included
para 63 Could recklessness of this sort give rise to an inference that Crown counsel deliberately and improperly used the office of the Crown Attorney, that such use is inconsistent with the statuts of “minister of justice”, and that it amounts to the prosecutor perpetrating a fraud on the process of criminal justice and in doing so, perverting or abusing his or her office and the process of criminal justice? For the purpose of this motion, I will assume it could.
***MAG suable per this case and argument
Pg 17 para 66 “Where fraud, misrepresentation, breach of trust, malice or intent is alleged, the pleading shall contain full particulars, but knowledge may be alleged as a fact without pleading the circumstances from which it is to be inferred.
***Fraud of the Code everyone equal per sections 5 to 10 and fair investigation is pleaded with sufficient facts from employer events and fact that none of complainant’s witnesses where interviewed nor all sexual harassers, and judicial facts from law of other complainants’successful human rights complaints differ from my judicial review court who refused to weigh evidence and are sufficient facts for malice and recklessless
para 68 “Here, the plaintiff alleges as fact no more than that Barry knew or ought to have known facts that deprived the prosecution of reasonable and probable cause.
*Not same as my pleadings per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record that I pleaded “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigations” and “apart from the facts from the employer events”
which are all the facts required for prima facie complaints made out and given to the Crown by me and the respondents in their rebuttal since all the respondents validated I made internal sexual harassment complaints and that these validations which are collaborations of facts proving prima facie complaints were obstructed by Crown
Pg 18 Para 73 “the minimum level of material fact disclosure has been reached, making the pleading regular and relief by way of particulars potentially available”
*not same as my case when Justice Lofchik’s endorsement records says my pleadings includes “facts from employer events” and “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation” – motion/order for particulars is available to me as Justice Lofchik does not say in endorsement that the “facts from employment events” are deficient with specific examples from pleading paragraphs in claims
Dawson v. Rexcraft Storage & Warehouse Inc. 1998
Rule 20.04(4) genuine issue exists as to material facts requiring trial
Case dealing with Investors?
Misrepresentation
Deep v. Ontario 2004 Spence J.
Striking out pleadings
Pg 1 “Deep’s claim related to the withholding that was effected from his fees from 1982 to 1984 and a second withholding of fees initiated in 2000 that was continuing.”
Pg 2 “Deep’s mere allegation of a breach of statute was insufficient to found a cause of action. He failed to plead material facts that would support an allegation that the College or Crown owed him a private law duty of care or to support his allegations of abuse of power and that the Crown and College acted with malice against him. Deep’s assertions that he offered full cooperation was without merit. The Ministry of Health was not a proper party and was not a suable entity at law. The statement of claim failed to disclose a cause of action against the individual defendants in their personal capacities. There was nothing in the factual context of the case that would support a finding of impugnable discrimination. Deep’s claim for prohibition of the continued withholding of fees had to be raised by way of judicial review. The allegations relating to the first time period were barred by the limitation period.
Pg 5 “Background
“Statement of Claim: Relief Sought
para 18 “In summary, the plaintiff asserts the following claims for relief: 1 to 6 items from claim
“The Statement of Claim: Principal Allegations
para 19 “The following statements taken from the following numbered paragraphs in the Statement of Claim state the principal allegations of the plaintiff: lists 4 to 25 (pg 5 to 7)
pg 7 “The Statement of Claim: Further Details – para 20 to 28 details from plaintiff’s claims
***this is evidence of differential retreat by Justice Lofchik as no where in his endorsement records does he make any references to paragraphs in claims with specifics to validate his analysis of the claim as deficient because my pleadings are sufficient per his other comment that I pleaded “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation” and “apart from the facts from the employer events” when I only need the facts from the employer events to show an intentional flawed biased investigation and reports and Judicial Reviews and Appeals to injure me that includes not interviewing any of my witnesses at 3 places of employment therefore to say insufficient evidence in Case Analysis without interviewing my witnesses is to fabricate insufficient evidence and fundamental omission per Ruckpaul’s Federal Court Judicial Review
pg 10 para 37
25.06 (1) Every pleading shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the party relies for the claim or defence, but not the evidence by which those facts are to be proved.
(2) A party may raise any point in law in a pleading, but conclusion of law may be pleaded only if the material facts supporting them are pleaded.
(8) Where fraud, misrepresentation, breach of trust, malice or intent is alleged, the pleading shall contain full particulars, but knowledge may be alleged as a fact without pleading the circumstances from which it is to be inferred.
Para 38 Allegations of legal conclusions are not facts and are insufficient for the purposes of pleading. This is particularly so where allegations of intentional or malicious conduct are made. A plaintiff must plead circumstances, particulars or facts which are sufficient to enable a trier of fact to properly infer intentional or malicious conduct.”
*See Wilson arguments on malice and recklessness proven by facts of improper investigation with serious omissions no witnesses interviewed for the complainant pleaded sufficiently and with particularity per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record “they acted deliberatedly with the quality of the investigation” and “apart from the facts from the employer events” which is all I need to show intentional flawed investigation of employer events and manipulated reports per MMP’s case analysis at #30 discriminatory and libelous opinion of “unfit to work had I return” to injure plaintiff
Para 45 “However, in the present case, there is a motion for summary judgment with affidavits from both sides. In these circumstances it seems to be only fair to take into account the affidavits and their bearing upon the summary judgment motion before making a final determination whether to strike a pleading that is factually deficient. Otherwise, it would be possible, at least in theory, to end up with a decision that would strike a pleading as factually deficient while at the same time granting the motion for summary judgment based on the facts established on the motion. Such a result would seem prima facie repugnant to good sense and fair process.
Para 46 “A typical instance of this kind of deficiency is the pleading or affidavit that states as a fact what is really a conclusion without a stated factual basis. For example, a party might state simply that the party was defamed by the other party without stating what the other party said that was defamatory. Such a statement fails to assert a fact and accordingly does not enable the other party to identify the factual basis of the case which it is required to meet.”
***My pleadings clearly state that the defamatory facts are fabrication of incompetency (MMP that includes disarray of books plus other items including overtime pay request not owed to me when another Government Department the Labour Board clearly stated to MMP it was owed to me and I received $1.00 raise at 3 month probation, and for Xentel incompetency allegations proven as fabrication to get rid of complainer per sexual harassment complaint that resulted in termination meeting after I advised Manager I was seeking 3rd party involvement when Xentel offered notice with release), that the MMP Case Analysis report at #30 was libelous opinion with “unfit to work had I return”, and lastly injurious falsehoods of insufficient evidence of discrimination, sexual harassment and reprisal to discredit me without a fair proper investigation of all the facts and interviewing harassers and witnesses and reliance on unreliable witnesses such of Mrs. Page and Mr. Clarke with proven Bad Faith conduct per MMP’s termination letter and changing cause 5 times
Para 50 “The plaintiff asserts a claim for breach of natural justice. Breach of natural justice is not a cause of action known in law. So it is plain and obvious that the statement of claim does not disclose a reasonable cause of action”
*not same as my claims in that breach of natural justice is like breach of statute per Saskatchewan argument in Odhavji that it does not, however, establish that the breach of a statute cannot give rise to liability if the constituent elements of tortuous responsibility have been satisfied and same applies to breach of natural justice and it can be improper purpose or unlawful conduct for intentional torts that are the tortuous responsibility
04 Matter Pleading para #9
I plead that the misdiagnosis of a delusional disorder is behind conspiracy campaign resulting in the additional harassment at Mackay and 3 more employers, and the commission obstructing natural justice of not referring 4 prima facie complaints to the Tribunal.
*Here I stated it as a fact of behaviour/conduct to prove conspiracy campaign with Crown with MMP of leaving out prima facie facts and evidence out of case analysis report to obstruct natural justice are per this pleading the facts are:
Dasha Page treated me less favorably by alleging incompetence and reduction of work and she made one indirect comment of “delusion” in my presence in March and she made the comment that I said “people were out to get me” to both WSIB and the Ontario Human Rights commission, and finally Dasha Page abdicated her duty to care and never contacted me once about my health nor to provide accommodation for my injury to health, nor pay me 5 sick days per policy or respond to my November/December letters to her. Plus Mrs Page sends to my home on January 20th 2003 a termination letter in direct violation of the Occupational Health and Safety Act section 50 and the criminal code 425.1 demonstrates Retaliatory Discharge. Based on this pattern alone by Dasha, which demonstrates discrimination and reprisal, I can only infer the case analysis by the commission to not refer to the Tribunal is collusion with MMP and a form of accessory after the fact someone who helps a person who has committed a crime to escape detention or capture as outlined in section 23 of the Criminal Code. That crime is not just discrimination but a conspiracy to injure me with a mental illness of the type of “people out to get me”.
*This pleading does not say I plead cause of action of obstruction natural justice but rather the tort of Conspiracy of which to achieve a conspiracy with employer defendants it requires the Crown defendants to obstruct natural justice which is an improper purpose and/or unlawful action per tort of conspiracy and Misfeance of public office to refuse tribunal which causes injury to plaintiff, and by siding with Page per Wilson Case accepting unreliable witness evidence by ignoring all of my evidence and refusing to interview my witnesses particular Karen Tarpos on the alleged incompetency when she was the one training me not Page nor the two alleged witnesses per Case Analysis
***another fundamental omission in report no mention how MMP accommodated my disability before terminating my employment proving no investigation of this fundamental disability discrimination fact
04 Matter Pleading Para #13:
I plead that the defendants Mrs. Page and Mr. Clarke and Watts Industries, deliberately and knowingly made false and erroneous allegations which were/are defamatory and were made to cause me economic harm and damage that adversely affected my relationship with co-workers, WSIB, Ontario Human Rights Commission, the Employment Standards Office, and Small Claims Court (precedent case: Duke v. Puts, 2004). This defamation of my character by defendants Watts and MMP with the commission resulted in the December 2004 case analysis from Shannon Meadows-Lee of the investigation department of the OHRC with many injurious falsehoods that are easily disputed to obstruct natural justice of referring my prima facie complaints against MMP and Watts to the Tribunal, and later refusal to refer decision by Chief Commissioner Keith Norton. These case analysis also represents the commission’s misfeasance of public office and other tortious actions such as deceit, defamation, conspiracy to injure, intentional emotional distress (acting on their knowledge of my injury to health vulnerability), injurious falsehoods; and criminal action of obstruction of justice, accessory after the fact, adding and abetting, concealing my evidence, and controlling witnesses to avoid adverse outcome.
***Here I clearly state this defamation and many injurious falsehoods to obstruct natural justice which is a fact of conduct, and criminal action of obstruction of justice not tort of breach of natural justice which denotes unlawfulness per Conspiracy tort element, and facts being items in the case analysis which would include injurious falsehoods of incompetency and insufficient evidence of sexual harassment, discrimination (gender and disability perceived and real) and reprisal
***Also it is unlawful conduct for tort of conspiracy and improper purpose for misfeasance of public office
Additional facts pleaded that includes paras #2 to #134 in claim where facts of each sexual incident and Crown’s alleged factual basis in case analysis to refuse referral:
I also infer that the commission is colluding with both Watts and Mackay as they were late in submitting their defense statement causing noting in default, and motions to set aside default to file defence till closer to date of the OHRC’s submission of their case analyses, and both deny the material facts from #2 to #134 with general denials and are asking for stay of proceedings till the commission has made their decision in their original defence. I believe this due to the fact that MMP’s statement of defence only give general denials with no material fact to back up the denials particularly why they summary dismissed me with cause and no notice per rule 25.07 (3). I believe that both MMP and Watts would have submitted a motion to dismiss my claim based on the case analyses fabricating insufficient evidence provide to them by the OHRC as per their original defence statement. A stay of these proceedings should not be granted per the following reasons: it’s been already 2 years since my dismissal, collusion and obstruction by the OHRC, and I am currently unemployed again as a direct result of additional interference and repeating of items in my Human Rights Complaints, and I am having more difficulty finding replace work than I did in 2002. Plus the arguments found in Kurlyk v. Toronto (City) Board of Education of: ample precedent for allowing parallel proceedings which may result in different findings, deletion of exclusive jurisdiction clause permitting judicial incursion into areas formerly occupied by the commission, and assessment of damages is not beyond the ken of this court and the commission. The case of Skoptiz v. Intercorp Foods allowed an extension of the common law notice, consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Wallace, based on a finding that the employer had violated the Human Rights Code by not accommodating the plaintiff’s medical disability. It is feasible that a plaintiff may use both the civil claim and the human rights process in tandem.
04 Matter Pleading Para #15
I plead that the extent of Watts’ defamation of my character extends beyond Watts Industries interference at Mackay and includes defaming my character with the Ontario Human Rights commission to cause an obstruction of natural justice and injurious falsehoods by the commission staff of insufficient evidence of prima facie complaints.
*Here I clearly say to cause an obstruction of natural justice and injurious falsehoods with the breach part of the defamation tort and reference to improper investigation all conduct to discredit the complainant with reader of case analyses
*Per Deep I have sufficiently pleaded per tort of defamation with damages being at large and for the infringement of a guaranteed right
*I continue in this pleading with the certain facts for defamation as:
The defamation of my character can easily be demonstrated based on my pass memos of performance by others prior to working at Mackay and MacKay’s description of my work ethics during my employment that they submitted to the Ontario Human Rights commission in their rebuttal to my complaint, in the December 2004 case analysis, and Mr. Clarke’s comments in his letter to the Employment Standards Office. I can show that in 1992 I was promoted to branch administrator; in 1993 I was recognized by my manager for my attention to Quality; in 1996 that same manager stated that my solid and reliable performance is appreciated; in 1999 from Watts manager being noted that I was a strong performer in accomplishing tasks and 2001 rating of 4 exceeding expectations in receivable duties; in 2002 reference letter from employer before Mackay that I was a conscientious, punctual employee who took her responsibilities very seriously; and then from Mackay claiming performance issues without progressive discipline process for wrongful dismissal excuse after they received my Human Rights complaint against them when original reason for termination is reprisal action under the Code and violation of criminal code 425.1. I can also show fabrication of warning letter at Watts Industries to paint me a trouble-maker and lacking in team spirit which was successfully challenged in fax to commission in May 2001.
MacKay’s defamatory reference for me in their response to Human Rights commission was the following: the respondents state that the employment was terminated following a significant absence and due to performance issues (proving discrimination based on real disability); Dasha Page was upset by the conversation given the nature of the conversation and the bizarre accusations that were being made, the Respondents considered terminating the employment immediately during the probationary period; it became clear that the Complainant could not handle the full responsibilities of the position and was really just not competent enough to perform to work in a busy office; Dasha Page denies that there was any conversation regarding quitting; the Respondents could have let her go during the probationary period but elected to try and preserve her position as she made it apparent that she needed the job; the Complainant was unable to operate the accounting duties and the Respondents were required to bring in additional help in order to do the accounting; there was significant damage done to the Respondents by virtue of the administration system implemented by the Complainant; and the Complainant maintained that extensive overtime was necessary in order for her to do the job, while the job had previously been done without the necessity of overtime. I submitted an excellent rebuttal to this fabrication causing additional fabrication by the defendants in the commission case analysis of disarray of books that were not mentioned in their rebuttal to my complaint that I received and was allowed to cross examine.
*Last line are facts to the breach of natural justice therefore not conclusion
My reputation as a good worker has been defamed by Watts Industries, and now Mackay to the point of not being able to receive fair employment without this continuation of Watts’ mobbing campaign at next employer nor good references for future job opportunities due to their actions, plus not being giving the appropriate work environment to grow and improve my skills, and is career stoppage. I also have the added problem of now having my Charter Rights obstructed by the OHRC. My excellent health record destroyed by the actions by these two employers causing intentionally injury to my health which resulted in loss of insurance benefits in 2003 at fourth employer in this campaign due to the fact now I have to reveal that I have suffered from depression when previously I did not.
***facts of Damages
04 Matter Pleading para #18:
I plead that I mitigated my loss of employment at Mackay by starting a part time telemarketing job on January 10th, 2003, and a full time accounting job on February 10th, 2003, and working at both jobs till September 15th 2003. The full time position rate of pay of $35,000/year exceeded the rate of pay at MMP and I was also wrongfully terminated in March 2004. I continue to mitigate my damages but finding difficult to find work with 3 additional employers participating in this campaign and not receiving proper reference letters from these participants too. This difficulty in finding replacement work is demonstrated by the following: in 2003 it took only 1 month to be rehired, in 2004 it took 6 months, only to be wrongfully dismissed after only 2 months and complaining again of sexual environment, and now currently unemployed since November 15th 2004. Also I mitigated my damages to my health by first challenging the misdiagnosis with the Ontario College of Surgeons and Physicians and closing of that file in September 2002. Then by seeking another assessment for my injury to health via trained psychologist who listens to their patients, which I received on October 2002 of anxiety with depressed moods that is acute, and changing my medication to match the correct assessment. I changed my medication from Anti-Psychotic Perphenzine to Paxil around December 5th 2002 and continue to medicate on Paxil. I am currently still taking this medication to continue to mitigate my health damages as a result of additional mobbing stress at 3 more employers plus obstruction of natural justice by the OHRC that causes abnormal levels of anxiety and anger to avoid another episode of reactive depression and suicide ideation that leads to attempts.
*Here it’s the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress which I called (mobbing stress) as a result of the “FACTs” of 1) Crown’s conduct of obstruction of natural justice (the refusal to refer prima facie complaints to tribunal like other complainants with same facts) which is the Overt statement/action causing the stress – “Fact” of anxiety and anger requiring to medicate on Paxil (proven illness of abnormal anxiety)
*Per SCC of Odhavij this is sufficient for pleadings for Tort of Intentional Inflection of Emotional Distress
***facts for damages
04 Matter pleading para #20:
I plead that the facts as stated in Shannon Meadows-Lee from the investigation office at the commission in her December 2004 MMP case analysis are injurious falsehoods and the tort of deceit from the commission colluding with now MMP Limited to protect Watts Reprisal campaign from being exposed by concealing evidence and controlling witnesses who would provide adverse outcome to the facts presented in these case analyses. The concealment of evidence is the concealment of the material facts in this statement listed from #36 to #142. This concealment of evidence and material facts demonstrates a breach of fairness by the OHRC. I had already commenced a civil suit for misfeasance of public office against the commission for colluding with the third and fourth employers in this campaign in 2004 prior to receiving these case analyses. I infer the commission has a need to avoid the truth from being exposed at the Tribunal because of their participation with this campaign in 2003/2004 and this is the criminal action of accessory after the fact. The most obvious injurious falsehoods is the allegation of gross incompetence and the concealing of my termination letter in direct violation of the criminal code 425.1 by both MMP Limited and Shannon Meadows-Lee and Dina Waik (investigating officer) to obstruct natural justice of referring my prima facie complaint to the Tribunal were the evidence will contradict the commission’s finding of fact.
*Here I plead the tort of injurious falsehoods again and the tort of deceit that includes the fact of unlawful conduct by Commission staff of obstruct natural justice and breach of fairness for the deceit tort
*Per Wilson case pg 15 para #59 – Malice and reckless disregard of evidence which discloses unreliability of information provided by employer defendants particularly Mrs. Page and Mr. Clarke and facts from employer events as to what was unreliable pleaded and sufficient for continuing suit against the Crown defendants
*Defamation per injurious falsehoods includes facts of the case analysis just like Botiuk SCC case, facts of conduct of concealing evidence and controlling witnesses listed at paras in claim from #36 to #142, fact of injurious falsehoods of incompetency, fact of conduct to obstruct natural justice of referring my prima facie complaint to Tribunal
***Tort of deceit – misrepresentation – my claims were being investigated fairly – fact of an investigation implies that the Crown investigates fairly, fact concealing my termination letter, and fact of conduct concealment of evidence and material facts demonstrates a breach of fairness by the OHRC per list #36 to #142
***Tort of Conspiracy – Colluding with MMP to protect Watts reprisal campaign by conduct of concealing evidence and controlling witnesses part of the conduct of obstruction of justice
Additional facts for conclusion of conspiracy, deceit and injurious falsehoods with judicial facts from case law:
I claim that the defendants have no honest belief in their statement of gross incompetence because they do not use this defense in common law because there is no defense for cause of gross incompetence without a progressive discipline process and a couple of signed warning letters from me but apparently the commission feels there is such a defense in the Human Rights jurisdiction. I like to argue that this is abuse of statutory duty and authority by the commission as per the following in Pritchard v. OHRC: “while administrative boards have the delegated authority to determine their own procedure, the exercise of that authority must be in accordance with natural justice and the common law.” Also, the defendants allege reduction of work which would be considered to be a demotion which is a breach of contract and supports a constructive dismissal suit. My evidence of fact to the commission shows increase in work load not reduction. By fabricating falsehoods of reduction of work, the defendants at MMP and the OHRC demonstrate they intended to breach contract not to mention wrongful interference with contract. The MMP defendants and the commission are attempting to rely on the common law defense of after-acquired cause with the alleged disarray of books which I feel are facts that should have been readily available to me from the outset between March to August 2002 for the defendants to provide me with a progressive discipline process while employed and/or at least include this alleged fact in their January 20th 2003 dismissal letter that I received after my 5 month absence due to injury to health.
04 matter para pleading #28 clearly denoting the obstruction of natural justice as fact of conduct/behaviour and not cause of action:
I plead that the commission being a quasi-judicial process relies and hides behind their immunity status to abuse their authority and statutory duties. I feel that this is a case where the commission acted outside its limit (collusion). I infer that the commission improperly exercises its judicial powers with criminal behaviour of obstruction of natural justice, concealing evidence and controlling witnesses who would provide adverse outcome are types of misconduct that amount to sufficient excesses of jurisdiction and are thus not protected by an absolute immunity. By alleging facts and evidence in her case analysis of gross incompetence as cause for my dismissal, refusing to review and note January 20th 2003 termination letter with retaliatory discharge reason for dismissal plus the lack of credibility by the defendants at MMP, refusing to question witness on bantering of disability of persecution with “people out to get me”, and statement made that had I return I would not be mentally capable of handling my duties when facts show I moved on very quickly to part time and full time employment, Shannon Meadows-Lee and Dina Waik demonstrate sufficient excesses of abuse of jurisdiction and targeted malice. I refer to page 289 of Klar’s Tort Law #146: Judicial immunity is defended on the ground that it is not for judges’ protection but for the public’s protection; Judges should be able to act independently and fearlessly without threat of lawsuit by disappointed litigants; this rational is understandable; it does not, however, justify extending the immunity to judges who act maliciously in order to harm claimants.
***Per Wilson case shows malice and reckless conduct
Deep pg 12 para #51 “Since there is no nominate tort of statutory breach in Canada, the plaintiff’s mere allegation of a breach of statute is insufficient. Rather, any purported breach of a statute must be considered in the context of a claim of negligence: Canada v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool [1983] 1 S.C.R. .
***error in law per Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse SCC dated 2003 invalidates this legal argument see my appeal factum pg 22/23 para in case #31 as SCC judge corrects the error made by SCC in 1983:
“I wish to stress that this conclusion is not inconsistent with R. v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 205, in which the Court established that the nominate tort of statutory breach does not exist. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool states only that it is insufficient that the defendant has breached the statute. It does not, however, establish that the breach of a statute cannot give rise to liability if the constituent elements of tortuous responsibility have been satisfied. Put a different way, the mere fact that the alleged misconduct also constitutes a breach of statute is insufficient to exempt the officer from civil liability. Just as a public officer who breaches a statute might be liable for negligence, so too might a public officer who breaches a statute be liable for misfeasance in a public office. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool would only be relevant to this motion if the appellants had pleaded no more than a failure to discharge a statutory obligation. This, however, is not the case. The principle established in Saskatchewan Wheat Pool has no bearing on the outcome of the motion on this appeal.
***This legal argument also applies to Breach of Natural Justice or obstruction of Natural Justice – that there is no tort of Breach of Natural Justice but the 1983 case does not establish that the breach of natural justice cannot give rise to liability if the constituent elements of tortuous responsibility have been satisfied as also part of liability for misfeasance in public office –such as my position one of the improper purpose or unlawful conduct for tort of Conspiracy or tort of deceit and defamation
32.31.30.Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21 Ontario Court of Appeal file Appeal C50990 for September 22nd 2010
04 Matter para pleading #25:
, that exposure to sex picture is automatic breach of code 5 and 7 and proves poisoned work environment under the code
“When the respondent’s treatment of the complainant is partly reprisal for contacting the Commission, there is a breach of section 8.” Therefore Watts’ treatment of the complainant by interfering with her employment relations for filing her 2000 complaint with the phrase “sucks to be you”, address of Claude, and additional exposures to sexual pictures is a breach of section 8.
***“breach of a statute” I make references to breach of code 5 and 7 at para #25, code 8 at para #26, and breach of fairness which has to do with the tort of deceit and misrepresentation that my complaints were being investigated fairly and without bias (one sided investigation)
04 Matter para pleading #20:
I plead that the facts as stated in Shannon Meadows-Lee from the investigation office at the commission in her December 2004 MMP case analysis are injurious falsehoods and the tort of deceit from the commission colluding with now MMP Limited to protect Watts Reprisal campaign from being exposed by concealing evidence and controlling witnesses who would provide adverse outcome to the facts presented in these case analyses. The concealment of evidence is the concealment of the material facts in this statement listed from #36 to #142. This concealment of evidence and material facts demonstrates a breach of fairness by the OHRC.
This alleged fact of gross incompetence alone is evidence of Bad Faith and unfairness of an employer’s dismissal investigation and the commission’s statutory duty, breach of fairness, aggravated an injury to the plaintiff and therefore magnified the award of damages for mental distress, warrants punitive and now exemplary damages.
04 Matter para pleading #26:
I plead that by imaging a sham investigation fabricating insufficient evidence and controlling the witnesses at the employers that Watts interfered with such as MMP the commission demonstrates biase towards Watts and discriminating employers, breach of fairness, and has violated my Charter Rights section 15 (1) of: Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination. Thus fabricating insufficient evidence at MMP will naturally result in fabrication of insufficient evidence at Watts, particularly when the commission only interviewed the managers at MMP who are the other defendants in this suit.
04 Matter para pleading #27:
I plead that there is evidence of defamation in 2001 by the commission that Ms. Meadows-Lee is concealing regarding my 2000 Watts Complaint. At #17 in Watts’ case analysis Ms. Meadows-Lee alleges insufficient evidence obtained during investigation to indicate that Watts defamed the complainant’s character during the mediation process which is additional imaging of the truth. The 2000 complaint was submitted in the fall and the deadline for Watts’ rebuttal was in January. In February my intake officer left a message with my husband to advised me that this complaint was being sent to the investigation department, and then the commission allowed Watts to send me their rebuttal in April demonstrating breach of fairness by the commission.
***Intake officer was Janet Barrett (lacasse case)
Deep para #57: “As noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Cooper, the statute is the only source of the Crown decision-maker’s duties, private or public. Apart from the statute, a Crown decision-maker is in no different position from the ordinary man or woman on the street. If a duty to the plaintiff is to be found, it must be in the pertinent statutory provisions. If the statute does not provide for a private law duty of care, so such duty exists and there can be no claim of negligence.:
*Code provides for duty to apply Code to eliminate discrimination for everyone in its preamble, sections 5 to 10, and s. 29 function of commission (a) to forward the policy that the dignity and worth of every person be recognized and that equal rights and opportunities be provided without discrimination that is contrary to law and (d) to develop and conduct programs of public information and education and untertake, direct and encourage research designed to eliminate discriminatory practices that infringe rights under this Act, and to provide damages such as making complainant whole
Deep para #60: “The plaintiff at paragraph 29 pleads that the defendants were “negligent in their exercise of statutory powers and breached the duty required of them…” but has failed to plead material facts to support any allegations that the defendants owed him a private law duty of care. The allegations of negligence in the statement of claim fail to give rise to a reasonable cause of action and it is plain and obvious that any such claim cannot succeed.”
***not same as my claim with no such pleading as at Deep para #29 and both Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record and Crown Defendants factum make no reference to a paragraph in my claim where I did but rather make bald conclusions of law
Deep para #64: “Bad faith is a legal conclusion. It has been held to involve an allegation of an intent to deceive or to make someone believe what is false. It has been said to be equivalent to an allegation of dishonesty. Where a plaintiff’s claim includes an allegation of bad faith, the pleading must be supported by sufficient particulars that support a legal conclusion of bad faith. If it does not, the pleading should be struck.”
Deep para #65: “The plaintiff’s allegations of bad faith are found inparagraph 17 of the statement of Claim (allegation that the College has a long history of dealing unfairly with him), paragraph 30 of the Statement of Claim (allegations that the defendants improperly proceeded with mala fide and reckless disregard of the consequences of its decisions, their conduct was reprehensible and aggravated damages are warranted), paragraph 31 of the Statement of Claim (allegation that the defendants acted in a high handed vindictive manner with callous disregard to the plaintiff and his rights) and paragraph 32 of the Statement of Claim (allegation that the action of the defendants was intentionally directed against the plaintiff and his property warranting punitive damages). Nor is there any affidavit evidence to support a claim of bad faith.
*Not same as my claim since Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record or the Crown Defendants’ factums arguments are unsupported by no reference to paragraphs in my claims where I pleaded insufficient bad faith so their arguments are bald conclusions of law per Deep para #66
Deep para #66: “All of these allegations state legal conclusions unsupported by any particulars of the conduct that constitutes bad faith.”
Deep Para 46: “A typical instance of this kind of deficiency is the pleading or affidavit that states as a fact what is really a conclusion without a stated factual basis. For example, a party might state simply that the party was defamed by the other party without stating what the other party said that was defamatory. Such a statement fails to assert a fact and accordingly does not enable the other party to identify the factual basis of the case which it is required to meet.”
***Justice Lofchik does not provide in endorsement record nor Crown in their factums any paragraphs in my claims of a typical instance of this kind of deficiency per Deep but are both wrongfully lumping the employment event facts from human rights process all into the argument only allowed to review via Judicail review which is also not per Deep’s Appeal careful and comprehensive reasons (154 paragraphs) dealing with all of the issues, including procedural issues relating to Rules 20, 21 and 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and substantive issues raised by the appellant and both sets of respondent
***My pleadings clearly state what the defamatory facts per Justice Lofchik of “apart from facts of employment events” are fabrication of incompetency with Bad Faith (MMP that includes disarray of books plus other items including overtime pay request not owed to me when another Government Department the Labour Board clearly stated to MMP it was owed to me and that MMP contravene the Labour Act and I received $1.00 raise at 3 month probation, and for Xentel incompetency allegations when Xentel offered notice with release), that the MMP Case Analysis report at #30 was libelous opinion with “unfit to work had I return”, and lastly injurious falsehoods of insufficient evidence of discrimination, sexual harassment and reprisal without a fair proper investigation of all the facts and interviewing harassers and witnesses which includes the Crown finding my witness statement to be uncredible over Mrs. Page and Mr. Clarke with proven Bad Faith conduct per their termination letter left out of case analysis report pleaded sufficiently
04 Matter para #8:
My claim of a scapegoat campaign to induce a mental illness of persecution type is further substantiate by the fact that Mrs. Page breaches her fiduciary duty and sets out to deceive the WSIB in August 20th letter with false fact that I made no complaints, and later that I said to her “people were out to get me”, acts in bad faith by providing me one reason for termination in letter dated January 20th, 2003, which is different from termination reason provided to Ontario Human Rights commission and later to Small Claims Court in Burlington, and no reason for dismissal with cause in her defense for Superior Court claim, and finally new reason of disarray of books in the commission case analysis that I only received in December 2004.
04 Matter para #11:
My termination clearly states that my employment was terminated because my WSIB claim was denied and my allegation not substantiated, that is a discipline measure of termination because I provided information to a person whose duties include the enforcement of provincial law. The injurious falsehoods of gross incompetence of disarray of books only being used by the Human Rights commission only in December 2004 is additional retaliation and now violation of section 425.1 of the criminal code. Also, MMP’s behaviour of continuously changing the reason they dismissed me after I out argue the original reasons demonstrates bad faith termination and creates Wallace damages.
04 Matter para #20:
The concealment of evidence is the concealment of the material facts in this statement listed from #36 to #142. This concealment of evidence and material facts demonstrates a breach of fairness by the OHRC.
Sproats’ Wrongful Dismissal Handbook of: malice has been described as the absence of bona fides proven or reasonably inferred from the facts; malice in the law of injurious falsehoods is sometimes equated with dishonest or improper motive; honest belief in an unfounded claim is not malice but the nature of the unfounded claim may be evidence that there was not an honest belief in it. In my case the purpose of false claims in one jurisdiction and not the other for the sole purpose of avoiding a referral to Tribunal where the evidence will be exposed is malice and absence of bona fides.
I claim that the defendants have no honest belief in their statement of gross incompetence because they do not use this defense in common law because there is no defense for cause of gross incompetence without a progressive discipline process and a couple of signed warning letters from me but apparently the commission feels there is such a defense in the Human Rights jurisdiction. I like to argue that this is abuse of statutory duty and authority by the commission as per the following in Pritchard v. OHRC: “while administrative boards have the delegated authority to determine their own procedure, the exercise of that authority must be in accordance with natural justice and the common law.” Also, the defendants allege reduction of work which would be considered to be a demotion which is a breach of contract and supports a constructive dismissal suit. My evidence of fact to the commission shows increase in work load not reduction. By fabricating falsehoods of reduction of work, the defendants at MMP and the OHRC demonstrate they intended to breach contract not to mention wrongful interference with contract. The MMP defendants and the commission are attempting to rely on the common law defense of after-acquired cause with the alleged disarray of books which I feel are facts that should have been readily available to me from the outset between March to August 2002 for the defendants to provide me with a progressive discipline process while employed and/or at least include this alleged fact in their January 20th 2003 dismissal letter that I received after my 5 month absence due to injury to health.
Furthermore, there are cases showing precedent that if the Employer contributes to the incompetence, or the employee’s performance deteriorate because of illness, especially a stress-related one caused by the employer, or the employer fails to give opportunity to respond to allegations of cause the court will consider this factor in determining whether cause for summary dismissal exists. I refer to Casey V. General Inc. (1988), 24 C.C.E.L. 142, 73 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 103 (Nfld. S.C.). This fact in law is also represented in the Human Rights decision in Morrison v. Motsewetsho which the investigation staff is intentionally ignoring: “Sexual harassment may justify an employee’s poor work performance.” This alleged fact of gross incompetence alone is evidence of Bad Faith and unfairness of an employer’s dismissal investigation and the commission’s statutory duty, breach of fairness, aggravated an injury to the plaintiff and therefore magnified the award of damages for mental distress, warrants punitive and now exemplary damages.
*As well I pleaded fabricating insufficient evidence in several paragraphs throughout the claim which is an allegation of an intent to deceive or to make someone believe what is false equivalent to an allegation of dishonesty sufficient for allegation of Bad Faith per Deep para #65
Deep para #70 elements of abuse of public office:
that the defendant is a public officer
the defendant exercised his/her power as a public officer
the defendant was acting with malice or improper purpose
the plaintiff has sufficient legal interest to sue
there is causal connection between the wrongful exercise of power by the defendant and the plaintiff’s harm
the plaintiff must prove his/her damages
Deep para #72: “The plaintiff has failed to plead facts to support his allegations with respect to the defendants’ purported abuses of power. Specifically, he has failed to plead material facts describing the following: which of the defendants has or have committed such abuses; what specific powers were abused; how and when such powers were abused; or that the plaintiff himself was the object of the impugned conduct.”
Deep para #73: “Moreover, the plaintiff has failed to plead any facts that would support the allegation that the defendants (or any of them acted with malice towards him; with the knowledge that their conduct lacked statutory authority, with the intent to injure him; or with knowledge that their acts would injure the plaintiff.”
Pg 17 Deep para #78: “The plaintiff has failed to plead any specific facts with respect to any allegations that the predominant purpose for any impugned legal proceeding was improper.”
Deep para #83: “A claim against a Minister of the Crown is a claim against the Minister personally.”
Deep para #90: “The plaintiff claims that the General Manager’s decision to suspend payments to him pursuant to the Health Insurance Act violates his rights under s. 7 of the Charter “to life, liberty and security of the person,” because it limits his “right to choose his occupation and where to pursue it”. The plaintiff relies on the decision of the Court of Appeal of British Columbia in Wilson v. British Columbia (Medical Services Commission) (1988), [1989] 2 W.W.R.1., 30 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, 53 D.L.R. (4th) 171, (leave to appeal refused [1988] 2 S.C.R. vii, [1988] S.C.C.A. No. 352).
*Not same as my pleading
04 Matter para pleading #32 with grounds of gender and disability perceived and real resulting in last of jobs s. 7 right to not be deprived:
I plead that my Charter Rights, equal access and benefit of the law, have been violated by the OHRC by their tortious actions with my complaints against the defendants Watts and MMP Limited as per the material facts listed at #36 to #142. The commission process in it self is inconsistent with the Charter. My situation is worsening since filing my first complaint in 2000 and by the addition of tortious actions by commission staff from 2003 onwards. Section 7 states: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Section 15 (1) states: Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. For the past 6 years my right to job security has been violated due to being a woman whistleblower of sexual harassment in the work place and therefore sex discrimination by five employers, four of them in a row. The OHRC’s statutory duty affects the employment contract as they are to make the complainant whole as if the discrimination never occurred. This includes all loss in wages. Therefore, the violation to the charter applies to the commission due to their misfeasance of public office by providing me a sham investigation and fabricating insufficient evidence to not refer my prima facie complaints to the Tribunal where I can recover full loss in wages as if the discrimination had never taken place.
Deep pg 20 para #97: “Section 15(1) of the Charter provides that “every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination…”. In order to succeed under s. 15 of the Charter, the plaintiff must prove that he has been subjected to differential treatment based on an enumerated or analogous ground and that the differential treatment is discrimination in the sense that it deprives him of his human dignity.
Deep pg 21 para #98: Although the plaintiff pleads that “no other physician in Ontario was subjected to total withholding of payments”, there is no suggestion that he is being treated any differently from any other doctor who repeatedly violates his or her obligations to cooperate with MRC inspectors under s. 40.2 of the Health Insurance Act.”
Deep para #99: “Even if the plaintiff were treated differently from other doctors as he has alleged, it is clear that his rights under s. 15 have been been infringed. To infringe his s. 15 rights, that difference in treatment would have to be based on an enumerated or analogous ground, and would have to deprive him of his human dignity. The payments were not suspended, for example, on the facts pleaded, because of his race, ethnic background, gender, citizenship status or any other enumerated or analogous ground.”
*Unlike my claim for ground of gender and disability perceived and real
Deep pg 22 para #105: “At paragraph 8 of the statement of claim, the plaintiff alleges that “no other physician in Ontario was subjected to total withholding of payment in these circumstances”. The plaintiff does not in the paragraphs up to and including paragraph 8, allege any particular “circumstances”. In the paragraphs that follow, the plaintiff asserts a number of adverse allegations about the conduct of the defendants. These allegations do not alleged facts that would support a finding that the treatment the plaintiff received was discriminatory in comparison with the treatment received by other persons in similar circumstances to those of the plaintiff.
*Not same as my case with judicial facts of case law such as Jones, Janzen, Budge V. Thorvaldson Care Homes Ltd. Cited and others
04 matter para pleading #25;
. Ms. Waik is supposed to be an expertise in fact-finding and she leaves out of her report submitted to Ms. Meadows-Lee the following material facts for MMP as listed from #36 to #114: my termination letter in direct violation of criminal code 425.1, that exposure to sex picture is automatic breach of code 5 and 7 and proves poisoned work environment under the code,
04 matter para pleading #32:
I plead that my Charter Rights, equal access and benefit of the law, have been violated by the OHRC by their tortious actions with my complaints against the defendants Watts and MMP Limited as per the material facts listed at #36 to #142. The commission process in it self is inconsistent with the Charter. My situation is worsening since filing my first complaint in 2000 and by the addition of tortious actions by commission staff from 2003 onwards. Section 7 states: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Section 15 (1) states: Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. For the past 6 years my right to job security has been violated due to being a woman whistleblower of sexual harassment in the work place and therefore sex discrimination by five employers, four of them in a row. The OHRC’s statutory duty affects the employment contract as they are to make the complainant whole as if the discrimination never occurred. This includes all loss in wages. Therefore, the violation to the charter applies to the commission due to their misfeasance of public office by providing me a sham investigation and fabricating insufficient evidence to not refer my prima facie complaints to the Tribunal where I can recover full loss in wages as if the discrimination had never taken place.
04 Matter para pleading #26 that includes facts of conduct imaging a sham investigation fabricating insufficient evidence and controlling witnesses plus judicial recognized facts of case law to show how I am being treated differently with these other complainants particularly Jones whom the Commission referred to the Tribunal with absolutely no sexual harassment complaints validated by Jone’s respondent whereas I do have Respondents validation/collaboration per MMP, Xentel, and Lyman Complaints:
I plead that by imaging a sham investigation fabricating insufficient evidence and controlling the witnesses at the employers that Watts interfered with such as MMP the commission demonstrates biase towards Watts and discriminating employers, breach of fairness, and has violated my Charter Rights section 15 (1) of: Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination. Thus fabricating insufficient evidence at MMP will naturally result in fabrication of insufficient evidence at Watts, particularly when the commission only interviewed the managers at MMP who are the other defendants in this suit.
I used the following arguments in Human Rights in my reconsideration application to convince the Chief Commission to reconsider one of my reprisal complaints against Watts. I did not have anyone make hostile comment of “sucks to be you” to me in my work places till Watts Industries, and than repeating this hostile remark and variations of it in mocking manner at four employers in a row. That in its self is enough of a link to require the commission to do its statutory duty and process the reprisal complaint against Watts. The repeating of ‘sucks to be you” particularly links interference by Watts as this disparaging remark disguised as joke was repeated and variations of it at all of these places of employment after filing a successful Human Rights Complaint against Watts Industries in 2000 where one of the incident involves this specific phrase by Lynn Shea. I refer to the argument in case of Moffatt v. Kinark Child & Family Services (1998), 35 C.H.R.R. D/205 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry): “Section 8 requires an actual or threatened retaliatory act linked to the making of a complaint under the Code. The link can be established in two ways: proof the respondent intended to retaliate or the perception of the complaint, on a “reasonableness” standard.” At MMP the repeating of a variation of the hostile remark “sucks to be you” on top of exposing me to sexual picture, addressing me as “Claude”, Ross Clarke fiddling with his pants in my presence and withholding the sexual harassment policy till August 9th when he uses that policy to intimidate me, Ross Clarke bantering in my presence about another staff caught looking at pornography on his computer, use of double speak to create errors in my work, and lastly Mrs. Page’s bantering the word “delusional” and later alleging I said to her that “people were out to get me” is enough of a retaliatory act linked to the making of the Watts’ complaint under the Code. Not only are these incidents right out of my 2000 complaint proof the respondent retaliated it is the perception of the complainant on a “reasonable” standard.
I also refer to the case of deSousa v. Gauthier (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 5053, 43 C.H.R.R. D/128, [2002] O.H.R.B.I.D. No. 9 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry); Bryan v. Premark Canada Inc. (November 6, 1998), Doc. 98-18 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry); Elkas v. Blush Stop Inc. (1994), 25 C.H.R.R. D/158 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry): “When the respondent’s treatment of the complainant is partly reprisal for contacting the Commission, there is a breach of section 8.” Therefore Watts’ treatment of the complainant by interfering with her employment relations for filing her 2000 complaint with the phrase “sucks to be you”, address of Claude, and additional exposures to sexual pictures is a breach of section 8. I refer to the case on reprisal of Donaldson v. 463963 Ontario Ltd. (Jan. 14, 1994), No. 83 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry): “The issues under section 8, following a complaint of sexual harassment, are whether the complainant feels threatened by the respondent’s acts and whether she believes the acts constitute an act of retaliation. In this case, the respondent kept contacting the complainant at home after she left her employment with him; a breach of section 8 was found.” In my case, Watts and the other employers interfere with my employment relations by contacting next employer to pass on information in my complaints to get this new employer to repeat the same items that I complain about like the hostile disparaging remark of “sucks to be you.”
I refer to case of Jones v. Amway of Canada Ltd. (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 1191, 159 O.A.C. 331, 2002 C.L.L.C. 230-030 [2002] O.J. No. 1504 (Ont. Div. Ct.); see also Moffatt v. Kinark Child & Family Services (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 5891, 35 C.H.R.R. D/205 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry) and Bryan v. Premark Canada Inc. (November 6, 1998), Doc. 98-18 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry): “An internal complaint pursuant to the employer’s harassment policy is sufficient to trigger protection under section 8. Moreover, the employee’s right to this protection is not affected by the employer’s rejection of the internal complaint.” Therefore, an external Human Rights Complaint pursuant to the Code is sufficient to trigger protection under section 8. I refer to case of Aboucher v. Toronto (Metro) School Board (No. 3) (1998), 31 C.H.R.R. D/411 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry): “Where the employer discriminates against a job candidate because the candidate has made a human rights complaint against another employer, this constitutes reprisal under section 8.” By repeating items that I complained in my previous complaints is because the candidate has made a human rights complaint against another employer particularly exposure to sexual picture on second day of hire at MMP. Lastly I refer to the following argument from case of Broadfield v. De Havilland/Boeing of Canada Ltd. at #139: “the line of reasoning that underlies this principle begins with the notion of indirect action by an employee which puts the employer in breach of the Code by way of s. 8. The point was made in Fu v. Ontario Government Protection Service (1985), 6 C.H.R.R. D/2797 at D/2800, para. 22922: Where the individual employer himself takes no direct action or discrimination but authorizes, condones, adopts or rectifies an employee’s discrimination, then the employer is himself personally liable for contravening the Code…as it is the employer himself who has infringed or done, directly or indirectly, an act “that infringes a right under this Part” (section 8). Section 8 of the Code says “No person shall infringe or do…anything that infringes a right…” The employer is infringing or doing something by its mere passive inaction of allowing an infringement of a right in the workplace when the employer could rectify the situation. To do nothing can be, in the circumstances, to “do” something that “infringe a right” within the meaning of section 8.” The Commissioner did reconsider based on these and other arguments that I put in my reconsideration application.
Thus based on the above reprisal cases and material facts that link back to Watts’ 2000 complaint I will also succeed on the civil tort of interference with employment relations. I refer to Ontario Court of Appeal’s guidance on the tort of interference found in case of Reach M.D. Inc. v. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Assn. Of Canada (2003), 17 C.C.L.T. (3d) 149: “To establish the tort of interference with economic relations, the plaintiff must prove: 1) that the defendant intended to injure the plaintiff; 2) that the defendant interfered with the plaintiff’s business by illegal or unlawful means; and 3) as a result, the plaintiff suffered loss. With respect to the first part of the test, the Court held that it was not necessary that the defendant was predominantly motivated in its actions to injure the plaintiff; mere targeting of the plaintiff was sufficient to ground liability.” Mere targeting such as passing information that sexual pictures and the phrase “sucks to be you” annoys me to promote others to harass me with this same phrase again plus sexualizing my work environment is unlawful means and result in financial loss of wrongful termination on January 20th 2003, another loss of proper reference letter, and loss in gross income in 2002.
04 Matter para pleading #21 (disability discrimination by Crown defendants reason behind discrediting plaintiff’s validated sexual harassment complaints):
I plead that by not including in the December 2004 case analysis the material fact that Dasha Page in her witness statement to WSIB and her rebuttal to my complaint made comments that I said to her “people were out to get me” after my March 18th meeting regarding Watts passing on slanderous information was bantering of a disability of delusions shows Shannon Meadows-Lee is colluding to protect the conspiracy to injure with permanent delusional disorder Watts campaign. Also, Dasha Page claims she reduced my work and was considering terminating my employment for performance issues in March yet in June’s appraisal meeting she refused to provide me with a list of performance issues where I can improve showing she was not interested in me improving or giving me that opportunity. I infer that these facts were not investigated because they provide adverse outcome to the December 2004 case analysis. This behaviour by the defendant shows she was treating me based on perceived disability less favorably than others and Shannon Meadows-Lee is concealing the evidence and controlling the witnesses to slant this case analysis to protect MMP and ultimately Watts.
Furthermore, the perceived disability of delusions has to do with the belief of harassment and being persecuted and the fact remains that I was harassed and persecuted to promote these thoughts to give the appearance to authorities that I have this disorder. I provided a copy of the DSM-IV description of this disorder to Dina Waik and therefore the commission should have interviewed all the staff involved in the harassment incidents in my complaint that I requested per material facts listed from #36 to #114: Mrs. Page, Ross Clarke, Karen Tarpos, John Kuzmichuk, Alice Reid, Vincent Julian, Tony Millington, Les Rozahagi, Bill at commercial photo, Kin Lau, Kevin Diamond, Ron Cherubin, Reinhold Schuele, Marguerite of Marchildon Zimmerman Associates, Norma Lawson, and Dave Mancini. The commission only interviewed Dasha Page, Ross Clarke and two other witnesses who may or may not have worked with me during my employment because these individuals would be less than truthful. This exemplifies controlling the witnesses who may provide adverse outcome. Moreover, based on article “Perceived-Disability Discrimination An Often Overlooked But Potentially Problematic Area Of The ADA” the author states: it is important to remember that the focus of any perceived-disability case is on the employer’s perception of an individual’s actual or perceived impairment. I infer that the defendants at MMP’s plus the commission’s perception or imaged perceptions are a perceived impairment. Shannon Meadows-Lee, on behalf of the OHRC, in her own words demonstrates this imaged perception of perceived impairment at #30 “it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position.” I say imaged perception because Shannon Meadows-Lee worked on the next two employers case analysis showing I started part time position on January 10th 2003 (incompetence issue to do with sales not accounting) and full time position on February 10th 2003 (no incompetence issues). I say imaged perception because of comment by Mr. Wharton in Payne v. OHRC of “apparent tendency of Commissioners to follow unquestioningly any staff recommendations.” I received from Mr. Keith Norton, Chief Commissioner his decision in 2005 with standard commission form alleging again insufficient evidence and ignoring evidence I provided him with of no claim of incompetence civilly. Keith Norton’s decision represents abuse of natural justice and common law. Also, this statement at #30 alone represents discrimination by the Ontario Human Rights Commission for perceived disability which leads to refusal of service of doing their statutory duty of proper investigation of the facts and evidence that led to decision to refuse referring my prima facie complaint to the Tribunal.
***Also case of Cashin and Ruckpaul are additional proof of differential treatment as the Crown are to investigate all facts and evidences and witnesses and are to provide complainant with their evidence when challenged per breach of natural justice and this includes judicial review judges
04 Matter para pleading #34 (facts as to my work situation worsening, damages, and dignity injury):
I plead that I am not your typical target of bullying/mobbing as I do stand up against it to the detriment of my health, my personal relationships, and career stoppage. I expose it every time and I do not reward it with my silence, which is why I am being expulse from the work environment at Watts in 2001, and at Mackay, and 3 additional employers after Mackay in a row, plus receiving obstruction of justice by the commission. I am being seen by these employers and the OHRC as expendable and if I won’t move on of my own volition these employers just invoke their rights as employer to breach the contract for whatever reason they choose to have on that date of expulsion because common law based on law of early Century society says either party can breach the contract at any time. I have been expulse with the following wrongful reasons: constructive dismissal through Human Rights process 2001, Wrongful Dismissal in 2002 with various reasons including gross incompetence with after the fact acquired reason, Wrongful Dismissal in 2003 of incompetence with notice offer after condoning my low sales prior to my request to the commission for complaint forms 2003, Wrongful Dismissal in 2004 for lay off claim of closing division and later shortage of work and later hiring two ex female employees to do work I could be doing, and finally Wrongful dismissal again in 2004 claiming change in business after 3.5 hours of handing my second written complaint to management when offer at interview was promised of full time permanent position. My experience alones shows that the current legal system, in both jurisdiction of the human rights and civil law, is not working to deter these kinds of employment abuses. My experience shows that sexually oriented practices endanger a woman’s job, undermines her job performance and threatens her economic livelihood” still. These employers show that the support, acceptance and collusion surrounding Workplace Bullying is as much a crime against the dignity of working people such as myself as the abuse itself.
04 Matter Para Pleading #136:
I plead that the commission’s case analysis is distorted again at #30 of: the evidence does not indicate that the complainant requested any form of accommodation, or indicate to the respondent that her performance issues were related to disability; the evidence indicates that the respondents provided the complainant with further training after extending her probation period, but her performance did not improve; it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position. Shannon omits facts supplied of: that I notified the defendants in August 2002 of my injury to health with my doctor’s note requesting leave of absence due to negative stressors in the work place causing my inability to function at work at my job; that the respondents made no effort to offer of accommodation prior to sending the January 20th termination letter; that I was waiting for a response to my November and December letter for sick pay; that the training was on new duties not old duties; and no written warning notice signed by me of “her performance did not improve”. The facts show that while I was employed Dasha Page requested I contact male coworker, Kenny, who was off on WSIB to request when he might return to work and I expected the same treatment when I was off and there was no such phone call from my employer. The facts and evident that I have contradict Shannon Meadows-Lee’s allegation here that “her performance did not improve” and proves my point of collusion with MMP Limited with injurious falsehoods of gross incompetence to obstruct natural justice of referring my prima facie complaint to the Tribunal and a form of inducing breach of contract and wrongful interference with contractual relationships.
*Similar facts to successful disability case of Margaretha Willems-Wilson v. Allbright Drycleaners Ltd (1997) prior to Crown’s 2004 case analysis
04 matter para pleading #133:
I plead that the commission’s case analysis distort the facts at #28 of: facts that I provided to the commission were not investigated and would fail six elements of the reasonableness test suggested in the Canadian Human Rights decision per case Budge V. Thorvaldson Care Homes Ltd. Cited: (2002), 42 C.H.R.R. D/232 (Man. Bd. Adj.): 1) it is aware that sexual harassment is prohibited conduct (yet Mrs. Page did not know that a joke about a hung penis was sexual in nature showing no investigation of this copulation joke about a hung penis, and the sexual harassment policy was withheld after requesting it in March), 2) a complaint mechanism is in place (yet when I complained to Mrs. Page she did not follow through on this mechanism per their own internal policy, did not document or make notes of the meetings, and the policy was withheld from me after requesting it, and she lies to the WSIB saying I made no complaints, and says to Michelle Spaate at WSIB that I made no complaints because I made none in writing), 3) it acted with alacrity in handling the complaint (no follow up with me after the complaint by Mrs. Page, I received no counseling on their policy, and the harassment policy was withheld from me after requesting it till August 9th after Ross Clarke attempted to intimidate me about not handing him signed copy of sexual harassment policy), 4) it dealt with the matter seriously (Mrs. Page later makes a comment about penis in a crew workbook, plus later a conversation about her breast, plus no writing documentation of my complaint, plus lying to Workers Compensation that I made no complaints and than later admitting I made a complaint but she did not know that a joke about a hung penis was sexual in nature, plus withholding the harassment policy after I requested it), 5) it has met its obligation to provide a healthy work environment (if the environment was healthy I would still be working there and I would have received a copy of the harassment policy as requested, and Mrs. Page would have provided me with memo to inform the complainant and would not need to lie in her August 20th letter to WSIB), and 6) it met its obligation to inform the complainant of its response (absolutely no written notice by Mrs. Page after I made my complaint to avoid any evidence I made complaints except for receiving my supervisor’s statement from the workers’ compensation investigation and copy of her August 20th letter, and my employment is terminated after I blow the whistle on their illegal behaviour with the WSIB and Employment Standards). Mackay fails this test. Shannon omits the fact that I presented the above argument of this failed test to the commission in my rebuttal to MMP’s rebuttal in her case analysis along with my argument from Workplaceca on a progressive discipline process. Shannon was not going to provide copy of my rebuttal along with my evidence to be presented to the commissioner for the commissioner to make an inform decision of my complaint.
04 Matter para Pleadings #134:
I plead that the facts that were not investigated by the commission plus the facts that were investigated clearly shows discrimination based on sexual harassment and sex per Janzen et al v. Platy Enterprises Ltd.: Sexual harassment in the workplace may be broadly defined as unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that detrimentally affects the work environment or leads to adverse job-related consequences for the victims; it is an abuse of both economic and sexual power; sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination within s. 6(1) of the Human Rights Act. The fact not investigated by the commission are: that Kin Lau came very close to having his lap in my face which is sexual to me, and that Dasha and Kin Lau attempted to entrap me into a leering of Kin Lau’s lap to charge me with leering. The commission did not investigate per the case analysis a very important material fact that Ross Clarke’s used the sexual harassment policy to intimidate me on August 9th, 2002, and he came to my desk angry because I did not give him signed copy of the policy when management refused to provide me with a copy, and after this conversation he gives me a copy to type in the computer but does not bother to ask for his signed copy again. The facts are that comments of “penis joke in crew book”, “breast enlarge due to pregnancy”, “so you don’t want any sex”, “can’t say ass” on top of Ross Clarke’s behaviour on August 9th do have a sexual meaning and/or is evidence of poison work environment because it annoys me and therefore discrimination. The commission omitted these items to protect MMP and Watts from exposure of wrongdoing which is obstruction of justice.
04 Matter para Pleading #135 (differential treatment per legal doctrine of progressive discipline process requirements):
I plead that the commission’s case analysis distort the facts at #29 of: there is insufficient evidence to indicate that the complainant was treated unequally or subjected to harassment in the workplace because of her disability; it does not appear that the respondents exaggerated the complainant’s performance issues because she had or was perceived to have a disability; there is insufficient evidence regarding the allegation that the respondents knew about her disability, conspired with staff from Company B or treated her in a discriminatory fashion when she was off on sick leave. Shannon omits the following facts in her case analysis for obvious reasons of: March 18th I made complaint that Watts passed on slanderous information and I am receiving the same tactics; Dasha distorts my words to a delusional bantering of “people out to get me”; that she advises the commission that my behaviour was bizarre and they had performance issues to warrant dismissal before my 3-mth performance review; I requested in June letter for list of areas where I can improve to protect my performance of allegations of gross incompetence and none was supplied in writing contradicting that there was performance issues prior to 3-mth probation; I received $1.00 raise at my 3-mth probation to match Marshall’s hourly rate; my August 7th email from Karen Tarpos of June’s Month End duties and training on Thursday night; January 20th 2003 termination letter for cause to be WSIB claim denied and my allegations of poisoned work environment not substantiated and no mentioned of any incompetence issue; and the defendants allege gross incompetence for summary dismissal with cause only in the jurisdiction of the Ontario Human Rights but do not use this defense in their statement of defenses civilly. Shannon intentionally omits my cross examination remarks in my rebuttal of: I refer to the article at Workplace.Ca on Criteria for an employer to prove an employee Incompetence: the adjudicator noted the requisites for an employer to build a case for innocent incompetence as follows: the employer must define the level of job performance required; the employer must establish that the standard expected was communicated to the employees; the employer must show it gave reasonable supervision and instruction to the employee and that it afforded the employee a reasonable opportunity to meet the standard; the employee must establish inability on the part of the employee to meet the requisites standards to an extent that renders him incapable of performing the job and that reasonable efforts were made to find alternative employment within the competence of the employee; the employer must prove that reasonable warnings were given to the employee that a failure to meet the standard could result in dismissal; that Mackay fails this requisite for an employer to build a case for incompetence.
RemoveClaudette Losier via The Elders: There is a lot of Deafening Global Silence towards Human Rights around the World including in Ontario Canada. My Appeal C50990 includes the Crown applying the Code fraudulantly with the positive misrepresentation being the Code’s preamble and purpose that “Everyone In Ontario Is Equal” with measures to codify per sta…re decisis of section 5 to 10 of the code being completely ignored by the Crown’s Human Rights process in both jurisdicition human rights. My appeal includes the Crown acting without authority of the Code applying section 34 (no investigation) alleged rules of discretion to dismissed 4 complaints under section 36 (investigation) prima facie complaints made out without investigating any of complainant’s witnesses or sexual harassers. My Appeal has been set for September 22nd in Toronto allowing insufficient time of 40 minutes to argue 8 day Rule 21 Unconstitutional Motion order that includes judge refusing to abide by the UN Treaty and you can read my factum arguments for …See More
Sri Lanka’s disturbing actions met by ‘deafening global silence’ | The Elders
theelders.org
Evidence Ontario and Canadian Governments are not doing their Code, Charter, and United Nations Treaty duty to Human Rights:
One last comment regarding yesterday, Toronto School of Art has a policy on how models are to be treated by staff and student which is what I abide be and expect that includes not touching models at all and they do not use excuse mind reader when its in their company policy and everyone is to read and be aware so that no incidents happen in the first place per Human Rights Code section 29 which is proactive conflict resolution. Other companies have similar policies and human rights policies which the Ontario Government is supposed to be educating its colleges and universaties per the Code section 29 to eliminate these conflicts from happening in the first place including Sheridan and that is why I am suing the Ontario Government for discrimination because they are not doing their job per the Code and Charter and United Nations Treaty. Meg works at Toronto School of Art so perhaps she could provide Sheridan with their wonderful policy on model treatment. In fact, last class I modelled for her she mentioned these things to the students as part of her job to educate model ediquitte which I greatly appreciated and shows a great high respect to the model unlike what I received yesterday. In fact I do believe Brenda as well did the same. So two female instructors can do it then so can your male instructors.
Please note it is not for the model to conformed to others european ways of being touchy feelly per the Human Rights Code. I am not a Joanne nor a Jordie and I do not have to conform to earopean ways per Human Rights. In addition I dont require thank you for a job well done in the form of unwelcoming touching in the class and outside the class. I receive sufficient thank you by the pay cheque I receive but more importantly by seeing beautifully rendered lines and forms from my physical body and gestures inspiring your students creativity. Thats my thank you.
If my modeling work for you that includes who I want to work for or not is problematic to you, rather than interrupting the class I am working in creating conflict which everyone in that class, the instructor and students, and Mark’s class next store could hear, I would suggest that you select to terminate my employment privately. As I mentioned that the unwelcome touching started in class and I selected not to make a scene which you appreciated yet you elected to come to my class so that everyone could hear our discussion which created a scene and negative energy emptying that room of the positive creative energy I was creating with the students. A proper conflict resolution of such discussion should have been privately in your office and if you felt you needed a witness you could have invited your Human Resource staff at Sheridan to come and take notes. I am surprised that Sheridan College has not given you training on appropriate conflict management. I hold Sheridan and the Ontairo Goverment responsible for that not you.
Until the Ontario Government does its job and properly educates its Colleges and Universities on Human Rights per the Code, Charter, and UN Treaty Law I wont waste my energy at Sheridan with these types of conflicts by Students or Instructors. I am not looking for a response from you as mentioned because the Ontario Government and Canadian Government are not doing their jobs abiding by its duty to eliminate discrimination against everyone in Ontario and are discriminating against me so all my energy will be on them not Sheridan per my Appeal against them on September 22nd in Toronto which includes their duty to properly train its colleges and universities and others in Ontario on Human Rights. If my email is upsetting to you please do not come to me publicly in class or in the hall way to advise me.
The incident Friday was in the hall way male instructor Jordie comes up to thank me squeezing my left shoulder when I was quietly not paying attention and sketching an elephant in hallway. He had already thanked me in class for my modeling work so it was not necessary to come to me in the hall way again to again stroke my shoulder with unwanted touching so I told him not to do it and continue my focus on my sketch. This was the first time working for him, other than this instructor interrupting a life drawing workshop with Students at MTM to give them instructions.
Now I had no attentions to file a complaint because that would be a waste of my time because the Ontario Government is not doing their duty per the Code and Minister of Attorney General Act 1990
and are discriminating against me per my September 22nd Appeal against them file C50990,
and are connected to all colleges and universities through their funding programs and per the Crown Agency Act 1990 which includes all Universities as Crown Agencys. Jordie, the male instructor, filed a complaint against me with the model coordinator for rejecting his unwelcome touching. Joanne should have never come to me while I was modeling in the class to reprimand me for rejecting Jordies unwelcome touching to increase the conflict but wait to see if I filed a complaint. Her reprimand and comments yesterday are discriminatory showing the Ontario Government still in 2010 not doing their duty to education joanne. Since I was not filing internal complaint Joanne should not come to me to fish for one with her typical discriminatory justifications ready to put women down of “not a mind reader” and “European Ways of Touchy Feelly Comformatty” and put down “over exaggerating” when I was not even making an internal complaint! She also ignores the fact she knows I am a Human Rights Activist per our discussions these past 4 years. She never got the full story and was told by Jordie only touchy feely once in the Hall way.
Now I will wait to receive the retaliation that usually comes after such conflicts and from sending this email either in the form of increasing the conflict, reduction of work and/or termination of employment at Sheridan because the Ontario Government is not doing their job per their duty of their Ontario Human Rights Policy to eliminate discrimination in Ontario which includes discriminatory attitudes such as I received yesterday to justify violating the Code of “not a mind reader” and “European Ways of Touchy Feely Conformaty”.
Ontario Human Rights Code 2005 – by Bowland
Section 7 – harassment because of sex(gender) in workplace
Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd., [1989} 1 S.C.R. 1251; Impact Interior Inc. v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (1998), 35 C.H.R.R. D/477 (Ont. C.A.); Olarte v. De Filippis (1983), 4 C.H.R.R. D/1705 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry); affirmed
“Unwanted touching constitutes sexual harassment”
Impact Interior Inc. V. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (1998), 35 C.H.R.R. D/477 (Ont. C.A.); Drummond v. Tempo Paint & Varnish Co. (1998), 33 C.H.R.R. D/175 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry)
“Behaviour which is not explicitly sexual may amount to harassment because of sex. It must be viewed in the overall context.”
Slobodian v. Adamès Warehouse Burlington Ltd. (May 2, 1994), No. 94-009 (Ont. BD. of Inquiry) and see deSousa v. Gauthier (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 5053, 43 C.H.R.R. D128, 2002 O.H.R.B.I.D. No. 9 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry)
For sexual statements to be perceived as humour, the person making the comment and the person hearing the comment must share a similar viewpoint. (same applies for unwelcome touching)
Saunders v. Morsal Developments Ltd. (August 23, 1995), No. 718 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry)
Conduct is vexatious where the complainant finds the comments and conduct worrisome, discomforting and demeaning.
This has been the law since 1995 so why in 2010 after the harasser complains to the model coordinator that I rejected his European touchy feelly character or personality come to me to reprimand me trying to force me to comform to her none human rights standands and disregard my human rights attitude
The answer is due to the Ontario Government and Canadian Government are not doing their duty per their own Code and Charter policy to education everyone that everyone has an equal right to harassment and discrimition free work environments.
The Ontario and Canadian Government are not doing their duty to eliminate discrimination in Ontario and Canada per the United Nation Treaty which includes discriminatory attitudes such as I received on Friday at Sheridan to justify violating the Code of “not a mind reader” and “European Ways of Touchy Feely Conforming” which are excuses that are old hat probably has been used since the 1970s and in human rights case laws. Its now 2010 and Human Rights has been around long enough for the Ontario Government to get its act together at its Colleges and Universities to work towards proactive conflict management to reduce and/or eliminate the conflict. This is also their duty per the United Nations Treaty which is part of our Canadian Law system in the Ontario Code preamble and in Supreme Court Cases such as Slaight.
The UN Treaty the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and its Optional Protocol 2000 Article 2 (b) to (f), pg 5 Book of Authority, Tab 25
b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women; (c) To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination; (d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation; (e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization, or enterprise; (f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women”
34.Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21 Ontario Court of Appeal file Appeal C50990 for September 22nd 2010
Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record at para #60 states: The plaintiff has failed to plead facts which support a claim of bad faith, abuse of power or malice toward her. Referring to the passages of a Case Analysis Report with which she disagrees just does not do it. This is so particularly when the Divisional Court in her judicial review application found that “there was an abundance of evidence to support the findings upon which the discretion of the Commission was exercised.” And that, “the Applicant has failed to establish that the decisions are arbitrary, capacious or made in bad faith.”
This analysis by Justice Lofchik is imaging the truth as he does not refer to law that says case analysis does not do it nor shows where I pleaded insufficiently in 2 claims like all other Rule 21 cases including Deep.
The Law per HVK, Crown’s authority for this Rule 21 that they did not include for this appeal because it benefits my case and is my authority now clearly states a case analysis is sufficient. Crown’s authority of Wilson also states case analysis is sufficient. HVK allows for suits for bad faith and damages after a judicial review per pg 2 held:
The plaintiff’s claim was not a re-litigation of the previous proceedings (Judicial Review), as they did not involve any claim for damages. It was possible that the court could find that the decisions of the directors and employees was motivated by bad faith and not protected by any limitation of liability.
Suits for damages against Commission and staff are allowed after Judicial Reviews when Judicial Review is based on human rights jurisdiction lesser rules to violate our Charter Rights then Rules of Civil Procedure for evaluation of facts and evidence so not the same. My Judicial Review was based on due difference to decision makers at the Commission and judges refusal to weigh evidence per their own words in their endorsement record found in Court Transcript which the Appeal Court is refusing to review for this September 22nd Appeal to protect the Crown and wrong doing by Justice Lofchik. The Court Transcript is full of comments by Justice Lofchik validating I have facts and pleaded sufficiently, but he refuses to accept employment facts in 4 prima facie complaints (the “apart from facts” at para #60) because Judicial Review.
My judicial review endorsement record is also like Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record a bare recital of the law with no analysis per items in complaints and reports particularly where none of my witnesses were interviewed per Federal Court Judicial Review of Ruckpaul 2004 which clearly says that is a flaw and that the Commission in this case realizes it is a flaw. Not so here in Ontario because of the corruption by the Minister of Attorney General who continues per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record to alleged the Crown has a discretion to dismiss complaints without interviewing any witnesses for the complainant whent that is a major flaw and fundamental ommission in the Federal Courts!
The Crown’s authority of Gismondi, Mr. Moore quotes the law that this type of judicial analysis, both Judicial Review and Justice Lofchik, is not allowed of Bare Recital of the Law with generalizing what is in the claim without making any references to show that I am deficient per the Claims!!! A proper judicial review is being done in Federal Courts for human rights per the case of Cashin and Ruckpaul. These two cases validate my allegation of a sham Judicial Review and Appeal in 2006/2007 which I did not have this case at that time and Ontario Judges taking advantage of litigants who are unrepresented. Also, a judicial review court cannot be trier of fact of Bad faith or malice per civil jurisdiction for tort law of Misfeasance of Public Office per Justice Lofchik’s legal reasoning in his endorsement record above, and I have a right to a trial that includes cross examination and witnesses in court. To dismiss my appeal base on this reason will only support my allegations further that the Minister of Attorney General is and was behind the improper investigation tactics in the first place because I filed a small claims court suit in Spring 2004 against the Commission and intake staff 1178/04 prior to the investigation and report in December 2004, and that the Minister of Attorney General has persistantly with concerted action provided me with judges who are bias to protect his wrong doing.
Deep v. Ontario (2005) appeal pg 3 para #5:
“The appellant appeals the motion judge’s decision. In our view, the appeal must fail. The motion judge wrote careful and comprehensive reasons (154 paragraphs) dealing with all of the issues, including procedural issues relating to Rules 20, 21 and 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and substantive issues raised by the appellant and both sets of respondents. We explicitly record our agreement with the motion judge’s reasoning, which we regards as sound, and with his dispositions of the three motions.”
***Not same as my appeal:
1) Justice Lofchik making no references to any pleadings in my two claims therefore ignoring substantive issues raised by appellant,
2) Refusing to accept Employment Human Rights complaints and HR case analyses reports facts for all torts pleaded which is all I need to prove they abused their job and their job was to investigate all of these facts fairly and without bias, and provides no legal authority to ignore these facts completely
3) Justice Lofchik acknowledges I pleaded “facts of the Employer events” with “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigations” and this counters his other arguments that there are no facts or that I pleaded negligence or that I have not pleaded cause of action
4) no analysis in endorsement record of issue of two torts pleading: tort of deceit and constitutional tort
5) breach of rule of law and stare decisis of all complainants authorities that invalidate the Crown’s authorities relied upon in endorsement record
6) no analysis of intentional torts listed in his endorsement records with elements and showing where pleadings are deficient when Justice Lofchick admits “I pleaded they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation” and “apart from the facts of employment events” and he is allowing me amend claims against employer who are joint tortfeasors with Crown for Conspiracy and defamation
7) Defamation/libel tort made out per SCC Botiuk and Hill, and per Deep para #46 pleading sufficient facts of what I feel is defamatory to discredit my character by reader of the case analysis and proven fact per Mr. Norton’s Report and Judicial Review appeals of fabrication of incompetence and insufficient evidence of sexual harassment, discrimination and reprisal, and Crown defendants do not provide this Court with an argument or case law to counter SCC Botiuk and Hill in their submissions, and Crown defendants have pleaded in defence that they acted in good faith nor request the complainant to provide particulars of the defamation
Intentional Inflection of Emotional Distress Tort and Misfeasance of Public Office made out per the requirements in SCC case of Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse
pg 16 para 40: “In the defendant officers’ submission, the essence of the plaintiffs’ claim is that they were deprived of a thorough, competent and credible investigation. And owing to the fact that no individual has a private right to a thorough, competent and credible criminal investigation the plaintiffs have suffered no compensable damages. If this were an accurate assessment of the plaintiffs’ claim, I would agree. Individual citizens might desire a thorough investigation, or even that the investigation result in a certain outcome, but they are not entitled to compensation in the absence of a thorough investigation or if the desired outcome fails to materialize. This, however, is not an accurate assessment of the plaintiffs’ submission. In their statement of claim, the plaintiffs also allege that they have suffered physically, psychologically and emotionally, in the form of mental distress, anger, depression and anxiety as a direct result of the defendant officers’ failure to cooperate with the SIU.”
Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21 Ontario Court of Appeal file Appeal C50990 for September 22nd 2010
Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record at para #60 states: The plaintiff has failed to plead facts which support a claim of bad faith, abuse of power or malice toward her. Referring to the passages of a Case Analysis Report with which she disagrees just does not do it. This is so particularly when the Divisional Court in her judicial review application found that “there was an abundance of evidence to support the findings upon which the discretion of the Commission was exercised.” And that, “the Applicant has failed to establish that the decisions are arbitrary, capacious or made in bad faith.”
This is error in law per Crown’s Case of Wilson
pg 15 para 59: malice would be made out if they were to find that: …the respondents continued the prosecution either for an improper purpose, or in reckless disregard of evidence which would have disclosed the unreliability of the information provided by the [complainant], or out of ill will, spite or for selfish purposes, or because [the complainant] wanted them to do so.
***Therefore the Case Analysis by the commission and staff as part of an investigation is sufficent for Malice, Bad Faith, and Abuse of Power. This is a criminal case and the complainant is the person who gave evidence for the wrongful prosecution– in my case it would be the investigation staff accepting unreliable evidence from respondence such as fabrication of incompetence by MMP when MMP’s termination with no allegations of incompetence but prima facie reprisal cause because my WSIB was denied and allegations of poisoned work environment not substantiated we are terminating your employment which was given to me 5 months after I went on sick leave sufficient time for MMP to discover any after the fact incompetence and put it in this termination letter. This termination letter and the conduct of changing the reason for termination several times with final reason in MMP’s defence statement for this suit with generalized denials of we deny we dismissed her wrongfully and no allegations of incompetence that is in the Crown’s case analysis!!!! This in its self is proof the Minister of Attorney General is behind this wrong doing and is using his position of power with the current Minister of Attorney General to dismissed this suit per Justice Lofchik’s generalized and bias endorsement record ignoring these facts which show the commission investigation staff accepting MMP”s proven Bad Faith per Wallace SCC Case creating Wallace Damages in this same claim. This is per Wilson accepting unreliable evidence but my claim includes more examples than this and reason why Justice Lofchik and the Crown’s factum make absolutely no reference to any pleadings in 2 claims like all other rule 21 motion cases.
Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21 Ontario Court of Appeal file Appeal C50990 for September 22nd 2010
Ontario Human Rights Commission Immunity per the Law:
Crown’s factum pg 2 para 2 (e) and (f), pg 15/16/17 paras 47, 48 Smith, 49 (White, York, Oren, Lacasse, Wanxia, Zakaria), bare recital of disrection no analysis of authorities that invalidate SCC decision of Westlake)
Westlake et al. v. The Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario 1971/1973 SCC
White v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) 1999
Smith v. New Brunswick (Human Rights Commission) 1997
York Advertising v. OHRC 2004
Oren Nimelman by Next Friend Cheryl Katz et al. v. The Ontario Human Rights Commission, Nancy Pocock, Christopher McKinnon and Keith Norton (unreported) 2002
Wanxia Liao v. The Ontario Human Rights Commission 2002
Mohammed Bilai Zakaria v. the Ontario Human Rights Commission Date? 19?
York validates my arguments from Starline that the Commission is a Crown Agency and suable per the Proceedings Against the Crown ACt:
Pg 1 Held: However, neither the Commission not the Tribunal was a servant of the Crown or the Crown. They were not suable entities, and York and Murphy were compelled to challenge them through the process of judicial review.
*** Crown Agency Act, S.O. 1998, c. 15 is listed but no analysis to this act with regards to suability in this case. The judge is correct the Commission is not a servant but why did this Judge not address the fact that the Commission is an Agent and suable as an Agent of the Crown when the Crown Agency Act was an authority in this case?
“A Crown agency is for all its purposes an agent of Her Majesty and its powers may be exercised only as an agent of Her Majesty. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.48, s. 2.
Proceedings Against the Crown Act includes both Servants and Agents!
Pg 12 Para 31. “The Commission is responsible to the Minister for the Administration of the Code. Members of the Commission and the Tribunal are appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council.
*legal Capacity to sue the Commission Body as Crown Agent per Proceedings Against the Crown Act 1990 s. 5, 8, and 23, and per Crown Agency Act 1990 that per stare decisis invalidates all of the Crown’s and Justice Lofchik’s authorities based on SCC Westlake 1972/73 decision based on Commission being a 6 category entity
para 32 “Section 47 stipulates that the Code binds the Crown and every agency of the Crown.”
Para 33 “Section 5 of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act provides that, except as otherwise provided, the Crown is subject to all liabilities in tort to which, if it were a person of full age and capacity, it would be subject in respect of a number of matters. The listed matters do not encompass the type of claim with which we are here concerned.
***This analysis on liability per matters of an injunctions for potential future damages does not apply to my case which is a claim for liability due to past actions resulting in damages and makes no mention to Agents such as the Commission Body.
Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 27
Liability in tort
5. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, and despite section 71 of Part VI (Interpretation) of the Legislation Act, 2006, the Crown is subject to all liabilities in tort to which, if it were a person of full age and capacity, it would be subject,
(a) in respect of a tort committed by any of its servants or agents;
Where proceedings in tort lie
(2) No proceeding shall be brought against the Crown under clause (1) (a) in respect of an act or omission of a servant or agent of the Crown unless a proceeding in tort in respect of such act or omission may be brought against that servant or agent or the personal representative of the servant or agent. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 5(2).
“A judge should not give a judgment contrary to that of another judge of the same court unless at least one of the following situations exists: (1) subsequent decisions have affected the validity of the impugned judgment; (2) it is shown that some binding authority in case law or some relevant statute was not considered;”
Error in Law there is legislation, binding authority in case law of Starline and relevant 1990 statute, that establishes directly that a Commission Body has the legal status and capacity required to be sued if the requirement have been met which are intentional wrong doing not negligence being ignored by all Judges in Ontario to protect wrong doing by the Commission and Minister of Attorney General:
1) Neither SCC decision in Westlake 1972/73, nor cases of Smith v. NHRC 1997, White v. OHRC 1999, Oren 2002, and York Advertising Ltd v. OHRC, Wancia Liao, Mohammend Bilai Zakaria, Justice Millenitti or Justice Lofchik refer to or due analysis in their analysis of the law for immunity to two new legislation in 1990 that establishes that Commission Bodies are Crown Agents and have since 1990 legal status and capacity to be sued for intentional torts not negligence that nullifies all these cases as no longer valid per legal doctrine of stare decisis. The 1990 Crown Agency Act now replaces Westlakes’ definition of a Commission Body as a sixth category of statutory bodies based on definition in the Securities Act 1966 when the Human Rights Commission is not governed by the Securities Act 1966 but by the Human Rights Code. Commission bodies now are agents and no longer a sixth category of statutory bodies which was validated by judge in Starline case that includes SCC Crown Agency decision in Berardinelli v. Ontario Housing Board in 1979. The Proceedings Against the Crown Act establishes legal capacity to be sued per sections 5 liability, 8 as if the Crown were a corporation therefore all their evidence is available for suit, and 23 this act governs over all other acts in conflict with it that includes the Securities Act in Westlake,and the Code.
2) Argument from Starline re: Westlake: if a statute confers powers of this type upon a non-corporate entity which it brings into existence, the as Taylor, J., pointed out in Bank of Montreal v. Bole, [1931] 1 W.W.R. 203, it flows as a necessary intendment from the enactment that the statutory body is to be amenable to the ordinary processes of Court such as statutes of 1990’s Crown Agency Act and the Proceedings Against the Act s. 5, 8, and 23 that Crown Agency’s are amenable to the ordinary processes of Court.
3) The Ontario Human Rights Commission is not governed by the 1966 Securities Act but rather by the OHR Code Act. OHRC clearly establishes directly that the Commission has the legal status per s. 27 (2) because the Commission is responsible to the Minister for the administration of this Act, and s. 29 that they are to eliminate all forms of discrimination, and per the code make complainants whole as if there was no discrimination therefore compensable damages such as all loss in wages from employment contracts to make the complainant whole are available for wrong actions, and lastly section 47 from York Case that the Code binds the Crown and every agency of the Crown.
4) United Nation Treaty the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and its Optional Protocol 2000 Article 2 (b to f) prohibiting all discrimination against women, effective protection of women against any act of discrimination, to refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation, eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization, or enterprise, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitutes discrimination against women.***This includes to stop discrimination of Canadians by its governments that includes the Commission Body, its investigators, Judicial Review and Appeal Court Judges, and the Minister of Attorney General in charge of Human Rights Law in Ontario plus the Queen Her Majesty
5)1990 Legislative Acts of The Proceeding Against the Crown Act and the Crown Agency Act and the Code plus the United Nations Treaty included in the Code’s preamble combine establishes legal capacity to be sued plus legal arguments found in York case (above) and Starline Case with proper analysis of the law (pages 7 to 16) for the Commission Body as Crown Agent acting in administrative capacity can be sued for intentional wrong doing resulting in compensable damages of loss in wages to make the complainant whole, and control test met for Minister is control of commission and Human Rights Act
Starline pg 7to 16:
Crown Agency is defined in s. 1 as:
…a board, commission, railway, public utility, university, manufactory, company or agency, owned, controlled or operated by Her Majesty in right of Ontario, or by the Government of Ontario, or under the authority of the Legislature or the Lieutenant Governor in Council
The consequence of an entity being a Crown Agency is that it is “for all purposes an agent of Her Majesty and its powers may be exercised only as an agent of Her Majesty”: see s. 2, Crown Agency Act.
The Ontario Gaming Control Commission appears to be a Crown agency. It is obviously a “commission”, and is under the auspices of the Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations. Its decision are appealable to the Commercial Registration Appeal Tribunal, which in turn is governed by the Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations Act. The Ontario Gaming Control Commission also meets the “control” test for a Crown agency set out by P.W. Hogg in Liability of the Crown, 2nd ed. (Scarborough: Carswell, 1992), at pp. 249-50:
The courts no longer classify the functions of a public body that claims a Crown immunity. Instead, the courts examine the relationship between that body and the Crown, as represented by the ministers of the Crown. If that relationship is one of control by a minister, then the controlled body is an agent of the Crown.
“endowing it with powers to enter into contracts”
requirements in SCC case of Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse
pg 16 para 40: “In the defendant officers’ submission, the essence of the plaintiffs’ claim is that they were deprived of a thorough, competent and credible investigation. And owing to the fact that no individual has a private right to a thorough, competent and credible criminal investigation the plaintiffs have suffered no compensable damages
Code includes compensable damages of making complainant’s whole including all loss in wages from employment contracts which complainant cannot sue for in wrongful dismissal suits against Employers
“(c) Liability of the Crown and its Officials under the Public Authorities Protection Act
Section 5 of the Public Authorities Protection Act makes it clear that the Crown can be liable in tort if its servants or agents have committed a tort. It is clear that Crown agencies are included under the Act. This was stated in obiter in the Berardinelli v. Ontario Housing Corp., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 275, 90 D.L.R. (3d) 481, case, which is dealt with below. Both the Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations and the Ontario Gaming Control Commission are thus covered by the statute as long as the requirements are met.”
***This case also nullifies SCC decision in Westlake set in 1973 ignored by all of the Crown and Justice Lofchik’s legal authorities for immunity
Requirements:
If appears that if bona fides exists, neither the Crown nor its servants will be liable. Negligence is not enough for a finding of liability: See Moffatt v. Dufferin (County) Board of Education, [1973] 1 O.R. 351 at p. 354, 31 D.L.R. (3d) 143 (C.A.).
To require the application of the Public Authorities Protection Act the acts must be acts not authorized by any statute or legal justification, but acts intended to be done in pursuance or execution of some statute or legal power. It would appear, therefore, if illegal acts are really done from some motive other than an honest desire to execute the statutory or other legal duty and an honest belief that they are justified by statutory or other legal authority; if they are done from a desire to injure a person or to assist some person or cause, without any honest belief that they are covered by statutory authority, or are necessary in the execution of statutory authority, the Public Authorities Protection Act is no defence, for the acts complained of are not done in intended execution of a statute, but only in pretended execution thereor.
***pretended execution thereor like my pleading of imaging a process because it does not matter about the truth it only matters that we provide a process such as Justice Lofchik applying s. 34 discretion to claims for 4 s. 36 prima facie complaints being dismissed without fair investigation and/or any investigation
***My allegations are that the investigation and case analysis, the judicial review and appeals in 2006/07 and Justice Lofchik’s management of rule 21 8 day motion hearing are all “pretend execution of a statute” the Code, Charter and the United Nation Treaty and my conclusions are not baldly stated but are based on all the facts in 4 prima facie complaints including collaborative prima facie evidences from respondenced left out of reports, and judicial endorsement records plus all my legal authorities that the Commission, Judicial Review Courts and Justice Lofchik are bound by being breached
The plaintiffs have alleged that the “investigation conducted by the Ministry which resulted in the unwarranted freezing of the bank accounts of the Aurora Stallions Jr. Lacrosse Club Inc. and the Starline Roller Hockey Club was motivated by malice”. They also allege that the actions of Mr. Major and the Ministry were throughout an abuse of government power, and that the freezing of the bank accounts constituted an abuse of investigatory powers.”
Para 78: The plaintiff alleges that this investigation was motivated by malice, either because of friction between Starline and the Ministry arising out of the negotiations over removing the license, or on the part of the other defendants, whom the plaintiff suspects of having made accusations concerning them to the Ministry.”
Para 71: of the amended statement of claim, the plaintiff’s allege that the Ministry’s representations to Starline regarding the rules of bingo licences were incorrect and negligent.
***and negligent not same as my claim with “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation”
Abuse of Power: “Everything which is contrary to good order established by usage. Departure from reasonable use; immoderate or improper use”. Also under the heading of “abuse”, “abuse of power” is found to be the “use of one who possesses it in a manner contrary to law. Improper use of power, distinguished from usurpation of power which presupposes exercise of power not vested in the offender.”
The principle that public bodies must not use their powers for purposes incompatible with the purposes envisaged by the statutes under which they derive such powers cannot be in doubt in Canada since the landmark case of Roncarelli v. Duplessis (1959), 16 D.L.R. (2d) 689, [1959] S.C.R. 121. Since that case, it is clear that a citizen who suffers damages as a result of flagrant abuse of public power aimed at him has the right to an award of damages in a civil action in tort.”
“Bad faith is different from negligence because the former involves intent”
“Malice has been described as “improper purpose….includes any other improper purpose, such as to gain a private collateral advantage.”
***Crown’s motion record documents is example of the private collateral advantage which Justice Lofchik is using the Judicial Review and Appeal dismissals as main reason to dismiss my claim proving my allegations pleaded in my claim against the Crown
“If there is no malice, as long as the public officer knows there is no power to do the act, and that it will likely hurt the plaintiff, the officer is liable.”
*Crown ignoring purpose and intent of code per preamble, s. 5 to 10 and s. 29, plus applying legal argument for s. 34 to refuse investigation to 4 prima facie complaints after investigation dismissed under s. 36 shows they had no power to do the act – and Judicial Review also improper for these 4 complaints per standards of Judicial Review by Federal Court Judicial Reviews cases of Ruckpaul and Cashin, and Crown’s BC Judicial Review case of Lewis v. Standen which shows what a thorough and neutral investigation and Judicial Review appeals of all the prima facie human rights facts looks like in writing of the endorsement record and case analysis reports
Region Plaza Inc. v. Corporation of the Regional Municipality of Hamilton-Wentworth et al. (Municipal law – Action against councilors)
Pg 751
“If the plaintiff does not at the outset have knowledge of facts that give rise to the conclusions of malice, breach of duty, conspiracy to injure, or abuse of power, then it is improper to make such bald allegations in the statement of claim. It was not sufficient to simply say that the supporting facts were within the knowledge of the defendants.”
***not same as my claim per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement “they acted deliberately with the quality of investigation” and “apart from the facts of employment events there are no other facts”
Ontario Society for Prevention of Cruelty of Animals v. Ontario Veterinary Assn. (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 183 (H.C.J.), in which Callaghan J. (as he then was) commented: “In this case the question of the motive which prompted the council to act as it did is a question of fact and is one which should be decided at trial.”
“if it sustains damages as a result of such an abuse, to come to a common law court for its remedy and not necessarily rely on the remedies afforded through judicial review of such action.”
***I argued this case with Justice Lofchik in this 8 day Rule 21 Motion hearing and he is breaching it per his endorsement record and gives no reason why he is ignoring this law that he is bound by!
“The principles above relate to ordinary actions and Crown immunity. There are special rules for intentional torts committed in bad faith. Crown officials are no longer allowed to avail themselves of the protection of the Public Authorities Protection Act.
Nelles was cited by both parties. There has always been a sharp distinction drawn between public officials exercising judicial and administrative functions under the functional test. In this case, Major would probably be acting in an administrative capacity, and thus his actions deserve additional scrutiny.
It would appear on the basis of the authorities cited that, in general terms public officers are entitled to no special immunities or privileges when they act beyond the powers which are accorded to them by law in their official capacities. It would follow, then, that where a public officer, a servant of the Crown, exceeds the powers of his office or acts improperly in fraud of his duties and powers, or acts with malice in the discharge of his duties, he does not have immunity from civil suit and where, by reason of such excess of power or improper motive, he causes damage he may be civilly liable in damages. This indeed, seems clear as far at least as it may concern public servants who act in administrative capacities.
Continuing cause of action:
“a cause of action which arises from the repetition of acts or omissions of the same kind as that for which the action was brought”
***The analysis in Starline is a proper Rule 21 analysis of the facts and law not Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record per Justice Millenitti’s 2005 improper analysis or the Crown’s authorities White, Smith, Oren, York, Mohammed. Therefore there is no imunity for a Crown Agency per the 1990 statutes per SCC 1979 case of Berdanelli v. Ontario Housing Corp for a Commission body under control of the Minister of Attorney General and authority of the Legislature or the Lieutenant Governor in Council acting in administrative capacity of a commission investigation under section 36 before tribunal referral where it changes to quasi-judicial function when it abuses its office by acting in bad faith or malice with reckless disregard of prima facie facts in 4 prima facie human rights cases and both ignoring the intent and purpose of the Code’s preamble, s. 5 to 10 and s. 29 to intentionally injure plaintiff and causes damages
5) Control Test states if Minister is responsible for the statutory body then it becomes an agent of the Crown
6) OHRC clearly establishes directly that the Commission has the legal status to be sued per s. 27 (2) because the Commission is responsible to the Minister for the administration of this Act, and s. 29 that they are to eliminate all forms of discrimination and preamble that “everyone is equal”, and section 47 per York case that the Code binds the Crown and every agency
7) The Proceedings Against the Crown Act establishes legal capacity to be sued per sections 5 liability, 8 as if the Crown were a corporation, and 23 this act governs over all other acts in conflict with it include the 1966 Securities Act in Westlake, and the Code
8) United Nation Treaty the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and its Optional Protocol 2000 Article 2 (b to f) establishes legal capacity to be sued for Charter violations prohibiting all discrimination against women, effective protection of women against any act of discrimination, to refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation, eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization, or enterprise, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitutes discrimination against women
9) if a statute confers powers of this type upon a non-corporate entity which it brings into existence, the as Taylor, J., pointed out in Bank of Montreal v. Bole, [1931] 1 W.W.R. 203, it flows as a necessary intendment from the enactment that the statutory body is to be amenable to the ordinary processes of Court,
10) Starline Entertainment Centre Inc. v. Ciccarelli 1995 case Ontario Court Epstein J. arguments for no immunity: distinction drawn between public officials exercising judicial and administrative capacity, administrative capacity deserves additional scrutiny, issue of immunity a trial was required to be considered within a factual basis, no special immunities or privileges when they act beyond the powers which are accorded to them by law, acts in fraud of his duties and powers, or acts with malice, excess of power or improper motive he cause damages
11) new argument found in Wilson v. Toronto (Metropolitan) Police Service para 18, 19 and 20 – floodgate of litigation excuse used by Crown does not justify absolute immunity for Commission or its staff or Minsiter per Westlake, Smith, White and all other Crown authorities based on these 3 cases
Wilson case Pg 4 Para 18 from SCC 1989 Nelles case: “Lamer J., as he then was, speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court in Nelles concluded that these policy considerations, while possessing some merit, did not justify absolute immunity. They had to give way to the right of a private citizen to seek a remedy when a prosecutor acts “maliciously in fraud of his duties”.
Pg 5 para 20 “First, absolute immunity for prosecutors cannot be permitted. The existence of absolute immunity would be a threat to the individual rights of citizens who have been wrongly and maliciously prosecuted by agents of the Attorney General. It would be alarming if such wrongdoers, despite being persons from whom we expect the highest standard of conduct in exercising an important public trust, could not be held accountable to their victims.
***Same argument applies to my case that policy considerations did not justify absolute immunity threat to individual rights of citizens who have been discriminated and reprised against by agents of the Attorney General at the Commission
To add to the challenge of no immunity I would like to add the following legal argument.
Justice Lofchik quotes as part of his analysis of negligence law based on para in ORen case at para #14:
The plaintiffs claim for negligence on the part of the individual defendants. The Commission does not dispute that, for purpose of liability in negligence, a relationship of proximity exists, but it disputes that a duty of care is owed to the plaintiffs. The Commission and the individual defendants are engaged in a quasi-judicial process. To subject them to liability in negligence would be inimical to the proper exercise of their responsibilities without fear of lawsuits from disappointed complainants; Edwards v. Law Society of Upper Canada (No. 2) (2000), 48 O.R. (3d) 329 at para 40 (C.A.). It would be anomalous if the individual defendants could be sued in negligence when the Commission itself cannot. The work of the Commission is and remains subject to the discipline of judicial review. These reasons negativing a duty of care are compelling.”
1. Code says under section 36 that the Commission does have a duty to fairness owed to the complainant to make thorough and neutral investigations of all prima facie facts in complaints.
2. This case only speaks of negligence – they made an innocent mistake – one cannot sue but there is no mention that complainants cant sue for deliberate malfeasances against the Commission Body and the staff.
27.Go to Canlii(google) website to read Justice Lofchik’s bias endorsement record where there is no references to any of my pleadings made to substantiate his analyses as in other Rule 21 cases such as SCC case of Hunt v. Carey and Crown’s case of Deep. He does not write or refer specifically to any paras in my pleadings to show where I am deficient like Hunt and Deep and all other Rule 21 motions presented by the Crown because my pleadings are sufficient and he did not want to draw attention to that fact! Nor did the Crown defendants in their factum for the Rule 21 Motion and this here Appeal as compared to the Factum found in case of KRP against the same Minister. This is called imaging the truth.
Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21
Superior Court of Justice — Ontario
allegations — suable — pleading — complaints — judicial review
Cooking the Judicial Books
Evidence of Bias at Rule 21 Motion Hearing and reasoning why Ontario Court of Appeal is refusing to allow the Court Transcript to be part of this appeal:
1. During the 8 day motion hearing Justice Lofchik’s comments was evidence of
Discriminatory attitude, bias and intervening in the hearing process in a way that persistly favours the Crown and acting as trier of fact which also includes his argument in his endorsement record that I pleaded no facts. In Court Justice Lofchik admits I pleaded facts. Justice Lofchik’s arguments presented to me for refusing to be bound by the United Nations Treaty per SCC Slaight case, joint tortfeasors defamation legal doctrine, Crown Agency Act, and others are not based on law. For some of his arguments he refuses my right to provide me with the law so that I had an opportunity to defend my claims and is a breach of natural justice. These comments are found in the Court Transcripts per the following:
a) Pg 89 breach of natural justice by JL: “Well, I’m still not sure that the Human Rights Commission fits the description of a Crown Commission, or a Crown agent or Grown agency. The authority is there; whether the authority applies to the Human Rights Commission is the thing that I’m not…” “So how do we figure that out to make sure that we are sure?” “I’ll tell you what I decide.” “Bu I need to have an opportunity to argue whatever…” “Well, I thought you had.” “No, because you’re saying…” “I’ve heard your argument. I’m going to take what you said, I’m going to look at this, and I am going to make a decision. I don’t intend to debate this for the next two days.” “Yeah, but the Crown Agency applies.” “Well, that’s what I’m saying, as I’m not sure it does on the interpretation of the Act.” “What part of the interpretation? A Crown Agency is in all purpose of an agent fo Her Majesty and its powers may be exercised…”
b) Pg 90 JL not applying Code s. 27 which clearly says Lieutenant Governor and Minister: “I’m not sure that the Human Rights Commission is a commission operated by Her Majesty or the government of Ontario or under the authority of the legislature or the lieutenant governor in council.” “It is owned by the Ontario government.” “Well, I’m not sure it is.” “Then who owns it?” “I don’t think it’s owned by anybody. It’s an independent board.” “It’s owned by somebody.” “I’m not sure it is, just as this court isn’t owned by anybody.”
c) Pg 94 “But you are also bound by section 23 of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.” “Well, I’ve heard your argument on that. Let’s carry on. You’ve got your – I’m at paragraph 43 of your factum now. I can tell you that the United Nations as far as I’m concerned, a great organization, they do good work, but they have no binding affect on me so I am not going to pay any attention to that argument.”
d) Pg 123: “Well, I take it your point is tha t your claim against the employees of the Commission is not just in negligence. You are claiming misfeasance. “I’m not – I’m not claiming any negligence.” “All right. Then you are claiming misfeasance.”
e) Pg 142 “I accept the proposition that if a government employee exceeds the bounds of their office or acts with malice to cause, deliberately cause somebody harm, contrary to their duties under that public office then that’s not negligence, it’s a separate tort. So I don’t know what else you’re getting at here.” “My argument was that my friend here was stating that that was negligence…” “Well, all right, I…” “ …which is the material issue in dispute and that’s to be decided at trial and not in a motion hearing.” “All right.”
f) Pg 155 “All right. So your point here is that there was in affect information withheld in the Commission’s report, or information didn’t go in there that you feel should have gone in there.” “That were intentionally omitted.” “All right, intentionally omitted, and that that causes – that gives rise to the tort of deceit.” “Deceit, and misfeasance of public office, conspiracy, injurious falsehoods, and defamation of character, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The case analysis does state I got the dollar raise. If I got the dollar raise there was no incompetency per common law on employment law.”
g) Pg 160-161 “Any omission, and I wouldn’t be here today if it was just one omission, but we’re taking – we’re talking about a lof of omission, serious ommissions. Not just serious omissions but an act of pretend execution of the Ontario Human Rights Code which I discussed earlier as both Mackay and the case analysis admit I was exposed to a sex picture on March 8th, I believe, the 2nd day of work. It was a pornographic faxed image of a couple copulating from behind. They admit that. That is sufficient evidence, a violation of code five and seven. I don’t need any more evidence other than that.” JL “Ah, that’s not quite the same thing. The tribunal doesn’t hear every case. They have a discretion as to which cases to hear. That doesn’t mean there wasn’t a violation, it just means that given the amount of time and resources they have, they have to chose which cases they feel are serious enough to deal with.” “They have to apply the code per the code. The code says a pornographic image, which I already referred to Your Honour…” “Well, that – but, and there is not question about that, but they still have to make a qualitative decision. They don’t prosecute every case. I think there is case law that says that they are not obliged to prosecute every case. They can pick the cases that they in effect feel are serious, enough to prosecute. Otherwise, every time a mechanic puts up a Playboy calender up on his back wall there is a case before the Human Rights Commission and that just – the system will crumble under the weight of what they have to do.” “Well that’s not eliminating discrimination against women and according to the United Treaty.” “No, it’s not, and it may very well not be, but the question is does not prosecuting every case amount to a tort of misfeasance in public office? That’s the real issue that we have here.”
h) Pg 192 JL acting as trier of fact: “All right. So the issue is how does the pleading of those facts prove collussion as opposed to mere negligence?” “Well, we’re not here to prove.” “Well, you say it proves.” “We are here to say that those facts, the wording, is collusion, obstruction of justice, slanting this analysis, that’s not a pleading in negligence. That is a pleading in misfeasance for improper purpose, and the improper purpose is…”
i) Pg 194-95 “The difficulty of having a statement of claim that reads more like a novel then a statement of claim is that it’s hard to pick out the important stuff from narrative…” “Yes. If you look at the back part, Your Honour, there are from 122 to about 142 I go through the case analysis point by point and show the error made, which is fabrication or incorrectly stating the facts. An additional proof of that, Your Honour, if I may, is that if you go to my tab four…” “If you look at number one; “The defendant pleading denies the allegations contained in paragraphs two throug 134 of the statement of claim.” “So they are denying even the rebuttal to the Commission. They are denying even the validated sexual harassment, two complaints that I made internally. Those are facts they are to admit per the rule 25.07(3) I believe, and because they are not admitting them there are costs consequences at another rule, 57.” “Again, that’s another – that’s for another time and place.” “Okay, but this validates my claim that they are not being truthful, that I have a valid claim against all parties. We went through bad faith, okay. Yesterday my friend said that negligence refers to anything I say. Regardless of anything that Ms. Losiers calls, it is all negligence…” “…which is an error in law, as we’ve already gone through, that an omission is not the tort of negligence, it is the tort of misfeasance of public office.” “Well, that’s not quite true either, but you can have negligence through omission or commission.”
j) Pg 196-97 JL acting as trier of fact based on Crown’s defence that all is negligence when I clearly pleaded deliberate to injure: “No, but failure to record a complaint properly or accurately may or may not be negligence. It could be negligence just she wrote it down wrong, or she developed the wrong attitude toward it, she misunderstood, and number of things. It can be negligence…” “…or it can be deliberate act of misfeasance, and we’re gone around this mulberry bush a lot of times now and it seems to me the law says, subject to what counsel has to say, that an act of negligence is in effect not suable but an act of deliberate misfeasance with intent to injure is. We don’t – we’ve gone around that mulberry bush…” “…so that the issue is, and I understand your argument, that you are characterizing these actions as deliberate acts of misfeasance with effectively a deliberate attempt to cause you injury.”
k) Pg 220 discretion duty per preamble and s. 29(d) with Crown Defendants duty to eliminate discrimination, and Crown’s discretion is to be narrowly interpreted not broadly per Code Book pg 3 which contradicts JL comment: “The difficulty is that there is a considerable body of case law that supports that proposition, that is that they are not obliged to forward every case to the tribunal, that they have a discretion. In fact, there are cases that say that the Commission is in effect a gatekeeper to the Tribunal and they have a broad discretion as to –the difference being this. The police have a duty to prevent crime. They have a duty to act. They must; I mean, that’s part of their raison d’etre. That’s why they’re there. That’s not the function of the board. It doesn’t have a duty, statutory duty, to forward every case to the tribunal. In fact, it’s statutory duty is otherwise. The statute gives it, under section 34 and 36, the right to say it stops here, so factually the proposition that Justice Crane rejects doesn’t have an awful lot do do with the statute that the board operates under.”
l) Pg 221 evidence JL is making up the law when UN treaty part of Code preamble and SCC case “Okay, but the board also operates under the United Treaty, which says that they do have a duty to eleminate discrimination against women.” “I am not going to go there. The United Nations Treaty just become operative on courts and boards when they become law passed by the legislature. The government can trot around and sign all the treaties it wants but until they are enacted into law they don’t affect you and I as citizens necessarily.”
m) Pg 223 favouring the Crown per JL’s comment: “My last argument, I think, is almost my last argument, per KRP, courts can review discretion of police staff and the Minister of Attorney General, so therefore they can also review a discretion, abuse of discretion, by staff at the Commission.” “That’s what we call judicial review.” “That’s what we call misfeasance of public office that the courts can review.” “But Justice Crane said that they also could be reviewed by a court in a civil matter, and this is a civil matter, KRP, not a judicial review matter.” “oh, I see what you are saying.”
n) Pg 224 JL trying to deny me right to argue other torts: “ Well, I thought that you were making those allegations with respect to those torts. I think we’ve – you mentioned conspiracy.” “I haven’t mentioned my case law for conspiracy and all the other elements.” “You mean what constitutes Conspiracy?” “Yeah.” “I don’t think we have to go there.” “But the employers are going there and my friend here has offered a case on that matter, so those are the improper purpose for the misfeasance of public office. That’s what I’m referring to.” “Okay”
o) Pg 249-50 “All I’m saying is, as I indicated at the outset, I think your statement of claim will ultimately have to be redrafted for these reasons.”
p) Pg 267-276 “Now what facts are there any facts pleaded with respect to the conclusion that the defendants have no honest belief in their statement of gross incompetence?”
q) Pg 275-76 JL acting as trier of fact again (sufficient for pleadings per Ruckpaul case of distorting the truth and flawed investigations) : “Well, it’s not so much distorting facts as coming to an improper conclusion on the facts or ignoring the facts, perhaps.” “For distorting the facts, because they leave out the other three incidents afterwards.” “Well, distorting the facts to me means the facts are one thing and then they say another; nothing to do with the conclusion drawn from the facts.” “Did the report indicate that the people at Mackay admitted that they did whatever you say they did?” “Yes.” “The report says that.” “Yes” “So then it’s not distorting that fact.” “No, but the distortion is saying that those facts are insufficient evidence.” “Well, my – and you can correct me if I’m wrong, but my understanding of distorting the facts is, in effect, saying that the facts are something other than what they are, not from the point of view of a legal conclusion but just from the point of view of statement of fact.”
r) Pg 285 “Well, that’s right, and my question to you is, other than saying, look at there’s other evidence that they didn’t accept my version of the facts, apart from that, are there facts pleaded that show conspiracy or collussion or are you saying because they only accepted the employer’s version of the facts and ignored mine, there must be collussion and there must be a conspiracy. Does your pleading to beyond that?”
s) Pg 296 “Yeah, I repeat those facts when I say the facts listed between – my material facts are listed between 36 to 142.” “That doesn’t count for very much, does it?” “Well, it’s dated, it’s logical, it’s by date order. And I also pleaded in paragraph 23, the first statement of claim 45.
t) Pg 323 “Same thing. That’s a complaint against the process. What I’m asking, what I’m looking for is facts pleaded wherein these employees, facts that support an allegation of misfeasance in public office” “Well, 32, Your Honour, I do list the material facts listed at 36 to 142. If you’d like we can go through those facts.” “Well, yeah, but…” They include the two sexual harassment complaints, they include my termination…” “All right. No, no, 32 I have and I think it’s all in a nutshell. Really your complaint is the last sentence, I think, on that first paragraph, I have that, that they violate your Charter rights because of misfeasance by providing sham investigation, et cetera.” “Yeah” “I have that.”
u) Pg 564 “So there may be a statute for the Minister of the Attorney General.” “Well, the onus is on you to find it.”
v) Pg 571 “All right. So maybe the way we’ll have to deal with this is I’ll render my decision in this case. And I am going to order that the statement of claim be amended to comply with the rules. But I am – I still don’t see any harm in doing it twice. One step at a time. Let’s get this part right.”
w) Pg 578-579 JL ignored the Constitutional tort inhis endorsement: “Well, the legislation, I agree, but the constitutional torts against the staff is not just because of the legislation; it’s because of the conduct of those staff.” “That I am being discriminated against.” “Well, and that’s part of your claim for damages here.” “I understand that.” “And the other road is a claim for damages for people acting for the Commission under the statute as it exists. It’s got nothing to do with the wording of the statute or anything. Your complaint is their actions…” “…are discriminatory, no matter how the statute is written.”
x) Pg 581 “Same set of facts.” “Well, same facts but maybe different liabilities and different responsibilities.” “Yeah, so then there are facts.”
y) Pg 586-90 JL acting as trier of fact again “The fabrication of incompetency. The fabrication…” “Well, again, it’s – the facts are – they make a comment that you disagree with, and therefore, you say ‘because I don’t agree with what they said, that must be fabricated.’” “They’re not allowed to fabricate.” “No, they’re not allowed to fabricate…” “…to make some evaluation of the evidence.” “And my point is that other than the fact that you disagree with what they said, what facts are there to show that those are fabricated? Number one, it could be a mistake, they misapprehended the evidence.” “The allegations of incompetency is a fabrication. I’ve provided you evidence with the defendant’s Mackay’s statement of defence where they’re not using those same allegations, disarray of books…”
”If it was not a fabrication, it would have been in Mackay’s statement of defence, plus their affidavit of documents that I’ve already received with absolutely no documents relied upon for those disarray of books to prove allegations of incompetency. So to me, the whole…” “But could that not be something as simple as someone from the Commission going to Mackay’s and being told, ‘Look at this, this place is a mess. Her workplace was a mess. She wasn’t doing her job.’ The Commission person accepts that. It might be wrong, it might even be a lie. But does that make it a fabrication on the part of the Commission person?” “That’s the issue here. We need – and I have a right to a trial to decide that. Not through a Rule 21 motion. We’re arguing items here that I feel that are for the trial judge to decide.” “And it can be proven.” “And you heard arguments yesterday to say, well, no, you don’t accept those allegations as true. That’s something I’m going to have to analyze.” “The other argument that I have, too, is some of those after-the-fact arguments were not in Mackay’s rebuttal to the Commission, the original rebuttal. Therefore, it’s quite possibly that they didn’t interview anybody, I mean, because that’s just right now he said/she said, Mrs. Meadows-Lee saying that, “Yeah, we interviewed those people.” There’s no corroborating evidence to say that they actually did interview those people.” “…to decide what it takes for an allegation in a statement of claim to be accepted at face value. That’s really what it comes down to.
z) Pg 604 evidence of favouring Crown per endoresment record alleging my claim is abuse of process when in court JL said: “But she’s lumping all these other torts as well, it can only be through a judicial review.” “And that’s not the correct jurisdiction for these courts. And I’ve given you factums, in my factum arguments.” “I don’t need to go there. I accept your submission that…” “…if you’re seeking damages for torts…” “..it’s in a proceeding such as this and not judicial review. You don’t have to argue that.”
aa) Pg 615-19 JL acting as trier of fact again: “It mentions here, “It’s no longer sufficient to make bald allegations of malice in the statement of claim. The extension of this rule is consistent with its purpose.” And then it says something here that it is important to allege to the wrongdoer, to be able to understand what is to the wrongdoer, to be able to understand what is alleged of him and her with precision and be placed in a position that allows a response. Well, fabrication of insufficient evidence in the case analysis…” “…does fit that.” “…it’s still an allegation of…” “Fact. That my fact differs from their fact, that they didn’t fabricate.” “Well, I guess that’s the issue, or is it a conclusion? Because you disagree with what they find, you say it’s a fabrication.” “Then they’re facts in there is also a conclusion. Because they say that’s the truth.” “Well, no, there’s no question they draw conclusions. But all I’m saying is there’s a distinction between an erroneous conclusion made in the course of doing whatever they do and deliberately fabricating. And you use this term, what is it, fabrication of lack of evidence?” “Insufficient evidence.” “Yeah. But fabricate, when I think of fabricate in the terms of evidence, I think of somebody making up evidence.” “Exactly.” “Well, what evidence have they made up?” “They made up the incompetency allegations, the after-the-fact incompetency allegations. We went through that on the other day.” “Well, that’s not – but that’s not fabrication of insufficient evidence. That’s fabrication of – that’s, in effect…” “It’s tied into – the full case analysis, at the end of it, it says, “insufficient evidence of discrimination of reprisal of sexual harassment.” “Whatever you say is fabricated.” “The after-the-fact incompetency allegations that are in the case analysis…” “And most of them is the disarray of books…” “…that was not written in the original MMP rebuttal and is not in their defence, not in my termination statement.” “So you’re saying since they don’t raise it in their defence, she couldn’t have been told that in her investigation? That’s your position?” “So for the purpose of pleadings, it’s whether a defendant can properly defend themselves and according to those pleadings, it is quite easy for the defendant, Ms. Rue (ph) and Ms. Waik to properly defend, basically saying, ‘We didn’t fabricate.” “Well, I would – that’s going to have to be re-written anyway, even if I agree with me.” “I mean, it seems to me the reasonable way to deal with that is that Ms. Meadows – is it Meadows-lee – says in her report, stated that she was told this, this and this by the Defendants, when in fact she was not told this, this and this and that she fabricated those facts. Nowhere succintly does your pleading set that out. I suppose if we pick through it, we can ultimately find those bits and pieces and put them together, but it’s not very well put, let’s put it that way, even if it’s sustainable.” “Yeah, but my argument is that I’m deficient in writing.” “Oh well, yeah, I appreaciate that. All I’m saying is that it’s going to have to be rewritten anyway.” “yep, yep. And I have no argument.” “And you’re – you say you should have the opportunity to re-write it, as long as the bare bones are there.” (HVK allows for rambling deficiencies of bits and pieces!)
bb) Pg 620 evidence JL did not read the statement of claim paragraphs 36 to 140 which can be read by all: “The concealment of evidence is the concealment of the material facts in the statement listed.” There’s where the material facts are, point 36 to 140 total.” “Okay, Well, I can tell you that when you re-write this pleading, you should set out those specific facts because anybody who’s reading this statement of claim isn’t going to have 36 to 42 in front of them, so they have no idea what you’re talking about.”
cc) Pg 754 “Now, as I understand, this last argument is, well, there are relevant facts that might be made by way of amendment. I think the argument should be more focused on the issue of facts supporting the allegation of breach of statutory duty, because it seems to me that becomes the crux of the claim against the Human Rights Commissioner.” (HVK and Deep allows for amendments)
dd) Pg 754 JL’s arguments on discretion not based on law but him making it up (I query) and refusal to provide me with his case law breaching natural justice again as I have a right to defend/argue against his law authority (as a given), and lack of resources argument not sufficient per SCC: “Obviously they have a discretion…” “…in the way they carry out their duties.” “The fact that there are – how shall I put this – I guess I can’t put it any other way – the fact that there are facts supporting your claim that may or may not have been investigated as thoroughly as you wish might very well have much to do with the claim against the other employers, and whether there are sufficient facts pleaded to maintain the claims against them.” “Now, there’s a duty ot investigate. However, there’s a great deal of discretion on how an investigation is carried out. And I query whether there’s a statutory duty to investigate every lead, every fact, every aspect of every complaint.” I request these authorities and JL responds “Well, I can tell you, I’m taking that as a given, based on all kinds of case law that says that there’s a great discretion on the way they carry out their investigation; and indeed whether they recommend that any particular case go the Tribunal.” “They also have a discretion as to, ‘We only have so many resources and we can only pursue so many complaints, and therefore, we pick and choose the ones that we’re going to recommend and send to the Commission.”
ee) Pg 757 accepting uncorroborated he said she said evidence is breach of statutory duty JL’s response “Okay; that can be said in one sentence. Let’s carry on.” “All right; but here’s the point: rather than going through all of the facts that you say weren’t properly investigated, et cetera, if your point is the breach of statutory duty here is failing to follow up every fact and accepting some evidence as uncorroborated, that can be said in, as I say, a sentence or two, rather than going through your whole statement of claim pointing out instances where that happened.”
ff) Pg 758 “Well, you’ve pleaded lots of facts.” “But the issue is, a lot of those facts relate to your alleged complaints against the former employers and their employees. And the issue then becomes, how does that relate to the claim against the Human Rights Commission? And you’ve in one sentence really, it seems to me, dealt with that, unless there are other issues. And that is, failure to follow up all of these facts, or to merely accept the evidence of statement of people by – and without further investigation, is what you say is the breach of statutory duty.” “I mean, I know you’ve pleaded lots of facts here. And if the basis of your complaint against the Commission is merely accepting people’s statements as to the truth or untruth of your allegations with respect to those facts, if that’s what you say is breach of statutory duty, that seems to me is dealt with in that part of the argument.”
gg) Pg 759 “…haven’t said in your statement of claim is – you say, ‘Well they didn’t talk to everybody.’ What you don’t say is, ‘If they’d talked to Sam he would’ve said something else.” “The suggestion is that there’s somebody out there who might have given evidence or information contrary to what was told to the investigator.” “I said it right here on paragraph – page 77-61” “If they had spoken to Les directly…”
hh) Pg 760 Tony Millington’s address to Claude JL response “But he may not have said that” ***is favouring the Crown and JL acting as trier of fact
ii) Pg 761-4 “What I said was, that there have been facts pleaded with respect to the alleged harassment and incidents involving former employers and their employees.” “And what I tried to suggest is, point me at the pleadings of facts that support, you say support your allegation of breach of statutory duty.” “And now you’ve said to me in your argument that failure to carry a balanced, out a balanced investigation by not interviewing witnesses who you think maybe would’ve been favourable to you is part of the breach of the statutory duty. That’s what I take from what we’ve just been talking about.” “Yes, not one witness.” “They only interviewed me. Okay; so that was paragraph 21. Then my friend went to paragraph 24 – oh, I should maybe just go back to 21.” “…image perception because Shannon Meadows-Lee worked on the next two employers case analysis showing I started…” “And then I state clearly where the breach of statutory duty is. Shannon Meadows-Lee on behalf of the OHR – in her own words demonstrates image perception of perceived impairment at 30. It appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position.” “That is a fact, a statement made; that is the what. And the where is that the Commission, in the case analysis, that is a breach of statutory duty – ‘cause this here is defamation. That’s not it in complete detail, but we’d have to actually look at the copy of the case analysis. But I’ve written it in several paragraphs that particular phrase that was in the case analysis.” “The Commission and any members of the justice system do not have the right per discretion to libel people. And then I go on to say that this is imaging behaviour, because Shannon Meadows-Lee worked on the next two employers case analysis showing that Xentel and Lyman – showing I started part-time position on January 10th, 2003 – incompetiency issues to do with sales not accounting – or alleged incompetency – and a full-time position on February 10, 2003, no incompetency issues.” “I worked at two places of employment, full-time and a part-time job, showing I was fully capable of handling the position had I gone back to MMP. And I had previously stated that this particular argument is what my friend here calls speculation and conclusion, which Ms. Meadows-Lee cannot prove because I never returned back to MMP.” “But I can prove, as a basis for breach of statutory duty, collusion, defamation, libel, tort of deceit and misfeasance of public office, abuse of discretion. They did not have the right to fabricate facts or make libel statements.” “And I also noted at the bottom half here of this paragraph 21, also the statement at 30 alone represents discrimination by the Ontairo Human Rights Commission of a perceived disability which leads ot refusal of doing their statutory duty – there’s the breach – of proper investigating the facts and evidence that led to the decision to refuse referring my prima facie complaint to the tribunal.”
jj) Pg 771-777 the following represents JL overstepping his boundary and acting as trier of fact: “Might I suggest, that rather than go through all that – in a nutshell, your position is, I have pleaded facts that justifies my claim against the employers. These were facts that I made known to the investigators for the Commission. They didn’t properly investigate them. That’s really where you’re at, isn’t it?” “Not just that they did not properly investigate them, Your Honour, they fabricated.” “Well, I suppose that’s arguable, in the sense that they told by some of your former employers that you weren’t doing the job, and they accepted that at face value without investigating it further.” “No, Your Honour” “You mean, they just made it up out of the blue?” “Yes, Your Honour.” “The facts in my statement of claim says that the employer allegedly told the Commission.” “But the facts also show in my statement of claim that the employer gave me three defence statements for this suit with absolutely no same allegations…
”…that the Commission is stating is in the case analysis.” “…doesn’t that still come down to what I just said, that there were allegations by the employers that they took at face value and they didn’t investigate them further. And that’s really an improper investigation.” “Improper purpose” “So, all I’m saying is, I don’t know whether we need to go through every paragraph of your statement of claim where you’re pointing to me where there are allegations against your former employers, and then setting out why you think that there was an improper investigation, or fabrication, whatever you want to call it.” “Your position is set out in the nutshell that I put to you, I think. The facts that you plead with respect to the improper investigation are really the fact that there’s another side to the story which you plead in your statement of claim, which they didn’t investigate. Is that fair?” “No” “Well, you say “fabricating”, but they’re not – “fabricating” to me means there’s absolutely no evidence from anybody that they can either choose to accept or not accept, but that they’ve been making something up out of the blue.” “I don’t see that as what comes out of your statement of claim. What I see comes out of the statement of claim is, there are statements being made which you say are untrue by the employer. So, maybe the employers are fabricating, and the investigators are accepting these things at face value without going behind them or testing the truth of those statements.” “Now, that to me doesn’t mean that the investigator is fabricating, it just means that he’s maybe – or she – are accepting what you say is a fabrication by the employers.” “And the fabrication on the part of the employers is part of your claim against them, which we’re not really dealing with here. We’re dealing with breach of statutory duty of the investigators. Whether it’s fabrication or not by the employers, misleading the investigators is for another day.” “Not according to this argument that I presented Your Honour earlier by Dixon on page 55 of my factum. Their assessment requires the consideration by the jury of the entire conduct of the defendant prior to the publication…” “Well, yeah, but that’s the test of what goes on at a jury trial, not the test of what an investigator is supposed to do.” “My claim of breach of statutory duty, and to do with the facts of the incompetency, are also the tort of libel and defamation, therefore…” “And I picked up on that” “…therefore, it is the entire conduct continuing through to trial. Which includes my – the Crown defendants receiving statement of defence – three of them – from MacKay, MacKay, and Peters, with absolutely no allegations of these so-called incompetency facts that are written up in the case analysis…” “All right; no, I picked up on that. Part of your claim is, again, there’s these allegations made which they’ve picked up on, haven’t properly investigated and then repeated in their report, which you say are libelous. That hasn’t escaped me.” “No, no, you didn’t understand my point. My point is that, information has come to light to them of defence statements from MMP saying there was no allegations of incompetency.” Ms. K. “MMP’s legal positioning with respect to a statement of defence is not relevant in this matter.” JL “And that’s an unproven allegation, at best.” (same applies to Crown defendants alleged investigation that is unproven) “I mean, that can be a situation where there was an allegation of incompetency,, it was repeated by the investigator; and now the people at MMP realize they’re out on a limb and decide to deny it in a statement of defence. That’s not proven that it wasn’t made.” “But my argument is, Your Honour…” “Well, your argument…” “…that’s part…” “…it was repeated…” “…no, no, no, no, my argument is that for my statement of claim to continue on, that not only do I get to include that fact, but I also get to include the fact that that has become – made to light for the Crown defendants.” “And according to laws and rules, that once new evidence has come into light, that some true statement was made false, then they are to do what is right, not just to continue the fabrication of the incompetency in this motion trial and in the appeal process.” “And two of these defence statements were given to the Crown after the case analysis; and that includes all the way up to the Supreme Court.” “But their statement’s in a statement of defence. That doesn’t…” “That there was no incompetency…” “…but that doesn’t mean they’re true, which I think is counsel’s point.” “Yes, and that’s right. And it’s a matter of the trial judge, not a motion judge, to decide what is true.”
kk) Pg 777-792 same as Botiuk case and therefore I have proper pleaded facts and cause of action against the Crown per JL’s comments of “Because your point is that, as I say, that they were accepted by investigators and repeated by investigators without properly being investigated and considered. Fine; I have that point.” “Frankly, that could all be dealt with, in so far as the Commission is concerned, in a relatively short paragraph or two in the statement of claim. What you’re doing here is pleading evidence. And, as I indicated way back at the beginning, that’s not what a statement of claim is all about.” “I’m pleading facts…” “Well, you’re…” “…the evidence are of physical documents.” “But the facts you rely on so far as the Commission is concerned, is that they took statements from the employers at face value without properly investigating them; repeated them in their report; and some of those statements are libeloous. As I say, that – in a statement of claim, that’s all that’s required. What you’re pleading, all this other stuff here is what you do at trial to prove those claims. And that’s why, as I indicated to you at the outset, this statement of claim has to go.” “The only issue is whether the Commissioner stays in as a defendant or not, because it’s not a proper statement of claim.” “Because the Commissioner obviously is vicariously liable for the staff.” “Well, it’s the facts, it’s the facts with respect to the Commission, not the facts with respect to your other employers and the other defendants that are relevant to me here.” “And I think that argument still is that, so far as the Commission is concerned, you haven’t pleaded – as I understand the argument, you haven’t pleaded facts to support the claim of collusion and breach of statutory duty.” “You’ve pleaded lots of facts so far as what you say the other employers did and said, there’s no question about that.” “Well, I have, according to my authorities in the law. Again, I’ll go – repeat Chahal and also Dixon; it’s the publication of libel continuing through to the conclusion of trial. “Libel includes those libelous statements by the defendant employers.” “And the Crown.” JL “Yes.” “If they’re repeated in the report.” “Or if they make statements that you say are libelous. The issue then becomes, though, if they’re made in good faith, as opposed to – of an intent to, in effect, harm you…” “…then they’re probably protected by their statutory duty. So, it really then comes back to, again, what are the facts that take them out of the realm of the …” “Of good fiath.” “…protection of the statutory protection.” “And I have provided Your Honour with those arguments as well.” “Well, you have; but I don’t know that you’ve done that this morning.” “Okay. According to Deep, paragraph 64 in the defendant’s authority book: Bad Faith is a legal conclusion. It has been held to involve an allegation of an intent to deceive or to make someone believe what is false.” “So, this point at number 30 in the case analysis, this fact that the case – number 30 by Shannon Meadows-Lee…” “It appears that even if the complainant returns with a decision after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position” “This is a fact of behaviour of manipulating the case analysis to discredit the complainant. It has nothing to do with the defendants at MMP giving her any facts that she investigated, this is Shannon Meadows-Lee making a libelous, opinionated statement.” “And that is sufficient evidence of bad faith.” “All right. Well, we’ve already looked at that and you’ve made the argument.” “Okay, I’m just – bad faith, it has been held to involve an allegation of intent to deceive to make someone believe what is false. This is Ms. Meadows-Lee – if she wrote tha tone statement, then I have the right to prove that all the other statements were an intent to deceive and were not investigated, were just her writing up comments. My pleadings of fabrication of insufficient evidence, incompetency and sham investigation to image the truth is that allegation of an intent to deceive or make someone believe what is false by the Crown defendants that led to the following believe what is false solely by – as being Crown staff – and nothing else.” “Mr. Norton and judges in the appeal courts have now attempted to make Justice Lofchik believe what is false by dismissing my claims against them. Where a plaintiff claims – includes an allegation of bad faith, the pleading must support sufficient particulars that support a legal conclusion of bad faith.” “That particular statement, plus the incompetency allegation, is an example of bad faith. My pleadings of bad faith – and I’m getting to it – termination letter by MMP – okay, my pleadings of bad faith temination by MMP defendants warning the Wallace damage – and I won’t go through that case ‘cause Your Honour said that you’re very familiar with Wallace damages.” “Is sufficient per the Supreme Court case of Wallace v. United Grain Growers that the Crown defendants by association ignoring the legal doctrine of bad faith for the employer in Wallace case, where an employer must be honest at the time of termination as to the reason for termination to the employee and by changing their reason for cause have demonstrated beyond bad faith, particularly when their defence statement after the – their defence statement after the date of the fabricated Human Rights case analysis dated December 2004 does not use the defence of incompetence that they have – and they’re co-conspirators with the Crown defendants – are using in the Human Rights jurisdiction. These facts are sufficiently pleaded.” “Page 88 – these are relevant facts against the Crown as well as MMP.” “it is my paragraph 107. On or about January 29th, 2003, I received a courier at my home – a termination letter signed by Mrs. Page stating cause to be: We have received and reviewed the report from Workplace Safety and Insurance Board that does not substantiate your allegation. The employment standard claim for overime hours was in process and not decided upon as of January 20th, 2003 termination letter. I went on sick leave August 14th; I was terminated on January 20th, sufficient time for the defendants to put in their statement of claim all the allegations of incompetency that are in the case analysis – this is relevant (s/b termination letter not stmt of claim). This is relevant also to the tort – or the bad faith intent to deceive or make someone believe what is false. According to Wallace, at the time of termination, the employer is to be honest – reason of termination to the employee, and changing the reason for cause have demonstrated beyond doubt particularly when their defense statement – after the date of the fabricated case analysis dated summer 2004 does not have the defence of incompetency that they and their conspiractors – the Crown defendants – are using in the Human Rights jurisdiction. These two facs are sufficiently pleaded. These two facts are relevant to all of the torts against the Crown as the defendants; as well as the principle of bad faith. The Crown accepting MMP’s bad faith termination reason, ignoring the Supreme Court case, are demonstrating their bad faith, and these facts have been pleaded numerous times in a sufficient particularity. Other examples of bad faith are: the particulars need to be added, as the Crown defendants accepting Mrs. Page’s uncorroborated he said-she said witness statement, when she has demonstred bad faith per termination reasons in the Wallace case legal doctrine.” Ms. K “Your Honour, again we’re getting into an area where Ms. Losier claims to want to add facts, as opposed to describing what is contained in the existing pleading which we’re dealing with today” (KRP & Deep has rebuttal allowed to add facts if supports cause of action) “Yes; and they’re relevant to the bad faith argument. And if I have a cause of action with these other particulars, then I have the right to amend my statement of claim. And the reason why I didn’t add them, because I had no legal knowledge or training. Had I had that legal knowledge and training – how to write a proper statement of claim – they would’ve been included.” “Well, that argument only gets you so far. Ultimately, I still look at the statement of claim to see whether it discloses a cause of action. Now, I hear what you’re saying and I’ll take that into consideration. Let’s just get on with it.” “Another example of bad faith, only interviewing respondent’s witnesses, two persons who did not work with me at the time of employment, and no witness for the plaintiff.” “I thought from our earlier discussions I made it clear to you that I understand that’s part of your claim.” “But I didn’t make that in reference to bad faith.” “That’s why I’m, I’m dealing with right now bad faith.” “And it’s relevant to that. “As well as not interviewing any of my witnesses, because that demonstrates bias, unbalanced investigation and part of the fabrication of insufficient evidence by controlling the – or the plaintiff’s witnesses which also form a – there’s also a form of concealing evidence by not interviewing anybody; which to me are all a part of my allegations of bad faith conduct. Again, that definition is, an attempt to deceive or make someone else believe what is false.” “In the ’05 matter, it’s fabricating insufficient evidence of sexual harassment when the Commission staff did not interview any of the sexual harassers; plus, left out of the case analysis validated and corroborated sexual harassment and internal complaints validated by Xentel and Lyman in their rebuttals to the Commission. All of my allegations that they validated; and with Lyman there were several. This too represents bad faith, an attempt to deceive or make someone believer what is false.”
ll) Pg 792-3 “And according to this case of Chahal, it’s a meeting; so therefore, if there really was an investigation, that is where the collusion between MMP and the Crown comes in: to orchestrate those facts of incompetency during the Human Rights process; to orchestrate injurious falsehoods of gross incompetency – because it wasn’t – it wasn’t before the Human Rights process that they came out and not after are they coming out – by fabricating facts during the employment and after employment, refusing to provide the plaintiff with the specific evidence of these allegations – such as the disarray of books – both in the Human Rights process and in MMP’s affidavit of documents and the Crown’s affidavit of documents; ignoring the dollar raise, a fact that’s in my statement of claim; termination letter for cause of WSIB denying non-incompetency to avoid referral to the tribunal.” “I think you should move on…” “But I’m just responding to the Crown’s allegations that there is bald allegation and no facts.” “Well, yeah, but you’ve done that before too.” “There are facts. And I want to make sure that Your Honour is aware of them, and how they’re meant to be read per the allegations.” “Yes, all right; I have your point.”
mm) pg 817 tort of conspiracy “Well, I don’t doubt that you pleaded facts with
respect to that issue; so just carry on.”
mn) Pg 823 JL’s argument re: tort of libel is not based on any law as he refuse to
give me his authorities and is a breach of natural justice not allowing me to
review his authorities to defend my claim: “If the investigator is under a duty to
report – a legal duty to report, then query whether that doesn’t raise an issue of
qualified privilege on the part of the investigator” and “But if the report is solely
internal within the Commission under a duty to report, then query that’s
considered to be a publication of the libel.”
mm) Pg 824 JL’s argument re: tort of libel is not based on any law as he refuse
to give me his authorities and is a breach of natural justice not allowing me to
review his authorities to defend my claim: “Well, I suppose what I’m saying is,
I’m not sure that this is a totally accurate statement of the law” and I request a
copy of what is he responds with “I’m sure I do somewhere, but not here today,
Carry on.” (never provided me with his copy of law)
nn) Pg 828 tort of libel on joint tortfeasors “All right; that’s trite law, we don’t need to get into that. I mean you’re just repeating what you said before.” “Well, no, this is back to the reading of that other one whether – it it’s reproduced, who is responsible for it. So, here it’s saying each time defamatory material is communicated to a new person, it is a fresh and actionable defamation.” JL “There’s no quarrel with that.”
oo) Pg 846 “All right; so your point is what? That departure from the standards is an infliction of …” “Emotional Distress” “All right I have your point.”
pp) Pg 856 JL making up the rules again re: SCC’s decision HR as high as UN treaty: “I understand your position to be, he wasn’t doing it in compliance with the Human Rights Code – or they weren’t doing it in compliance with the Code, they were deviating from the duties under the Code, and that’s what caused the mental suffering.” “If that’s the case, then I don’t think we need to get into all this Human Rights – United Nations stuff, because I’m presuming that the Code is valid legislation for the purposesm of this lawsuit.” “My reference to this is the overt statement which I argued yesterday, which is at number 30 in the MMP case…” “…is not allowed, per discretion, to make a libelous and discriminatory statement that I was unfit to work opinion by…” “Well, all right…” “…the investigation statement.” “…I understand – all right, I take that point.” “I still don’t know where the United Nations Treaties on Human Rights and all that comes into play with respect to that. But…” “…per the United Nations Treaty, it says to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practice which constitute discrimination against women. That includes these discriminatory comments by a Commission staff. And…” “All right; I have that point.” “…there’s also – the United Nations also refers to that it is against – that I can have a Human Rights complaint or suit against any person, any organization, any enterprise. That includes the Crown, there is no immunity. That’s how it relates…” “Well, all right, I don’t think United Nations Charters overrule Canadian law; so, let’s get on with it.”
”Well, the Supreme Court says that it does.” “Well, that’s not how I read it.”
qq) Pg 862 “And so, as far as the statement of claim in respect of your claim for damages – that is, your claim you were harmed by these actions – as far as that’s concerned, I’m satisfied that there’s pleading in there to that effect.” “Because I’m content that you’ve pleaded in your statement of claim that the actions of the defendant caused you emotional harm. And that’s all this is dealing with.”
rr) Pg 888 “And also my friend here, the Crown made submissions that – earlier that it was her versions of facts – or her version of events was the actual words she used – which events are facts – and therefore admitting I have pleaded facts. And that her version of events are the material issue in dispute.” “Right” “Your Honour’s discretion in this Rule 21 is to – not to decide the question of fact motive which prompted the Commission staff to act – being to write deceitful facts in case analysis based on uncorroborated he said-she said evidence…” “No, my job is to decide wheter the statement of claim…” “…pleads sufficient material facts to establish the basis of a cause of action in a claim. That’s my job.” “And in my factum I had also pleaded at page 43, paragraph 59, that ommissions were done in bad faith.” “Yes” “or by unlawful means.” “Unlawful means also includes accepting uncorroborated he said-she said evidence by respondents. Which is collusion, a one-sided investigation, per my facts, stated facts.”
15. I plead that the extent of Watts’ defamation of my character extends beyond Watts Industries interference at Mackay and includes defaming my character with the Ontario Human Rights commission to cause an obstruction of natural justice and injurious falsehoods by the commission staff of insufficient evidence of prima facie complaints. The defamation of my character can easily be demonstrated based on my pass memos of performance by others prior to working at Mackay and MacKay’s description of my work ethics during my employment that they submitted to the Ontario Human Rights commission in their rebuttal to my complaint, in the December 2004 case analysis, and Mr. Clarke’s comments in his letter to the Employment Standards Office. I can show that in 1992 I was promoted to branch administrator; in 1993 I was recognized by my manager for my attention to Quality; in 1996 that same manager stated that my solid and reliable performance is appreciated; in 1999 from Watts manager being noted that I was a strong performer in accomplishing tasks and 2001 rating of 4 exceeding expectations in receivable duties; in 2002 reference letter from employer before Mackay that I was a conscientious, punctual employee who took her responsibilities very seriously; and then from Mackay claiming performance issues without progressive discipline process for wrongful dismissal excuse after they received my Human Rights complaint against them when original reason for termination is reprisal action under the Code and violation of criminal code 425.1. I can also show fabrication of warning letter at Watts Industries to paint me a trouble-maker and lacking in team spirit which was successfully challenged in fax to commission in May 2001.
MacKay’s defamatory reference for me in their response to Human Rights commission was the following: the respondents state that the employment was terminated following a significant absence and due to performance issues (proving discrimination based on real disability); Dasha Page was upset by the conversation given the nature of the conversation and the bizarre accusations that were being made, the Respondents considered terminating the employment immediately during the probationary period; it became clear that the Complainant could not handle the full responsibilities of the position and was really just not competent enough to perform to work in a busy office; Dasha Page denies that there was any conversation regarding quitting; the Respondents could have let her go during the probationary period but elected to try and preserve her position as she made it apparent that she needed the job; the Complainant was unable to operate the accounting duties and the Respondents were required to bring in additional help in order to do the accounting; there was significant damage done to the Respondents by virtue of the administration system implemented by the Complainant; and the Complainant maintained that extensive overtime was necessary in order for her to do the job, while the job had previously been done without the necessity of overtime. I submitted an excellent rebuttal to this fabrication causing additional fabrication by the defendants in the commission case analysis of disarray of books that were not mentioned in their rebuttal to my complaint that I received and was allowed to cross examine.
My reputation as a good worker has been defamed by Watts Industries, and now Mackay to the point of not being able to receive fair employment without this continuation of Watts’ mobbing campaign at next employer nor good references for future job opportunities due to their actions, plus not being giving the appropriate work environment to grow and improve my skills, and is career stoppage. I also have the added problem of now having my Charter Rights obstructed by the OHRC. My excellent health record destroyed by the actions by these two employers causing intentionally injury to my health which resulted in loss of insurance benefits in 2003 at fourth employer in this campaign due to the fact now I have to reveal that I have suffered from depression when previously I did not.
16. I plead that when I left Watts Industries in 2001 and after the time off for disability leave it took me one month of a job search before I was hired by Marshalls Transport who laid me off in January 2002 with no repeating items in my Human Rights complaint of exposure to sexual picture or sucks to be you comments. Again it only took me approximately one month of looking for work before I was hired by MMP Limited in March 2002 only for them to repeat items, particularly sexual picture and sucks to be comment, in my Watts Industries’ 2000 Human Rights Complaint and wrongfully breaching of contract in January 2003. Again it only took me one month from starting my job search in December 2002 to be hired by Xentel DM Incorporated for part time telemarketing position in January 2003 only to repeat items in my Watts Industries and MMP Limited Human Rights complaints followed by breach of that contract on September 15th 2003. While employed at Xentel for part time telemarketing position it only took me one month to find replacement full time accounting position at Lyman starting on February 2003 and only again to repeat items in my Watts and MMP Limited Human Rights Complaints with the OHRC colluding and passing additional information to Lyman and Xentel. Again my contract was breached wrongfully by Lyman on March 19th 2004. This pattern alone demonstrates a persecution order otherwise known as scapegoat campaign by Watts Industries after my 2000 Human Rights complaint against them to ruin my career and health for blowing the whistle on their illegal labour practices. In 2004 it took 6 months before I was rehired by Kinros/Laurentide in September 2004 only to repeat items in all of my Human Right Complaints and terminate my employment only 3.5 hours after I handed my second complaint letter. It’s now going on six months where I have submitted 90 resumes to various job openings with approximately 20 call backs for interviews and no job offer. This pattern of difficulty finding work is the result of Watts defaming my character per se of unchaste woman and/or unfit to work and their conspiracy scapegoat campaign through four employers in a row giving my resume the appearance I can’t hold down a job.
17. I plead that I am experiencing significant loss of gross income because of Watts’s interference with my employment relations and career since 2001 and they are responsible along with their co-conspirators for this financial damage. My income tax return from 2001 to 2004 demonstrates this financial loss of gross income as a result of Watts Industries’ scapegoat campaign to ruin my career: 2001 $43,004 (includes 4 month settlement from Watts), 2002 $20,748, 2003 $38,887 (combine income from Xentel and Lyman), and 2004 $24,654.02. Currently my net income from 2005 is $3,640.00 from E.I. which I am no longer receiving. By the end of 2005 if this Watts induced blacklisting and defamation continues my damage from loss in gross income will be approximately an additional $35,000. I went to an interview in 2005 where the interviewee advised me that she has had other candidates for bookkeeping positions looking for remuneration of $50,000 a year. My potential to reach that level of remuneration is being sabotage by Watts and the employers that they influence to repeat items in my Human Rights Complaints. This lost and difficulty holding or getting a job is a result of defamation of my character by Watts, followed by MMP Limited, Xentel, Lyman, and the Ontario Human Rights Commission supporting discrimination, reprisal and violation of criminal code 425.1 by these employers. Soon I will be forced to use my RRSP fund which will increase the damages.
18. I plead that I mitigated my loss of employment at Mackay by starting a part time telemarketing job on January 10th, 2003, and a full time accounting job on February 10th, 2003, and working at both jobs till September 15th 2003. The full time position rate of pay of $35,000/year exceeded the rate of pay at MMP and I was also wrongfully terminated in March 2004. I continue to mitigate my damages but finding difficult to find work with 3 additional employers participating in this campaign and not receiving proper reference letters from these participants too. This difficulty in finding replacement work is demonstrated by the following: in 2003 it took only 1 month to be rehired, in 2004 it took 6 months, only to be wrongfully dismissed after only 2 months and complaining again of sexual environment, and now currently unemployed since November 15th 2004. Also I mitigated my damages to my health by first challenging the misdiagnosis with the Ontario College of Surgeons and Physicians and closing of that file in September 2002. Then by seeking another assessment for my injury to health via trained psychologist who listens to their patients, which I received on October 2002 of anxiety with depressed moods that is acute, and changing my medication to match the correct assessment. I changed my medication from Anti-Psychotic Perphenzine to Paxil around December 5th 2002 and continue to medicate on Paxil. I am currently still taking this medication to continue to mitigate my health damages as a result of additional mobbing stress at 3 more employers plus obstruction of natural justice by the OHRC that causes abnormal levels of anxiety and anger to avoid another episode of reactive depression and suicide ideation that leads to attempts.
19. I plead that the wife abuse that I am referring to is directly related to work abuse as my husband has been affected by the effects of the work abuse on my emotions and angry behaviour which I infer is part of my claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The wife abuse that I refer to is only psychological not physical and is related to the fact that I was misdiagnosed with a delusional disorder and my husband believed I had this assessment and was psychologically attempting to create doubt in my thinking during my employment at MMP when we discuss the additional harassment I was receiving which elevated my anger. I expected my husband to trust his wife not create doubts in her thinking and push psychiatrist with misdiagnosis and pills that I don’t believe in with the possible threat hanging over my head that if I don’t go to these doctors and take these pills that my husband believes in we might separate like in 2001 during my employment with Watts. The effects on my husband from my work abuse are like the effects of second hand smoke to someone who does not smoke. My husband became hyper vigilance over my behaviour and health being overly concern, with good reason particularly concern that I might attempt suicide again, where in the past he trusted his wife to know what she needs health wise. One of the behavioural change in my husband that I call spousal abuse is discounting my feelings and beliefs of work abuse. Discounting is abusive and a bully trait. Previously to Watts, my husband did not discount my feelings or beliefs particularly with the 1995 Rentway sexual harassment complaint against one employee yet he does so with my issues with Watts and Mackay, Employers providing me with work group mobbing harassment and sets out to irritate me with countering excuses that its just a habit.
The Defendants are highlighting this one email and conversation on the topic of spousal abuse to Dasha Page on August 14th, 2002, after 5 months of work harassment relates to typical and predictable bully behaviour of art of deflection and countering excuses per Tim Field’s book “Bully in Sight”. This is counter-accusations with a grain of truth i.e. “my August 14th email about wife abuse” to magnify this one comment to portray it as the norm, rather than the exception, whereas the mistakes that the bully makes (usually plenty #2 to #90 original statement of claim) are somehow forgotten, overlooked, or “not relevant” or completely denied #2 to #90. The bully’s objective is to keep the spotlight on the victim and what he/she has/hasn’t done. Here the defendants at MMP want the court to believe that they did not behave or are responsible for the facts in #2 to #90, except they pick out the facts at #56 (original statement) of my one wife abuse email message to deflect responsibility and accountability of my injury to health on my husband and that they are faultless to injuring my health by the facts in #2 to #90 which I regularly complained about.
20. I plead that the facts as stated in Shannon Meadows-Lee from the investigation office at the commission in her December 2004 MMP case analysis are injurious falsehoods and the tort of deceit from the commission colluding with now MMP Limited to protect Watts Reprisal campaign from being exposed by concealing evidence and controlling witnesses who would provide adverse outcome to the facts presented in these case analyses. The concealment of evidence is the concealment of the material facts in this statement listed from #36 to #142. This concealment of evidence and material facts demonstrates a breach of fairness by the OHRC. I had already commenced a civil suit for misfeasance of public office against the commission for colluding with the third and fourth employers in this campaign in 2004 prior to receiving these case analyses. I infer the commission has a need to avoid the truth from being exposed at the Tribunal because of their participation with this campaign in 2003/2004 and this is the criminal action of accessory after the fact. The most obvious injurious falsehoods is the allegation of gross incompetence and the concealing of my termination letter in direct violation of the criminal code 425.1 by both MMP Limited and Shannon Meadows-Lee and Dina Waik (investigating officer) to obstruct natural justice of referring my prima facie complaint to the Tribunal were the evidence will contradict the commission’s finding of fact.
The facts that the defendants from MMP Limited do not supply the Superior Court of Justice in their defense statement the same reason for summary dismissing me with cause of gross incompetence, plus do not in their original defense statement to Small Claims Court in Burlington, yet only in the jurisdiction of the Human Rights is the tort of injurious falsehoods as per Sproats’ Wrongful Dismissal Handbook of: malice has been described as the absence of bona fides proven or reasonably inferred from the facts; malice in the law of injurious falsehoods is sometimes equated with dishonest or improper motive; honest belief in an unfounded claim is not malice but the nature of the unfounded claim may be evidence that there was not an honest belief in it. In my case the purpose of false claims in one jurisdiction and not the other for the sole purpose of avoiding a referral to Tribunal where the evidence will be exposed is malice and absence of bona fides.
I claim that the defendants have no honest belief in their statement of gross incompetence because they do not use this defense in common law because there is no defense for cause of gross incompetence without a progressive discipline process and a couple of signed warning letters from me but apparently the commission feels there is such a defense in the Human Rights jurisdiction. I like to argue that this is abuse of statutory duty and authority by the commission as per the following in Pritchard v. OHRC: “while administrative boards have the delegated authority to determine their own procedure, the exercise of that authority must be in accordance with natural justice and the common law.” Also, the defendants allege reduction of work which would be considered to be a demotion which is a breach of contract and supports a constructive dismissal suit. My evidence of fact to the commission shows increase in work load not reduction. By fabricating falsehoods of reduction of work, the defendants at MMP and the OHRC demonstrate they intended to breach contract not to mention wrongful interference with contract. The MMP defendants and the commission are attempting to rely on the common law defense of after-acquired cause with the alleged disarray of books which I feel are facts that should have been readily available to me from the outset between March to August 2002 for the defendants to provide me with a progressive discipline process while employed and/or at least include this alleged fact in their January 20th 2003 dismissal letter that I received after my 5 month absence due to injury to health.
Furthermore, there are cases showing precedent that if the Employer contributes to the incompetence, or the employee’s performance deteriorate because of illness, especially a stress-related one caused by the employer, or the employer fails to give opportunity to respond to allegations of cause the court will consider this factor in determining whether cause for summary dismissal exists. I refer to Casey V. General Inc. (1988), 24 C.C.E.L. 142, 73 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 103 (Nfld. S.C.). This fact in law is also represented in the Human Rights decision in Morrison v. Motsewetsho which the investigation staff is intentionally ignoring: “Sexual harassment may justify an employee’s poor work performance.” This alleged fact of gross incompetence alone is evidence of Bad Faith and unfairness of an employer’s dismissal investigation and the commission’s statutory duty, breach of fairness, aggravated an injury to the plaintiff and therefore magnified the award of damages for mental distress, warrants punitive and now exemplary damages.
21. I plead that by not including in the December 2004 case analysis the material fact that Dasha Page in her witness statement to WSIB and her rebuttal to my complaint made comments that I said to her “people were out to get me” after my March 18th meeting regarding Watts passing on slanderous information was bantering of a disability of delusions shows Shannon Meadows-Lee is colluding to protect the conspiracy to injure with permanent delusional disorder Watts campaign. Also, Dasha Page claims she reduced my work and was considering terminating my employment for performance issues in March yet in June’s appraisal meeting she refused to provide me with a list of performance issues where I can improve showing she was not interested in me improving or giving me that opportunity. I infer that these facts were not investigated because they provide adverse outcome to the December 2004 case analysis. This behaviour by the defendant shows she was treating me based on perceived disability less favorably than others and Shannon Meadows-Lee is concealing the evidence and controlling the witnesses to slant this case analysis to protect MMP and ultimately Watts.
Furthermore, the perceived disability of delusions has to do with the belief of harassment and being persecuted and the fact remains that I was harassed and persecuted to promote these thoughts to give the appearance to authorities that I have this disorder. I provided a copy of the DSM-IV description of this disorder to Dina Waik and therefore the commission should have interviewed all the staff involved in the harassment incidents in my complaint that I requested per material facts listed from #36 to #114: Mrs. Page, Ross Clarke, Karen Tarpos, John Kuzmichuk, Alice Reid, Vincent Julian, Tony Millington, Les Rozahagi, Bill at commercial photo, Kin Lau, Kevin Diamond, Ron Cherubin, Reinhold Schuele, Marguerite of Marchildon Zimmerman Associates, Norma Lawson, and Dave Mancini. The commission only interviewed Dasha Page, Ross Clarke and two other witnesses who may or may not have worked with me during my employment because these individuals would be less than truthful. This exemplifies controlling the witnesses who may provide adverse outcome. Moreover, based on article “Perceived-Disability Discrimination An Often Overlooked But Potentially Problematic Area Of The ADA” the author states: it is important to remember that the focus of any perceived-disability case is on the employer’s perception of an individual’s actual or perceived impairment. I infer that the defendants at MMP’s plus the commission’s perception or imaged perceptions are a perceived impairment. Shannon Meadows-Lee, on behalf of the OHRC, in her own words demonstrates this imaged perception of perceived impairment at #30 “it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position.” I say imaged perception because Shannon Meadows-Lee worked on the next two employers case analysis showing I started part time position on January 10th 2003 (incompetence issue to do with sales not accounting) and full time position on February 10th 2003 (no incompetence issues). I say imaged perception because of comment by Mr. Wharton in Payne v. OHRC of “apparent tendency of Commissioners to follow unquestioningly any staff recommendations.” I received from Mr. Keith Norton, Chief Commissioner his decision in 2005 with standard commission form alleging again insufficient evidence and ignoring evidence I provided him with of no claim of incompetence civilly. Keith Norton’s decision represents abuse of natural justice and common law. Also, this statement at #30 alone represents discrimination by the Ontario Human Rights Commission for perceived disability which leads to refusal of service of doing their statutory duty of proper investigation of the facts and evidence that led to decision to refuse referring my prima facie complaint to the Tribunal.
22. I plead the tort of defamation was committed by the investigation staff particularly with the case analysis statement at #30: “it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position.” This statement is defamation per se unfit to work had I returned in January 2003 to MMP Limited I would be unfit to work. This defamatory statement is an opinion not fact and does not reflect reality and is for the sole purpose of influencing the reader of this statement and therefore constitutes libel. Ms. Waik and Ms. Meadows-Lee worked on the next two employers case analysis showing I started part time position on January 10th 2003 till September 15th 2003 (incompetence issue to do with sales not accounting), and full time position on February 10th 2003 till March 19th 2004 (no incompetence issues rather fabrication of shortage of work). This shows not only was I fit to return to work in January 2003 but that I was fit to work at two employers at the same time from February to September 2003. This is with the aid of Paxil as I have learned my lesson that I need medication in order to work in an abusive work environments otherwise the same injury on the abusive work environment inducing me into reactive depression that hit me in June 2001 and August 2002 would have been repeated in 2003/2004.
23. I plead that I am complying with the provisions of the Public Authorities Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.P.38, and, in particularly, subsection 7(1) thereof. In that regard, the action herein was commenced within the six months of the execution of public and/or statutory duties on the part of these Defendants, with the fabricated case analysis fabricating insufficient evidence that I only received on December 3rd 2004, giving rise to the action herein. As such, the action herein is not statute-barred. In fact, the actions against the commission and the Minister of Attorney General responsible for their agents are still on going as my prima facie complaints have not been submitted to the Tribunal and are now 4 months obstructed. In fact, I received from Chief Commissioner on February 24th 2005 a memo that my reconsideration application was sent to respondents for review for reasons that there is an integrity issue with the commission process. The respondents would have been given 15 day time limits to submit their response, and its now May 5th and my faxes for status are being ignored by commission.
24. I plead that the staff in the investigation office of the OHRC has committed the act of Misfeasance of Public Office in the targeted malice line of cases where the public officer recklessly disregards the means of ascertaining the extent of his or her power. Particularly, the statement at #30 in MMP’s case analysis represents this recklessness and targeted malice. I refer to Uni-Jet Industrial Pipe v. Canada (A.G.) on the test for abuses of public office of: 1. an intentional illegal act, which is either: i) an intentional use of statutory authority for an improper purpose; or ii) actual knowledge that the act (or omission) is beyond statutory authority; or iii) reckless indifference, or willful blindness to the lack of statutory authority for the act; 2) intent to harm an individual or a class of individuals, which is satisfied by either: i) an actual intent to harm; or ii) actual knowledge that harm will result; or iii) reckless indifference or willful blindness to the harm that can be foreseen to result. I infer that I received a sham investigation process that is use of statutory authority for an improper purpose. What I received as an investigation is the following: because it doesn’t matter about the truth it only matters that they have provided an accepted process so that when you say they disadvantaged you they can say they followed an established process.
Shannon Meadows-Lee from the commission claims there is evidence to support gross incompetence to refuse referral to the Tribunal and without this excuse for my termination she would have no choice but to refer my prima facie complaint to the Tribunal. Ms. Meadows-Lee conceals the material fact of my termination letter as she makes no mention of it in the case analysis for MMP and my termination letter is in direct violation of criminal code 425.1 which is strong evidence of reprisal. By doing so, Ms. Meadows-Lee is going against natural justice and common law. In addition, Shannon Meadows-Lee slanted the case analysis at #30 to discredit me with mental illness being the cause for my alleged incompetence with her comment of “it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position.” By making this statement Shannon Meadows-Lee over stepped the boundaries of her duties and willfully misrepresented the facts to do harm to discredit the complainant with the commissioner reading her decision, with the judge in my civil suit reading her case analyses, and this demonstrates improper purpose. She is well aware that I commenced part time position on January 10th 2003 and full time position on February 10th 2003, and that I worked both till September 15th 2003. There was no allegation at fourth employer of gross incompetence in accounting duties and I worked there for 13 months. She wrote up the case analysis for these two employers as well.
These case analyses by the commission staff causes remedies that I am now seeking with regards to MMP Limited, additional defamation by Watts. I seek remedies against the commission investigation staff, the commission and the Ministry of Attorney General for: misfeasance of public office, injurious falsehoods, deceit, conspiracy to injure, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and inducement of breach of contract with false allegations of gross incompetence. The criminal behaviour that supports my civil claims are obstruction of natural justice, accessory after the fact by concealing evidence and controlling the witnesses supports my claims civilly particularly intentional use of statutory authority for improper purpose. I refer to section 8 (2) of the Ministry of Citizenship and Culture Act regarding Crown Liability: Subsection (1) does not, by reason of subsections 5 (2) and (4) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act, relieve the Crown of Liability in respect of a tort committed by a person mentioned in subsection (1) to which it would otherwise be subject, and the Crown is liable under the Act for any such tort as if subsection (1) had not been enacted (R.S.O. 1990, c. M. 18, s. 8 (2).
25. I plead that the Commissioner’s reconsideration on February 24th 2005 under section 37 (2) is further evidence of wrong doing by the investigation staff of fabricating insufficient evidence for my complaints against all four employers, particularly MMP Limited and Watts. My reconsideration application alleged sham investigation to image the commission providing me with a process per the following description of a sham investigation from other targets: because it doesn’t matter about the truth it only matters that they have provided an accepted process so that when you say they disadvantaged you they can say they followed an established process e.g. ‘full’ investigation and mediation. I refer to The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code book and case of Commercial Union Assurance v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission): “The authority to reconsider arises when there is an issue as to the integrity of the Commission’s process, where factual circumstances have changed from the time of the original Commission decision, or where new facts have arisen which were not previously available and are subsequently brought forward.” The commissioner sent me letter dated February 24th, 2005, that the commissioner has decided to reconsider under section 37 (2) for the Watts reprisal, the MMP and Xentel and Lyman complaints, and that my reconsideration application was sent to these defendants. I did not provide any factual circumstances that have changed from time of original commission decision or any new facts that have arisen. My reconsideration application was that the investigation staff provided me with sham investigation to image to authorities that they provided me with a process and that the case analysis of insufficient evidence is fabricated to benefit the discriminating employers. Therefore, the commissioner is in agreement that there is an issue as to the integrity of the Commission’s investigation process done by Ms. Meadows-Lee and Ms. Waik with this section 37 (2) reconsideration decision. I infer that the December 2004 case analyses was for the sole purpose to frustrate the complainant in both jurisdiction, Human Rights and civilly, to obstruct justice and intentionally inflict unnecessarily emotional distress with additional tort of deceit. The deceit by the commission of fabricating reasons for not referring my prima facie complaints affects my contract due to the commission failure to make the complainant whole as if the discrimination never taken place which includes remedies of total loss in wages not just notice period.
I refer to The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code book and case Gismondi v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission): “The Commission has a well-recognized expertise in fact-finding and processing complaints in the human rights context. Its screening function is more administrative than quasi-judicial in nature. Because of this, the standard of review under sections 34 and 37 is patent unreasonableness. The court may look at the material before the Commission to see if there is a rational basis for the result.” The Commissioner made the decision for a section 37 (2) because the investigation staff’s case analysis is not only lacking in integrity but also demonstrates patent unreasonableness particularly with natural justice and common law, and criminal law (425.1). My evidence and material facts supplied to the commission will show that the case analysis lacks integrity and is patent unreasonableness. Ms. Waik is supposed to be an expertise in fact-finding and she leaves out of her report submitted to Ms. Meadows-Lee the following material facts for MMP as listed from #36 to #114: my termination letter in direct violation of criminal code 425.1, that exposure to sex picture is automatic breach of code 5 and 7 and proves poisoned work environment under the code, Mrs. Page’s obvious bantering of persecution disorder of “delusion” and fabricating that I said “people are out to get me” proving discrimination of a perceived disability of persecution disorder, at my 3-mth probation I received $1.00 raise because I was working out and Mrs. Page refusal to provide me a written list of items where I can improve, emails supplied to the commission that I was receiving additional training on new duties of closing of the books in August just prior to leaving, that Mrs. Page supplied August 20th 2002 letter to WSIB that I made no complaints showing deceit, that there was not progressive discipline process, Mrs. Page’s email that my overtime was “no problem” and that I filed a successful Employment Standards Claim for those overtime hours, that Mrs. Page fabricates and contradicts herself in WSIB witness statement that she gave me an internal due process meeting regarding my complaint of hung penis joke but advises WSIB that she did not know this joke was sexual, concealing of solicitation of sex comment by Les of “so you don’t want any sex” in June 2002, absolutely no comments or investigation of the incidents to sabotage my work to give appearance of incompetence nor the lap games by Kin Lau and John, nor Ross Clarke intimidating me with the sexual harassment policy on August 9th, etc.
I refer to The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code book and case Gismondi v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission): “In addition, all the complainant’s arguments must be placed before the Commission when it makes its decision and the complainant must be informed of the matters the Commission will consider. I was advised by the investigation staff that they were not submitting my original rebuttal to the respondent’s rebuttal to the Commissioner when he made his decision to refer to Tribunal or not, which is part of all the complainant’s arguments and cross examination. This is with good reason by the investigation staff to conceal my valid arguments. I refer to The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code book and case Pieters v. University of Toronto: “The same standard of review, patent unreasonableness, should apply to the judicial review of decisions made under section 34, 36, and 37. The court reviews the material before the Commission to see if it supports the result reached. Based on my evidence and material facts in this claim listed from #36 to #114 that was not included in the case analysis the court will conclude that the evidence does not support the result reached in the case analyses by the investigation staff. Based on these arguments from the Code I will succeed in the tort of Misfeasance of Public Office.
26. I plead that by imaging a sham investigation fabricating insufficient evidence and controlling the witnesses at the employers that Watts interfered with such as MMP the commission demonstrates biase towards Watts and discriminating employers, breach of fairness, and has violated my Charter Rights section 15 (1) of: Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination. Thus fabricating insufficient evidence at MMP will naturally result in fabrication of insufficient evidence at Watts, particularly when the commission only interviewed the managers at MMP who are the other defendants in this suit.
I used the following arguments in Human Rights in my reconsideration application to convince the Chief Commission to reconsider one of my reprisal complaints against Watts. I did not have anyone make hostile comment of “sucks to be you” to me in my work places till Watts Industries, and than repeating this hostile remark and variations of it in mocking manner at four employers in a row. That in its self is enough of a link to require the commission to do its statutory duty and process the reprisal complaint against Watts. The repeating of ‘sucks to be you” particularly links interference by Watts as this disparaging remark disguised as joke was repeated and variations of it at all of these places of employment after filing a successful Human Rights Complaint against Watts Industries in 2000 where one of the incident involves this specific phrase by Lynn Shea. I refer to the argument in case of Moffatt v. Kinark Child & Family Services (1998), 35 C.H.R.R. D/205 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry): “Section 8 requires an actual or threatened retaliatory act linked to the making of a complaint under the Code. The link can be established in two ways: proof the respondent intended to retaliate or the perception of the complaint, on a “reasonableness” standard.” At MMP the repeating of a variation of the hostile remark “sucks to be you” on top of exposing me to sexual picture, addressing me as “Claude”, Ross Clarke fiddling with his pants in my presence and withholding the sexual harassment policy till August 9th when he uses that policy to intimidate me, Ross Clarke bantering in my presence about another staff caught looking at pornography on his computer, use of double speak to create errors in my work, and lastly Mrs. Page’s bantering the word “delusional” and later alleging I said to her that “people were out to get me” is enough of a retaliatory act linked to the making of the Watts’ complaint under the Code. Not only are these incidents right out of my 2000 complaint proof the respondent retaliated it is the perception of the complainant on a “reasonable” standard.
I also refer to the case of deSousa v. Gauthier (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 5053, 43 C.H.R.R. D/128, [2002] O.H.R.B.I.D. No. 9 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry); Bryan v. Premark Canada Inc. (November 6, 1998), Doc. 98-18 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry); Elkas v. Blush Stop Inc. (1994), 25 C.H.R.R. D/158 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry): “When the respondent’s treatment of the complainant is partly reprisal for contacting the Commission, there is a breach of section 8.” Therefore Watts’ treatment of the complainant by interfering with her employment relations for filing her 2000 complaint with the phrase “sucks to be you”, address of Claude, and additional exposures to sexual pictures is a breach of section 8. I refer to the case on reprisal of Donaldson v. 463963 Ontario Ltd. (Jan. 14, 1994), No. 83 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry): “The issues under section 8, following a complaint of sexual harassment, are whether the complainant feels threatened by the respondent’s acts and whether she believes the acts constitute an act of retaliation. In this case, the respondent kept contacting the complainant at home after she left her employment with him; a breach of section 8 was found.” In my case, Watts and the other employers interfere with my employment relations by contacting next employer to pass on information in my complaints to get this new employer to repeat the same items that I complain about like the hostile disparaging remark of “sucks to be you.”
I refer to case of Jones v. Amway of Canada Ltd. (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 1191, 159 O.A.C. 331, 2002 C.L.L.C. 230-030 [2002] O.J. No. 1504 (Ont. Div. Ct.); see also Moffatt v. Kinark Child & Family Services (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 5891, 35 C.H.R.R. D/205 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry) and Bryan v. Premark Canada Inc. (November 6, 1998), Doc. 98-18 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry): “An internal complaint pursuant to the employer’s harassment policy is sufficient to trigger protection under section 8. Moreover, the employee’s right to this protection is not affected by the employer’s rejection of the internal complaint.” Therefore, an external Human Rights Complaint pursuant to the Code is sufficient to trigger protection under section 8. I refer to case of Aboucher v. Toronto (Metro) School Board (No. 3) (1998), 31 C.H.R.R. D/411 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry): “Where the employer discriminates against a job candidate because the candidate has made a human rights complaint against another employer, this constitutes reprisal under section 8.” By repeating items that I complained in my previous complaints is because the candidate has made a human rights complaint against another employer particularly exposure to sexual picture on second day of hire at MMP. Lastly I refer to the following argument from case of Broadfield v. De Havilland/Boeing of Canada Ltd. at #139: “the line of reasoning that underlies this principle begins with the notion of indirect action by an employee which puts the employer in breach of the Code by way of s. 8. The point was made in Fu v. Ontario Government Protection Service (1985), 6 C.H.R.R. D/2797 at D/2800, para. 22922: Where the individual employer himself takes no direct action or discrimination but authorizes, condones, adopts or rectifies an employee’s discrimination, then the employer is himself personally liable for contravening the Code…as it is the employer himself who has infringed or done, directly or indirectly, an act “that infringes a right under this Part” (section 8). Section 8 of the Code says “No person shall infringe or do…anything that infringes a right…” The employer is infringing or doing something by its mere passive inaction of allowing an infringement of a right in the workplace when the employer could rectify the situation. To do nothing can be, in the circumstances, to “do” something that “infringe a right” within the meaning of section 8.” The Commissioner did reconsider based on these and other arguments that I put in my reconsideration application.
Thus based on the above reprisal cases and material facts that link back to Watts’ 2000 complaint I will also succeed on the civil tort of interference with employment relations. I refer to Ontario Court of Appeal’s guidance on the tort of interference found in case of Reach M.D. Inc. v. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Assn. Of Canada (2003), 17 C.C.L.T. (3d) 149: “To establish the tort of interference with economic relations, the plaintiff must prove: 1) that the defendant intended to injure the plaintiff; 2) that the defendant interfered with the plaintiff’s business by illegal or unlawful means; and 3) as a result, the plaintiff suffered loss. With respect to the first part of the test, the Court held that it was not necessary that the defendant was predominantly motivated in its actions to injure the plaintiff; mere targeting of the plaintiff was sufficient to ground liability.” Mere targeting such as passing information that sexual pictures and the phrase “sucks to be you” annoys me to promote others to harass me with this same phrase again plus sexualizing my work environment is unlawful means and result in financial loss of wrongful termination on January 20th 2003, another loss of proper reference letter, and loss in gross income in 2002.
27. I plead that there is evidence of defamation in 2001 by the commission that Ms. Meadows-Lee is concealing regarding my 2000 Watts Complaint. At #17 in Watts’ case analysis Ms. Meadows-Lee alleges insufficient evidence obtained during investigation to indicate that Watts defamed the complainant’s character during the mediation process which is additional imaging of the truth. The 2000 complaint was submitted in the fall and the deadline for Watts’ rebuttal was in January. In February my intake officer left a message with my husband to advised me that this complaint was being sent to the investigation department, and then the commission allowed Watts to send me their rebuttal in April demonstrating breach of fairness by the commission. What the commission did by allowing Watts 3 additional months to respond was for Watts to perform additional tactics to wear me down and to manufacture the truth to portray them innocent of wrong doing. To top this off I received contemptuous communication from Mr. Rick Della Vella, mediator from the commission, calling me a disgruntled employer and telling me in one phone conversation “you won’t win the lotteries by a human rights complaint.” These words are laced with contempt for me and are a symptom of defamation. Also, after I faxed my rebuttal to Watts’ warning letter in May 2001 I called Mr. Della Vella to make sure he had received it and his tone on the phone was disappointment as he stated “I saw it”. Behaviours don’t lie people do.
Also Ms. Meadows-Lee states at #14: Ms. Losier also believes that the president of Watts followed her in his car to intimidate her and might have used “super surveillance” such as bugging her telephone and speaking to her private associates and family in order to have them harass her further. Ms. Meadows-Lee leaves out important material facts submitted that supports my belief of super surveillance such as: Mary in an Alanon meeting all of a sudden provoked me with shame tactic of imitating a stripper gesturing around her breasts with tassles, George at a Tai Chi session with Alanon members made unusual statement of “don’t worry about the president of the company”, I saw Mr. Fifer driving his white rental car behind me on Fruitland Road a couple of blocks away from my home on one occasion and on one occasion followed me to lunch and just stood outside his car to intimidate me as I walked to my car to go back to work, I bumped into David Lord at an artist opening in Hamilton and he knows some of the same people at the Hamilton Artist Inc., that Greg Sampson had discussion with Joan Coles regarding my art show in Simcoe without me providing anyone at Watts this information, one discussion by Dale about “you know she is going to church”, one discussion with Troy Nantais advising me how employers use internet spy software to find information on their employees, etc. These incidents were included in my 2000 Watts complaint and they promote super surveillance thinking, and my 2000 complaint was settled for 4 months pay for 3 years of employment.
Ms. Meadows-Lee’s slanted her comments here again to put the complainant in the worst possible light to pursued the reader of her case analysis. Since MMP alleges they did not contact Watts for a reference and Watts alleges they never received a call from MMP for a reference yet MMP repeats several items in my 2000 complaint leaves the logical conclusion of super surveillance such as bugging my telephone to know when and where I go on an interview or who hires me. For my rebuttal to this case analysis statement I showed that there is precedent of this type of super surveillance behaviour by Employers as per the Globe and Mail article by Wallace Immen “Workplace privacy gets day in Court”. I particularly listed the snoop tools in this article such as: Stealth cameras, Webcams, Phone Registers, Global positioning system tracking, and Infrared sensors. I particularly mentioned that Phone Registers are “automated monitors that record several days’ worth of messages and keep logs of time, date and length can be purchased for a few hundred dollars.
The statement at #15 in the case analysis is also imaging innocence of wrong doing: “All Watts employee interviewed attested to the fact that the president of Watts Industries, who resided in the United States at the time Ms. Losier was employed, only spent minimal time in Canada and when he did so, he communicated mainly with the officers of the company and would not have had occasion to converse with Ms. Losier directly apart from greating her in the corridor or meeting her with other employees at the company Christmas gathering.” These employees that were interviewed were not present at the stalking incidents documented therefore their comments are irrelevant to the incidents by Mr. Fifer that I refer to as stalking to intimidate me with paranoid thougths to discredit me. The material facts regarding Mr. Fifer’s behaviour towards me differs from Ms. Meadows-Lee’s statement at #15 in the Watts case analysis. While I was employed this president did great me with hello several times in 1998. He came to the Accounts Receivable department once when the supervisor, Diane, was on vacation to ask me about an account on hold and than he ran off to the VP of Finance to ask him to ask me same question. He also left voice message on my phone in 1998 with his US phone number to call him in his office in Andover regarding his letter to Allan D. Strauss from Delta Faucet Canada dated June 3, 1998, which he writes: Claudette Losier has received data from you to process invoice corrections, and needs to complete that processing or contact you for any further information. I did call him back to advice him that I was waiting for information from Alan at Watts in the warehouse. The fact of the Delta Faucet letter shows that these employees that the commission interviewed where not completely aware of what their President who resides in the United States was doing where I am concerned while I was employed. I did spot him where I lunched at Wendy’s on two occasions, one being with him and his boss from corporate office just sitting in his car while I go get my lunch. The other occasion was when he stood by his car as I walk back to my car with my lunch and he said nothing therefore his intentions was to intimidate me, and there were no other Watts employees witness to this incident. He did try to follow me on the QEW on another occasion and I quickly changed lanes and lost him and next day showed his anger by glaring at me when he walked by the accounts receivable department. There was one incident where I spotted him right behind me on Fruitland Road in Stoney Creek right after I got off the highway in his white rental car just a couple of blocks away from my home. There was one incident with him and sales VP standing on top of staircase as I came up to the stairs to intimidate me, and he made no attempt again to converse with me and barely moved out of the way. I refer to case of Lynch v. Theodorakakos (1992), 16 C.H.R.R. D/319 (B.C.C.H.R.): Council Member found that the restaurant owner’s lack of knowledge about the incidents did not protect him from liability as he was nevertheless responsible for offering a non-discriminatory workplace environment. Thusly, the witnesses interviewed by the commission in 2004 have no knowledge of the behaviour of this president in 1998 to 2001, and therefore Watts is not protected from liability as they are responsible to provide me with a non-discriminatory workplace environment and to not retaliate after I leave their place of employment by passing on information to interfere with my employment relations at Company C, D, and E.
This president, Mr. Fifer, left Watts coincidently on approximately the same date I filed my reprisal complaint against Watts Industries in December 2002. I saw what I saw and none of these Watts’ witnesses where there at the time of these incidents and cannot say that this president was not behaving in this manner to intimidate me to promote paranoid thinking to discredit me and my complaints as the commission is alleging in their case analysis. I never attended any Christmas gathering so therefore I agree there would be no opportunity for this president to converse with me during a Christmas gathering as Watts is alleging in this analysis. Most of these incidents where
listed in my 2000/2001 complaint against Watts and there was no evidence at that time brought forward by these witnesses at that time only in 2004 after the fact. The commission staff is only now in 2004 interviewing and have not disclosed who these witnesses are to me as they are supposed to under section 36 demonstrating a controlling of the witnesses. The fact remains that the complaint in 2000/2001 listing those incidents was not dismissed in 2001 under section 34 for being frivolous, vexatious, and in bad faith, and that complaint was settled validating my documentation of all incidents.
28. I plead that the commission being a quasi-judicial process relies and hides behind their immunity status to abuse their authority and statutory duties. I feel that this is a case where the commission acted outside its limit (collusion). I infer that the commission improperly exercises its judicial powers with criminal behaviour of obstruction of natural justice, concealing evidence and controlling witnesses who would provide adverse outcome are types of misconduct that amount to sufficient excesses of jurisdiction and are thus not protected by an absolute immunity. By alleging facts and evidence in her case analysis of gross incompetence as cause for my dismissal, refusing to review and note January 20th 2003 termination letter with retaliatory discharge reason for dismissal plus the lack of credibility by the defendants at MMP, refusing to question witness on bantering of disability of persecution with “people out to get me”, and statement made that had I return I would not be mentally capable of handling my duties when facts show I moved on very quickly to part time and full time employment, Shannon Meadows-Lee and Dina Waik demonstrate sufficient excesses of abuse of jurisdiction and targeted malice. I refer to page 289 of Klar’s Tort Law #146: Judicial immunity is defended on the ground that it is not for judges’ protection but for the public’s protection; Judges should be able to act independently and fearlessly without threat of lawsuit by disappointed litigants; this rational is understandable; it does not, however, justify extending the immunity to judges who act maliciously in order to harm claimants.
Also, the OHRC has a history of unwillingness and failure to properly exercise their statutory mandate as per article by S. Peiters listing various reports to guide the commission to improve its performance that are ignored, including 1993 Ombudsman report by Roberta Jamieson. Other examples of failure to properly exercise their statutory mandate are: in March 2000 the Ontario Superior Court squashed two section 34 decisions by the Ontario Human Rights Commission. In Payne v. Ontario Human Rights Commission, a retired commissioner, Mr. Wharton, in his affidavit believed the commission colluded with Payne’s employer. I infer that this commissioner has inside knowledge that the commission in fact at times does collude with discriminating employers. The commission will use the defense that I am just a disappointed litigant/complainant to avoid exposure. I am requesting this judgment seat as per my rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms section 15 (1) against the commission to review the evidence that Shannon Meadows-Lee is relying upon to willfully refuse to do her statutory duty of referral of a prima facie complaint to Tribunal to prove excess of jurisdiction and therefore tortious behaviour.
29. I plead that this immunity status for the commission is based common law prior to the Charter in 1982, therefore should be lifted. I refer to section 32 from my paralegal course booklet: the Charter protects the rights of the individual with respect to the state by regulating the actions of the federal Parliament, the provincial legislatures, and all organizations that come under government authority, such as boards and agencies. The Charter regulates only the relationship between the individuals and the state—it does not apply to private matters. In most cases, the rights of individuals in private matters are protected by other human rights legislature or by common law.” My suit is a public matter against the commission, a government agency, and its staff for Misfeasance of Public office violating my Charter Rights section 15 and 24, and therefore section 32 applies to protect the rights of the individual with respect to state and includes boards, agencies and therefore the commission. Furthermore, I would argue that section 33 the notwithstanding clause could not apply to allow for the Commission’s common law immunity to being sued to stand above my Charter Rights in matters of tortious actions that include criminal behaviour that supports my civil claim of Misfeasance of public office.
30. I plead that this continuous attack on my character by MMP Limited, Watts Industries, and now the collusion by the OHRC with the fabricated December 2004 case analysis warrants punitive damages and now exemplary damages. The reasons for awarding punitive damages was well stated in Uni-Jet Industrial Pipe v. Canada (A.G.) #91 In Hill, Cory J. stated (at para. 199): Punitive damages can and do serve a useful purpose. But for them, it would be all too easy for the large, wealthy and powerful to persist in libeling vulnerable victims. Awards of general and aggravated damages alone might simply be regarded as a license fee for continuing a character assassination. The protection of a person’s reputation arising from the publication of false and injurious statements must be effective. The most effective means of protection will be supplied by the knowledge that fines in the form of punitive damages may be awarded in cases where the defendant’s conduct is truly outrageous. The 2000 settlement offer from Watts plus my misdiagnosis of a delusional disorder is that licence fee for continuing a character assassination.
I feel that this case is truly outrageous even more so since receiving Shannon Meadows-Lee’s case analysis with injurious falsehoods of gross incompetence of disarray of books that MMP alleges took till December 2004 to correct. I barely completed one month’s set of books that of June in August 2002 prior to my absence which should not take MMP till 2004 to correct, 2 years after the fact, as they and the commission are alleging. Furthermore, after receiving the commission’s case analysis I now infer that Watts, MPP Limited and 3 additional employers were encouraged after the 2000 Human Rights complaint to treat me with additional anti-social mobbing behaviour of repeating items in my complaints with malice and reckless disregard for my rights and the Human Rights Code without stop because the commission condoned and colluded with Watts’ campaign. This is an authoritarian work abuse system or machine that needs the law to severely penalize it to deter it from continuing this character assassination, and condoning of anti-social behaviour. I can prove this with 4 employers in a row after Watts repeating items I complain in my 2000 Watts complaint and later adding items in the other complaints at next employer increasing the anti-social behaviour which infers collusion with Commission’s protection of avoidance of accountability and refusal to refer to Tribunal 4 prima facie complaints.
31. I plead that by continuing the deceit of denial of wrongdoing and bringing forward additional deceit in form of allegations of gross incompetence of disarray of books that was not disclose to me till December 2004, 2 years after the fact, and only in jurisdiction of the Human Rights with the commission to obstruct justice demonstrates personalities and collective authoritarian work abuse system without conscience. Our society appears to be evolving at a faster pace developing more personalities and organizations without conscience as referred to in Robert D. Hare’s book “Without Conscience” and law professor Joel Bakan’s book “The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit Of Profit And Power”.
The behaviours that I complain about in my statement of claim of the material facts listed from #36 to #142 and the general denials without any material facts in the defendants’ statement of defenses and the commission’s case analysis is congruent with some of the behavioural characteristics in the DSM-IV for anti-social personality disorder/psychopath of the following: callous unconcern for the feelings of others, reckless disregard for the safety of others, deceitfulness with repeated lying and conning others, incapacity to experience guilt, failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviours. Furthermore, I infer that my cases demonstrates “serial bullying/mobbing” at work in the sense of serial to repeat offending behaviour because it offends me. Serial mobbing is similar to serial rapist and serial murder, in that the displayed behaviour is repeating of modus operanti and leaving calling cards to psychologically intimidate the target which is the tort of intimidation. The calling card from Watts to Mackay and 3 additional employers in a row is repeating items that I complain about in my Human Rights complaints like subjugation of sexual picture and hostile disparaging remark disguised as joke of “sucks to be you”, and addresses of “Claude” to mock my convictions/complaints. The repeating of vexatious behaviour that I complain about fits the definition of serial, mobbing, section 10 (1) of the Human Rights Code, and section 81.18 of the Quebec labour code to prohibit “psychological harassment”. Therefore the employment contract law needs to advance to deter this trend of these characteristics evolving even more in our work systems with greater penalties, such as exemplary damages being awarded, given out to these white collar perpetrators and rule breakers. I am asking for development of greater penalties to the defendants in this case to deter future occurrences of repeating this anti-social behaviour particularly with my next employer (6th employer) or some other vulnerable target in their workplaces who might not know their rights as well as I do now, or some other complainant to the commission.
32. I plead that my Charter Rights, equal access and benefit of the law, have been violated by the OHRC by their tortious actions with my complaints against the defendants Watts and MMP Limited as per the material facts listed at #36 to #142. The commission process in it self is inconsistent with the Charter. My situation is worsening since filing my first complaint in 2000 and by the addition of tortious actions by commission staff from 2003 onwards. Section 7 states: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Section 15 (1) states: Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. For the past 6 years my right to job security has been violated due to being a woman whistleblower of sexual harassment in the work place and therefore sex discrimination by five employers, four of them in a row. The OHRC’s statutory duty affects the employment contract as they are to make the complainant whole as if the discrimination never occurred. This includes all loss in wages. Therefore, the violation to the charter applies to the commission due to their misfeasance of public office by providing me a sham investigation and fabricating insufficient evidence to not refer my prima facie complaints to the Tribunal where I can recover full loss in wages as if the discrimination had never taken place.
The process as it is currently set up is a bureaucratic stalling process that needs to be seriously remedied as this process does not fulfill the purpose of the Human Rights Commission to be remedial for eliminating discrimination and prejudices the complainant’s complaint. The Human Rights process takes the average life span of 5 to 6 years when a civil case that supports human rights violation can be settled within 6 months per Barrister David Harris. The process should follow same procedure as in Civil Law moving quickly to Trial where the evidences is exposed in the open and the facts are argued with both sides present and a trained judge of law decides on the outcome to be consistent with the Charter. Other issues with the commission process that is inconsistent with the Charter are: only accept a 2 page complaint from the complainants which does not represent the full set of facts, the investigation process is secretive government controlled process where the complainant does not receive copies of the witnesses statement to cross examine them, the information given to the commissioner after the investigation does not include all the evidence nor the complainant’s rebuttal (cross examination of the respondent’s rebuttal), section 34 and 36 (2), and the common law rules for employment termination and precedent cases should also apply in the jurisdiction of Human Rights. Furthermore, I am being denied the following right per Section 24 (1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances. A section 36 (2) decision to not refer to Tribunal after the investigation process goes through a conciliation and request payment to settle by the respondents violates my Charter Rights. I refer to the argument in Kulyk v. Toronto (City) Board of Education: “It should be troubling to the administration of justice, and we should be cautious where employment situations coupled with human rights violations are used as tools to prevent victims and aggrieved parties, in the correct circumstances, from having access to our courts. “
33. I plead that the current Human Rights Process is a shield against the person seeking redress for the discrimination sought to be remedied by the legislation and therefore needs to be changed. I refer to Belleghem J.’s argument found in Kulyk v. Toronto (City) Board of Education: “The Human Rights Code is remedial legislation. It addresses the need to facilitate the airing of human rights complaints. Though these broader powers attract more complaints, they could not thereby have been intended to curtail the complainant’s right to sue for those same grievances. If the legislation was intended to limit the right to sue, it would have clearly so stated. Workmen’s compensation legislation and auto insurance legislation are obvious examples of a legislative limit on the right to sue. On the other hand, the very removal of the privative provisions from the earlier human rights legislation supports an interpretation that whatever powers the board has, they are in addition to, rather than alternative to, the complainant’s civil rights, including the right to sue. It is inconsistent with the object of the remedial legislation to use it as a shield against the person seeking redress for the very mischief sought to be remedied by the legislation.” Therefore the Charter of Rights under section 15 (1) and 24 do not prevent a plaintiff to bring forth their claims of discrimination to court of competent jurisdiction. LaForme J. in Kulyk agreed with Belleghem J. in Lehman that: “given the deletion of the exclusive jurisdiction clause from the Human Rights Code, it may be intended to permit judicial incursion into areas formerly occupied by the board in a “proper case”.
34. I plead that I am not your typical target of bullying/mobbing as I do stand up against it to the detriment of my health, my personal relationships, and career stoppage. I expose it every time and I do not reward it with my silence, which is why I am being expulse from the work environment at Watts in 2001, and at Mackay, and 3 additional employers after Mackay in a row, plus receiving obstruction of justice by the commission. I am being seen by these employers and the OHRC as expendable and if I won’t move on of my own volition these employers just invoke their rights as employer to breach the contract for whatever reason they choose to have on that date of expulsion because common law based on law of early Century society says either party can breach the contract at any time. I have been expulse with the following wrongful reasons: constructive dismissal through Human Rights process 2001, Wrongful Dismissal in 2002 with various reasons including gross incompetence with after the fact acquired reason, Wrongful Dismissal in 2003 of incompetence with notice offer after condoning my low sales prior to my request to the commission for complaint forms 2003, Wrongful Dismissal in 2004 for lay off claim of closing division and later shortage of work and later hiring two ex female employees to do work I could be doing, and finally Wrongful dismissal again in 2004 claiming change in business after 3.5 hours of handing my second written complaint to management when offer at interview was promised of full time permanent position. My experience alones shows that the current legal system, in both jurisdiction of the human rights and civil law, is not working to deter these kinds of employment abuses. My experience shows that sexually oriented practices endanger a woman’s job, undermines her job performance and threatens her economic livelihood” still. These employers show that the support, acceptance and collusion surrounding Workplace Bullying is as much a crime against the dignity of working people such as myself as the abuse itself.
The law needs to advance to view Bullying in the same light as Domestic Violence. I refer to article “Mediation is not the way to deal with cases of Workplace Bullying” by Hadyn Olsen, Employment Relations Advisor/Facilitator. In this article he states: Domestic violence and Workplace Bullying actually share many of the same dynamics; they both involve an addiction to power and they are both centered on controlling others in a detrimental way. Domestic violence is now seen as a perpetrator problem; not a victim problem. It is something only the perpetrator can fix. It is not the victim’s responsibility at all. Regardless of the failings and weaknesses of the victim, there is no excuse or reason that justifies the use of violence. The person who uses violence must take full responsibility for their actions. The perpetrator alone must change. Yet in the employment arena this is not so. We continue to perpetuate the belief that if a business/organization is successful then the employer must be all right. The complaining employee is often suspected—after all what is one individual up against many well-qualified and experienced managers? The employee is seen a troublemaker who is rocking the boat. Or even worse, senior management claim that it is not Workplace Bullying that is the problem, but only personality differences. The complaining employee is seen as expendable, is ignored and consequently moves on or out. The Employment Relations Service and the Human Rights Commission currently are bully-friendly. The practice of demanding mediation as the first response to any workplace grievance (including Workplace Bullying) places our society back in the same position it was in the 60’s and 70’s in regard to domestic violence. It is an entirely inappropriate response to this problem. Workplace Bullying and domestic violence are almost identical twins. Why then do we have different ways of dealing with them? There should be no tolerance for the practice of abusing others, regardless if it is domestic violence or workplace violence.
35. I plead that what I experienced at Watts and repeated at Mackay was the premeditative passing around to various members in the work group what pushes my buttons and causes me to complain, particularly sexual items, sucks to be you hostile comment and addressing me with “Claude”. I infer that this is a work system problem where employers hide beyond the wordings in their company policies to harass by imaging an internal due process such as with the picture incident at Mackay, then passing info to harass me with another member causing the cycle to perpetuate so I have to complain again and we go through another imaging of internal due process this time with the sexual joke of hung penis at Mackay where Dasha Page does not know from her imaged investigation that this joke was sexual in nature, and this second complaint does not stop the sexualizing of the work environment as Mackay management withhold the sexual harassment policy for 5 months and moved this tactic to others such as Dasha Page, Les, Kin Lau, John and Ross Clarke. An employee should only have to make one sexual harassment complaint not more than 1 in any work place if the system and law were working correctly as more than one complaint infers “poison work environment” and “work group mobbing”, defamation of one’s character, and therefore discrimination practices and illegal labour practices.
I refer to the comments made in Robichaud v. Her Majesty the Queen, as represented by the Treasuary Board [at D/2709, para. 22321]: “The broad remedies provided by section 41, the general necessity for effective follow-up, including the cessation of the discriminatory practice, imply a similar responsibility on the part of the employer. That is most clearly the case with respect to the requirement in paragraph 41 (2)(a) that the person against whom an order is made “take measures, including the adoption of a special program, plan or arrangement…to prevent the same or a similar practice occurring in the future”. Only an employer could fulfill such a mandate.” I like to infer as well that the employer can also influence the work group to continue the same or a similar practice occurring in the future by moving the practice to another employee or next employer. Watts encouraged their employees to continue the harassment by moving the tactics around to various individuals in a systematic campaigned of conspired harassment and I got told by Watts’ HR manager “it may get worst before it gets better” in February 2001. Watts passed this technique to Mackay, and 3 additional employers. Only the employer can take measures, including the adoption of a special program, plan or arrangement…to prevent or continue the same or a similar practice occurring in the future. Mackay and Watts fail this test showing they did not take measures or adopt special programs but rather hide behind their harassment policies to continue the conspired harassment within the work group and without the work group by Watts and later MMP. I infer that had I complained at Watts and at Mackay after every single sexual comment/gesture/picture it would not stop this tactic as these employers did not want to provide me with respectful work environment per the implied terms of my contract just like Mackay did not want to provide me with a progressive discipline process to improve my alleged gross incompetence as they were only interested in inducing breach of contract.
Also I infer that the commission too fails this test to put measures in place to stop this anti-social behaviour of discrimination and reprisal from being repeated against the same complainant and by the same respondent being Watts. I also infer and responded to Chief Commissioner, Mr. Keith Norton, my belief that the investigation was a sham to image a process per the following: because it doesn’t matter about the truth it only matters that they have provided an accepted process so that when you say they disadvantaged you they can say they followed an established process e.g. ‘full’ investigation and mediation. The commission offered me an imaged sham investigation to protect all parties in this campaign from exposing the truth. Therefore, OHRC is condoning the sexualizing of my work environments with sexual pictures, gestures and vexatious comments.
36. I commenced employment with the Defendants at MMP Limited in March 7th, 2002, as Accounting Clerk. I was continuously employed with the Defendant from March 7th, 2002, to January 20th, 2003, with a leave of absence starting August 15th, 2002, due to injury to health inducing anxiety with depressed moods causing reactive depression, overwhelming anger leading to suicide ideation and attempt of overdosing on medication on August 21st. I faithfully and diligently performed my duties on behalf of the Defendant and throughout my employment with the Defendant, I proved myself to be a valuable and reliable employee and received a $1.00 raise at my 3-mth probation in June as per interview promise by Dasha Page to match what I was previously making at another employer because I was working out. No list in writing from management was given to me where I needed to improve per my June letter.
37. During my employment at Mackay from March to August 14th, 2002, I was subjugated again to items that I complained about at Watts Industries in my 2001 Human Rights Complaint. The tactics started in first week of employment which I infer is hiring in Bad Faith for the sole purpose to humiliate me further for my sexual harassment complaints and convictions and to shame me into quitting. On March 8th, Alice in office after a day of vacation comes up to me by the photocopier between Tony’s and Dasha’s offices to show me two faxes. One of these faxes was a sexual picture joke showing a couple copulating, and the other was a joke fax about the Alanon/AA serenity prayer and being an asshole. I was stunned by this and went agh and walked away from Alice.
37. During my employment at Mackay from March to August 14th, 2002, I was subjugated again to items that I complained about at Watts Industries in my 2001 Human Rights Complaint. The tactics started in first week of employment which I infer is hiring in Bad Faith for the sole purpose to humiliate me further for my sexual harassment complaints and convictions and to shame me into quitting. On March 8th, Alice in office after a day of vacation comes up to me by the photocopier between Tony’s and Dasha’s offices to show me two faxes. One of these faxes was a sexual picture joke showing a couple copulating, and the other was a joke fax about the Alanon/AA serenity prayer and being an asshole. I was stunned by this and went agh and walked away from Alice.
38. On the Saturday after this incident, March 9th, 2002, I advised Karen Tarpus of my objection for being exposed to sexual joke. I was in on Saturday with Karen for training. Near the end of the training session after 2:00 pm out of the blue Karen makes the comment “It Sucks To Be Me” which has no relation to the topic on accounting that we were discussing. This is an item in my 2001 Watts Industries Human Rights complaint. It references a comment made by employee Lynn Shea to humiliate me of “It Sucks To Be You” and is an example of double speak.
39. On March 18th, 2002, at 9:00, I went to Dasha’s office and closed the door to discuss the negative stressors that of my belief that Watts Industries has passed on some information to slander me to Mackay as I was experiencing some of the same tactics by some employees. Mrs. Page’s manner towards me was patronizing and not taking my negative stressor seriously. She jokingly put on a show asked questions like who and what and when, and denied having receiving any information from Watts.
40.On March 22nd, 2002, I had a meeting with Mr. Ross Clarke in the afternoon in the boardroom he mentioned that I should locate and read the company’s condition of employment and sexual harassment policy. I advised Mr. Clarke that I saw a file with information on Sexual Harassment in the filing cabinet and that I would check there. When I went back to my desk to look for this file I could not find it. I asked both Mrs. Page and John where can I locate the sexual harassment policy and neither one of them could find me a copy. I sent an e-mail to Karen to find out if she knew where the policies where kept and she could not find me a copy.
41. On March 28th, 2002, at 10:10, I request again from Mr. Clarke a copy of the conditions of employment and sexual harassment policy. Again, Mr. Clarke did not provide me with copies.
42.Also in March there was one incident where Mrs. Page and Mr. Clark are standing at the end of my work station to have a conversation that I am made to hear regarding their hiring agent for Diana Hall. In this conversation they discuss the possibility of all new staff taking a psychological test and Mrs. Page mentions the word delusional out of the blue. At the same time they also discussed that they were not happy with this service from this vendor that they know through the Business Commerce group that they belong to.
43. On April 2nd, 2002, I went into Mrs. Page’s office with a personal request to use the fax machine for my husband. Out of the blue Mrs. Page makes the inappropriate comment “I thought you were going to quit…” In April, 2002, I requested that the DacEasy accounting duties be transferred to me from Karen. Mrs. Page advised me should discuss this with Mr. Clarke. We also talked about waiting till their slow season in the fall to change accounting package from DacEasy to Simply Accounting or other accounting packages. Mrs. Page never got back to me with a response to my request.
44. On April 23rd, 2002, at 9:00 I walk by Mrs. Page and John who are standing by the middle filling cabinet discussing a job. As I walk by, Mrs. Page jokingly makes the comment about a penis joke that a crewmember wrote in a field notebook.
45. On April 26th, 2002, Vince Julian came by my workstation and told me a male bashing joke, which I did not get the joke. He proceeded into another joke, which I asked if it was sexual and received no response. Vince started on a third joke and I asked twice if it was a sexual joke. Vince ignored my questions in an aggressive bully manner and proceeded with his joke about a hung man (large penis) joke who stuttered and wanted to have his stuttering problem removed by having his penis cut in size. I stood there and was subjugated to his joke knowingly seeing my discomfort. Later that day, I made a verbal complaint of this harassment incident with Mrs. Page that I do not appreciate being subjugated to sexual jokes and having my work time wasted by Vince. I asked that she speak to Vince about this incident. Mrs. Page did not provide me with any written report of her disciplinary action with Vince for his harassment behaviour towards me.
46. A few days later, Vince came by my workstation and addressed me as “Claude” repeating another item out of my 2000 Human Rights Watts Industries’ complaint. I advised him my name is “Claudette” and I continued to do my work ignoring him. A couple of days later, Reinhold walks by my workstation and addresses me as “Claude” and comes up with the excuse that he knew a woman called that name. Again a few days later, Mr. Tony Millington (tenant renting office space) comes to my workstation with his associate Ron Nathan addressing me as “Claude”. I advised Tony that my name is “Claudette” and walked back to my desk. Tony played innocent and asked what did he call me? His coworker Ron concurred that Tony did intentionally call me “Claude”. A few days later, I was working away at my workstation when Tony Millington walks up to Mrs. Page who is behind the counter by my desk. Mr. Millington proceeds to have a conversation with Mrs. Page about someone being overly sensitive. I interrupt this conversation and said, “I am sensitive just because I asked you to not call me “Claude”? Mr. Millington made the comment of “Ah hah” which shows that he is intentionally trying to push my buttons with the name-calling and this conversation about being sensitive. I was provoked and continued on commenting that there is nothing wrong with having a sensitive nature, that I’m not a heard follower that people in the office were behaving like puppets: first Vince, then Reinhold, and then Mr. Millington. Mrs. Page was present and she was made aware by my comment that I perceived these incidents to be negative stressors.
47. In May, 2002, I asked Mrs. Page again for the accounting duties of DacEasy to be transferred to me from Karen. She again advised me she would speak to Mr. Clarke. I did not receive a response back.
48. On June 3rd, 2002, I made day timer entry that Mrs. Page advised me that she will discuss my 3-mth review and increase to $16.00/hour with Ross. She advised me of additional work required and taking over accounting duties from Karen. On June 4th, 2002, I drafted my 3-mth-appraisal letter out of fear and to push my qualifications in accounting. The management team left me out of the organization to move to the new location in May, the accounting duties were being withheld, and there were exclusion bully tactics that indicated strongly to me that management did not intend to keep me on at the new location. Also, I was hired while the person whom I was to replace, Ms. Diane Hall, was still working there. When I called about the interview in March of this year, I was told not to call the office and say I was calling about the interview. The ad in the paper was to a P.O. Box at the Spectator Paper. This is an employer who is secretive not direct and honest with their employees about dismissal issues. Ms. Diane Hall only started working there in November and was let go around her 3-mth probation period. I was advised in my interview that Ms. Hall was being let go due to incompetence and bad attitude. I was afraid that they were planning to do the same with me so I drafted my letter to push my qualifications.
49. On June 5th, 2002, after the move to new location the Scotia Bank interact modem would not work. John set up my computer, desk and modem. I worked till 8:00 p.m. on payroll and was advised by Mrs. Page who also worked late to write manual cheques for payroll. From June onwards I started having a lot of problems with computer equipment that I did not have prior to June.
50. On June 10th, 2002, Mrs. Page was shouting at me at my desk in the morning about the alarm going off on Friday and that it was my fault for forgetting to give her back the Accuguard Card with the security codes on it. She said she was very angry over this. On Wednesday, I had used Mrs. Page’s card to add codes in the alarm system. I worked late till 8:00 pm on the payroll because of the problems with the modem. Mrs. Page did not come up to me to request her card back. I was off on Thursday and Friday.
51. I was advised by Mrs. Page on June 11th, 2002, that she was working on a written list of duties/performance items and that she will do my appraisal with me in the morning. On June 12th, I asked Mrs. Page in the morning if we were going to meet for my 3-mth appraisal that was due June 7th. Mrs. Page advised me that she needed time to type up her list of my performance appraisal.
52. On June 13th, 2002, I came in and the first thing I did was to go to Mrs. Page’s office and press for my 3-mth appraisal. Mrs. Page appeared nervous and unorganized for my appraisal. She had nothing written down or prepared per her statement that she needed time to type up her list on June 12th. I had requested from Mrs. Page in my 3-mth-appraisal letter a list of items where I needed to improve. Then Mr. Clarke came in the office. Mrs. Page immediately requested Mr. Clarke to come into her office, as she needed his help with the appraisal. Mr. Clarke made one criticism that I needed to improve my handwriting. He mentioned that he thought my letter was well written and thoughtful. I just receive a verbal response from Mrs. Page that I need to improve my handwriting and memory. Mrs. Page stated that I had improve in that I don’t ask her to repeat her instructions 4 times but that we are now down to 2 times. She requested that I listen to her instructions first without searching for pen and paper. That I should try to write it down from her first instructions. Mrs. Page advised that I need to work on memory but gave me no examples where memory was a problem. She advised me that my benefits were to start as of June 7th and that I would receive the pay increase to $16.00 as of that date. She also mentioned that the duties to be added to my job would be that of training for record searching, and making copies of plans. She noted that Carol in Windsor was working on payroll changes to Windows System. This hesitation of any real acknowledgement of performance and value by management gives the appearance that my request in my formal letter of taking over the accounting function from Karen in Daceasy was not going to be met for no work performance related issue. Mr. Clarke in this meeting did not offer me the accounting duties per my request in my letter. He said something about waiting till we figure out what accounting package to change from, that I should create a file per customer and put their invoices in it and document my accounts receivable notes. I asserted myself by advising Mr. Clarke that I already created a call document and Mrs. Page is aware of it and that all invoices are kept in order in a binder already, and that I still need to work with a live accounting package now to perform my work duties. I advised that I need to work with a live accounting software for both accounts receivable and accounts payable and not excel spreadsheets. Mrs. Page stepped in to advise Mr. Clarke that Karen is tired of doing these duties and would like to be relieved of them. Mrs. Page also said to Mr. Clarke that he should give me the opportunity to see if I can do the duties and make a decision later something about “if I don’t work out…” Mr. Clarke left the room without consenting to my request. I asserted myself again and pressed Mrs. Page for me to start in June entering transactions into DacEasy. She said she would speak to Mr. Clarke again.
53. On June 13th, 2002, after this meeting Mr. Millington came in the office in the front door passing my receptionist desk addressing me again as “Claude” in front of Mr. Clarke sitting in the boardroom in front of my desk. Also on June 13th, 2002, I sent Mr. Clarke an e-mail about EHT tax that was due on the 15th of the month. I was at my desk working away and could see Mr. Clarke in the boardroom in front of my desk. Upon receiving my e-mail Mr. Clarke made the patronizing and mocking remark loud enough for me to hear of “I have another e-mail from Claudette”.
54. On June 18th, 2002, I advised Mr. Clarke that the account of Battery Plus was uncollectible due to the client going into receivership. I than receive a request to create work by Mr. Clarke to find out why this happened. I feel that this request by Mr. Clarke was a make work project to take time away from more urgent duties. Prior to this date Mr. Clarke made no inquiries with me about receivables and was content as long as the money was coming in to meet his cash flow situations. This account was over 60 days past due on November 28th, 2001, when I was not their employee. Mr. Clarke, being the owner, should have been aware of the problems with collection of this account prior to my conversation with him on June 18th, 2002. I proceeded to pull the file and note in my call document the series of collection attempts on this account. I sent Mr. Clarke an e-mail response at 11:15 starting with notation on October 5th of Mrs. Page’s letter to client for payment, to my notation on June 18th of call response from Deloitte & Touche for an update on the receivership. In my e-mail I ask Mr. Clarke “do you want to write this account off? Please advise.” I receive Mr. Clarke’s response at 12:35 of “no sense spending any more time on this, we still have the info, keep the file separate incase somebody wants to survey info.” Mr. Clarke ignored my inquiry to write this account off.
55. On June 19th, 2002, Mr. Clarke hands me a fax dated March 26th that he sent to Mrs. Page of a copy of the Conditions of Employment and there was no copy of the Sexual Harassment Policy attached. I requested this policy back in March. Later on June 19th, Mr. Millington walks in and passes my reception area and addresses me with “Hi Claude” while Mr. Clarke is sitting in the boardroom.
56. In the morning of June 20th, 2002, I notice Mrs. Page coming to my desk frequently with unnecessary interruptions and found it difficult to focus on my work with these unnecessary interruptions. Later in the afternoon, while I was at my desk working Mrs. Page came out to the front and sat down on a chair set out for the clients in front of my desk. She started looking through a woman’s magazine. All of a sudden Mrs. Page starts up a conversation with me about women’s breast. She showed me a picture of a woman that she liked the way she looked in a swimsuit. Mrs. Page started talking about her pregnancy and how her breast increased in size. Also on this day, Mrs. Page stopped by my desk to ask me if I had a complaint for her, and this was the third time Mrs. Page ask me this question which made me feel that she was provoking me into making complaints intentionally.
57. On June 21st at 10:00, 2002, I was at my desk working in Microsoft Access in the cost sheets for jobs entering the crews’ time sheets. I entered a quantity for wooden markers and notice that the dollar value was set to zero. I also notice that when I entered time for Reinhold Shuele in Access his charge out rate was also set to zero. I immediately advised Mrs. Page of this negative stressor by telling her what was going on with my computer without accusing her of wrongdoing. I let her know that I am all of sudden having problems with my computer not functioning in the manner that it did in the past. I asked Mrs. Page what was the charge for the wooden markers and was advised to set it at $2.00. I went into the access table and reset the dollar amount for the wooden markers and the charge out rate for Reinhold Shuele. The way in which this database works is if you set the value in the table to zero it will come up in the cost sheets with that value. I felt that this database had been tampered with to create errors in my work. I did not have this problem prior to this date and after mentioning it to Mrs. Page the problem went away. Also on June 21st, 2002, I advised Mrs. Page of another negative stressor regarding my computer in that I was having problems with my keyboard with the enter key being stuck or jammed all of a sudden impeding my work. I advised that I have to hit it really hard to make it work. I had been working with this problem for several days. Mrs. Page agreed I could purchase a new one. John later jokingly made the comment that one of the crews must have switched my keyboard with theirs that they were having this problem. At 1:00 p.m. Mrs. Page requested I come to her office to discuss the use of the gas card. Alice was in the office and wanted to use it. I did not understand why Mrs. Page would need to interrupt me for this. I had no need for the card. This was a pretext to bring me into the room for a premeditated conversation where I as the butt of the joke. Prior to this incident Alice or myself would just go to Mrs. Page’s office separately and ask for the card. Mrs. Page made some comment about saving her butt but started to say the word ass. Alice made the comment “can’t use the word ass.” I asked who started that rule? Mrs. Page advised me it is because she told her staff not to swear around me. I advised Mrs. Page that she misinterpreted my comment when I said that “I don’t like to swear I meant use the Fuck word.” I said in this meeting that I never complained to anyone at Mackay about that word that I only complained to Mrs. Page about sexual jokes. Alice made the comment that after working here for some time I would use this swear word like everybody else. I stated that I am not a herd follower just because others use that word does not mean that I have to join the crowd.
58. On June 24th, 2002, at 8:35 I come into the office from the front door. Mr. Millington is by the client’s seats in front of my desk with Mrs. Page at his side. Mr. Millington addresses me as “Hi Claudia”. I ignored this intentional provocation to promote an emotional reaction out of me and dropped off my things at my desk and left the office to go to the washroom.
59. On June 25th, 2002, at 9:00 a.m. I notice problem with Pitney Bowes Stamp machine in that I still had $60.00 left in the machine and the machine was telling me to refill as it was zero. I again immediately advised Mrs. Page of this negative stressor that I was all of sudden having problem with this machine. I had no such problem prior to June and my 3-mth appraisal. This problem with Pitney Bowes disappeared after I talked to Mrs. Page. Later at 10:30, Mr. Millington asks me if I want a coffee and I advised that I did not. Mr. Millington sent his associate Les to go do the Tim Horton coffee run. Les went by my desk to go out the front door. He stopped with the door open and suddenly asked me out of the blue “So you don’t want any Sex?” This incident coincidently happened after my conversation with Mrs. Page on June 21st (only complained about sex jokes), and after subjugated by Mr. Millington with Mrs. Page present to “Hi Claudia.” This situation was for the purpose of intentional infliction of emotional distress to annoy and cause an emotional reaction out of me. On June 25th, 2002, I advised Mrs. Page that Vincent Julian’s 3-mth probation was due on the 25th. Mrs. Page did not hesitate to talk to Vincent immediately and she did not need Mr. Clarke’s help as she did during my interview. This is an example of differential treatment.
60. On June 26th, 2002, I proceeded to make a collection call to client Mr. Dave Mancini. The number I dialed was an old number and I got the answering machine of a Dairy Company. I did not leave a message and hung up, as I did not know if Mr. Mancini was affiliated with the Dairy Company. I called up John in the office to mention my difficulty in contacting Mr. Mancini. John set out to deceive me and create conflict by advising me to call #905-304-3952 and that I could contact Mr. Mancini at Gates of Ancaster. I then called and left a message for Mr. Mancini to call me regarding his account. I later received a call from Mr. Mancini advising me that he got a message from the Dairy Company telling him that I left a message there for him. I advised him that I did call the Dairy Company and got their answering machine and hung up without leaving any message for Mr. Mancini.
61. On June 27th, 2002, at 4:30 I was in the DacEasy accounting software when I received error message advising me that can’t go in only one user. I again immediately advised Mrs. Page of this negative stressor of computer problem now in DacEasy. This problem went away as soon as I spoke to Mrs. Page about it. Also on this date I was given the task to enter items on the Condition of Employment by Mrs. Page. She had no problem showing me where I can find this computer file like she did in March and now it is available to me. Also on June 27th Kevin came up to my desk in the afternoon while Mrs. Page was standing by my desk to complain that plans for project 00H-050-36 where not sent out according to his instructions. Kevin said he left them on my desk. I assertively stated that there were no instructions from Kevin to send the package out and that I was waiting for client information to send the plans to the correct location. Kevin then changed his comment to saying that he thought he left me the instructions when I asserted myself with him in Mrs. Page’s presence. This was an attempt to make me look and feel incompetent by Mrs. Page and her staff Kevin. Also on June 27th I received a call from John in the office advising me that he has Mr. Mancini on his line. John proceeds with angry tone to ask me why I called Gates of Ancaster at #905-304-3952 for Mr. Mancini? I tried to explain the reason calmly that John instructed me to call at Gates of Ancaster and that he advised me I would find Mr. Mancini there as he was employed at Gates of Ancaster. John put on a show of getting very angry and upset with me, and I felt this to be a bully tactic so I assertively stopped his game playing with the comment “what’s was his point?” He then said he had Dave on the line and he hung up the phone on me. Mr. Mancini advised me that he did not receive the invoice and plans sent because we sent it to the old address. I requested he fax me his letterhead with his new address. I immediately went to Mrs. Page’s office to ask if I can go and make copies of the plan for this customer. Later I called the customer to tell him I was mailing 4 copies of his plan and invoice today and apologize to the client for the delay.
80. In July, 2002, I contacted vendor Norma Lawson to advise her of problem with her account on our system and that I needed to reconcile her account. I requested she send me a list of all invoices for the year showing which ones were paid and which ones were still outstanding. Since March, I had been following Karen’s instructions of adding to the excel spreadsheet lists for incoming vendor invoices and paid vendor invoices Norma’s invoices and paid invoices. I found out in June after I was trained on how to use DacEasy that there was a discrepancy on this vendor’s account. I notice that for the cheques that I wrote out prior to June paying specific invoices that Karen did not apply these cheques in DacEasy according to my request on the excel list. I checked further and found this problem goes back to January. Karen, the ex bookkeeper, should have advised me that she was not applying these cheques according to my excel list in March and why she was doing so, so that we could have looked at this account sooner to correct the application problem. Karen should have communicated with me that there was an application problem with this vendor. The list that I received from the vendor showed invoices not paid that were paid and cleared off the vendor payable account by Karen. I had copies of original invoice to be paid that were not open on the account in DacEasy. This account needed to be reconciled.
81. On July 2nd, 2002, Karen stopped by at 4:30 to train me. At 5:00, Kin Lau (contractor assisting Mrs. Page while she is on vacation) came to my desk and brought me 5 plans for project 02H-135 that he stated needed to be urgently courier out immediately. My working hours is 8:30 to 4:30. I was on overtime for the specific purpose of being trained by Karen. Kin Lau intentional waited till 5:00 with this urgent courier request taking away my training time with Karen. We had to stop my training to prepare plans to be courier out and call the Courier Company.
82. On July 5th, 2002, John advises me that Sil at Chamberlain called him to request copies of plans for project 02h-045-4 for Springfield Hotels (Airport) as he claims he never received copies of the plan. I advised John I would look into this matter and made a day timer entry to look for plans for this project. I remembered on June 25th that Mrs. Page had requested that I have this plan ready for Sil at Chamberlain and the Sil would stop by to pick up the plans. I pulled the file and find my copy of invoice #11159 for the plans with my hand written notation that the plans were picked up by client (he sent a woman to pick up the plans). I went to John’s desk to show him my copy of this invoice with my notation of pick up. John then spoke to the client and does not say anything further to me about the missing plans. John intentionally created conflict to make it look like I am inefficient at my duties and create unnecessary work.
83. On July 8th, 2002, I notice more computer/machine problems. At 3:20 the Pitney Bowes machine showed error town/province absent and refill. Also, my printer default was changed so that items would not go to my printer connected with my computer (PC Anywhere – Control Software can change files and delete files from another source while I am working on my computer). I did not have any computer problems prior to June and now I am having a lot. Also on July 8th at 1:35 I was trying to key in an invoice for the vendor Sokkia of #12023248 for $175.26 in DacEasy. I needed to delete the entry by hitting F6 when the system freeze on me so I controlled-alt-delete and received an error message that “this version of DacEasy accounting is for single user use only accessing of the program files by more than one user at a time is prohibited.” I called the accountant James to see why this is happening and he gave me the excuse the computer just thinks it is attached to another user. I had to shut down my computer and reboot which impeded my work.
84. On July 10th, 2002, I requested Mr. Clarke to signed two cheques for the Receiver General and GST cheques. Mr. Clarke only signed the Receiver General cheques. I also made out one cheque to the Association of Ontario Land Surveyors with the abbreviation of Association as Ass. I gave this cheque to Mr. Clarke in the boardroom to sign. Later, he comes to my desk with this cheque and asked me what I thought? I said I don’t understand what he was referring to? He pointed to the abbreviation and said that the vendor might read that abbreviation as asshole.
85. On July 12th, 2002, at 9:38 a.m. I sent Mr. Clarke an e-mail to advise him of the quarter GST payment due on July 31st will be $11,113.98 and asked him how much funds he would like me to transfer to the GST account as there was only $3700.02 in this account. I received e-mail reply of “the reason we have the GST account is to prevent this type of cash requirement from occurring.” I responded back with an e-mail to advise Mr. Clarke that the reasons why there is a cash shortage in the GST account is that I was instructed to make deposits of $500.00 to the GST account not $1000.00. I had continued to write cheques of $500.00 and Mr. Clarke continued to sign them without questioning me at the time. I also advised Mr. Clarke that I did not have accounting data to know how much funds would be required since I had not been trained on the DacEasy accounting software. When I challenge Mr. Clarke I then receive a derogatory note “don’t be so defensive.” Mr. Clarke did not make it clear to me that the $500.00 transfer of funds was only one time.
86. On July 15th, 2002, at 10:59 a.m. I sent Mr. Clarke e-mail request for him to review my collection letter to A. Wesley Paving for disputed invoice #10706. There were four parties involved. After meeting with the clients on May 28th and submitting my request for payment letter of May 29th and resubmitting request for payment to other party at fault, I received response from all parties that no one is responsible for payment of this invoice. I ask Mr. Clarke to review my next letter and provide his opinion on how to pursue collection on this disputed item. At 12:40 I received e-mail response back from Mr. Clarke and he does not respond to my accounts receivable inquiry. On July 16th at 1:19 I send another e-mail requesting a response to my accounts receivable letter. At 3:19, Mr. Clarke advises that he will pay the Halton Catholic Separate School Board a visit to see if he can resolve this disputed invoice and see who should pay for the services rendered. He stated he would be in on Friday and that I should have the file of correspondence ready for him. At 3:21 Mr. Clarke sends me second e-mail requesting to change the words in my letter. I thought that this was good that I was finally getting some feedback. July 19th I gave Mr. Clarke the information he requested. Later, Mr. Clarke contacted the School Board and he later advised me that I would need to pursue small claims court against A. Wesley Paving. Around the first week in August, all of a sudden Mr. Clarke passes on the collection of this disputed invoice to Mrs. Page. I could see the two in the boardroom having this conversation. I was excluded from this discussion intentionally and Mr. Clarke made no attempt to advise me that I do not need to pursue the small claims yet. Mrs. Page had just return from a three-week vacation and had other more urgent surveying items to pursue than this disputed invoice administration issue.
87. On July 16th, 2002, I received an e-mail response from Mr. Clarke of “I see no reason to call an uncollected account a bad debt, we never had the money in the first place”. This was management’s response to my request for instructions on how Mackay handles bad debt items. My original e-mail was on June 26th, my second request e-mail was on June 27th, and finally on June 28th Mr. Clarke advises me that he will discuss this matter with me when he is in the office (see attached). No discussion took place. On July 16th I sent third request for instructions and received the response that I should not call an uncollected account a bad debt? On July 17th I sent Mr. Clarke an e-mail response as to why I call an uncollected item a bad debt and not a reversal of revenue: based on my 13 years of experience, information from my accounting book (copies given to Mr. Clarke to read and discuss with me), and my husband who has his CMA certificate. In this e-mail I stated that I would do the entry per his instructions for Gerry Williamson and outstanding invoice #9800, but needed his instructions for the other item that was over $1000.00. I never received a response from Mr. Clarke as to how to handle this second item. I also felt I was being set up for another criticism down the road on the item for Gerry Williamson so I did not do this entry as per my e-mail. I also did not do this entry as I felt it was not good accounting to reverse revenue that should be a bad debt expense. Later on August 9th I received from the accountant Lisa Osborne an accounting list of year-end entries with an entry to clear the Gerry Williamson uncollectible to bad debts expense and not reversing revenue as Mr. Clarke instructed me. At 3:00 p.m. on July 16th, I looked on my desk for the GST forms that I needed to fill out to pay the second quarter payment of GST. I could not find this form on my desk where I left it. I double-checked the vendor files for Minister of Finance and the Receiver General. The form was no where to be found. No one else in the office would need this form. This tactic was used by Watts Industries of taking customer fax off my desk that I was working on as noted in my 2000 complaint. On July 17th at 1:00 p.m. I looked again for the GST form on my desk and in the files for the Minister of Finance and the Receiver General. The form was still missing. I knew this to be a bully tactic so I placed a yellow sticker on my computer as a reminder to myself to look for this form. The notes were visible for everyone in the office to see. On July 19th I looked again in the Minister of Finance file and at the back of it was placed the missing GST form.
88. On July 17th, 2002, I was working on doing the payroll which ended on Wednesday. Alice came up to my desk to intentionally deceive me by advising me that she was only going to work 4 hours as she had to take her daughter to the doctors. I repeated what she said only going to work 4 hours? She said ok. On July 18th Alice came up to my desk to ask why she was short on her pay that she was short some time on her pay stub. We reviewed the hours on the excel spreadsheet with her pay. She now tells me that she told me on July 17th that she would be working till 4:00 p.m. not 4 hours only on Wednesday. I knew this was a bully tactic and did not fall for this conflict created situation to argue with her. I simply made a negative assertion statement of apologizing for this misunderstanding. I was not interested in arguing with Alice and continued to document this incident. I stated to her that he adjustment would be for 3.5 hours and she agreed. I repeated this amount again to make sure no misunderstanding as to what Alice is telling me. I advised he that it would be adjusted on her next pay stub. Alice was smiling and made a speech in a patronizing manner that “its ok to make a mistake.” Later I received her time card for the Wednesday, which shows she worked a full shift of 8 hours, which clearly indicates premeditation to create errors in my work and make me look incompetent. On July 22nd, 2002, the Pitney Bowes stamp machine did not function properly again it showed error message to refill when I knew there was still $40.00 left for stamps.
89. On July 24th, 2002, I was looking around my desk for the original invoice for vendor RJM for the Bell system setup for $4304.45. This invoice was not entered in the accounts payable payment system of DacEasy for the June’s month end. I could not close June’s month without entering this item. I had written out a cheque to pay this vendor and needed to enter this payment in the payable system of DacEasy. I had an open file for vendor invoices to be entered in accounts payable, which is the last place where I put this invoice. I placed it in this file waiting to speak to Karen about the accounts she would use for this entry. I asked Mrs. Page and John if they had this invoice. They both denied they had it. Mrs. Page then made a negative critical comment that the vendor Ron wrote out a written copy and that he would not have a duplicate copy for me if I contact him. I called Dasha’s bluff and advised her that it would be unlikely for a vendor not to have his own copy of this invoice for reason of audit. I left two messages with this vendor and he faxed over a copy of the invoice. Later on August 7th John stopped by my desk with a folder and the original invoice for $4304.45 without saying anything to me.
90. Also, at 4:00, on July 24th, I went back to Mrs. Page’s office to review billing issues that we had been discussing. When I went back to her office Mr. Kin Lau was behind her desk by the window standing in front of a plan for Coreslab. I went to sit down looking up at Mrs. Page waiting to carry on with our discussion about the billing. She proceeds to point at the Coreslab plan at a section where there is an easement problem that missed by her and has caused problems for the customer. Due to this negligent, Coreslab is suing Mackay for the problem it has caused for their client. Kin Lau’s body/lap was very close to the plan where Mrs. Page was pointing her finger. This seemed abnormal because Mrs. Page repeated herself 3 times about this easement section and pointing her fingers in that area close to Mr. Kin’s body/lap and looking back at me. There was no reason for her to review this matter three times or at all with me. I felt this was entrapment attempt to set me up to be charged with sexual harassment by Mr. Lau for leering with Mrs. Page as a witness.
91. On July 25th, 2002, at 2:25, I turned at my desk to write into my day timer that was son the small grey table behind me. I am bent over writing away when Mr. Lau comes towards me not politely asking me to move or pass him the plan that was in the Commercial Photo bag to my left. He leans over my writing and gets his body in my face almost to pick up the plan. He was too close, almost touching or brushing up against me. Had I looked up my eyes would be right in Mr. Lau’s lap and I feel he is doing this to accuse me of sexual harassment. I closed my eyes and tried to move my body away and Mr. Lau would move his body closer to mine. He picked up the bag with the plan. I asserted myself with him immediately and demanded that he place his request for plans at the front counter of my desk rather than do it behind and around me so we don’t do this dancing at the back. I advised Mr. Lau that I could do my job you stand over there and make your request. At 4:20 John comes around my desk looking for plans for Budd Development so I start looking around my desk and I notice John staying close to where ever my eyes were looking similar to Kin’s earlier behaviour. I feel that John was staging his body close to me so I would make a mistake and look at his body inappropriately.
134. I plead that the facts that were not investigated by the commission plus the facts that were investigated clearly shows discrimination based on sexual harassment and sex per Janzen et al v. Platy Enterprises Ltd.: Sexual harassment in the workplace may be broadly defined as unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that detrimentally affects the work environment or leads to adverse job-related consequences for the victims; it is an abuse of both economic and sexual power; sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination within s. 6(1) of the Human Rights Act. The fact not investigated by the commission are: that Kin Lau came very close to having his lap in my face which is sexual to me, and that Dasha and Kin Lau attempted to entrap me into a leering of Kin Lau’s lap to charge me with leering. The commission did not investigate per the case analysis a very important material fact that Ross Clarke’s used the sexual harassment policy to intimidate me on August 9th, 2002, and he came to my desk angry because I did not give him signed copy of the policy when management refused to provide me with a copy, and after this conversation he gives me a copy to type in the computer but does not bother to ask for his signed copy again. The facts are that comments of “penis joke in crew book”, “breast enlarge due to pregnancy”, “so you don’t want any sex”, “can’t say ass” on top of Ross Clarke’s behaviour on August 9th do have a sexual meaning and/or is evidence of poison work environment because it annoys me and therefore discrimination. The commission omitted these items to protect MMP and Watts from exposure of wrongdoing which is obstruction of justice.
135. I plead that the commission’s case analysis distort the facts at #29 of: there is insufficient evidence to indicate that the complainant was treated unequally or subjected to harassment in the workplace because of her disability; it does not appear that the respondents exaggerated the complainant’s performance issues because she had or was perceived to have a disability; there is insufficient evidence regarding the allegation that the respondents knew about her disability, conspired with staff from Company B or treated her in a discriminatory fashion when she was off on sick leave. Shannon omits the following facts in her case analysis for obvious reasons of: March 18th I made complaint that Watts passed on slanderous information and I am receiving the same tactics; Dasha distorts my words to a delusional bantering of “people out to get me”; that she advises the commission that my behaviour was bizarre and they had performance issues to warrant dismissal before my 3-mth performance review; I requested in June letter for list of areas where I can improve to protect my performance of allegations of gross incompetence and none was supplied in writing contradicting that there was performance issues prior to 3-mth probation; I received $1.00 raise at my 3-mth probation to match Marshall’s hourly rate; my August 7th email from Karen Tarpos of June’s Month End duties and training on Thursday night; January 20th 2003 termination letter for cause to be WSIB claim denied and my allegations of poisoned work environment not substantiated and no mentioned of any incompetence issue; and the defendants allege gross incompetence for summary dismissal with cause only in the jurisdiction of the Ontario Human Rights but do not use this defense in their statement of defenses civilly. Shannon intentionally omits my cross examination remarks in my rebuttal of: I refer to the article at Workplace.Ca on Criteria for an employer to prove an employee Incompetence: the adjudicator noted the requisites for an employer to build a case for innocent incompetence as follows: the employer must define the level of job performance required; the employer must establish that the standard expected was communicated to the employees; the employer must show it gave reasonable supervision and instruction to the employee and that it afforded the employee a reasonable opportunity to meet the standard; the employee must establish inability on the part of the employee to meet the requisites standards to an extent that renders him incapable of performing the job and that reasonable efforts were made to find alternative employment within the competence of the employee; the employer must prove that reasonable warnings were given to the employee that a failure to meet the standard could result in dismissal; that Mackay fails this requisite for an employer to build a case for incompetence.
136. I plead that the commission’s case analysis is distorted again at #30 of: the evidence does not indicate that the complainant requested any form of accommodation, or indicate to the respondent that her performance issues were related to disability; the evidence indicates that the respondents provided the complainant with further training after extending her probation period, but her performance did not improve; it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position. Shannon omits facts supplied of: that I notified the defendants in August 2002 of my injury to health with my doctor’s note requesting leave of absence due to negative stressors in the work place causing my inability to function at work at my job; that the respondents made no effort to offer of accommodation prior to sending the January 20th termination letter; that I was waiting for a response to my November and December letter for sick pay; that the training was on new duties not old duties; and no written warning notice signed by me of “her performance did not improve”. The facts show that while I was employed Dasha Page requested I contact male coworker, Kenny, who was off on WSIB to request when he might return to work and I expected the same treatment when I was off and there was no such phone call from my employer. The facts and evident that I have contradict Shannon Meadows-Lee’s allegation here that “her performance did not improve” and proves my point of collusion with MMP Limited with injurious falsehoods of gross incompetence to obstruct natural justice of referring my prima facie complaint to the Tribunal and a form of inducing breach of contract and wrongful interference with contractual relationships.
137. I plead that the last statement of fact presented in at #30 by Shannon Meadows-Lee of “it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position” proves my point of collusion and slanting this analysis by Shannon to obstruct natural justice and not a true presentation of the facts. Shannon Meadows-Lee is very much aware that I started a part time job on January 10th 2003 and a full time job on February 10th 2003, that I kept working the part time job till September 15th 2003 after receiving same harassment mobbing behaviour at both places of employment, and kept working at the full time position till March 2004 with no issues of gross incompetence at this full time accounting position. Shannon Meadows-Lee is aware of these facts because she wrote up additional fabricated case analysis in favour of these two employers. Shannon Meadows-Lee is putting in her case analysis “it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position” to influence the commissioner so he won’t change the decision to refer this complaint to the Tribunal.
138. I plead that the commission’s case analysis is distorted at #31 of: there is insufficient evidence to indicate that reprisal was a factor in the termination of the complainant’s employment; the evidence indicates that the complainant was unable to perform the duties of her position. There is an abundance of facts and evidence being concealed by Shannon Meadows-Lee and Dina Waik of: January 20th 2003 termination letter for cause of WSIB claim being denied and my poisoned work environment allegation not being substantiated and no mentioned in this letter of gross incompetence after 5 months absence; the allegations of gross incompetence offered by MMP changed from their original rebuttal in 2003 to the commission and this here analysis in 2004; I received two statement of defense civilly by MMP and no use of this defense in common law for summary dismissing me with cause; not to mentioned my allegations of setting me up to fail while I was employed not after the fact that were not investigated at all nor reflected here in this analysis; my numerous email communications between Karen and myself to show the kind of training I actually did receive which was lacking.
139. I plead that the commission’s case analysis for the prima facie reprisal complaint against Watts Industries also contain errors, omission of facts and evidence, plus Shannon Meadows-Lee does a wonderful job slanting that analysis towards painting me with a diagnosis of delusional disorder. Shannon’s obstruction of justice with the MMP complaint leads to obstruction of justice with the Watts’ reprisal complaint.
140. I plead that the concealing of facts in the MMP case analysis affects my reprisal complaint against Watts Industries. The facts as stated by retired commissioner Mr. Wharton in Payne v. Ontario Human Rights Commission are: the apparent tendency of Commissioners to follow unquestioningly any staff recommendations. Shannon Meadows-Lee and Dina Waik, staff of the investigation office at the commission, by writing these fabricated case analysis, concealing evidence and controlling witnesses, have set in motion unnecessary delays of natural justice and abuse of process.
141. I received at my home Chief Commissioner, Keith Norton’s, decision dated February 1st 2005 again refusing to refer my prima facie complaints to the Tribunal with the allegation insufficient evidence. This decision by Keith Norton is based on my 20 page rebuttal and copy of MMP’s defence statement in Burlington’s Small Claims Court with no allegation for cause of summary dismissal of gross incompetence nor disarray of books. Keith Norton is a lawyer and I infer his decision does not reflect natural justice nor common law.
142. As a result of the Defendants’ lack of conscience, continuous deceit to cover up their wrongdoing, and ruthless conduct, I lost my jobs; my once perfect health record destroyed causing stigmatism and further similar abuses, and refusal of future insurance benefits due to injury to health (depression); lost of skill utilization for future advancements; lost of job references; required to take medication in order to work to reduce condition caused by additional mobbing behaviour to mitigate further injury into reactive depression and suicide ideation; a good standard of living and loss of reputation of my good name.
Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress:
I plead that the acts and omissions of the Defendants noted above were calculated to cause me serious anguish and to suffer in the form of distress, anxiety, depression, hypervigilence and insomnia to induce permanent delusional disorder as a direct consequences of the Defendants conduct noted above and therefore I am entitled to damages. I plead that the Defendants’ conduct was cold, calculated, arrogant, malicious, reckless, vindictive, ruthless, dishonest, without conscious, premeditated, systematic and reprehensible and deserving of the Court’s censure. I plead that I have made reasonable attempts to mitigate my damages and that in the course of mitigating damages I have incurred expenses, the full particulars of which I will undertake to provide to the Defendants prior to trial.
The Plaintiff proposes that the trial of this action be held in the Hamilton Superior Court of Justice.
R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Form 14A; O. Reg. 533/95, s. 7; O. Reg. 652/00, s. 3; O. Reg. 653/00, s. 12.
Form 4C
Courts of Justice Act
backsheet
Losier v. MMP Limited, Dasha Page, Ross Clarke, Watts Industries, Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, Ontario Human Rights Commission, & Minister of Attorney General
File No. 04-13797
Ontario
Superior Court of Justice
PROCEEDING COMMENCED AT Hamilton
45 Main Street East
Hamilton, Ontario, L8N 2B7
Statement of Claim
Claudette Losier, 80 West 33rd St., Hamilton,Ontario,L9C 5J1, 905-388-7794
Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited and Dasha Page & Ross Clarke C/O James D. Higginson (Barrister) fax 905-523-4144
Watts Industries (Canada) Inc. fax 905-332-6068
Minister of Attorney General, Ontario Human Rights Commission, Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee fax 416-314-3571(OHRC)
O. Reg. 333/96, s. 5; O. Reg. 457/01, s. 15.
Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited and Dasha Page & Ross Clarke C/O James D. Higginson (Barrister) fax 905-523-4144
Watts Industries (Canada) Inc. fax 905-332-6068
Minister of Attorney General, Ontario Human Rights Commission, Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee fax 416-314-3571 416-314-3571 (OHRC)
137. I plead that the last statement of fact presented in at #30 by Shannon Meadows-Lee of “it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position” proves my point of collusion and slanting this analysis by Shannon to obstruct natural justice and not a true presentation of the facts. Shannon Meadows-Lee is very much aware that I started a part time job on January 10th 2003 and a full time job on February 10th 2003, that I kept working the part time job till September 15th 2003 after receiving same harassment mobbing behaviour at both places of employment, and kept working at the full time position till March 2004 with no issues of gross incompetence at this full time accounting position. Shannon Meadows-Lee is aware of these facts because she wrote up additional fabricated case analysis in favour of these two employers. Shannon Meadows-Lee is putting in her case analysis “it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position” to influence the commissioner so he won’t change the decision to refer this complaint to the Tribunal.
****This pleading shows that every conclusion I make I back it up with facts from my 4 prima facie complaints ignored and left out of the case analysis not allowed per duty of fairness to complainant and standard for investigation per Federal Court Judicial Review cases of Cashin and Ruckpaul not the Ontario Minister of Attorney General’s erroneous standards which are discriminatory.
Go to Canlii(google) website to read Justice Lofchik’s bias endorsement record where there is no references to any of my pleadings made to substantiate his analyses as in other Rule 21 cases such as SCC case of Hunt v. Carey and Crown’s case of Deep. He does not write or refer specifically to any paras in my pleadings to show where I am deficient like Hunt and Deep and all other Rule 21 motions presented by the Crown because my pleadings are sufficient and he did not want to draw attention to that fact! Nor did the Crown defendants in their factum for the Rule 21 Motion and this here Appeal as compared to the Factum found in case of KRP against the same Minister. This is called imaging the truth.
Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21
Superior Court of Justice — Ontario
allegations — suable — pleading — complaints — judicial review
Justice Lofchik dismissed my case based on my Judicial Reviews being dismissed and this too is an error in law per the following:
2006 Ontario Judicial Review Error in Law:
Para #60 The plaintiff has failed to plead facts which support a claim of bad faith, abuse of power or malice toward her. Referring to the passages of a Case Analysis Report with which she disagrees just does not do it. This is so particularly when the Divisional Court in her judicial review application found that “there was an abundance of evidence to support the findings upon which the discretion of the Commission was exercised”. And that, “the Applicant has failed to establish that the decisions are arbitrary, capacious or made in bad faith”.
***My allegations in the Rule 21 8 day motion hearing was that the Minister of Attorney General continued the cause of action with the Judicial Review Courts and I have a Charter Rights to amend my claim which includes improper judicial review by refusing to weigh all the evidence per standard in Ruckpaul case. What I received is per Crown’s factum pg 8 para #23 another imaged process because it does not matter about the truth only that we provide her with a process so when she says we disadvantage her we say we gave her the process:
We do not inent to analyze all the evidence, not the specific details of each complaint and each Case Analysis Report. However, certain general observations are necessary. Ms. Losier correctly contends that it was not necessary for her to establish an entire pattern of facts, because even one “incident” can sometimes justify a finding of workplace harassment or reprisal. She points to numerous particulars that she says the Commission did not try to verify, a belief stemming from the fact there is no reference to them in the Case Analysis Reports or the reasons for the decisions. She asserts that the Commission did not address conflicting evidence or explain why her evidence was rejected or ignored, or why other evidence was preferred. Ms. Losier also contends that the Commission resorted to second hand information (hearsay evidence) rather than first hand evidence, when first hand evidence was available. It is worth repeating that the Commission is not sitting as a tribunal; it is acting in an investigative and administrative screening capacity.
***Ruckpaul Judicial Review contradicts the analysis of the law for judicial review in this paragraph.
We are not prepared to assume that the failure to mention every allegation, or the detailed particulars of Ms. Losier’s evidence, leads to the conclusion the Commission failed to consider those allegations or that evidence. It is very clear that the Commission assessed the credibility of Ms. Losier’s allegations and evidence, and found it wanting. The court cannot second guess the Commission’s assessment of credibility or wade into the evidence and reach opposite conclusions without first determining that the Commission’s findings were irrational.
***If they did not analyze all the evidence or specific details of each complaint that they cant say that my credibility is wanting and this here is also defamation of my character.
In our view, the decisions are not irrational. There is an abundance of evidence to support the findings upon which the discretion of the Commission was exercised. The applicant has failed to establish that the decisions are arbitrary, capricious or made in bad faith. Each application is therefore dismissed”
***If they refused to analyze all the evidence than they have provided a one sided bias Judicial Review solely based on case analysis and no analysis done per Ruckpaul’s Judicial Review which is also differential treatment and prove of discrimination by Minister of Attorney General and Queenspark.
Ruckpaul v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 149 (CanLII),
analysis pgs 7 to 11 particularly paras 42, 45-50, 52-58, 62-71 and 75, is a proper judicial
review not what I received in Ontario to protect the abuse from the Minister of Attorney
General, Commission and investigation staff:
“its duty is to decide if, under the provisions of the Act, an inquiry is warranted having regard to all the facts.”
“an investigation had to be at least thorough and neutral for the Commission to have a fair basis on which to evaluate”
“that where the completeness of the investigation or report is challenged, the
underlying investigation documents are relevant and subject to production”
“If the investigation is flawed to the point where a court can reasonably conclude
the evidence reported by the investigator is incomplete or inadequate, the court
must intervene.”
“She failed to interview the applicant nor any of her witnesses. The Commission
realized this was a flaw and asked the investigator to interview the applicant’s
witnesses.”
***Same as my complaints – no witnesses.
“Furthermore, two supplemental witness statements, dated February 15 and 16,
2001, from CIC’s main witnesses in response to questions put by the investigator to
CIC were not disclosed.”
***Same as my complaint Mrs. Page, Mr. Clark and 2 witnesses statements were not disclosed.
“Ms. Huneault made a clear statement concerning one of the grounds upon which
the applicant based her discrimination and harassment claims. However, the
investigator failed to address this issue any further in his report. This omission
might constitute a “fundamental” omission.”
***Same as my complaints such as per my Judicial Review argument that “even one incident can justify” violation such as MMP’s 3 prima facie incidents not one of “exposure to porn joke” and “long absence” for disability discrimination and termination letter with cause because my WSIB was denied and your poison work environment allegations were not substantiated we are terminating your employment with no allegations of incompetence per case analysis nor in Judicial Review endorsement record plus others items.
Kollar v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2002 FCT 848 (CanLII) also validates my claims of improper investigation and judicial review:
Standard:
Pg 7 para 34: “breach of the principles of natural justice or other procedural unfairness or unless the decision is not supportable on the evidence before the Commission”
Pg 9 para 38: Did the Commission commit a reviewable error of fact and law by ignoring witness evidence indicating that the sexual harassment had occurred?
***This paragraph then states the incident and who was interviewed whereas my Judicial Review analysis does no such analysis to each and every allegation of same reviewable error of fact and law!!!
Pg 9 para 39: The investigation report in this case seems to have focused not on the above information, but on the applicant’s work record when she was employed initially with CIBC then CIBC Securities Inc. and then again with CIBC. It is appropriate to discuss the applicant’s work record but the investigation report should also deal with the evidence of alleged sexual harassment. The investigation report does not deal with this evidence. Was the evidence not accepted? I cannot tell from the report or the record. In my opinion, the investigation report did not deal with this evidence and consequently, the investigation report did not deal with the apllicant’s first part of her complaint which was that the respondent failed to supply her with an harassment free work place. This aspect of the complaint should have been dealt with in the investigation report. In my opinion, the investigation was, in this respect, deficient as it lacked thoroughness.
***My complaints and case against the Crown in a nutshell that the investigating officer had to put what they investigated in the report and per what they did put in their report is not thorough nor neutral and also proves abuse by the Judicial Review Courts in Ontario and Justice Lofchik’s agreement with my Judicial Review per Crown’s para#23! This case clearly shows that the abuse in only in Ontario and its coming from the Minister of Attorney General providing complainants with improper investigations and Judicial Reviews and is an act of discrimination!
Para #40: The Commission need not accept the recommendations of the investigator but if it does and the investigation is found to be deficient because of lack of thoroughness, then the decision of the Commission is also deficient and cannot stand. I am of the opinion that the decision of the Commission is in error as it does not deal with the applicant’s first ground of complaint, that is that the employer did not provide her with an harassment free work place. For the above reason, I would quash the decision of the Commission and order that a new investigation be completed.
Para #42: I might add, however, that it appears from the record that only the respondent’s response to the complaint dated October 5, 1999 was cross-disclosed to the applicant. The response of November 10, 1999 does not appear to have been disclosed to the applicant. I am of the view that since it was accepted by the Commission, it should have been cross-disclosed to the applicant.
Suits are allowed after a judicial review for bad faith conduct resulting in damages per SCC Longley and Roncarelli cases based on civil court rules of evidence not Judicial Review rules of evidence based of due deference and not weighing evidence per HVK pg 2 held: The plaintiff’s claim was not a re-litigation of the previous prodeedings, as they did not involve any claim for damages. It was possible that the court could find that the decisions of the directors and employees was motivated by bad faith and not protected by any limitation of liability.
***Justice Lofchik acting as trier of fact again and his argument not based on law per Crown’s case of Wilson references to Reports and also what was left out of reports is sufficient for abuse of power, bad faith, and malice at pg 15 para 59 “malice would be made out if they were to find that: …the respondents continued the prosecution either for an improper purpose, or in reckless disregard of evidence which would have disclosed the unreliability of the information provided by the [complainant], or or out of ill will, spite or for selfish purposes, or because [the complainant] wanted them to do so. (in my claim the complainant is the respondent wanted them to do so )
***reckless disregard of facts and evidence proving unreliability from employment events: 1) of MMP and Xentel’s evidence of incompetency is a termination letter from MMP 5 month after off on sick leave for depression with no allegations of incompetency plus $1.00 raise at 3 month probation and no sign warning letter at probation or during MMP employment, and for Xentel a termination letter with severance/notice and release form for notice and Xentel settled claim in 2007, and 2) no witnesses of the complainant’s interviewed at all and no sexual harassers interviewed at all for Lyman and Xentel complaints and only Ms. Page for her breast comment incident interviewed, and 3) no witnesses at all interviewed to prove or disprove Watts retaliation/delusional profiling campaign of contacting next employer and passing info in complaints
***There was no interview of my witness Karen Tarpos who was the one not Mrs. Page to train me on new duties and not retrain on the alleged old duties that I was incompetent on and is fundamental omission proving conspiracy to injure me with damages of refusal to refer to tribunal, injure me with personal injury of delusional disorder and to discredit me
OHRC Code book 2005 s. 36
Pg 185 Layzell v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) 2003 – The Commission owes to the Complainant a duty of fairness in its procedures…
Pg 187 Valair v. Canada (Attorney General) 2004 (FC) – Uneven disclosure can constitute a breach of procedural fairness. The Commission must provide to the complainant all the submissions by the respondent, unless the submission adds nothing new. (like the disarray of books only in report dec 2004 and only alleged interviewing MMP’s witnesses 2 undisclosed workers who did not work with plaintiff)
Pg 188/9 – Kollar v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2002 (FCT) – The investigation must be thorough and this will be assessed on the basis of the investigation report. If the Commission makes its decision on the basis of an investigation report which fails to deal with evidence relating to all the alleged breaches of human rights law, the decision of the Commission cannot stand. (MMP’s termination letter prima facie reprisal because my allegations of poison work environment were not substantiated per WSIB report, MMP’s rebuttal disability discrimination “long absence” and “people out to get me”, leaving out all sexual harassment items and internal complaints validated at Xentel and Lyman, Lyman’s prima facie disability discrimination of Ins. Co. denying benefits due to past history of depression)
Pg 189 – Lee v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2002 (FCT) – The record before the Commission must not be flawed. Commission staff must treat the parties in an evenhanded fashion, particularly where one party is unrepresented) (uneven only allegedly interviewed MMP’s witnesses Mrs. Page, Mr. Clark, and 2 undisclosed witnesses who did not work with plaintiff)
Roncarrelli pg 166/67
“On a consideration of these I am unable to find that the Legislature has, either expressly or by necessary implication, laid down any rules to guide the commission as to the circumstances under which it may refuse to grant a permit or may cancel a permit already granted sections and of the remainder of the Act.”
“In my opinion the intention of the legislature, to be gathered from the whole Act, was to enumerate (i) certain cases in which the granting of a permit is forbidden, and (ii) certain case in which the cancellation of a permit is mandatory, and, in all other cases to commit the decision as to whether a permit should be granted, refused or cancelled to the unfettered discretion of the commission. I conclude that the function of the commission in making that decision is administrative and not judicial or quasi-judicial.”
***This validates my factum argument paras 6 to 8 that legislation of Code expressly laid down rules to guide the commission being ignored as to circumstances under which it may refuse to grant a complaint and the intention of the Code to be gathered from the whole Act that includes the preamble with its purpose/intent, section 5 to 10 as to what constitutes prima facie complaints per grounds, and not just Way/Gismondi recital of section 34 with no case examples of prima facie complaints made out dismissed per section 36 as per Crown’s factum argument and Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record.
Pg 169 “He must give notice when he will proceed with the matter, and he must act honestly and impartially and not under the dictation of some other person or persons to whom the authority is not given by law. There must be no malversation of any kind.” (including defamation, conspiracy, accepting unreliable and hearsay evidence and ignoring collaborated prima facie facts and evidence)
***Impartially proven when they only interview 2 witness for MMP respondents and none for the complainant and leave out prima facie facts and evidence collaborated from Respondents.
“fraud, collusion or malice…” (list items that are improper purpose for Misfeasance of Public office so defamation is also acceptable)
Claim Against Minister of Attorney General – Michael Bryant
Go to Canlii(google) website to read Justice Lofchik’s bias endorsement record where there is no references to any of my pleadings made to substantiate his analyses as in other Rule 21 cases such as SCC case of Hunt v. Carey and Crown’s case of Deep.
Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21
Superior Court of Justice — Ontario
allegations — suable — pleading — complaints — judicial
Crown’s factum pg 17 para 53: “Furthermore, the Appellant raised no factual allegations of any wrongdoing as against the Minister of the Attorney General in either pleading” claims?
04 Matter paras: 1 j & k,
para #23
I plead that I am complying with the provisions of the Public Authorities Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.P.38, and, in particularly, subsection 7(1) thereof. In that regard, the action herein was commenced within the six months of the execution of public and/or statutory duties on the part of these Defendants, with the fabricated case analysis fabricating insufficient evidence that I only received on December 3rd 2004, giving rise to the action herein. As such, the action herein is not statute-barred. In fact, the actions against the commission and the Minister of Attorney General responsible for their agents are still on going as my prima facie complaints have not been submitted to the Tribunal and are now 4 months obstructed. In fact, I received from Chief Commissioner on February 24th 2005 a memo that my reconsideration application was sent to respondents for review for reasons that there is an integrity issue with the commission process. The respondents would have been given 15 day time limits to submit their response, and its now May 5th and my faxes for status are being ignored by commission.
***Includes continuing case of action and that the Minister is responsible for his agents at the Commission which is true per the Code section 27 that the Commission is responsible to the Minister for this Act. Therefore the Minister is suable personally for promoting, condoning and utilizing improper investigation tactics and Judicial Review/Appeal Courts that are discriminatory and different then the standards for investigation and judicial review set out in the federal human rights jurisdiction before the date of my investigation in 2004 per case law of Cashin, Ruckpaul and others which are case law found in Ontario Human Rights Code Book 2005. The actions against the Minister includes continuing the same wrong doing into 2010 now with Justice Lofchik and refusing to do his duty to eliminate discrimination in Ontario for everyone per preamble, section 5 to 10, and section 29 of the Code.
Para 24:
I plead that the staff in the investigation office of the OHRC has committed the act of Misfeasance of Public Office in the targeted malice line of cases where the public officer recklessly disregards the means of ascertaining the extent of his or her power. Particularly, the statement at #30 in MMP’s case analysis represents this recklessness and targeted malice. I refer to Uni-Jet Industrial Pipe v. Canada (A.G.) on the test for abuses of public office of: 1. an intentional illegal act, which is either: i) an intentional use of statutory authority for an improper purpose; or ii) actual knowledge that the act (or omission) is beyond statutory authority; or iii) reckless indifference, or willful blindness to the lack of statutory authority for the act; 2) intent to harm an individual or a class of individuals, which is satisfied by either: i) an actual intent to harm; or ii) actual knowledge that harm will result; or iii) reckless indifference or willful blindness to the harm that can be foreseen to result. I infer that I received a sham investigation process that is use of statutory authority for an improper purpose. What I received as an investigation is the following: because it doesn’t matter about the truth it only matters that they have provided an accepted process so that when you say they disadvantaged you they can say they followed an established process.
Shannon Meadows-Lee from the commission claims there is evidence to support gross incompetence to refuse referral to the Tribunal and without this excuse for my termination she would have no choice but to refer my prima facie complaint to the Tribunal. Ms. Meadows-Lee conceals the material fact of my termination letter as she makes no mention of it in the case analysis for MMP and my termination letter is in direct violation of criminal code 425.1 which is strong evidence of reprisal. By doing so, Ms. Meadows-Lee is going against natural justice and common law. In addition, Shannon Meadows-Lee slanted the case analysis at #30 to discredit me with mental illness being the cause for my alleged incompetence with her comment of “it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position.” By making this statement Shannon Meadows-Lee over stepped the boundaries of her duties and willfully misrepresented the facts to do harm to discredit the complainant with the commissioner reading her decision, with the judge in my civil suit reading her case analyses, and this demonstrates improper purpose. She is well aware that I commenced part time position on January 10th 2003 and full time position on February 10th 2003, and that I worked both till September 15th 2003. There was no allegation at fourth employer of gross incompetence in accounting duties and I worked there for 13 months. She wrote up the case analysis for these two employers as well.
These case analyses by the commission staff causes remedies that I am now seeking with regards to MMP Limited, additional defamation by Watts. I seek remedies against the commission investigation staff, the commission and the Ministry of Attorney General for: misfeasance of public office, injurious falsehoods, deceit, conspiracy to injure, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and inducement of breach of contract with false allegations of gross incompetence. The criminal behaviour that supports my civil claims are obstruction of natural justice, accessory after the fact by concealing evidence and controlling the witnesses supports my claims civilly particularly intentional use of statutory authority for improper purpose. I refer to section 8 (2) of the Ministry of Citizenship and Culture Act regarding Crown Liability: Subsection (1) does not, by reason of subsections 5 (2) and (4) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act, relieve the Crown of Liability in respect of a tort committed by a person mentioned in subsection (1) to which it would otherwise be subject, and the Crown is liable under the Act for any such tort as if subsection (1) had not been enacted (R.S.O. 1990, c. M. 18, s. 8 (2).
***Ministry is typo (writing defiency) since 4 other references to the Minister in claim all say Minister not Ministry including heading on first page and back page, and para 1 and #23 of claim. Per Crown’s authority of Dawson I am allowed to amend all “oversights” and per SCC case of Hunt all deficiencies in writing. Going against Natural justice is pleaded here as fact of conduct not a cause of action and allowed per Odhavji for improper or unlawful conduct for intentional torts. Bad Faith and Malice sufficient pleaded here per allegation of injurious falsehoods to discredit the complaint per law Bad Faith means dishonest purpose and not carrying out the statute according to its intent and purpose (factum #12).
Minister can be sued in his own name per:
1) Proceedings Against the Crown
2) Deep pg 17 para 83: a claim against a Minister of the Crown is a claim against the Minister personally”. Michael Bryant was aware of wrong doing by Commission and staff in spring of 2004 , notice and small claims court suit 1178/04, prior to the improper investigation in Fall 2004 and improper case analysis reports in December 2004 sufficient facts for conclusion of reprisal motive.
***Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record says I pleaded “they acted deliberately with the quality of investigation” and this includes the Minister of Attorney General being behind the creation of improper investigation tactics and Judicial Reviews/Appeals “acting deliberate with the quality of the investigation” and he is responsible for the Code and the Commission per section 27 of the code to eliminate discrimination for everyone here in Ontario; and per MAG Act section 5(b) shall see that the administration of public affairs is in accordance with the law per the Code preamble, section 5 to 10, section 36 not 34 with duty to fairness of investigation of all prima facie facts, section 27 and 29 to eliminate discrimination including within his own department both at the Commission/Tribunal and the Judicial Review/Appeal Courts, and with judges like Justice Lofchik making discriminatory comments in court.
3) no vicarious liability for staff in any pleadings against the Minister of Attorney General
4) KRP suit allows for suit against Minister of Attorney General personally for: a) the plaintiffs pleaded that this acquiescence was a violation of s. 5(b) of the MAG Act. Section 5(b) of the MAG Act states that the Attorney General shall see that the administration of public affairs is in accordance with the law” and b) alleged OPP failure to enforce the Henco injunction depriving them the benefits of their contracts
***Minister of Attorney General’s job is to set proper investigation and judicial review standards in Ontario that conforms to the standards in the Federal Court’s Human
Rights Jurisdiction as there is only one human rights throughout Canada per Ontario’s Human Rights Code book 2005
*Ms. Meadows-Lee was not my investigating officer, and was brought in to write improper case analyses (other Judicial Review say reports written by investigating officers). I had no dealings with Ms. Meadows-Lee other than the case analysis.
*Minister of Attorney General, Michael Bryant, was put on notice of intentional unlawful conduct by intake staff in spring of 2004 and with receipt of small claims court suit #1178-04 against intake staff, prior to the investigation of 4 prima facie complaints and the four questionable case analyses dated December 2004, and these two claims sufficient for reprisal motive against the Minister of Attorney General using Meadows-Lee to write up sham case analysis and continuing cause of action with Judicial Review and Appeal Courts with improper Judicial Review/Appeals per other provinces proper Judicial Reviews in cases Cashin, Ruckpaul and Crown’s case of Lewis of all the prima facie facts.
Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse
Pg 3: “The officers’ alleged failure to cooperate with the SIU investigation and the Chief’s alleged failure to ensure that they did cooperate both constitute unlawful breaches of statutory duties under the Police Services Act. The allegation that the officers’ acts and omissions “represented intentional breaches of their legal duties as police officers” satisfies the requirement that the officers were aware that their conduct was unlawful and that it was intentional and deliberate. The allegation that the Chief deliberately failed to segregate the officers satisfies the requirement that he intentionally breached his legal obligation to ensure compliance with the Police Services Act.
***This argument from SCC is similar to the KRP case which clearly shows that the person who is ultimately responsible to ensure the Commission cooperates with the CODE ACT that includes duty of fairness to complainant during investigation and Judicial Reviews constitutes unlawful breaches under the Code and the MAG Act. My case is that MAG knew of my allegations against the Commission in spring 2004 per notice and then received suit against intake staff, refused to do an investigation, did nothing, influenced, authorized and condoned the reprisal of improper investigation tactics employed that includes not interviewing any sexual harassers for Xentel and Lyman complaints, and only interviewing Mrs. Page with proven bad faith, and by having Ms. Meadows-Lee not my investigator Dina Waik write up the case analysis. This is so because the Minister of Attorney General, Michael Bryant and the current one, are continuing the wrong by the Commission through Judicial Review Courts and now Justice Lofchik into 2010 protecting this shame investigation part of continuing the cause of action is sufficient to continue with suit against the MAG for refusing to ensure compliance with the Code preamble, section 5 to 10, section 36 and duty to fairness to the complainant, and section 29 to eliminate discrimination for everyone in his departments at the Commission and the Courts. The Minister of Attorney General has a public legal duty to act to eliminate discrimination in Ontario. This is a deliberate willfully disregard of duty to eliminate discrimination for women in Ontario and that everyone is equal and deserving of an equal human rights process through the commission and courts similar to other successful complainants with similar facts such as exposure to pornography is prima facie complaint made out.
Odhavji
pg 12 para 23: “In each instance, the tort involves deliberate disregard of official duty coupled with knowledge that the misconduct is likely to injure the plaintiff”
para 24: “that a failure to act can amount to misfeasance in a public office, but only in those circumstances in which the public office is under a legal obligation to act”
“If there is a legal duty to act and the decision not to act amounts to an unlawful breach of that legal duty, the omission can amount to misfeasance [in a public office].”
“a public officer who could have discharged his or her public obligations, yet willfully chose to do otherwise”
SCC Botiuk and Hill per my factum arguments para #13:
“The so-called “single publication rule” does not apply to concurrent tortfeasors, who can be defined as persons whose torts concur, or run together, to produce the same damage.”
“three instances: agency, vicarious liability, and concerted action.”
“As set out in Hill, supra, “if one person writes a libel, another repeats it, and a third approves what is written, they all have made the defamatory libel.”
“The Declaration and Report are by their terms inextricably interrelated. By their actions, the appellants become joint tortfeasors. Further, they, as lawyers, signed the Declaration without undertaking any investigation. For Lawyers to act in this way constituted reckless behaviour.”
***Any investigation includes proper investigation which includes plaintiff’s witnesses and including collaborated prima facie facts in reports, and a $1,00 raise at MMP and offering of sufferance pay with notice at Xentel means no incompetency per employment law ignored by Minister of Attorney General through Commission and Judicial Review jurisdictions.
***The dismissed complaints per the case analyses and the Judicial Review/Appeal court documents is concerted action and third person approving what is written that is libel by continuing this wrong to continue without correcting the wrong by the Minister of Attorney General to violate my charter rights and all other intentional torts pleaded. For the Minister of Attorney General, who is a lawyer not just politician, to act this way is reckless knowing that a $1 raise at 3 month probation at MMP and termination with incompetence with offer of sufferance and release form at Xentel means no incompetence, and that the Respondents validated my complaints and discriminatory facts that are at issue in this claim left out of case analyses, Judicial Review/Appeal endorsement records and Justice Lofchik’s rule 21 endorsement record for improper purpose to obstruct 4 prima facie complaints from reaching the Tribunal or Court Trial in 2004 through to 2010, resulting in obstructing to make the complainant whole resulting in compensable damages and other damages
Wilson case on arguments for Malice and Reckless against MAG same as my suit:
pg 15 para 59 “malice would be made out if they were to find that: …the respondents continued the prosecution either for an improper purpose, or in reckless disregard of evidence which would have disclosed the unreliability of the information provided by the [complainant], or out of ill will, spite or for selfish purposes, or because [the complainant] wanted them to do so. (the complainant in this case refers to the witness against Wilson who made the allegations to the Attorney General that Wilson was the accused)
***My allegations are the same as this paragraph reckless disregard of evidence disclosing the unreliability and bad faith information provided by MMP and no evidence for Xentel/Lyman/Watts as no interviews of respondents, witnesses or sexual harassers was made and leaving out of reports all collaborated and validated sexual harassment internal complaints made per case analysis and these facts pleaded sufficiently I infer/conclude is “improper investigation” tactics.
para 60 “Lamer J. Stated , at p. 640 of Nelles, that to succeed in an action for malicious prosecution against the Attorney General or Crown counsel, the plaintiff would have to prove malice “in the form of a deliberate and improper use of the office of the Attorney-General or Crown Attorney, a use inconsistent with the Statute of “minister of justice”. He went on to say that in his view, this amounts to a requirement that the prosecutor “perpetrated a fraud on the process of criminal justice and in doing so has perverted or abused his office and the process of criminal justice.”
pg 16 para 62 “Borins J.A. noted, at paragraph 49, “that the core meaning of malice is the use of the criminal justice system for an improper purpose, the proper use of it being to bring before the Court a person whom the prosecutor has reasonable and probably cause to believe has committed a criminal offence.” He went on to say that: “although the prosecutor may have reasonable and probable cause to commence a prosecution, if the prosecutor obtains information which suggests that the person probably did not commit the offence, or recklessly disregards advice that such information could be obtained through routine investigative steps, the prosecutor lacks reasonable and probable cause to continue the prosecution, and malice may be inferred.
***Like the use of human rights justice system through Commission/tribunals and Judicial Review and Appeal Courts for improper purpose to reward discriminators and punish complainants with obstruction of justice of prima facie complaints made out with improper investigation tactics and Judicial Review and Appeals when the proper use of Human Rights Statutes is to bring to the Commission discriminators who have violated the Code to change them so they eliminate their discriminatory behaviour, attitude, custom, policy, law, etc. This includes the Crown refusing to abide by routine investigation steps and Judicial Reviews per the proper standards in Federal Court Judicial Review cases such as Cashin and Ruckpaul, Lewis and Koller that I found after this sham Rule 21 motion per Court Reports that the Ontario Court of Appeal is refusing to review. Neither the Crown nor Justice Lofchik provided the Court with any authority of case law of a section 36 dismissal and judicial review in Ontario that says the Crown is allowed to provide the sham investigation tactics and Judicial Review that I was given in 2004 and 2006. Gismondi and Way are case authorities for section 34 prior to investigation and don’t cant per Justice Lofchik’s error in law.
para 63 Could recklessness of this sort give rise to an inference that Crown counsel deliberately and improperly used the office of the Crown Attorney, that such use is inconsistent with the statuts of “minister of justice”, and that it amounts to the prosecutor perpetrating a fraud on the process of criminal justice and in doing so, perverting or abusing his or her office and the process of criminal justice? For the purpose of this motion, I will assume it could
** Dawson v. Rexcraft Storage and Warehouse Inc. (1998), 164 D.L.R. (4th) 257 (C.A.) at para. 10 and contour argument para 11
Crown’s factum pg 11 para #28 “absence of a necessary element of the cause of action will constitute a defect” and refers to case of Dawson pg 10 para 10:
“In other cases, however, the statement of claim may be defective because it has failed to allege the necessary elements of a claim that, if properly pleaded, would constitute a reasonable cause of action”
***Properly pleaded means the plaintiff does not have that element verses writing deficiency forgot to include it due to oversight or no law training did not know.
Para #11 contours this argument and aligns with “plain and obvious” test that includes reading generously with allowances for inadequacies due to drafting deficiencies such as the plaintiff had no lawyer or law school training to plead like a lawyer and any missing element of a tort is an oversight and she is allowed to amend per Charter values of access to justice that includes amending all oversights and writing errors: “To illustrate the second situation, suppose, for example, that P sues D for damages for malicious prosecution. To recover for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must establish these elements: institution of criminal proceedings by the defendant without reasonable and probable cause; an improper purpose in instituting the proceedings such as malice, or a primary purpose other than that of carrying the law into effect; termination of the criminal proceedings in favour of the plaintiff; and damages: J. Fleming, The Law of Torts (8th ed., 1992, The Law Book Co. Ltd.) at 610. If P fails to plead favourable termination of the criminal proceedings, D may move to strike out the statement of claim on the ground that P failed to allege a necessary element of the tort. P’s failure to plead favourable termination may simply be an oversight. If so, the court should allow P to amend the statement of claim to add this allegation, and the lawsuit will proceed. See AGF Canadian Equity Fund v. Transamerica Commercial Finance Corp. Canada (193), 14 O.R. (3d) 161 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 172-74 (Gen. Div.)
***If this plaintiff did not have favourable outcome and did not include one in his claims then the element would be missing.
I also have a case against current Minister of Attorney General based on Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record and continuing cause of action to protect wrong doing by Micheal Bryant when he was in office in this position and Commission and staff.
Bald Assertion, Conclusion, Speculation Arguments
Go to Canlii(google) website to read Justice Lofchik’s bias endorsement record where there is no references to any of my pleadings made to substantiate his analyses as in other Rule 21 cases such as SCC case of Hunt v. Carey and Crown’s case of Deep.
Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21
Superior Court of Justice — Ontario
allegations — suable — pleading — complaints — judicial
Bald Allegations, Legal Conclusions, Speculative and Inferences (Crown’s factum pg 2 para #2 h, i, and j, pg 10 para 25, 26 Senechal and 27 Wilson and Oren, pg 12 para 34, pg 18 para 56)
Crown’s factum pg 11 para 31: Appellant based the allegations in her claim various alleged tortious conduct purely on her “own perceptions of events”, when events are facts per HVK of who, what when and where and allowed, and Justice Lofchik’s validates that my suits are the same as my Judicial Review employment events facts per complaints and case analyses but is acting as trier of fact that they are insufficient for 6 intentional torts I pleaded and he validated with “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigations”
The only analysis Justice Lofchik did of facts and is not sufficient per all Rule 21 Striking cases are found in Para #8 and #52 which prove I did plead facts to reach conclusions of 6 intentional torts:
Para #8: The Plaintiff’s allegations are, essentially, that she was sexually harassed and discriminated against on the basis of disability while employed by her former employers and that the Commission and its employees did not properly investigate her complaints and colluded with the other defendants to stifle her complaints. The Plaintiff further alleges the Defendants acted in a coordinated manner to share information about her.”
***Justice Lofchik validates here that I pleaded only intentional conduct as there is no reference to negligence in this paragraph such as found in law cases of Oren, Lacasse, Wilson, Deep, Starline, etc
Para #52: The basis of the claims set out above comes back to the Case Analysis Reports. Because she does not agree with the contents of the Reports and some of the statements in them, the Plaintiff concludes that the investigation conducted on behalf of the Commission were flawed or a sham, and that the investigators colluded with the other Defendants to deny her a hearing before the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal.
Para #53: Apart from the references to the Reports and the contents with which she disagrees, the Plaintiff has failed to plead any material facts….P
Para #8 “that the Commission and its employees did not properly investigate her complaints and colluded with the other Defendants to stifle her complaints”
***The facts are more then the “references to the Reports and the contents” and include comparing these facts with all the facts in 4 prima facie human rights complaints left out of the case analysis sufficient for conclusion of all deliberate conduct and torts.
HVK pg 10 para 32: “a Society and a social worker preparing a Society case are obvious instruments of Government within the meaning of subsection 32(1)”
Events are facts and that I pleaded them “apart from the facts of the employment events”. Therefore I pleaded sufficient facts that differs from the Crown’s perception of these events from “facts of employment events” which are the material issues in dispute to be decided at Trial not a Rule 21 motion and allowed per Estey in SCC Hunt when the defendants deny they acted with such intent per their defence statement they were able to plead in defence and these defendants never asked for particulars per their case of Senechal para #65 and Rule 25.10. My factum #6 pg 7 “question of motive which promted the council to act as it did is a question of fact and is one which should be decided in trial and not Judicial Review Courts deciding on Bad Faith per Intentional Torts law and rules of evidence.”
Also, my own perceptions of events are facts per HVK Para 33 pg 10: “a minimum level of material fact despite the rambling and repetitive nature of the pleadings. What is alleged to have been said, when, where, by whom and to whom it was made is buried in the voluminous lines of the claim.”
Exception to Rule 21 Facts are to be taken as true: that facts not to be accepted as true are only those facts that are speculative on future damages per the following 3 cases that are not similar to my claim per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement “apart from the facts of employment events” (Crown Factum pg 11 para #29):
a) Operations Dismantle of Future cruise missiles no damages till event happens
b) York Advertising v. OHRC case was for injunctions for potential damage in future from disclosing tribunal results against York and judge dismissed per Operations York Pg 9 para 23 (a) There is no evidence of real damage before the court – the damages are purely speculative.
c) Region Plaza Inc. v. Corporation of the Regional Municipality of Hamilton-Wentworth et al. (Municipal law – Action against councilors) Pg 751: “If the plaintiff does not at the outset have knowledge of facts that give rise to the conclusions of malice, breach of duty, conspiracy to injure, or abuse of power, then it is improper to make such bald allegations in the statement of claim. It was not sufficient to simply say that the supporting facts were within the knowledge of the defendants.”
d) Dyce Case para 16 (fishing expedition): “The plaintiff frankly concedes that he has no other information because as he alleges he has been to unable to obtain it”
***Justice Lofchik and the Crown do not provide any case law that pass event facts from employment human right and commission investigation pass events are speculative, and they do not provide in their endorsement record or factum paras in claim of the facts that they alleged are speculative per Operations/York/Region/Dyce therefore their analysis/argument is bald conclusion additional imaging like the Commission’s case analyses.
Deep 2004
para 37: Rule 25.06: (2) “A party may raise any point of law in a pleading, but conclusions of law may be pleaded only if the material facts supporting them are pleaded.” And (8) Where fraud, misrepresentation, breach of trust, malice or intent is alleged, the pleading shall contain full particulars, but knowledge may be alleged as a fact without pleading the circumstances from which it is to be inferred”
para 38: the particulars pleaded must enable a trier of fact to properly infer intentional or malicious conduct
para 46: “A typical instance of this kind of deficiency is the pleading or affidavit that states as a fact what is really a conclusion without a stated factual basis. For example, a party might state simply that the party was defamed by the other party without stating what the other party said that was defamatory. Such a statement fails to assert a fact and accordingly does not enable the other party to identify the factual basis of the case which it is required to meet.”
para #66: “All of these allegations state legal conclusions unsupported by any particulars of the conduct that constitutes bad faith.” (refers to para 65), and para 65: “The plaintiff’s allegations of bad faith are found in paragraph 17 of the statement of Claim (allegation that the College has a long history of dealing unfairly with him), paragraph 30 of the Statement of Claim (allegations that the defendants improperly proceeded with mala fide and reckless disregard of the consequences of its decisions, their conduct was reprehensible and aggravated damages are warranted), paragraph 31 of the Statement of Claim (allegation that the defendants acted in a high handed vindictive manner with callous disregard to the plaintiff and his rights) and paragraph 32 of the Statement of Claim (allegation that the action of the defendants was intentionally directed against the plaintiff and his property warranting punitive damages). Nor is there any affidavit evidence to support a claim of bad faith.
Senechal v. Muskoka (District Municipality) 2003
Pg 9 para 50: A pleading must, at a minimum, disclose sufficient material facts, but not evidence, to enable the opposite party and the Court to ascertain precisely the issues in dispute and to enable the other party to respond to the allegations in its pleadings. It is improper to baldly plead conclusions without any supporting facts.
Pg 10 Para #52 borrows and repeats para 20 from George v. Harris [2000] O.J. No. 1762 (S.C.J.): A pleading that demonstrates a complete absence of material facts will be declared to be frivolous and vexatious.
Para 63 I do note that the Municipality was able to plead to the allegations of the plaintiffs without the need to ask for particulars under Rule 25.10.
***Case Analysis Reports and Human Rights complaints are allowed as facts per the Crown’s Rule 21 motion hearing authority of HVK a case against case worker writing up its case analysis reports and plaintiff was allowed to amend claim and sue per case reports.
Oren Para 11: The plaintiffs claim for abuse of office and malicious conduct. Paragraph 33 of the Statement of Claim alleges, in respect of the defendants Pocock and McKinnon, malice or ulterior or improper motive as set out in that paragraph, i.e. (a) on the part of Pocock, as “payback” against Katz (b) on the part of McKinnon, to support Pocock and cover up her “wrongdoing and (c) on the part of both of them, to divert criticism away from themselves. The problem with this pleading as to motive is that it pleads inferences without pleading any facts that would support the inferences.
George v. Harris para 20:
document that demonstrates a complete absence of material facts will be declared to be frivolous and vexatious
portions of a pleading that are irrelevant, argumentative or inserted for colour, or that constitute bare allegations should be struck out as scandalous
The same applies to a document that contains only argument and includes unfounded and inflammatory attacks on the integrity of a party, and speculative, unsupported allegations of defamation. In such a case the offending statements will be struck out as being scandalous and vexatious
In addition, documents that are replete with conclusions, expressions of opinions, provided no indication whether information is based on personal knowledge or information and belief, and contain many irrelevant matters, will be rejected in their entirety.
Pg 6 Para 26 Crown’s factum:
The words “deliberately avoids disclosing the status of documents the status of documents that were formerly in the Premier’s Office” are objectionable. They contain inflammatory and unsupported attacks on the integrity of Mr. Harris and as such are scandalous. Mr. Klippenstein argues that there are facts before the Court that support this assertion. I disagree. What the plaintiffs have done here is they have examined Mr. Harris’s Affidavit of Documents, interpreted it and then used that interpretation as evidence. The distinction is between stating what the facts are on the one hand and putting in evidence and argument as to inferences on the other hand. The former is permissible and the latter is not. The words quoted will be stuck.
Pg 7 para 33:
Re Paragraph 12: This entire paragraph is inflammatory. It speaks of “evasions and deliberate gaps” as though the Court had already determined such. Not only is this not the case but the so called “facts” that Mr. Klippenstein points to as being supporting of such assertions are not facts at all but are conclusions drawn by the plaintiffs themselves based on their perceptions of the situation. While the plaintiffs may have strongly held beliefs that Mr. Harris has been evasive and has deliberately held back documents such assertions have no place in the grounds section of a Notice of Motion, a location that protects them from cross-examination. These words are struck.
***A Notice of Motion is not the same my claim and there is no protection from cross-examination of the fact of conduct of “deliberately held back documents” by Commission when the Commission has a duty to show me this investigation evidence of “disarray of books” per Cashin and Ruckpaul cases, and refusal is a deliberate breach of natural justice to refuse my right to receive the specifics of the generalized allegation of “disarray of books” for me to make a proper defence and that are defamatory to me
Pg 10 Para #52 borrows and repeats para 20 from George v. Harris [2000] O.J. No. 1762 (S.C.J.)
***Not same as my claim or Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record per Senechal para 53:
“The impugned pleadings against the Municipality are as follows: list pleadings a to l “
Para 54: “The statement of claim contains only the following material facts specific to the Municipality: a and b
Plus paras 53 to 66 with additional analysis of specific paragraphs in plaintiff’s claims with analysis why they are deficient not same as my claim per Justice Lofchik’
Para 63 I do note that the Municipality was able to plead to the allegations of the plaintiffs without the need to ask for particulars under Rule 25.10.
***Crown in my case also was able to plead to the allegations per their motions records book that includes their defence statements and never once request for particulars per rule 25.10 a fact and law ignored by Justice Lofchik to favour the Crown Defendants and additional Institutional bias
Facts also include fact of conduct:
Starline:
Ontario Society for Prevention of Cruelty of Animals v. Ontario Veterinary Assn. (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 183 (H.C.J.), in which Callaghan J. (as he then was) commented: “In this case the question of the motive which prompted the council to act as it did is a question of fact and is one which should be decided at trial.” And “not necessarily rely on the remedies afforded through judicial review of such action”
Wilson:
Held: It was not enough to plead that Barry negligently failed to learn facts that could have fixed him with the knowledge that reasonable and probable grounds did not exist. The claim against the Attorney General failed since it was based on vicarious liability for Barry’s actions.
pg 15 para 59 “malice would be made out if they were to find that: …the respondents continued the prosecution either for an improper purpose, or in reckless disregard of evidence which would have disclosed the unreliability of the information provided by the [complainant], or out of ill will, spite or for selfish purposes, or because [the complainant] wanted them to do so. (Here complainant is the witness who alleged Wilson did the crime)
***Therefore my alleges of “not properly investigate the file” includes facts in case analysis reports and prima facie facts left out of case analysis reports for improper purpose to obstruct human rights justice to reach the conclusion of a sham investigation of recklessly disregarding evidence which discloses the unreliability of the information provided to Commission by all respondents sufficient for all torts pleaded.
Discretion Arguments on top of my appeal factum paras #6 to 8.
Go to Canlii(google) website to read Justice Lofchik’s bias endorsement record where there is no references to any of my pleadings made to substantiate his analyses as in other Rule 21 cases such as SCC case of Hunt v. Carey and Crown’s case of Deep.
Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21
Superior Court of Justice — Ontario
allegations — suable — pleading — complaints — judicial
Discretion – can sue for abuse of Discretion or applying discretion without authority of statute per
Justice Lofchik’s argument pg 17 para #50 from Oren case “anomalous if the individual defendants could be sued in negligence when the Commission itself cannot” and “duty of care” does not exist
which does not say the Commission Body cannot be sued for breach of duty of fairness to provide thorough and neutral investigation to all the prima facie facts per Misfeasance of Public Office and other intentional torts– Longley, Roncarrelli, Uni-Jet, HVK, Odhavji, Wilson, Nelles, Starline, KRP, Botiuk, Hill, Chahal, Clark, Derry, (Crown’s factum argument #2 b, c, d, and k, pg 7 para 20 for only section 34 (Way and Gismondi) and no case law for s. 36, and para 21 “not under duty to proceed with every complaint placed before it, para 22 and 23 JR (Lacasse, York and Oren), pg 8 para 23 Losier’s JR are all bare recital of discretion)
***Crown/Justice Lofchik did not provide any Judicial Review case law of section 36 dismissed prima facie complaints after investigation with discretion of “not under a public duty to proceed with every prima facie complaints after an investigation” to compare to Losier’s case where the case analysis or the court’s endorsement records includes statement by Crown that the complainant had merit per the Code giving Commission discretion to refuse referral of 4 prima facie complaints to Tribunal due to money management of the commission department and this is justified under section 1 of the Charter per Oaks test and demonstrate that the Commission had reasonable basis for concluding that total denial of benefits of making complainant whole is a minimum impairment of her rights and that it has accommodated the appellant’s needs to the point of “undue hardship”. None of my case analyses or Judicial Review endorsement say that but rather fabricates I have insufficient evidence when I have prima facie facts and evidence not investigated or Judicial Reviewed in Ontario per standard in Federal Court’s Judicial Reviews which is evidence that this wrong doing is being directed intentionally by the Minister of Attorney General to save money and/or in my case reprisal for filing small claims court suit 1178/04 against intake staff in spring 2004 before the investigation in fall 2004 and December 2004 case analysis reports.
*Justice Lofchik’s pg 18 para #52 not proper analysis of facts or issues “The basis of the claims set out above comes back to the Case Analysis Reports. Because she does not agree with the contents of the Reports and some of the Statements in them, the Plaintiff concludes that the investigations conducted on behalf of the Commission were flawed or a sham, and that the investigators colluded with the other Defendants to deny her a hearing before the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal.” The facts also includes what was left out of these Case Analysis that the Respondents collaborated and are prima facie made out per the Code grounds particularly MMP’s “long absence/people out to get me/termination because allegations of poison work environment not substantiated”, Lyman’s “refusal of health benefits due to depression/sexual harassment complaints validated left out of case analyses”, and Xentel “sexual harassment complaints validated left out of complaint/retaliatory discharge when gave severance with release letter”. The case analysis reports and human rights complaints are sufficient per Crown’s authority of HVK which was based on a Society case analysis report and the plaintiffs were allowed to sue base on case analysis reports!!!!
Way
Para 6 and 7 s. 34(1) discretion – Commission pursuant s. 34(1)(b) and (d) – Section 34 of the Code permits the Commission to sift through complaints and remove a number of them from the time consuming process of investigation – The Commission is not under a duty to investigate every complaint
***Therefore only allowed to not proceed with complaint for those complaints that are refused to refer to investigation under s. 36 with measures to codify (1) (a to d) so cannot dismissed complaints because of lack of resources but has to be legitimate reasons such as no grounds
Crown’s case of Gismondi paras 23, 24, and 44 agrees with my definition of discretion in my factum paras #6 to #8 that discretion is based on measures to manoevre such as s. 34(1) (a to d) for no grounds, and s. 5 to 10 to prove grounds and prima facie complaints made out, plus that everyone is equal and has a right to no discrimination per Code, Charter and UN Treaty. Gismondi also refers to cases of Slaight (my factum #6 arguments) and Payne, and that breach of fairness is made out when crown’s considerations are undisclosed to complainant (disarray of books and respondents witnesses statements validated per cases of Ruckpaul and Cashin “no opportunity to controvert specific evidence against her”)
Para 23: “However, discretion must still be exercised in a manner that is within a reasonable interpretation of the margin of manoeuvre contemplated by the legislature, in accordance with the principles of the rule of law (Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [959] S.C.R. 121), in line with general principles of administrative law governing the exercise of discretion, and consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Slaight Communications Inc. V. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038).”
***This para in Gismondi case agrees with my authorities in Appeal Factum para #6-8 that there are margins to manoeuvre and my claim is that the Commission intentionally overstep those margins and acted without the authority of the Code and are accountable in civil suit for damages.
Para 24 The fundamental purpose of the Code is to establish a legislative framework “to ensure that all members of our society enjoy the essential right to be free from discrimination on racial and other grounds” : Payne v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (2000), 192 D.L.R.
Para 44 If the Commission were to proceed on a different recommendation or to base its decision on factors or considerations undisclosed to the complainant and the others there would be no opportunity to respond and the right to fairness would be infringed.
Crown’s factum pg 9 para #24 not part of Rule 21 motion hearing or in Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record refers to Dudnik case and code: subsection 30(1) of the Code further provided that no person who is a member of the Commission was required to give testimony in a civil suit or any proceeding as to information obtained in the course of an investigation under this Act. Dudnik v. York Condominium Corp. No. 216, (1990), 12 CHRR D/325 at para. 75, reversed on other grounds (1991), 14 CHRR D/406 (Decision June 20th 1990)
Dudnik v. York Condominium para 75:
In our view, s. 29(1) prohibits the Chief Commissioner and any other Commissioner from being required to give testimony in an inquiry or to produce documents. However, s. 29(2) allows a Commission employee, other than a Commissioner, to be compelled to give testimony or produce documents in any inquiry. Documents produced in response to a subpoena issued to a human rights officer or other employee would be admissible so long as relevance was established by the respondent, and there was no sustainable ground of privilege claimed by the Commission.
***Neither the Code nor this Case state that the Commission and staff being sued per Proceedings Against the Crown Act are not required to give testimony as Defendant, and per Dudnik there are allowances, and privilege is not sustainable if they did their job in Bad faith.
Stare decisis legal doctrine says this 1990 ruling no longer applies because binding authority of new statute created in 1990 the Proceedings Against the Crown Act dated in 1990 s. gives litigants right to sue for intentional wrongdoing per sections 5, 8 and 23 which invalidates the Crown’s authority
Proceedings Against the Crown Act – Liability in tort:
5. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, and despite section 71 of Part VI (Interpretation) of the Legislation Act, 2006, the Crown is subject to all liabilities in tort to which, if it were a person of full age and capacity, it would be subject,
(a) in respect of a tort committed by any of its servants or agents;
(d) under any statute, or under any regulation or by-law made or passed under the authority of any statute, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 5 (1); 2006, c. 21, Sched. F, s. 124.
Where proceedings in tort lie
(2) No proceeding shall be brought against the Crown under clause (1) (a) in respect of an act or omission of a servant or agent of the Crown unless a proceeding in tort in respect of such act or omission may be brought against that servant or agent or the personal representative of the servant or agent. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 5(2).
Discover section 8: In a proceeding against the Crown, the rules of court as to discovery and inspection of documents and examination for discovery apply in the same manner as if the Crown were a corporation,
Conflict: section 23: Where this Act conflicts with any other Act, this Act governs. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 23.
Other argument is that section 30(1) is unconstitutional and violates my rights and counters Justice Lofchik’s argument for absolute immunity at para #61 “If the law were otherwise, it would render immunity meaningless due to the threat of personal liability by a simple plea of malicious intent” per Pispidikis v. Scroggie and Morier v. Rivard SCC 1985 (see arguments in Wilson re: SCC Nelles 1989):
Crown’s case of Wilson includes SCC decision in Nelles 1989 which nullifies per stare decisis Justice Lofchik’s argument here based on SCC 1985 decision in Morier v. Rivard on immunity Pg 4 Para 18 that: “Lamer J., as he then was, speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court in Nelles concluded that these policy considerations, while possessing some merit, did not justify absolute immunity. They had to give way to the right of a private citizen to seek a remedy when a prosecutor acts “maliciously in fraud of his duties”.
Pg 5 para 20 that: “First, absolute immunity for prosecutors cannot be permitted. The existence of absolute immunity would be a threat to the individual rights of citizens who have been wrongly and maliciously prosecuted by agents of the Attorney General. It would be alarming if such wrongdoers, despite being persons from whom we expect the highest standard of conduct in exercising an important public trust, could not be held accountable to their victims.
Unconstitutional and Differential Treatment:
Federal Court Human Rights Jurisdictions does not have same rule 30(1) in their Human Rights Statute and overrules this Ontario Code rule per Human Rights cases of Cashin 1984 and Ruckpaul 2004 which both cases allows for complainants to received Crown’s investigation evidence because it is a human and constitutional right to review documents Commission relies upon to refuse one’s Charter Rights particularly when Crown breaches natural justice and duty to fairness, and the Code book says there is only one provincial and federal human rights legislation which is relevant to the interpretation of one human rights statute. Nowhere is a rule 30(1) mentioned in these 1984 or 2004 cases which are Judicial Review cases requesting investigation documents from the Commission given to the complainant. Therefore the Charter section 52 applies to null and void Ontario’s Code 30(1) and per SCC argument in Nelles’ policy such as OHRC section 30(1) did not justify refusal of investigation documents because they had to give way to the right of a private citizen to seek a remedy when the Commission and staff acts “maliciously in fraud of his duties”.
Abuse of Process to have a civil suit if had judicial review calling it a relitigation argument
Go to Canlii(google) website to read Justice Lofchik’s bias endorsement record where there is no references to any of my pleadings made to substantiate his analyses as in other Rule 21 cases such as SCC case of Hunt v. Carey and Crown’s case of Deep.
Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21
Superior Court of Justice — Ontario
allegations — suable — pleading — complaints — judicial
Justice Lofchik’s errored in his para #45 analysis of Judicial Review based on Lacasse, Oren and York argument as none of these 3 cases say can’t challenge decision in civil suit for damages from intentional torts which agrees with my authorities breached by him of Kulyk, Starline/ Ontario Society for Prevention of Cruelty of Animals) :
York’s injunctions case not a statement of claim case pg 14 para 42 and para 33: the Moving Parties are compelled to challenged them through the process of judicial review, assuming that they are granted status. Para 33: “Section 5 of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act provides that, except as otherwise provided, the Crown is subject to all liabilities in tort to which, if it were a person of full age and capacity, it would be subject in respect of a number of matters. The listed matters do not encompass the type of claim with which we are here concerned.
Lacasse at para # 5: (l) Proceedings to attack the conduct of, or the decisions of the Commission, must be made by way of an Application for Judicial Review (Judicial Review Procedure Act, Courts of Justice Act and the Rules). In any event, the complaints are still pending and no decision has been rendered. Therefore the proceedings against it are premature.
Oren at Para 12: “Paragraph 34 (b) alleges misfeasance and abuse of public office on the part of the defendants by neglecting to carry out their duties. This is a claim of negligence and not of intentional conduct, which is necessary for a claim of misfeasance in public office.
Other cases per my factum para #6: HVK, Kulyk, Starline (Ontario Society for Prevention of Cruelty of Animals) validates can challenge Commission’s decision by civil suit:
Ontario Society for Prevention of Cruelty of Animals v. Ontario Veterinary Assn. (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 183 (H.C.J.), in which Callaghan J. (as he then was) commented: “In this case the question of the motive which prompted the council to act as it did is a question of fact and is one which should be decided at trial.”
“if it sustains damages as a result of such an abuse, to come to a common law court for its remedy and not necessarily rely on the remedies afforded through judicial review of such action.”
HVK: application for judicial review. None of these proceedings involved claims for damages.
Justice Lofchik errored at para #64 pg 22 and para #65 pg 23 as his authorities for abuse of process facts are not the same as mine “facts of employment events/complaints” particularly when Fabian had a trial in the Lang case found in case of Carnegie v. Rasmussen Starr Ruddy, 1994 CanLII 7283 (ON S.C.), does not say it is abuse of process to sue for civil damages after Commission’s decisions were judicial reviewed and appealed from and allowed which includes Crown’s case of Dyce for a Court Order family matter for this appeal. Justice Lofchik relies on 3 cases for abuse of process without providing me copies of each one to defend and only does bald analysis and does not show how the facts of employment events in my pleadings apply per Lang and Toronto City cases. I can only find the following paras from other cases for 2 authorities and nothing for R. v. Wilson (a criminal matter not civil suit):
Lang Michener v. Fabian 1987 CanLII 172 (ON. S.C.), (1987), 59 O.R. (2d) 353, 16 C.P.C. (2d) 93 (H.C.J.). The facts on that case were somewhat similar to the facts in this case. Fabian, an unsuccessful plaintiff in a personal injury action, had commenced an action against the defence experts who had testified at trial. The statement of claim in the action was struck out which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Immediately thereafter Fabian commenced a second action against the same expert and the three solicitors acting for the defendants in the personal injury action. That action was dismissed as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. Fabian unsuccessfully appealed the order dismissing his order dismissing his action to the Supreme Court of Canada. Fabian, as an officer of a corporation, commenced numerous other actions with similar claims all of which have been unsuccessful. The solicitors Lang Michener Lash Johnston brought an motion pursuant to then s. 150(1) of the Courts of Justice Act to prohibit Fabian from bringing any further motions.
McGowan v. Toronto (City), 2010 ONCA 362 (CanLII) para 3: “With respect, this conclusion evinces too narrow an interpretation of the doctrine of abuse of process. Relitigation and abuse of process are not restricted to actions in which a party is seeking to set aside his or her convictions. An action can also be an abuse of process when the party seeks to challenge the correctness of a conviction without seeking to directly set is aside: See Toronto (City) v. Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U. P.E.), Local 79, 2003 SCC 63 (CanLII), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77.
R. v. Wilson, [1983] 2. S.C.R. 595 at 5-8 (no copy given to me and is criminal matter against the Crown not civil suit) –
Para #65 pg 23 Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record for hallmarks of a frivolous and vexatious proceeding and abuse of process refers to Currie v. Halton (Region) Police Services Board 127 A.C.W.S. (3d) 573. (no copy given to me and is also a criminal matter not civil suit and only information I could find is that its currently under review at the SCC). Justice Lofchik at para #68 is ordering “leave to deliver a fresh statement of claim” and he does not show at para #65 how my “facts of employment events” are “complete absence of material facts” for the 6 intentional torts pleaded when injurious falsehoods of gross incompetency MMP/Xentel is sufficient for both claims per argument in Crown’s factum and authority of George v. Harris Pg 5 Para 20: The next step is to consider the meaning of “scandalous”, “frivolous” or “vexatious”. There have been a number of descriptions provided in the multitude of authorities decided under this or similar rules. It is clear that a document that demonstrates a complete absence of material facts will be declared to be frivolous and vexatious.
Dyce Pg 6 para 24: (4) Are these claims a collateral attack on decisions made involving the plaintiff and his wife? It is quite apparent to me that both actions are indeed a collateral attack and ought to be dismissed as an abuse of process under rules 21.01(3)(d) and 25.11(c). Clearly it is an abuse of process to try to litigate issues already determined. A court order which has not been set aside or appealed from may not be attacked collaterally and that is exactly what the plaintiff is attempting to do in these cases.
Negligence and no cause of action for breach of statute and/or natural justice argument.
Go to Canlii(google) website to read Justice Lofchik’s bias endorsement record where there is no references to any of my pleadings made to substantiate his analyses as in other Rule 21 cases such as SCC case of Hunt v. Carey and Crown’s case of Deep.
Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21
Superior Court of Justice — Ontario
allegations — suable — pleading — complaints — judicial
Negligence (Crown’s factum pg 2 para #2 (f) and (g), pg 12 para 35, pg 16/17 para 50 & 51 Oren bare recital of discretionary power) (Crown’s Factum pg 3 para #2 (l), pg 15 para #45 Lewis and #46 Deep “breach may be considered within the context of the general law of negligence”, and Crown’s Factum pg 2 para #2 c and k, pg 19 paras 59 and 60, para 61 Dyce)
Justice Lofchik’s errered in his analysis of negligence law is solely based on Crown’s argument that I pleaded negligence without showing the paragraph in my claim that is same as Oren or Lacasse or the following Crown authorities:
Oren Para 14: “The plaintiffs claim for negligence on the part of the individual defendants. The Commission does not dispute that, for purposes of liability in negligence, a relationship of proximity exists, but it disputes that a duty of care is owed to the plaintiffs. The Commission and the individual defendants are engaged in a quasi-judicial process. To subject them to liability in negligence would be inimical to the proper exercise of their responsibilities without fear of lawsuits from disappointed complainants; Edwards v. Law Society of Uppwer Canada (No. 2) (2000), 48 O.R. (3d) 329 at para 40 (C.A.). It would be anomalous if the individual defendants could be sued in negligence when the Commission itself cannot. The work of the Commission is and remains subject to the discipline of judicial review. These reasons negativing a duty of care are compelling.”
***Not same as mine per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement that I pleaded “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation” and Oren was not suing employer defendants with Crown defendants and the Crown does have a duty to fairness per section 36 of the code to the complainants and a breach is unlawful and suable per Misfeasance of Public Office not Negligence:
OHRC Code book 2005 s. 36
Pg 185 Layzell v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) 2003 – The Commission owes to the Complainant a duty of fairness in its procedures…
Pg 187 Valair v. Canada (Attorney General) 2004 (FC) – Uneven disclosure can constitute a breach of procedural fairness. The Commission must provide to the complainant all the submissions by the respondent, unless the submission adds nothing new. (like the disarray of books only in report dec 2004 and only alleged interviewing MMP’s witnesses 2 undisclosed workers who did not work with plaintiff)
Pg 188/9 – Kollar v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2002 (FCT) – The investigation must be thorough and this will be assessed on the basis of the investigation report. If the Commission makes its decision on the basis of an investigation report which fails to deal with evidence relating to all the alleged breaches of human rights law, the decision of the Commission cannot stand. (MMP’s termination letter prima facie reprisal because my allegations of poison work environment were not substantiated per WSIB report, MMP’s rebuttal disability discrimination “long absence” and “people out to get me”, leaving out all sexual harassment items and internal complaints validated at Xentel and Lyman, Lyman’s prima facie disability discrimination of Ins. Co. denying benefits due to past history of depression)
Pg 189 – Lee v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2002 (FCT) – The record before the Commission must not be flawed. Commission staff must treat the parties in an evenhanded fashion, particularly where one party is unrepresented) (uneven only allegedly interviewed MMP’s witnesses Mrs. Page, Mr. Clark, and 2 undisclosed witnesses who did not work with plaintiff)
Roncarrelli pg 166/67: “In my opinion the intention of the legislature, to be gathered from the whole Act, was to enumerate (i) certain cases in which the granting of a permit is forbidden, and (ii) certain case in which the cancellation of a permit is mandatory, and, in all other cases to commit the decision as to whether a permit should be granted, refused or cancelled to the unfettered discretion of the commission. I conclude that the function of the commission in making that decision is administrative and not judicial or quasi-judicial.”
***This validates my factum argument paras 6 to 8 that legislation of Code expressly laid down rules to guide the commission being ignored as to circumstances under which it may refuse to grant a Tribunal referral and the intention of the Code to be gathered from the whole Act that includes the preamble with its purpose/intent that everyone is equal, section 5 to 10 as to what constitutes prima facie complaints per grounds, and not just Way/Gismondi bare recital of section 34 with no case examples of prima facie complaints made out dismissed per section 36 as per Crown’s factum argument and Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record.
Pg 169 “He must give notice when he will proceed with the matter, and he must act honestly and impartially and not under the dictation of some other person or persons to whom the authority is not given by law. There must be no malversation of any kind.” (including defamation, conspiracy, accepting unreliable and hearsay evidence and ignoring collaborated prima facie facts and evidence)
***Impartially proven when they only interview 2 witness for MMP respondents and none for the complainant and leave out prima facie facts and evidence collaborated from Respondents.
“fraud, collusion or malice…” (list items that are improper purpose for Misfeasance of Public office so defamation is also acceptable)
***Collusion made out per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement para #8 “colluded with the other defendants to stifle her complaints” and para #52 “investigators colluded with the other Defendants to deny her a hearing before the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal”
Pg 191 Ruckpaul v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) 2004 (FC) – If the investigation is flawed to the point where a court can reasonably conclude the evidence reported by the investigator is incomplete or inadequate, the court must intervene.
***Losier’s JR and investigations was flawed because my JR judges refused to weigh evidence when per this FC case they were suppose to weigh evidence and reports, and the evidence per the employment events facts warrants an inquiry” under section 36
Deep pg 12 para #51 “Since there is no nominate tort of statutory breach in Canada, the plaintiff’s mere allegation of a breach of statute is insufficient. Rather, any purported breach of a statute must be considered in the context of a claim of negligence: Canada v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool [1983] 1 S.C.R.
Deep para #60: “The plaintiff at paragraph 29 pleads that the defendants were “negligent in their exercise of statutory powers and breached the duty required of them…” but has failed to plead material facts to support any allegations that the defendants owed him a private law duty of care.”
***I did plead Breach of fairness of an investigation and there is a duty per code section 36: 04 matter paras 10,20, 26, 27 and 05 matter 5, 15, 31, 33, 34, 36, 44, 100, and 113.
Wilson: Held: It was not enough to plead that Barry negligently failed to learn facts that could have fixed him with the knowledge that reasonable and probable grounds did not exist.
Senechal case (Crown Factum pg 18 para 52 not in book): Pg 2 Held: Application allowed in part. The actions were not statute-barred. Most of the allegations of negligence were struck out. The plaintiffs were given leave to amend their statements of claim through the provision of facts that would support their allegations of negligence.
Claims intentional conduct:
***Even my case of Starline points to some paragraph in claim that shows pleading of negligence: Para 71: of the amended statement of claim, the plaintiff’s allege that the Ministry’s representations to Starline regarding the rules of bingo licences were incorrect and negligent.
Odhavji 2003 SCC
Pg 3: “The officers’ alleged failure to cooperate with the SIU investigation and the Chief’s alleged failure to ensure that they did cooperate both constitute unlawful breaches of statutory duties under the Police Services Act. The allegation that the officers’ acts and omissions “represented intentional breaches of their legal duties as police officers” satisfies the requirement that the officers were aware that their conduct was unlawful and that it was intentional and deliberate. The allegation that the Chief deliberately failed to segregate the officers satisfies the requirement that he intentionally breached his legal obligation to ensure compliance with the Police Services Act. However, the same cannot be said of his alleged failures to ensure that the officers produced timely and complete notes, attended interviews, and provided accurate and complete accounts. A mere failure to discharge obligations of an office cannot constitute misfeasance in a public office and the plaintiffs must prove the failures were deliberate.”
Odhavji para 20 Garrett v. Attorney-General , [1997] 2 N.Z.L.R.332, the Court of Appeal for New Zealand considered an allegation that a sergeant failed to investigate properly the plaintiff’s claim that she had been sexually assaulted by a police constable. Blanchard J. concluded, at p. 344, that the tort can be committed “by an official who acts or omits to act in breach of duty knowing about the breach and also knowing harm or loss is thereby likely to be occasioned to the plaintiff.
The failure to discharge obligation of the office in para #37 is per SCC argument on pg 16 para 40: “In the defendant officers’ submission, the essence of the plaintiffs’ claim is that they were deprived of a thorough, competent and credible investigation. And owing to the fact that no individual has a private right to a thorough, competent and credible criminal investigation the plaintiffs have suffered no compensable damages.
***Is not the same in Human Rights Jurisdiction where duty to fairness includes thorough and neutral investigation and there is compensable damages per
Therefore Justice Lofchik’s analysis of negligence law applied to my claims is solely based on my pleadings of breach of statute and based on Crown’s error in law of still applying in 2010 from para #45 from Lewis 1989 case that all “breach may be considered within the context of the general law of negligence” Pg 14 para 31 Saskatchewan Wheat Pool states only that it is insufficient that the defendant has breached the statute. It does not, however, establish that the breach of a statute cannot give rise to liability if the constituent elements of tortious responsibility have been satisfied. Put a different way, the mere fact that the alleged misconduct also constitutes a breach of statute is insufficient to exempt the officer from civil liability. Just as a public officer who breaches a statute might be liable for negligence, so too might a public officer who breaches a statute be liable for misfeasance of a public office. Sasketchewan Wheat Pool would only be relevant to this motion if the appellants had pleaded no more than a failure to discharge a statutory obligation. This, however, is not the case. The principle established in Saskatchewan Wheat Pool has no bearing on the outcome on this appeal.
The Odhavji argument of negligence for discharging office is for criminal jurisdiction not same as in Human Rights jurisdiction with different rules for investigations and what goes in reports. The Commission does have a duty to the complainant of fairness in their investigation that includes what they write in their Case Analysis reports and stare decisis to other complainants when “equality” is the issue per Ruckpaul and Cashin and other cases on what constitutes a proper human rights investigation/judicial review, and there are compensable damages unlike the criminal jurisdictions particularly loss of all wages to make the complainant whole and a breach is the Tort of Misfeasance of Public Office not negligence.
Human Rights Code section 36 pg 185 from Layzell case: The Commission owes to the complainant a duty of fairness in its procedures.”
Ruckpaul Federal JD: “an investigation had to be at least thorough and neutral for the Commission to have a fair basis on which to evaluate” and “its duty is to decide if, under the provisions of the Act, an inquiry is warranted having regard to all the facts.”, “Ms. Huneault made a clear statement concerning one of the grounds upon which the applicant based her discrimination and harassment claims. However, the investigator failed to address this issue any further in his report. This omission might constitute a “fundamental” omission.”and “She failed to interview the applicant nor any of her witnesses. The Commission realized this was a flaw and asked the investigator to interview the applicant’s witnesses.”, and “Furthermore, two supplemental witness statements, dated February 15 and 16, 2001, from CIC’s main witnesses in response to questions put by the investigator to CIC were not disclosed.”.
Starline: “Bad faith is different from negligence because the former involves intent” (04 Matter para #11, 14, 20, and 05 Matter para #16, 23, 25, 33, 44 plus other paras were I plead fabricated insufficient evidence which infers bad faith dishonesty intent)
Deep para #64: “Bad faith is a legal conclusion. It has been held to involve an allegation of an intent to deceive or to make someone believe what is false. It has been said to be equivalent to an allegation of dishonesty.
***Sufficiently pleaded para #20: This alleged fact of gross incompetence alone is evidence of Bad Faith and unfairness of an employer’s dismissal investigation and the commission’s statutory duty, breach of fairness, aggravated an injury to the plaintiff and therefore magnified the award of damages for mental distress, warrants punitive and now exemplary damages.
The Odhavji argument also applies to Justice Lofchik’s para argument #66 Breach of Natural justice not a cause of action does not give rise to liability if the constituent elements of tortous responsibility have been satisfied and he did not provide case law that says breach of natural justice cannot be used as improper purpose for Misfeasance of public office or unlawful conduct for Conspiracy Tort.
Deep para 50 “The plaintiff asserts a claim for breach of natural justice. Breach of natural justice is not a cause of action known in law. So it is plain and obvious that the statement of claim does not disclose a reasonable cause of action”
My claims not same as Oren or Lacasse argument
Go to Canlii(google) website to read Justice Lofchik’s bias endorsement record where there is no references to any of my pleadings made to substantiate his analyses as in other Rule 21 cases such as SCC case of Hunt v. Carey and Crown’s case of Deep.
Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21
Superior Court of Justice — Ontario
allegations — suable — pleading — complaints — judicial
Justice Lofchik’s validates I pleaded facts per employment events and case analyses per his paras #8, #46, #52-54 and #60 and does not show per my specific pleadings like other Rule 21 cases where I am deficient therefore these facts are sufficient to reach the conclusion of 6 intentional torts not just 4 in endorsement. Justice Lofchik cannot refuse access to justice because these facts and bad faith were judicial reviewed based on due deference with no cross examination per rules of civil trial, and not weighing the evidence and all the facts per Federal Court Judicial Review cases when these Case Analyses resulted in damages. The case analysis Reports are sufficient in themselves per HVK, SCC Hill and Botiuk defamation cases and are defamatory pleaded sufficiently and are discrediting the plaintiff, and SCC of Odhavji and Longley for Misfeasance of Public Office that includes Bad Faith requirement per this tort. Judicial Review Courts cannot be trier of fact for Bad Faith for civil torts which requires a trial and different rules of evidence such as cross examination that are not part of a Judicial Review.
Justice Lofchik’s endorsement Para #8: The Plaintiff’s allegations are, essentially, that she was sexually harassed and discriminated against on the basis of disability while employed by her former employers and that the Commission and its employees did not properly investigate her complaints and colluded with the other defendants to stifle her complaints. The Plaintiff further alleges the Defendants acted in a coordinated manner to share information about her.”
HVK pg 9 para 30: “In light of this statutory provision, it is open to a court to find that an officer or employee of the Society, who acted in bad faith in the execution of the person’s duty, is responsible for those actions and will not be protected by the corporate veil of the Society. In the case before me, allegations are made that the members of the Board of Directors met, planned and conspired with the Society to act against the plaintiffs, did not provide an independent review of the Director’s actions at the hearing in February, 2000, colluded with each other and acted throughout the legal processes in a manner that demonstrated bad faith. While such allegations may be difficult to prove, that does not mean that the pleadings should be struck at this stage as it is possible that the plaintiffs will be able to demonstrate bad faith on the part of the directors and that they are not protected by the statutory provision as officers of the Society.”
Para #46: The plaintiff has in fact applied for judicial review of the Commission’s decisions in respect of the Human Rights complaints that form the subject matter of these actions.
Para #52: The basis of the claims set out above comes back to the Case Analysis Reports. Because she does not agree with the contents of the Reports and some of the statements in them, the Plaintiff concludes that the investigation conducted on behalf of the Commission were flawed or a sham, and that the investigators colluded with the other Defendants to deny her a hearing before the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal.
***Justice Lofchik’s leaves our of endorsement record all the prima facie facts left out of case analysis that proves all of my conclusions and intentional torts such as MMP’s termination letter with no cause of incompetency. Justice Lofchik acting as trier of fact instead of a Rule 21 motion’s judge making the decision that the Commission staff acted in good faith in the contents of the Reports, when internal government reports pleaded were allowed per HVK pg 10 para 32 and the following case: The application of the Charter to the actions of a Children’s Aid Society has been considered by our courts in the case of Children’s Aid Society of the City of London and the County of Middlesex v. T.H., [1992] O.J. No. 3050 where Vogelsang J. held that the Charter applies and that, “a Society and a social worker preparing a Society case are obvious instruments of government within the meaning of subsection 32(1)”.
Para #53: Apart from the references to the Reports and the contents with which she disagrees, the Plaintiff has failed to plead any material facts that are not based on assumptions, suspicions, speculation, and her own conclusions regarding the conduct of the Commission or its employees. Many of the Plaintiff’s allegations are set out as her own “inferences”.
***Justice Lofchik fails to substantiate which paragraphs in claims are pleadings of assumptions, suspicions and speculation like all other rule 21 cases such as Operations and Regional, and this is cooking the judicial books/imaging the truth. Facts are more than the reports and the contents I disagree with are all the facts in my 4 Prima Facie complaint left out of the Reports that the Employer Defendants validated such as MMP’s “long absence” and “people out to get me”, Xentel’s offer of severance pay with release form and internal complaints, and Lyman’s many internal complaints and refusal for benefits because I disclosed past history of depression, plus not interviewing my witnesses and the sexual harassers.
Para #54: The claims boil down to an assertion that the Defendants performed their duties in such a way as to undermine the Plaintiff’s claims of sexual harassment and discrimination on the part of the other Defendants, and that they acted deliberately for this purpose. The Plaintiff’s complaint is essentially about the quality of the investigation of her complaints and the manner in which the employees of the Commission did their jobs. This is essentially a claim in negligence for which the employees are not suable.
***This paragraphs states the conclusion as “assertion” and also includes the facts to based that assertion of of sexual harassment and discriminating events not investigated sufficient for all torts pleaded. Justice Lofchik imaging like the case analysis because he makes no references to specific paragraphs in claims because they were pleaded sufficient with the facts being the incidents in complaints and reports that asserts the Crown acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation.
Para #60 The plaintiff has failed to plead facts which support a claim of bad faith, abuse of power or malice toward her. Referring to the passages of a Case Analysis Report with which she disagrees just does not do it. This is so particularly when the Divisional Court in her judicial review application found that “there was an abundance of evidence to support the findings upon which the discretion of the Commission was exercised”. And that, “the Applicant has failed to establish that the decisions are arbitrary, capacious or made in bad faith”.
***My allegations in the Rule 21 8 day motion hearing was that the Minister of Attorney General continued the cause of action with the Judicial Review Courts and I have a Charter Rights to amend my claim which includes improper judicial review by refusing to weigh all the evidence per standard in Ruckpaul case. What I received is per Crown’s factum pg 8 para #23 another imaged process because it does not matter about the truth only that we provide her with a process so when she says we disadvantage her we say we gave her the process:
We do not inent to analyze all the evidence, not the specific details of each complaint and each Case Analysis Report. However, certain general observations are necessary. Ms. Losier correctly contends that it was not necessary for her to establish an entire pattern of facts, because even one “incident” can sometimes justify a finding of workplace harassment or reprisal. She points to numerous particulars that she says the Commission did not try to verify, a belief stemming from the fact there is no reference to them in the Case Analysis Reports or the reasons for the decisions. She asserts that the Commission did not address conflicting evidence or explain why her evidence was rejected or ignored, or why other evidence was preferred. Ms. Losier also contends that the Commission resorted to second hand information (hearsay evidence) rather than first hand evidence, when first hand evidence was available. It is worth repeating that the Commission is not sitting as a tribunal; it is acting in an investigative and administrative screening capacity.
***Ruckpaul Judicial Review contradicts the analysis of the law for judicial review in this paragraph.
We are not prepared to assume that the failure to mention every allegation, or the detailed particulars of Ms. Losier’s evidence, leads to the conclusion the Commission failed to consider those allegations or that evidence. It is very clear that the Commission assessed the credibility of Ms. Losier’s allegations and evidence, and found it wanting. The court cannot second guess the Commission’s assessment of credibility or wade into the evidence and reach opposite conclusions without first determining that the Commission’s findings were irrational.
***If they did not analyze all the evidence or specific details of each complaint that they cant say that my credibility is wanting and this here is also defamation of my character.
In our view, the decisions are not irrational. There is an abundance of evidence to support the findings upon which the discretion of the Commission was exercised. The applicant has failed to establish that the decisions are arbitrary, capricious or made in bad faith. Each application is therefore dismissed”
***If they refused to analyze all the evidence than they have provided a one sided bias Judicial Review solely based on case analysis and no analysis done per Ruckpaul’s Judicial Review which is also differential treatment and prove of discrimination by Minister of Attorney General and Queenspark.
Ruckpaul v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 149 (CanLII),
analysis pgs 7 to 11 particularly paras 42, 45-50, 52-58, 62-71 and 75, is a proper judicial
review not what I received in Ontario to protect the abuse from the Minister of Attorney
General, Commission and investigation staff:
“its duty is to decide if, under the provisions of the Act, an inquiry is warranted having regard to all the facts.”
“an investigation had to be at least thorough and neutral for the Commission to have a fair basis on which to evaluate”
“that where the completeness of the investigation or report is challenged, the
underlying investigation documents are relevant and subject to production”
“If the investigation is flawed to the point where a court can reasonably conclude
the evidence reported by the investigator is incomplete or inadequate, the court
must intervene.”
“She failed to interview the applicant nor any of her witnesses. The Commission
realized this was a flaw and asked the investigator to interview the applicant’s
witnesses.”
***Same as my complaints – no witnesses.
“Furthermore, two supplemental witness statements, dated February 15 and 16,
2001, from CIC’s main witnesses in response to questions put by the investigator to
CIC were not disclosed.”
***Same as my complaint Mrs. Page, Mr. Clark and 2 witnesses statements were not disclosed.
“Ms. Huneault made a clear statement concerning one of the grounds upon which
the applicant based her discrimination and harassment claims. However, the
investigator failed to address this issue any further in his report. This omission
might constitute a “fundamental” omission.”
***Same as my complaints such as per my Judicial Review argument that “even one incident can justify” violation such as MMP’s 3 prima facie incidents not one of “exposure to porn joke” and “long absence” for disability discrimination and termination letter with cause because my WSIB was denied and your poison work environment allegations were not substantiated we are terminating your employment with no allegations of incompetence per case analysis nor in Judicial Review endorsement record plus others items.
Kollar v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2002 FCT 848 (CanLII) also validates my claims of improper investigation and judicial review:
The Standard for Judicial Review in Kollar in Federal Courts in 2002 shows I received improper investigation in 2004 and improper judicial review in 2006 in Ontario and that the Crown defendants all knew in 2004/2006 what constitutes a proper investigation and Judicial Review.
Pg 7 para 34: “breach of the principles of natural justice or other procedural unfairness or unless the decision is not supportable on the evidence before the Commission”
Pg 9 para 38: Did the Commission commit a reviewable error of fact and law by ignoring witness evidence indicating that the sexual harassment had occurred?
***This paragraph then states the incident and who was interviewed whereas my Judicial Review analysis does no such analysis to each and every allegation of same reviewable error of fact and law!!!
Pg 9 para 39: The investigation report in this case seems to have focused not on the above information, but on the applicant’s work record when she was employed initially with CIBC then CIBC Securities Inc. and then again with CIBC. It is appropriate to discuss the applicant’s work record but the investigation report should also deal with the evidence of alleged sexual harassment. The investigation report does not deal with this evidence. Was the evidence not accepted? I cannot tell from the report or the record. In my opinion, the investigation report did not deal with this evidence and consequently, the investigation report did not deal with the apllicant’s first part of her complaint which was that the respondent failed to supply her with an harassment free work place. This aspect of the complaint should have been dealt with in the investigation report. In my opinion, the investigation was, in this respect, deficient as it lacked thoroughness.
***My complaints and case against the Crown in a nutshell that the investigating officer had to put what they investigated in the report and per what they did put in their report is not thorough nor neutral and also proves abuse by the Judicial Review Courts in Ontario and Justice Lofchik’s agreement with my Judicial Review per Crown’s para#23!
Para #40: The Commission need not accept the recommendations of the investigator but if it does and the investigation is found to be deficient because of lack of thoroughness, then the decision of the Commission is also deficient and cannot stand. I am of the opinion that the decision of the Commission is in error as it does not deal with the applicant’s first ground of complaint, that is that the employer did not provide her with an harassment free work place. For the above reason, I would quash the decision of the Commission and order that a new investigation be completed.
Para #42: I might add, however, that it appears from the record that only the respondent’s response to the complaint dated October 5, 1999 was cross-disclosed to the applicant. The response of November 10, 1999 does not appear to have been disclosed to the applicant. I am of the view that since it was accepted by the Commission, it should have been cross-disclosed to the applicant.
***Same as my case the investigation interview of Mrs. Page, Mr. Clarke and 2 witnesses unknown to complainant and specific evidence of incompetence such as disarray of books was not disclosed
Suits are allowed after a judicial review for bad faith conduct resulting in damages per SCC Longley and Roncarelli cases based on civil court rules of evidence not Judicial Review rules of evidence solely on due deference and not weighing evidence providing another sham Crown process per Kollar’s Judicial Review which is continuing cause of action by Minister of Attorney General. HVK pg 2 held: The plaintiff’s claim was not a re-litigation of the previous prodeedings, as they did not involve any claim for damages. It was possible that the court could find that the decisions of the directors and employees was motivated by bad faith and not protected by any limitation of liability.
***Justice Lofchik acting as trier of fact again and his argument not based on law per Crown’s case of Wilson references to Reports and also what was left out of reports is sufficient for abuse of power, bad faith, and malice at pg 15 para 59 “malice would be made out if they were to find that: …the respondents continued the prosecution either for an improper purpose, or in reckless disregard of evidence which would have disclosed the unreliability of the information provided by the [complainant], or out of ill will, spite or for selfish purposes, or because [the complainant] wanted them to do so. (in my claim the complainant is the respondent wanted them to do so )
***reckless disregard of facts and evidence proving unreliability from employment events: 1) of MMP and Xentel’s evidence of incompetency is a termination letter from MMP 5 month after off on sick leave for depression with no allegations of incompetency plus $1.00 raise at 3 month probation and no sign warning letter at probation or during MMP employment, and for Xentel a termination letter with severance/notice and release form for notice and Xentel settled claim in 2007, and 2) no witnesses of the complainant’s interviewed at all and no sexual harassers interviewed at all for Lyman and Xentel complaints and only Ms. Page for her breast comment incident interviewed, and 3) no witnesses at all interviewed to prove or disprove Watts retaliation/delusional profiling campaign of contacting next employer and passing information in complaints
***There was no interview of my witness Karen Tarpos who was the one not Mrs. Page to train me on new duties and not retrain on old duties that I was alleged incompetent on and is fundamental omission proving conspiracy to injure me with damages of refusal to refer to tribunal, injure me with personal injury of delusional/depression disorder and to discredit me
Para #4: The Plaintiff also claims damages for negligence, “misfeasance”, injurious falsehood, emotional distress and defamation against the Minister of the Attorney General, the Ontario Human Rights Commission (the “Commission”) and two it then employees, Dina Waik and Shannon Meadows-Lee.
(only 3 intentional torts out of 6 and did not plead negligence per Crown’s and Justice Lofchik’s authorities)
Intentional Torts pleaded sufficiently per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record that I pleaded “they acted deliberately with quality of the investigation” with facts being employment events per his comment “apart from the facts of employment events the facts are insufficient” and that these claims are same as judicial review, and the Crown agrees per their factum pg 11 para #31 “alleged intentional conduct” and the Crown were able to plead in response when they filed their defence statement and never once request order for particulars/facts per their case of Senecchal, therefore these employment event facts in my human rights complaints are sufficient to base conclusion of all deliberate causes of actions of how the Crown abused their jobs. Justice Lofchik error at para #60 that my facts are merely “referring to the passages of a Case analysis Report with which she disagrees just does not do it” when I compare the case analyses facts with the prima facie facts in my complaints from employment events validated by Respondences, plus include adjudicated facts similar to mine from other successful human rights complaints, and facts showing not thorough investigation when Crown did not interview sexual harassers and my witnesses when they were required to per duty of fairness per standard in Federal Court cases of Judicial Review of Cashin, Ruckpaul, and Kollar in 2002. Justice Lofchik does no analyses to show in pleadings that the “employment event facts” are deficient for cause of actions pleaded per all Rule 21 cases and he cannot dismiss these facts because they were part of a judicial review when the law allows suits for damages after Judicial Reviews/Appeals exhausted for how the Crown abused their jobs “quality of investigation” so that he can wrongly claim my pleadings are bald and speculative. My two claims are not the same as all of the Crown’s cases per their arguments of hand selecting bare recitals of the law, such as Oren and Lacasse, refusing to show in writing specifics in my pleadings where I am deficient same as their authorities and other paragraphs in these cases invalidates their argument, therefore Justice Lofchik erred and did no independent review of these cases when he based his analyses strictly on Crown’s bare arguments for: Oren, Lacasse, Region, Operations Dismantle, Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, Deep, George, etc. Justice Lofchik validates that there are writing deficiencies per para #30 and order to amend claims for joint tortfeasors of employer defendants that includes oversights of torts elements due to no law training or lawyer and allowed to amend claim which is all that is required per Rule 21 to continue suit against the Crown. This includes a claim against the Minister as a claim against him personally per Justice Lofchik at para #42 per Deep para #83, KRP, Wilson/Nelles, Roncarrelli, Longley, Uni-Jet, and Odhavji for deliberately and improperly use of his office in 2004-2006 for uses inconsistent with the status of “minister of justice” per MAG Act, Code, Charter, and UN Treaty, and that this acquiescence was a violation of s. 5(b) of the MAG Act resulting in numerous damages including depriving me the benefits of my employment contracts. This includes concerted action not vicarious liability of improperly authorizing and condoning defamation of a member of the public and promoting improper investigation tactics and judicial reviews with intentional recklessness disregard of the truth and acting without the authority of the Code/Charter ignoring purpose of public policy to eliminate discrimination for everyone in Ontario is equal. The “discoverability rule” applies to the additional wrong doing after date of claim of continuing cause of action through Judicial Review/Appeal with additional improper administration of statute that is contrary to Charter values per example of proper administration of human rights statute in Federal Court 2004 case of Ruckpaul and 2002 case of Kollar, and other human rights cases similar to mine.
Justice Lofchik does not show in my pleadings which para is per his para #49 “allegedly negligently carrying out the duties of their positions or failure to carry out the duties of their positions” like Crown’s authorities does and based his analysis solely on the Crown’s factum para #35 rephrasing Oren’s para #11 “cover-up” of wrongdoing were found to be insufficient for the purposes of establishing motive and the factual basis of a claim for abuse of office involving Commission employees – which is distorting what the judge really said of: “(a) on the part of Pocock, as “payback” against Katz (b) on the part of McKinnon, to support Pocock and cover up her “wrongdoing and (c) on the part of both of them, to divert criticism away from themselves. The problem with this pleading as to motive is that it pleads inferences without pleading any facts that would support the inferences.” This is not same as mine when Justice Lofchik includes that the “Defendants undermine the plaintiff’s sexual harassment and discrimination on the part of the other defendants” which includes the facts of discrimination unlike this para from Oren. Oren was dismissed per reasoning in para #12 of: “(b) alleges misfeasance and abuse of public office on the part of the defendants by neglecting to carry out their duties. This is a claim of negligence and not of intentional conduct, which is necessary for a claim of misfeasance in public office”. Also not same as mine per Justice Lofchik’s para #54 “the plaintiff’s complaint is essentially about the quality of the investigation of her complaints and the manner in which the employees of the Commission did their jobs” which does not show any para in my claim of pleading “neglecting to carry out their duties” when he validates I pleaded “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation” in his para #8 and #52 with flawed/sham investigation which is all that is required per Oren para #12 for claim of misfeasance in public office. Lacasse is not a claim or rule 21 motion case but an application and her complaints were still open at the Commission Pg 5(l) and dismissed per the following: in any event, the complaints are still pending and no decision has been rendered. Therefore the proceedings against it are premature”, Para 3 and general damages against the Commission for failing in “there (sic, their) fiduciary duty and denying me the benefit and protection of law”, and per Pg 3 to 6, Para 5, “(b) The claims pursued in this proceeding by the Applicant cannot be the subject matter of an Application. The claims made in this Application are not claims that are authorized by either a statute or by the rules of court.” The judge here did not say that a civil proceeding not allowed for “failure to review file” but that it was premature at this stage since the files were still pending.
***My pleadings are not for “failing in there ficuciary duty” but for breach of duty of fairness that the Commission owes to all complainants (04 matter para #20) per the Code section 36 which is not negligence but misfeasance of public office
Neither of these two cases for allegations only of tort of negligence/misfeasance of public office “neglecting to carry out duties” or “failure to review files” are same as mine claim with 6 intentional torts including defamation with injurious falsehoods of gross incompetence with deliberate actions of fabricating
insufficient evidence and distort/slant the facts towards the respondence, controlling witnesses by not interviewing any for complainant including all sexual harassers, and leaving out prima facie collaborated facts from Respondences proving violation of the Code per Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision “that the law is clear that the prohibitive ground of discrimination need not be the only reason for the action taken, so long as it forms one of the reasons” such as #04 claim MMP’s “long absence” and #05 claim Lyman’s refused benefits because I disclosed episode of depression. My complaints are not pending at the Commission and were dismissed resulting in damages that are ongoing therefore civil suit not premature and there are facts per “employment events” in claim 04 Matter para #13 material facts from #2 to #134 and claim 05 Matter material facts listed at paras: #8, #10, #15, #19, #20, #21, #26, #27, #28, #29, #42, and #46-105 (with other similar para pleadings) sufficient conclusion of 6 intentional torts for “they acted deliberately.
14. I plead that Watts committed the tort of conspiracy to injure me with a mental illness through these employers with persecution type is due to me being a complainer and effective whistleblower and that the “mental health” trap is a popular employer weapon of discrediting routine against whistleblowers. There is a history of cases of whistleblowers being defamed with mental illnesses after they blow the whistle or complain. I refer to the article “Giving Workers the Treatment – If you raise a stink, you go to a shrink!” by Peter Downs: “Donald Soeken, a former U.S. Public Health Service psychiatric social worker who used to be in charge of giving fitness-for-duty exams, says the psychiatric exams almost always are shams. “The doctor will go into all the areas that could discredit a person,” Soeken says. “He’ll ask early life questions, late life questions, sexual questions, whatever he wants to ask, and then write it up and give it to the boss or law firm. Any doctor worth his salt will find something wrong, or even make up something, and if you don’t answer one of his questions, then you are uncooperative and you can be fired for that, too. What they are trying to do is put a person out on a psychiatric disability. If they succeed, you would never work again in your lifetime.” I infer these psychiatric exams almost always are shams are similar to what I received from the investigation staff of a sham investigation to image insufficient evidence and to slant the case analyses towards a mental illness of delusions for the sole purpose to discredit the complainant and shows a bias towards the discriminating employers. This is an authoritarian work abuse system with a known practice that employers’ use the “mental health” traps to get rid of and to discredit employees particularly those who complain. My evidence demonstrates this discreditation of mental illness routine where two managers, one from MMP and one from Xentel, two employers in a row use a bantering of a delusional disorder of “people out to get me” fears in writing to hand to authorities being the OHRC.
This article goes on to give an example of another female employee similar to my situation of making sexual harassment complaints and the employer attempting to discredit her with mental illness: “Maria Buffa, a former salaried employee in the personal department at Ford World Headquarters in Dearborn, Michigan, said she, too, was sent to a psychiatrist after she filed a sexual harassment complaint in February 1999 against a woman co-worker. “You think, maybe I am the problem, else why would they be sending me to a psychiatrist,” she said. The psychiatrist Ford selected, Dr. Edward Dorsey of Midwest Health Center, made a report that said the only psychiatric symptom Buffa displayed was anxiety. Dorsey’s report said that the referral came from Ford’s medical department and was at least in part due to her complaints of sexual harassment. He also noted that the Ford doctor who referred Buffa cited a couple of “incidents”: She was seen yelling at someone, and she had shown up at a fitness center “wearing less than the usual amount of clothing for that physical activity.” I too am a female whistleblower of sexual harassment, and also of discrimination and I have been misdiagnosed with a delusional disorder after my American own Employer, Watts, with American culture values of “you complain you go to a shrink” manufactured thoughts of stalking via anti-social behaviours that I documented while employed at Watts and later continued this campaign through my employment that includes 4 employers in a row after I blow the whistle on their unlawful actions in 2000 repeating items in that complaint.
There was one incident that highlights this tactic while I was employed at Watts where a female temp came to me to ask who in the Accounts Receivable department was going on sick leave and that management advised her that someone was. I advised her that no one was going on sick leave. There was one incident at Lyman in 2004 where Cindy advised me that she caught two female coworkers of hers sending emails around to each other about how they can make Cindy crazy today. Therefore my thoughts that repeating of items in Watts’ 2000 Human Rights complaint to create coincidences to image me paranoid is to manufacture persecution thoughts back to Watts to discredit my whistleblowing behaviour. The law needs to advance to stop this form of harassment to discredit whistleblowers with mental illnesses and make those anti-social personalities accountable instead of rewarding them for this behaviour. I feel I have a society duty to bring all of my complaints against these employers in the legal arena for playing this sport on me, an effective whistleblower, in hopes of deterring more employers from playing this sport on whistleblowers in the future.
15. I plead that in the alternative that this Watts Industries campaign is also to image me a “vexatious
litigant” because I make complaints that I am allowed to do by law, by Charter, and my material facts and evidence will demonstrate this pattern of labeling my complaints vexatious. Watts Industries attempted to dismiss my 2000 complaint under section 34 and label my 2000 complaint as being vexatious, frivolous, and made in bad faith. They did not succeed and have retaliated ever since with each new employer attempting as well to dismiss my Human Rights Complaint under section 34 for being vexatious, frivolous and made in bad faith, all refusing to tell the truth and all failing at a section 34 dismissal request. I would also infer that it is also a poor attempt to relitigate vexatious claim from items that I complained about in my 2000 Watts complaint through convincing next employers to repeat same items with variations and again label my complaints vexatious. This vexatious claim includes exposure to sexual picture at each employer which proves I do not make vexatious complaints and have a right to work in an environment with no sexual pictures.
In 2004, MMP Limited attempted to dismiss my civil suit against them for being abuse of process and was denied that motion. Lyman Custom Brokers attempted a similar motion in May 2004 for no cause of action, frivolous, vexatious, abuse of process, and attempted to label me a “vexatious litigant”. Deputy Judge R. Nairn dismissed their motion in September 2004. He made one small error in fact of law. I did file 4 separate suits in Small Claims that arise out of the same set of facts that should be joined into one suit either in Small Claims Court or Superior Court of Justice, like the decision by judge in Burlington Small Claims Court for MMP suits. I refer to Rules of The Small Claims Court of 6.02: a cause of action shall not be divided into two or more actions for the purpose of bringing it within the court’s jurisdiction. I did not intentionally file separate suits to bring it within the court’s jurisdiction or for double recovery; I filed these separate suits out of lack of legal knowledge at that time regarding actions arising out of same set of facts. I was denied that opportunity to join these suits into one by the judge at the Pre-Trial for the Wrongful Dismissal Suit against Lyman when I requested a discontinuance so I can resubmit correctly. Later in September I received Deputy Judge R. Nairn’s request for Lyman to file their defenses. Also, there is another error in law found in the law of tort of conspiracy does not permit an action against an individual defendant who has caused injury to the plaintiff, the law of torts does recognize a claim against them in combination as the tort of conspiracy if: 1) whether the means used by the defendants are lawful or unlawful, the predominant purpose of the defendants’ conduct is to cause injury to the plaintiff; or, 2) where the conduct of the defendants is unlawful, the conduct is directed towards the plaintiff (alone or together with others), and the defendants should know in the circumstances that injury to the plaintiff is likely to and does result. Lyman’s lawyer brought this fact in law up in this motion and therefore the correct decision would have been to allow me to amend my statement of claims into one suit. I will be submitting an order to transfer these suits and join to this one under the Courts of Justice Act section 110.
Since the Human Rights section 34 arguments for these employers failed to dismiss my complaints, Watts then enlist the aid of the commission investigation staff to provide me with a sham investigation and to fabricate insufficient evidence to not refer my prima facie complaints to the Tribunal under section 36 (2). My reconsideration application arguing this fact that I received a sham investigation to image to authorities that I received a proper investigation and that I do not have sufficient evidence of discrimination resulted in the Chief Commissioner’s decision to reconsider under section 37 (2) of the code around February 24th 2005 for the complaints against the following employers: Watts, MMP Limited, Xentel and Lyman. That was in February 24th and its now May 18th and I have not received response to my application which leads me to believe a breach of duty of fairness again from the commission that the respondents are receiving more than the 15 day limit to respond to a section 37 (2).
Furthermore, in 2005 I filed complaints against the 5th employer Kinros owned by Laurentide Manufacturing and sister company Laurentide Custom Woodworking, and reprisals against Watts, MMP Limited, Xentel, and Lyman. This time the commissioner attempted to not deal with all of these complaints except the Kinros complaint under section 34 for alleging my complaints being vexatious where previously the commission staff never attempted a section 34 with any of my other complaints. I infer this is a symptom of defamation that these employers have convinced the commission to treat me with additional contempt. I again submitted arguments that the commission has no grounds for a section 34 for being vexatious and the Chief Commissioner quickly sent me back his decision in favour of my arguments and forward all of these complaints to the respondents under section 37 (2) around the first week in April 2005.
Now I have an order to set aside a stay of proceedings for my Small Claims Suit against Commission staff to move forward on defendants’ motions to dismiss this suit and these defendants now opposing the setting aside of stay because they do not want to go forward on their motions after receiving my arguments in my factum why the motions should be dismissed with cost. One of these motions is from Susan Koehler at Lyman to dismiss her part in this suit which is similar to the same motion she filed in May 2004 that was dismissed and may qualify for an issue estoppel matter of trying to relitigate same issue.
What this demonstrates is that I am extremely credible and that there is an Authoritarian Work Abuse System through these employers and the commission to image that I am not credible or mentally ill via tort of deceit, conspiracy to injure, defamation of my character, and Misfeasance of Public Office. As a result of this defamation that there is a campaign to harass me to get me to complain about everyone to image that I am delusional with a persecution disorder and if that does not work than to label me and my complaints vexatious or fabricate insufficient evidence.
16. I plead that Watts Industries, Xentel DM Incorporated, Lyman Custom Brokers, and the companies from Laurentide Manufacturing intentionally made misleading statements to the staff at the Ontario Human Rights commission which is additional tort of deceit to avoid accountability of wrongdoing. Therefore, this suit is for additional tort of deceit that defames my character with the Ontario Human Rights Commission by these employers. For Watts for interference at Xentel and Lyman and Laurentide companies. For MMP, Xentel and Lyman to join in on the interference with my employment relations at the Laurentide companies. Also for Xentel and Lyman for tort of deceit by making false statements to mislead the commission that there is insufficient evidence of discrimination and harassment.
These misleading statements, the tort of deceit, resulted in injury of another wrong that of the investigation staff fabricating insufficient evidence in their December 2004 fabricated case analyses for these employers, slanting the analysis to put the discriminating employers in better light than the material facts and the complainant in poor light by concealing her material facts and evidence, and by controlling witnesses who would provide adverse outcome. Some of the material facts not included in the Xentel case analysis are: I was subjugated with sexual picture on first night an automatic breach of code 5 and 7, I was provided with poisoned work environment, providing me with a poisoned work environment may substantiate poor performance therefore dismissing allegation of incompetence of low sales, John Docherty condoning my alleged poor performance from January to August 18th and only after I called the commission on July 14th 2003 for the forms providing me with warning notice with no prior verbal warning, and lastly John Docherty’s bantering of a persecution disability of “people on the floor not out to get you.”
Some of the material facts not included in the Lyman case analysis are: I was subjugated with sexual picture an automatic breach of code 5 and 7, I was provided with a poisoned work environment with a serious of sexual vexatious comments, I received no internal due process for my complaints after July 16th meeting that includes my supervisor drawing me into sex talk in back office, bookkeeper asking me to look at the hole in her crotch and talk about it, my supervisor continuing to harass me with touching his belt after I made formal complaint, I submitted email evidence of an attempt to charge me with unsuitable employee conduct with management’s refusal to provide substantial and quantifiable evidence of this unsuitable conduct, that this fabricated discipline meeting in November constitutes an act of differential treatment when my complaints are being ignored, that management retaliated with fabricated dismissal for reason of shortage of work and then after I was terminated hired two ex-employees to do work that I could be doing without placing add in paper, and that 3 managers committed the act of perjury in their affidavit to Small Claims court denying any harassment that is contradicted by other documents where they admit I made numerous complaints and that they dealt with them to their best of their ability. The manner in which I was terminated at both Xentel and Lyman warrant Wallace damages for termination in bad faith. Also, these three employers induce the commission to breach their duty of fairness.
17. I plead that this interference at my employments at Xentel, Lyman, and Laurentide companies is to repeat items that I complain about in my human rights complaints particularly hostile remark out of my 2000 Watts complaint of “sucks to be you” resulting in all of these employers breaching the contract with wrongful termination in a row after I make sexual and non sexual harassment complaints and this action is a violation of the Whistleblower legislation where reprisals against Whistleblowers a general criminal indictable or summary offence per section 425.1 of the Criminal Code. It clearly states no employer or person acting on behalf of an employer or in a position of authority in respect of an employee of the employer shall take a disciplinary measure against, demote, terminate, or threaten to do so, adversely affect the employment of such an employee, or threaten to do so (b) with the intent to retaliate against the employee because the employee has provided information referred to in paragraph (a) to a person whose duties include the enforcement of federal or provincial law; (2) Any one who contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of (a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years; or (b) an offence punishable on summary conviction. This criminal action supports by civil claims for the tort of interference of employment relations and is also the breach of the implied terms of contract to treat me with “respect, civillity, and dignity”. These employers have a duty to provide me with work environment free of items that I complained about in a 2000 Watts Human Rights complaint and not take disciplinary action (repeating those same or similar items, fabricating discipline meetings and warnings, and wrongful terminating my employment) such as adversely affect the employment of such employee who has provided information to a person whose duty is the enforcement of provincial law such as the Human Rights Code.
18. I plead that by passing information in my complaint Watts has breached their fiduciary duty in the 2001 settlement with the commission at #2: The Corporation has written a letter of assurance to the Ontario Human Rights Commission in the form attached hereto as Appendix “A” and has provided assurance that they have and will continue to provide training to staff in an effort to insure compliance with the letter and spirit of the Code.” Watts breached their fiduciary duty in this settlement by passing on to Xentel, and Lyman my misdiagnosis and that I get offended with behaviours such as: comments of sucks to be you (or similar), exposure to sexual picture, being addressed as “Claude” or “loser”, use of double speak to confuse me and to cause errors in my work, etc. The spirit of the Code includes reprisal which in common law is the remedy for interference with my employment relations, defamation, and conspiracy to injure.
19. I plead that I was hired at fifth employer, Kinros/Laurentide, in Bad Faith with false promise of a full time permanent accounting/bookkeeping position to continue the mobbing and psychological tactics per all of my Human Rights Complaints to discredit me with a permanent delusional disorder or vexatious litigant which ever will stick. This is the tort of misrepresentation at the time of the interview that they had made a budgetary commitment to hiring for a full time permanent long term position at KINROS. The material facts surrounding the harassment are listed from #8, #10, #15, #19, #20, #21, #26, #27, #28, #29, #42, and #46-105. The tort of interference with employment relations is demonstrated now by passing to this fifth employer items out of all of my complaints for the following employers to be repeated again: Watts, MMP Limited, Xentel and Lyman.
Paul Underhill repeated the “sucks to be you” hostile remark that is a repeat or variation of same at all of these employers prior to working for Kinros. Paul Underhill also repeated unacceptable touching incident by intentionally bumping his bulging stomach onto my body that made me uncomfortable that repeats the complaint I made only at Xentel of male coworkers inappropriately touching me. Later Paul makes mocking comment to the guy “that’s harassment to touch my belly” which is repeating the mocking comments at Watts “can’t do that that’s harassment.” Paul also subjugated me to comments of “boobie, prick” repeating items out of Lyman’s complaint, and addressed me with “chickie or hon” repeating items out of my Watts/Xentel complaints. Surinder Sihra repeated the touching his groin area inappropriately in my presence similar to what I experience at Watts with two incidents one with Dan Bowes and another with Charles Mann. Surinder Sihra was mimicking the behaviour of Tony Millington at MMP with intentionally addressing me as “claudia” and “claude”. Kindy Sihra, Roman and Arlen repeated inappropriate discussions about their underwear similar to incident by Susan Koehler at Lyman that involves innuendoes about sex and underwear. A client of MMP, Mark Pallidini, has conversation with Kindy in my presence of sexual nature when he says “sex change”. Sherry at Laurentide subjugates me to an image of an old lady with her breast hanging down wearing only a thong repeating the sexual picture exposure at Watts, MMP, Xentel, and Lyman. Nayana mocked my complaints with her comment of “if I made as many complaints as you I would be a millionaire” which is similar to documented item from the Watts complaint by mediator Mr. Rick Della Vella and his comment to me that “I was not going to win the loterie” by my complaint. Kindy Sihra comes to me holding up her breast saying twice “my breast are too big” repeating subjugation of turning conversation to their breast item in my MMP by Dasha Page and many incidents at Lyman. Kindy Sihra also sent her friend Jen on November 11th just before I was terminated under false pretext to see me about licensing and instead she draws me into conversation where she makes the comment “men being ruled by their dicks”. This is a repeat of variation of comment by my supervisor Mike at Lyman of “being part of the boy’s club and a having a penis.”
Furthermore, I charge all three companies owned by Mr. Sihra that of Kinros Industries, Laurentide Manufacturing, and Laurentide Custom Brokers with the tort of conspiracy to injure and the tort of interference with my employment relations. I was hired by inter company Kinros Industries but never worked at that company’s location on Seaman, but rather worked at 111 Brockley the location for Laurentide Manufacturing and Laurentide Custom Woodworking. The majority of the employees participating in the mobbing during my employment were employed by these two companies and not Kinros Industries. In fact I handed my complaint letters to Nayana (employed by Laurentide Manufacturing) and Kindy (employed by Laurentide Custom Woodworking), and it was these two who avoided providing me with internal due process and I feel made the decision to terminate my employment on November 15th after 3.5 hours of receiving the second complaint letter. Nayana mocked my complaints with her comment of “if I made as many complaints as you I would be a millionaire”. Only two employers, Brad and Jim, from Kinros were involved. Also it is both Nayana and Kindy and their employers who committed the tort of deceit and breach of fiduciary duty in their Human Rights rebuttal fabricated that they did not received these letters that I handed to them but rather only received second letter after my termination. Therefore the tort of interference applies to Laurentide Manufacturing and Laurentide Custom Brokers.
20. I plead that this passing on of items in my Human Rights Complaint, particularly disparaging remark disguised as joke of “sucks to be you”, that annoys me is in the form of practical joker passing around slanderous information for the purpose of malice to intimidate and harass me by repeating items I complain about, and to intentionally wear me down emotionally with unnecessary stress which is the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. I refer to Wilkinson v. Downtown where one joke induced a state of nervous shock and prolonged mental and physical suffering. Why not it worked from 1998 to 2002 to land me in the psych ward with suicide attempt and a misdiagnosis of delusional disorder twice so lets do it again. I continued to medicate on Paxil during my full employment at Kinros/Laurentide to mitigate the damage to my mental health. I refer to Boothman v. R again: “S. hired the plaintiff because of her mental vulnerability, hoping to control her. He exploited that vulnerability from the start, initially to assert his control and domination over the plaintiff and later, when that failed, with the view of causing her to break down and quit her job. He intended to cause her harm and succeeded. The damage resulting from his actions was psychological in nature and included depression and anxiety attacks, feelings of suicidal despair and social isolation. S. committed the torts of assault and intentional infliction of nervous shock.”
The anti-social behaviour directed at me of repeating items in my Human Rights complaints started at Laurentide on first day on September 13th 2004 and progress from that day to my termination only 2 months later which I infer that I was hired because of my vulnerability of being misdiagnosed with a delusional disorder of persecution type per material facts listed at #46-#105. I infer that this vulnerability was exploited from the onset first to control and embarrass me than later to induce me to break down mentally and quit, and to later to discredit my complaints as being vexatious when I go to the authorities. The material facts supports my allegations of hiring me in bad faith because of my vulnerability of being misdiagnosed with a delusional disorder and for the sole purpose of continuing Watts’ harassment campaign: interview for full time permanent position, harassment of repeating items in my human rights complaints commenced on first day September 13th and continued to my termination day of November 15th, never moving me to KINROS location to work, start transferring employees of KINROS back to Laurentide payroll on September 17th, sexualizing my work environment, games with my name again, pen clicking tactic again, induced to making two formal written harassment complaints, management refused to provide me with internal due process to resolve the complaints in my letters and instead 3.5 hours after handing in my second complaint letter retaliates with alleged termination due to change in business, and sets out to mislead the commission that they never received any of my complaint letters while I was employed and have no knowledge of the incidents in my human right complaint. The management at Kinros/Laurentide is under false pretext that if they lie and say to the authorities that they knew nothing of my complaints while employed and that they received my complaint letter after my termination this absolves them of accountability. It does not and I refer to decision in Lynch v. Theodorakakos (1992), 16 C.H.R.R. D/319 (B.C.C.H.R.): “Council Member found that the restaurant owner’s lack of knowledge about the incidents did not protect him from liability as he was nevertheless responsible for offering a non-discriminatory workplace environment.” There is precedent in common law too with Stamos v. Annuity and Shah v. Xerox Canada regarding the employer providing a work environment per the implied terms of treating employees with “respect, civility, and dignity”.
I also infer that this hiring is also for the purpose of retaliation by Watts, MMP Limited, Xentel DM Incorporated, and Lyman Custom Brokers, and the Ontario Human Rights Commission combined. In 2004 I have commenced civil suit against all including the commission, plus filing human rights complaints against these employers, and all are condoning sex in the workplace and labelling me the troublemaker because I complain. I was addressed by several members at Watts as “hi trouble” and there was the bantering in my presence of the word “troublemaker” at Lyman and Laurentide. This abuse of authority taking advantage of employee’s vulnerability in employment has precedent in law particularly in Boothman v. R., where an employee was severely harassed by a superior who had knowledge of her fragile mental state. I also refer to the new law in Quebec to update their labour act (section 81.18, and 81.19) implemented in June 2004 to prohibit psychological harassment of the kind that I am experiencing through all of these employers and now at Kinros/Laurentide. This action also represents a continuing loss in reputation due to defamation of my character that I am mentally ill and/or that I make false harassment complaints and that I am a troublemaker and therefore deserving of additional contemptuous, ridiculing, dishonest, and malicious behaviour. The termination at Kinros/Laurentide, now the fifth employer in this scapegoat campaign and the fourth employer in a row fabricating reason for termination after I complaint about sex in the work place, requires the serious need for the legal system to advance and to implement Retaliatory Discharge tort as in the United States with serious legal consequences. I refer to the US retaliatory discharge tort and the two cases in Canada that have been allowed to proceed of: Ruggeiro v. Emco Ltd. (1993), 6 C.C.E.L. (2d) 57 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.); Duplessis v. Walwyn Stodgell, Cochran Murray Ltd. (1988), 20 C.C.E.L., 245 (B.C.S.C.).
21. I plead that the owners of KINROS own all three companies: Laurentide Manufacturing, and the two subsidiaries Laurentide Custom Woodworking and Kinros Industries. The owners, particularly their daughter Kindy Sihra and Surinder Sihra (brother of owner), are the one’s who made the decision to repeat harassing items in my complaints against Watts, Mackay, Xentel, and Lyman per material facts listed at #46-#105. The owners, and managers of Laurentide, made the decision to not provide me with internal due process which is breach of duty to care when I made 2 written complaints because it involved family members of Kindy and Surinder. The owners made the decision to terminate my employment on November 15th 2004 3.5 hours after I handed to Nayana my second complaint letter with alleged reason of change in business which is breach of fiduciary duty and retaliatory discharge.
I refer to the definition of an Employer in Employment Litigation Manual at 3.18: an employer can be an individual, a partnership or a corporation who or which controls and directs an individual under an express or implied contract for hire and who or which pays some kind of remuneration to the individual. My cheques where under the name of Kinros, but Laurentide did the controlling, directing and termination of my employment under the express implied contract for hire. I refer to section 3.21: “The “control test” suggests that if a company has actual control over the employee, it can be found to be the employer, even if it is a wholly owned subsidiary. In Gregorio v. Intrans-Corp. (1994), 18 O.R. (3d) 527 at 536 (C.A.), Laskin J.A., writing for the Ontario Court of Appeal, held: Generally, a subsidiary, even a wholly owned subsidiary, will not be found to be the alter ego of its parent unless the subsidiary is under the complete control of the parent and nothing more than a conduit used by the parent to avoid liability.” Based on this case and common law judgment and consequences surrounding my employment, there is a good argument to infer that Laurentide Manufacturing hired me under the conduit of KINROS as a pretext to continue the Watts campaign to induce mental illness to discredit me and used Kinros as a conduit for avoiding liability when there was no real offer of a permanent long term accounting position.
22. I plead that the defendants Watts Industries, MMP Limited, Xentel, Lyman deliberately and knowingly made false and erroneous allegations which were/are defamatory and were made to cause me economic harm and damage that adversely affected my relationship with co-workers at Kinros/Laurentide and the Ontario Human Rights Commission (precedent case: Duke v. Puts, 2004). This defamation of my character by defendants with the commission resulted in the December 2004 case analysis from Shannon Meadows-Lee of the investigation department of the OHRC fabricating insufficient evidence to protect Xentel, Lyman, Watts and Commission Intake Staff that are easily disputed to obstruct natural justice of referring my prima facie complaints to the Tribunal, to protect the discriminating employers, which influence the decision by Chief Commissioner Keith Norton. These case analyses also represents the commission’s misfeasance of public office and other tortious actions such as deceit, defamation, conspiracy to injure, intentional emotional distress (acting on their knowledge of my injury to health vulnerability), injurious falsehoods; and criminal actions that supports these tortious actions of obstruction of justice, accessory after the fact, adding and abetting, concealing my evidence, and controlling witnesses to avoid adverse outcome.
I refer to my argument in my reconsideration application for Lyman per Janzen and the Supreme Court of Canada decision: sexual harassment in the workplace may be broadly defined as unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that detrimentally affects the work environment or leads to adverse job-related consequences for the victims; it is an abuse of both economic and sexual power; sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination within s. 6 (1) of the Human Rights Act. Management and coworkers at Lyman subjugated me with sexualized work environment to make me feel uncomfortable and provoke me into complaining and documenting because that now makes me look delusional such as: removing sex off the computer in first week, supervisor Mike talking about phone sex, Mike making Bobbitt joke with gesture of slicing off penis, owner Clayton’s comment Ian was having a hard on, Mike’s dick and prick, Mike’s comment being part of the boys club and having a penis, Mike intentionally fiddling with his belt when he comes to me for work related issue even after I complain, Clayton’s she was touching her breast and someone did not even get a boner, Mike’s comment I have a hard time finding it as it is (after going to the bathroom), exposure to Scubby Doo Cartoon with tail between man’s leg as giant penis, Angie holding hamburger up to her breast and says boobies, Sue has conversation on her breast implants and asks woman to touch them at company picnic, Linda’s comment “better than knocking me over with those big boobs of yours, Susan’s so you are going to have hot sex tonight, Linda trying to get me to look at the hole in her crotch and talk about how her Rob enjoys it, I got to call phone sex, sexual 46, Linda’s joke about thanks for my husband taking my virginity, Cindy’s conversation about harems and orgies, Laurie’s comment so you are going to have to put out and Sue’s response yes I have four rooms, boner move, they were all naked in the hot tub, Anna’s sex moaning, eau de boobie, big boobs just like me, older women don’t like sex, big breast and Viagra, checking the Porn sites, just like a fast woman in and out, fuck me fuck me followed by no fuck and fuck yaw, get laid, Mike’s comment I don’t mind being attacked by a group of young girls, and Clayton’s comment “prick for a prick”. The above constitutes sufficient evidence of a “poisoned work environment”, sexual harassment, sex discrimination and discrimination based on perceived disability of a persecution disorder according to the code. The commission is imaging insufficient evidence without doing an investigation because this complaint includes the commission intake staff colluding with Lyman, the actus reus of aiding and abetting, and passing information as I faxed it to the commission. The commission staff does not want that truth to be exposed and therefore the investigation staff is imaging insufficient evidence to avoid my evidence reaching a court room.
I used the same argument for my Xentel reconsideration application from Janzen. I stated that management selected where I would sit and the coworkers would subjugated me with sexualized work environment to make me feel uncomfortable and provoke me into complaining and documenting because that now makes me look delusional such as: sexual cartoon on first night; comments of masturbation and Viagra, male friend searching the internet for penis extension, my name is VD – Venereal Diseases, I’m going to have sex with my girl friend, lets have sex song, cock, cock sucker, my neutered cat still wants it, did I dream about male coworker last night, whore and tassels; one female coworker leering at my breast, and one female coworker gesturing around her breast to make me leer at her breast; one female coworker zipping up her pants in my presence, being winked at by several male coworkers, and several male coworkers touching me inappropriately, being followed in the office by 50 year old male coworker stalking like singing to intimidate and annoy me “shady’s back” song, and being addressed as “Hon/Darling” by male in supervisor position with suspicious emails to my home computer with same addresses just shortly after the work incidents a form of cyber stalking. The above constitutes sufficient evidence of a “poisoned work environment”, sexual harassment, sex discrimination and discrimination based on perceived disability of a persecution disorder according to the code. The commission is imaging insufficient evidence because this complaint includes the commission intake staff colluding with Xentel, the actus reus of aiding and abetting, and passing information as I faxed it to the commission. I was terminated in a meeting regarding my sexual vexatious complaint against Barb where John refused to provide me with written record of meetings particularly with Barb and after I advised him I was seeking third party involvement then he terminated my employment. That is retaliation of the kind of unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that detrimentally affects the work environment or leads to adverse job-related consequences for the victims.
According to “The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code” book from Carswell sexual harassment may justify an employee’s poor work performance (pg. 62). The increase harassment in September did affect my ability to concentrate on my sales. The facts per my stats show that my sales were improving when John terminated my employment on September 15th. The low line hour poor performance excuse for dismissal is a pretext as John said in this meeting “if you had it so bad why did you stay?” This statement implies management participation and attitude if I don’t like it I can leave and is a complete abdication of management’s responsibilities. The analysis does not include John’s bantering of a delusional disorder with his comment that he alleges was to reassure me “Nobody on the floor is out to get you” in his September 15th letter. For the commission to avoid making any reference to this comment plus state insufficient evidence of unequal treatment or harassment supports my argument of a conspiracy campaign that includes the commission to induce a permanent mental disorder of persecution.
23. I plead that my claim in common law are for the remedies available for human rights abuses for Kinros/Laurentide defendants that supports: wrongful/constructive dismissal, and acting in Bad Faith (hire and termination); torts of deceit/misrepresentation, conspiracy to injure, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intimidation, sexual harassment and psychological harassment/mobbing; breach of company’s policies on harassment, inducing breach of contract; defamation (loss of reputation causing differential treatment, subjugation of anti-social behaviour, malice and reckless disregard for my rights), breach of duty of care, breach of fiduciary duty, wrongful interference with contractual rights or relations, and injurious falsehoods. I was hired by KINROS but Laurentide Manufacturing was the company controlling my contract and termination. Employees from all three companies KINROS, Laurentide Manufacturing and Laurentide Custom Woodworking were involved in the mobbing as per the material facts at #8, #10, #15, #19, #20, #21, #26, #27, #28, #29, #42, and #46-105. This involvement by staff members from the other companies other than KINROS represents interference with my employment relations thus all three companies are vicariously responsible for their employees and are included in this suit.
24. I plead that there are common law remedies for discrimination and harassment that of wrongful/constructive dismissal and tortious acts. It is feasible that a plaintiff may use both the civil claim and the human rights process in tandem. The defendants will ask for stay of proceedings till the commission process has been completed which should be denied per the advanced decision in Kurlyk v. Toronto (City) Board of Education of: ample precedent for allowing parallel proceedings which may result in different findings, deletion of exclusive jurisdiction clause permitting judicial incursion into areas formerly occupied by the commission, and assessment of damages is not beyond the ken of this court and the commission.
25. I plead that my claim also includes common law remedies against Watts Industries, MMP Limited, Xentel, and Lyman for acting in bad faith by passing on to Kinros/Laurentide information in all of my Human Rights complaints to abide by the spirit of the Code, and breaching their agreement in that settlement (for Watts). I am seeking damages for the following torts: intimidation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, interference with employment relations, indirect interference with contractual relations, unlawful conspiracy, inducing breach of contract, injurious falsehoods, and defamation via loss of reputation causing additional contemptible/ridiculing treatment and another poison work environment repeating items I complain about against them.
The tort of intimidation applies via passing information in my human rights complaints to next employer to continue the harassment which threatens my employment and is to intimidate me to control an effective whistleblower into submission and silence. The interference of employment relations is demonstrated by the repeating of items that I complain about in all of my human right complaints to create coincidences to image a persecution disorder to discredit the target and that resulted in another termination of employment on November 15th 2004. The indirect interference with employment relations is demonstrated by staff from Laurentide Manufacturing and Laurentide Custom Woodworking on top of staff at Kinros repeating items in my human right complaints to induce me to complain and when they can’t control me or induce me to quit they breach the contract by termination of my employment which is the tort of inducement of breach of my contract. The inducing the breach of contract is demonstrated by my need to write two formal harassment complaints and management’s refusal of providing me with internal due process and instead hands me termination letter and later commit additional tort of deceit with the commission. The fact that I am again receiving same harassment items in all of my human rights complaints demonstrates defamation and the passing of injurious falsehoods.
I have had to continue to medicate on Paxil to mitigate the damages to my health while employed at Kinros due to this additional intentional infliction of emotional distress through sexual and psychological harassment, and the termination of employment. The discriminating/contemptuous conduct that I received by all the defendants offends the code of Human Rights and supports my claims in common law including punitive damages. My statement of claim is not for the violation of the statute, as in Bhadauria, as I already have formal complaints at the OHRC against all corporate defendants. I would now go one step further to infer that criminal charges need to be laid per section 425.1 since nothing to date has been able to stop this abuse.
26. I plead that on November 11th 2004 at 3:10 Kindy Sihra intentionally sent her friend Jen under false pretense of coming to my desk for license stickers that were never exchanged only to subjugate me with sexual vexatious behaviour of comment and doing hand gesture around her groin area. She starts her entrapment game with drawing me into conversation with inappropriate question of “why I don’t show off my nice thin body.” I respond simply with “I don’t want attention to my body.” She moves into drawing me into conversation first on Superior/Inferior complex. I contribute with comment that “I don’t want to be inferior or superior just an equal.” Since she has my attention Jen moves into conversation about muscle and body building and starts to show me her belly with pierced ring. Now that she has my attention and has me smiling and relaxed she then all of a sudden moves the conversation about “men being ruled by their dicks” and gesturing around her crotch like she has a penis. Sherry laughs at this and I just stare back at this ridicules vulgar display. I said “I don’t hang around men like that” showing my distaste for the subject. Jen walks out of accounting department without getting or giving me the alleged license stickers. This behaviour by Jen resulted in 2 written complaint letters given to Kindy (comptroller) and Nayana (bookkeeper), and 3.5 hours after the second complaint letter I received termination letter alleging change in business in Jim Westman’s (Kinros manager) car after he asks me why I did not come to him about the incidents in my second letter.
29. I plead that Kinros Industries in their rebuttal to my human rights complaint set out to deceive the commission with additional action of tort of deceit per the following statement: “As stated above, the Respondent was not in receipt of the Complainant’s letter dated November 13, 2004 until after the termination of the Complainant’s employment, nor of any other complaints, written or oral during the relevant time. The Respondent denies that the Complainant’s termination was for any other reason than that stated in her termination letter of November 15. The Complainant was terminated because of changes in the Respondent’s business and restructuring, and for no other reason. By misleading the material facts of when the Respondent’s received my two complaint letters which is additional and ongoing tort of deceit and breach of fiduciary duty they have demonstrated that the termination was retaliatory and not change in Business. There is precedent in law for this behaviour to mislead such authorities as the OHRC or the WSIB in: Antonacci v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada (1998).
30. I plead that the extent of Watts’ defamation of my character includes defaming my character with the Ontario Human Rights commission to cause an obstruction of natural justice and injurious falsehoods by the commission staff. The defamation of my character can easily be demonstrated based on my pass memos of performance. I can show that in 1992 I was promoted to branch administrator; in 1993 I was recognized by my manager for my attention to Quality; in 1996 that same manager stated that my solid and reliable performance is appreciated; in 1999 from Watts manager being noted that I was a strong performer in accomplishing tasks and 2001 rating of 4 exceeding expectations in receivable duties; in 2002 reference letter from employer before Mackay that I was a conscientious, punctual employee who took her responsibilities very seriously; then from Mackay fabricating incompetence; and Xentel alleging incompetence. I can also show fabrication of warning letter at Watts Industries to paint me a trouble-maker and lacking in team spirit which was successfully challenged in fax to commission in May 2001. At Lyman, I received another attempt to fabricate warning notice of alleged unsuitable employee conduct over work related emails of the harassment that I was receiving which I successfully challenged as unsubstantiated. My reputation as a good worker has been defamed by Watts Industries to the point of not being able to receive fair employment without this continuation of Watts’ mobbing campaign nor good references for future job opportunities due to their actions, plus not being giving the appropriate work environment to grow and improve my skills. I also have the added problem of now having my Charter Rights obstructed by the OHRC because of Watts’ ongoing defamation of my character. My excellent health record destroyed by the actions by these employers causing intentionally injury to my health which resulted in loss of insurance benefits at Lyman in 2003 due to the fact now I have to reveal that I have suffered from depression when previously I did not. Plus now I have to medicate on Paxil to keep me from going into reactive depression with additional suicide ideation.
31. I plead that the facts as stated in Shannon Meadows-Lee from the investigation office at the commission in her December 2004 Xentel’s and Lyman’s case analysis are injurious falsehoods of insufficient evidence and represents also a breach of duty of fairness. That the commission has colluded with these employers to protect Watts Reprisal campaign from being exposed by concealing evidence and controlling witnesses who would provide adverse outcome to the facts presented in this case analysis. I had already commenced a civil suit for misfeasance of public office against commission staff for colluding with Xentel and Lyman in this campaign in spring of 2004 prior to receiving these case analyses in December 2004. In fact, after receiving the fabricated case analysis on December 3rd with a December 16th deadline to respond I also received from the Attorney General’s office a motion to dismiss this suit against commission staff on/around December 8th 2004 for December 17th motion hearing and one similar from Lyman. I infer the commission has a need to avoid the truth from being exposed at the Tribunal because of their participation with this campaign in 2003/2004 and this is the criminal action of accessory after by the investigation staff that of someone who helps a person who has committed a crime to escape detention or capture or accountability/exposure at a Tribunal. I like to argue also that this is abuse of statutory duty and authority by the commission as per the following in Pritchard v. OHRC: “while administrative boards have the delegated authority to determine their own procedure, the exercise of that authority must be in accordance with natural justice and the common law.” This breach of fairness by the investigation staff and refusal to do their statutory duty, aggravated an injury to the plaintiff and therefore magnified the award of damages for mental distress, warrants punitive and now exemplary damages.
32. I plead that I provided a copy of the DSM-IV description of this disorder demonstrating the connection to the harassing behaviour that I was subjugated with to image this disorder to Dina Waik. Therefore the commission should have interviewed all the staff involved in the incidents in my complaint that I requested. For Xentel the following employees should have been interviewed: John Docherty, Lori Danville, Shayne, Dawn, Dan, Barb, Bruce, Connie, Joey, Jeremy, Rick, Doris, Bill, MaryBeth, etc. For Lyman the following employees should have been interviewed: Susan Koehler, Mike Bachelor, Linda Holland, David Lyman, Joanne Rioux, Treena, Cindy Barone, Angie, Lisa C, Lisa Ball, David Dortie, Tom from Desert Traders, Anna, Judy Schimel, Lana Greigs, Laurie, etc. For the case analyses for Xentel and Lyman there is no list of any witnesses being questioned by commission investigation staff unlike the case analysis for MMP and Watts. It is with these two complaints, Xentel and Lyman, where I alleged commission collusion by the intake staff for which I filed a suit for misfeasance of office in 2004 against the commission staff and management at these two companies. This exemplifies controlling the witnesses who may provide adverse outcome to protect not only these two employers, but also the intake staff involved, and Watts Industries and MMP Limited.
33. I plead that the case analysis is to image a disability of delusional disorder to the reader of the case analysis. I refer to article “Perceived-Disability Discrimination An Often Overlooked But Potentially Problematic Area Of The ADA” the author states: it is important to remember that the focus of any perceived-disability case is on the employer’s perception of an individual’s actual or perceived impairment. Shannon Meadows-Lee, on behalf of the OHRC, in her own words demonstrates this imaged perception of perceived impairment at #3 for the Xentel case analysis and #2 for the Lyman case analysis: “Ms. Losier is a woman who was diagnosed with a disability known as delusional disorder, persecutory type. She was hospitalized in 2000 and 2001. It is Ms. Losier’s contention that the respondent in this case discriminated against her on the bases of disability and sex. She gave as reasons for her belief, the allegations outlined above. She further believes that her condition was mis-diagnosed.” Ms. Meadows-Lee concealed evidence that I provided the commission in her case analysis that would have put the complainant in a better light which enforced the complainant’s believes such as the 2001 clinical notes that this was a working assessment, the false statements in her clinical records by psychiatrist in 2002, letter from this 2002 psychiatrist stating he made his assessment based on previous assessment showing he did not make independent assessment and this is the “mental health” trap, the September 19th 2002 letter from the 2001 psychiatrist in Stoney Creek who made this assessment closing my persecution files, and my subsequent corrected October 2002 assessment of anxiety with depressed moods that is acute. Also, she leaves out details as to why I was hospitalized after the phrase “diagnosed with a disability known as delusional disorder” which again does not frame the complainant in a good light nor does it reflect reality. I infer the case analyses is to slant the mental health assessment towards the persecution disorder to put the discriminating employers in a better light than the truth warrants which demonstrates the behaviour for which these defendants stand accused of that of committing the tort of conspiracy to injure with a mental illness of persecution disorder.
Ms. Meadows-Lee also conceals another important material fact that of the bantering of persecution disorder by John in his September 15th 2003 letter that he felt I had fears of people out to get me and advised me that “no one on the floor was out to get you” which is a link per reprisal section 8 of the code. I refer to the argument in case of Moffatt v. Kinark Child & Family Services (1998), 35 C.H.R.R. D/205 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry): “Section 8 requires an actual or threatened retaliatory act linked to the making of a complaint under the Code. The link can be established in two ways: proof the respondent intended to retaliate or the perception of the complaint, on a “reasonableness” standard.” I make complaints regarding sexual and none sexual vexatious behaviours by coworkers, which management images that they are providing me with internal due process and terminates my employment at same time, and later fabricates that he felt I had fears of “people on the floor out to get me” is enough of a link back to my human rights complaints. It is a link of Perceived-disability discrimination of “quite often, the best evidence of perceived-disability discrimination comes from the comments an employer makes to an employee who may or may not have impairment”. This is also a direct link to MMP Limited’s Human Rights complaint as my supervisor Mrs. Page also uses this bantering of persecution disorder to authorities by fabricating I said to her that “people were out to get me”. It is a know fact that bullies repeat their hostile acts, and therefore repeating items in all of my human rights complaints. It is also a link to reprisal by Xentel as they condoned my poor line hour from January to August 18th with no verbal warning that there was no problem but only after I requested from the commission the forms to file did Xentel have problem with my performance. I do not believe that I was the worst line hour on the floor warranting dismissal but rather I was selected under pretext of problem with my performance to get rid of the complainer who just advised her manager she was seeking third party involvement.
By not interviewing witnesses who harassed me at Xentel, Ms. Meadows-Lee cannot make the statement at #7 of: “The evidence obtained does not support Ms. Losier’s assertions that the respondent Xentel DM have ever been in contact with employees of her former employer, or Commission staff prior to the current investigation. There is insufficient evidence to indicate that the complainant’s former managers at Xentel DM had any knowledge of her medical mis-diagnosis or her former human rights complaints. No evidence other than Ms. Losier’s statement was found to indicate that information was passed on to the respondent company in order to “black ball her, paint her as delusional, defame her character, discredit her, psychologically mob, bully and harass her.” By not interviewing witnesses who harassed me at Lyman, Ms. Meadows-Lee cannot make the statement at #6 of: “There is insufficient evidence to indicate that the complainant’s managers at Lyman had any knowledge of her medical mis-diagnosis or her former human rights complaints. No evidence other than Ms. Losier’s statement was found to indicate that information was passed on to the respondent company from employees of Company A and/or B, in order to “blackball her, paint her as delusional, defame her character, discredit her, psychologically mob, bully and harass her.” This statement above without interviewing any staff at Xentel and Lyman demonstrates that Ms. Meadows-Lee demonstrates through her behaviour that impartiality cannot be achieved and a fair outcome cannot occur for the complainant, and the result is fabricating insufficient evidence for improper purpose and therefore breach of fairness.
This statement conceals one important material fact and evidence that I provided the commission and proves this statement by Ms. Meadows-Lee is false that of John Docherty’s September 15th letter stating “I then said to reassure her “Nobody on the floor is out to get you” which demonstrates John imaging to authorities that I am paranoid. This statement by John is defamatory of the persecution type to paint me delusional, defame my character per se unfit to work, and to discredit me that because I make complaints this means I have fears of paranoia of “people out to get me”. John did not deny to the commission that I made some complaints particularly of inappropriate touching by male coworker. John did not dispute those complaints of vexatious behaviour that I brought to his attention and therefore all the other items that I only included in my human rights complaint, based solely on Ms. Losier’s statement, would not have been disputed either had I discuss them with John. One of the reason I did not discuss them was because management was involved and my employment would have been terminated sooner than September 15th 2003, and I can prove that because John terminated my employment in a meeting about my harassment complaints and after I advised him I was seeking third party involvement. John believed me when I made the few complaints that I did demonstrating that I am credible when I complain.
My Xentel Human Rights complaint includes the following incidents that the investigation staff did not investigate that qualifies as psychologically mob, bully and harass her of: exposure to sex picture on first night by Connie, Connie later drawing me into conversation of client whose last name is “Cock”, Amanda subjugating me with “cock sucker” comments and “lets of sex baby” song, Jeremy advising friends in my presence that he is having sex with his girl friend, Dan advising me that his friend was looking on the internet for a penis extension, Rick commenting to Marg in my presence of “Viagra” and another incident of comment “Damn Men”, Trevor repeating the disparaging remark disguised as joke of “sucks to be you” in my presence, Bruce commenting to me that my cyber stalker is masturbating over my emails, Barb’s comment of calling herself VD-Venereal Diseases, Wil’s comment “their discriminating against us now”, etc. In fact the sexual picture on first night is automatic breach of code 5 and 7, therefore sufficient evidence of of poisoned work environment and discrimination, and therefore is also sufficient evidence of “black ball her, paint her as delusional, defame her character, discredit her, psychologically mob, bully and harass her.”
This statement for Lyman also conceals important material facts and evidences that I provided the commission and proves this statement by Ms. Meadows-Lee is false that Susan Koehler made bantering joke of depression with Linda Holland on the very day that Linda handed me a letter from their insurance company refusing me benefits because I revealed I had suffered from depression. Plus, Susan Koehler also bantered about in my precense “Oh God Persecution” and paranoid of a turkey. Also Lyman puts in their defence statement for the wrongful dismissal suit that I made numerous complaints but that they dealt with them to the best of their ability and repeat something similar for their rebuttal to my Human Rights complaint which is evidence proving “black ball her, paint her as delusional, defame her character, discredit her, psychologically mob, bully and harass her.” My evidence which I supplied to the commission is that Lyman in their defence statement to Small Claims Court admits I made numerous complaints and 3 managers commit perjury in their affidavit stating they emphatically deny any harassment two contradictory statements. If I complained it was because I was harassed which including turning conversations to sex in my presence particularly after I complained on July 16th 2003 which is sexual harassment thus evidence of discrimination based on sex. The Supreme Court’s ruling in the Janzen case was that sexual harassment is evidence of sex discrimination.
Ms. Meadows-Lee conceals material facts in her case analysis such as Linda Holland exposes me to a sexual picture and tries to entrap me to look at the hole in her crotch and condone talking about it in a sexual pleasurable manner. Again exposure to sexual picture is automatic breach of code 5 and 7 and proves poisoned work environment. Ms. Meadows-Lee further fabricates no evidence for “Ms. Losier’s employment was terminated by the respondent as an act of reprisal” when she concealed the material fact in the respondent’s rebuttal that they terminated my employment fabricating shortage of work and hired Treena in April to do work I was doing proving no shortage of work, bad faith termination and reprisal. Ms. Meadows-Lee conceals my important material fact and evidence of my complaint in email to Mike Batchelor and Linda Holland in October regarding both their efforts to turn the conversation to sex in my presence and I asked if they were trying to entrap me into these conversations to discredit my sexual harassment complaints. She concealed evidence regarding Ms. Holland withholding training and duties that she had passed on to Treena in April 2003, that Treena faked quitting in May 2003, and who Lyman rehire after terminating my employment on March 19th 2004 fabricating shortage of work and then hires Treena to do work I could be doing. Furthermore, Treena is good friend of Linda Holland and Mike Batchelor, and therefore these two retaliated by first withholding duties and training to later image shortage of work when they terminating my employment so they can rehire their friend Treena. Lyman also hired a Melony H. after I was terminated who is another ex employee and they placed no add in the paper and this rehire was probably in the works in March 2004. Ms. Meadows-Lee concealed my evidence and material fact that at Lyman after management attempted to fabricate discipline and unsuitable employee charge against me for my work related email to another employee, they refused to provide me with internal due process for my complaints against various staff members which is differential treatment. Hiring Treena in April 2004 when this same Treena in May 2004 quit Lyman and fabricate to me shortage of work is also evidence of differential treatment. Also, Ms. Meadows-Lee conceals evidence that in Lyman’s defence statement they deny owing me overtime pay and in their Human Rights rebuttal they admit they owe me overtime pay.
34. I plead that the staff in the investigation office of the OHRC has committed the act of Misfeasance of Public Office in the targeted malice line of cases where the public officer recklessly disregards the means of ascertaining the extent of his or her power. I refer to Uni-Jet Industrial Pipe v. Canada (A.G.) on the test for abuses of public office of: 1. an intentional illegal act, which is either: i) an intentional use of statutory authority for an improper purpose such as fabrication of insufficient evidence of discrimination when I have automatic breach of code 5 & 7 with subjugation of sexual picture; or ii) actual knowledge that the act (or omission) is beyond statutory authority by concealing material facts and my evidence; or iii) reckless indifference, or willful blindness to the lack of statutory authority for the act; 2) intent to harm an individual or a class of individuals, which is satisfied by either: i) an actual intent to harm of obstruction of justice of referring my prima facie complaints to Tribunal and provided respondents with fabricated evidence to use against me civilly; or ii) actual knowledge that harm will result as complainant denied damages of making her whole as if the discrimination/reprisal never happened which includes all loss of wages; or iii) reckless indifference or willful blindness to the harm that can be foreseen to result. I infer that I received a sham investigation process that is use of statutory authority for an improper purpose. What I received as an investigation is the following: because it doesn’t matter about the truth it only matters that they have provided an accepted process so that when you say they disadvantaged you they can say they followed an established process.
Therefore I seek remedies against the commission investigation staff, the commission and the Ministry of Attorney General responsible for their agents of: misfeasance of public office, breach of duty of fairness, injurious falsehoods, deceit, conspiracy to injure, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and inducement of breach of contract. I seek damages for the criminal behaviour of obstruction of justice, accessory after the fact by concealing evidence, material facts, and by controlling witnesses who would provide adverse outcome that support my civil claims of tort actions particularly intentional use of statutory authority for improper purpose. I refer to section 8 (2) of the Ministry of Citizenship and Culture Act regarding Crown Liability: Subsection (1) does not, by reason of subsections 5 (2) and (4) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act, relieve the Crown of Liability in respect of a tort committed by a person mentioned in subsection (1) to which it would otherwise be subject, and the Crown is liable under the Act for any such tort as if subsection (1) had not been enacted (R.S.O. 1990, c. M. 18, s. 8 (2).
35. I plead that my reconsideration application alleged sham investigation to image the commission providing me with a process per the following description of a sham investigation from other targets: because it doesn’t matter about the truth it only matters that they have provided an accepted process so that when you say they disadvantaged you they can say they followed an established process e.g. ‘full’ investigation and mediation. Ms. Meadows-Lee used language in her case analyses to image that I have persecution order because of comment by Mr. Wharton in Payne v. OHRC of “apparent tendency of Commissioners to follow unquestioningly any staff recommendations.” This case analysis did succeed in influencing the reader of it Mr. Keith Norton, the Chief Commissioner per his first decision in February 2005 with standard commission form alleging again insufficient evidence and ignoring contradictory evidence and material facts that I provided him in my 20-page rebuttal to the case analyses. I can demonstrate image perceptions and fabricated case analysis with fabrication of insufficient evidence as per the Commissioner’s second decision on February 24th 2005 to reconsider based on my arguments in my reconsideration application challenging the integrity of the investigation process. I refer to The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code book and case of Commercial Union Assurance v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission): “The authority to reconsider arises when there is an issue as to the integrity of the Commission’s process, where factual circumstances have changed from the time of the original Commission decision, or where new facts have arisen which were not previously available and are subsequently brought forward.” In fact the Commissioner reconsidered under section 37 (2) on February 24th 2005 all four of my Human Rights Complaints against: Watts, MMP Limited, Xentel DM Incorporated, and Lyman Custom Brokers. I did not provide any factual circumstances that have changed from time of original commission decision nor any new facts that have arisen. My reconsideration application was that the investigation staff provided me with sham investigation to image to authorities that they provided me with a process and that the case analysis of insufficient evidence is fabricated to benefit the discriminating employers. Therefore, the commissioner is in agreement that there is an issue as to the integrity of the Commission’s process, and therefore the investigation done by Ms. Waik and the case analyses by Ms. Meadows-Lee.
I refer to The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code book and case Gismondi v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission): “The Commission has a well-recognized expertise in fact-finding and processing complaints in the human rights context. Its screening function is more administrative than quasi-judicial in nature. Because of this, the standard of review under sections 34 and 37 is patent unreasonableness. The court may look at the material before the Commission to see if there is a rational basis for the result.” The Commissioner made the decision for a section 37 (2) because the investigation staff’s case analysis is not only lacking in integrity but also demonstrates patent unreasonableness particularly with natural justice and common law. Ms. Waik is supposed to be an expertise in fact-finding and she leaves out of her report submitted to Ms. Meadows-Lee the following material facts for Xentel: termination of employment in a meeting regarding my sexual and none sexual harassment complaints demonstrating reprisal, my comment advising John that I was seeking third party involvement and his comment back that he did not feel comfortable with me working there seeking third party involvement, the other sexual incidents proving poisoned work environment that I did not complained to management, exposure to sex picture is automatic breach of code 5 and 7 and proves poisoned work environment under the code, Wil’s bantering of discrimination on September 6th on top of Barb’s bantering of sexual comment, John Docherty’s bantering of a disability of persecution in his September 15th 2003 letter demonstrating knowledge of this disability, that I was improving my line hour and that my warning letter stated that they needed to see improvement, that management condoned my lower than standard line hour from January to August, that the warning letter was not handed to me until after I called the commission for the forms on July 14th, and a week later I received first lie from Ms. Rioux intake supervisor to obstruct the processing of that complaint by more than 7 months, the closing of my misdiagnosis of a delusional disorder file was on September 19th 2002 and the opening of the corrected assessment of anxiety with depressed moods in October 2002, etc.
Ms. Waik is supposed to be an expertise in fact-finding and she leaves out of her report submitted to Ms. Meadows-Lee the following material facts for Lyman: exposure to sex picture is automatic breach of code 5 and 7 and proves poisoned work environment under the code, the other sexual incidents proving poisoned work environment and course of vexatious harassment that I did not complained to management such as bookkeeper entrapping game to look at hole in her crotch and to talk about it in a sexual way, my supervisor intentionally drawing me into sex talk after I made internal complaint to entrap and discredit me as per my email to him in October 2003 that was ignored, the fabricated discipline meeting and subsequent fabrication of unsuitable employee conduct by Joanne Rioux, Joanne Rioux after this meeting subjugates me with sexual comment of “get laid”, lack of proof of internal due process of any meetings in writing from the employer but lots of emails from complainant about the lack of internal due process for her complaints, differential treatment as discipline meeting was for another employee’s complaint against me in November yet my complaints during same time against other staff members was ignored with no discipline meeting against these employees, contradiction of statement in respondents affidavit supplied to small claims court that they emphatically deny any harassment and in their defence statement to Small Claims court and their rebuttal to the commission that I made numerous complaints and that they dealt with them to the best of their ability and is perjury, termination of employment with fabricated reason of shortage of work and hiring back two ex-employers without ad in Spectator paper, act.
Furthermore, because it was my supervisor, Mike Batchelor who from start of my employment, who after I made complaint against himself for repeatedly touching his belt in my presence repeating Watts’ created tactic in 2000, who after I received one internal due process for one offensive sexual comment on July 16th 2003, continued to turn conversations to sex per my documentation and complaint. His refusal to respect my boundary request resulted in an email in October to confront his behaviour that he was doing this intentionally to entrap me into conversation on sex to discredit my complaints on sex talk in the work place, and his avoidance behaviour in that he and other management refused to respond to my accusations and therefore refused me internal due process. This behaviour by my supervisor constitutes a breach of section 7(2) of the code. Then this same supervisor hires back his friend, Treena an ex-employee, just before handing me my termination letter on March 19th 2004. For my termination at Lyman, I refer to The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code book and case Abouchar v. Metropolitan Toronto School Board: “A prima facie case of discrimination is made out where the complainant is qualified for the job but is rejected, and then the employer continues to seek applicants with the complainant’s qualifications.” Therefore, I have demonstrated a prima facie case as I was employed for 13 months with no incompetence charge and was terminated based on fabricated reason of shortage of work and management continued to seek applicants with the complainant’s qualifications as they hired two ex-employees right after March 19th 2004. Therefore, I have proven fabrication of insufficient evidence of my prima facie complaints to intentionally refuse to refer to Tribunal by investigation staff. This represents the tort of deceit and misfeasance of public office.
I refer to The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code book and case Gismondi v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission): “In addition, all the complainant’s arguments must be placed before the Commission when it makes its decision and the complainant must be informed of the matters the Commission will consider. I was advised by the investigation staff that they were not submitting my original rebuttal to the respondent’s rebuttal to the Commissioner when he made his decision to refer to Tribunal or not, which is part of all the complainant’s arguments and cross examination. This is with good reason by the investigation staff to conceal my valid cross examination arguments of collusion with Xentel and Lyman by intake staff. I refer to The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code book and case Pieters v. University of Toronto: “The same standard of review, patent unreasonableness, should apply to the judicial review of decisions made under section 34, 36, and 37. The court reviews the material before the Commission to see if it supports the result reached. Based on my evidence and material fact that was not included in these case analyses the court will conclude that the evidence does not support the result reached by the investigation staff. Based on these arguments from the Code I will succeed in the tort of Misfeasance of Public Office.
35. I plead that the commission being a quasi-judicial process relies and hides behind their immunity status to abuse their authority and statutory duties and breach their duty of fairness. I feel that this is a case where the commission acted outside its limit (collusion). I infer that the commission improperly exercises its judicial powers with criminal behaviour of obstruction of natural justice, concealing evidence and controlling witnesses who would provide adverse outcome are types of misconduct that amount to sufficient excesses of jurisdiction and are thus not protected by an absolute immunity. Particularly, Shannon Meadows-Lee and Dina Waik demonstrate sufficient excesses of abuse of jurisdiction and targeted malice. I refer to page 289 of Klar’s Tort Law #146: Judicial immunity is defended on the ground that it is not for judges’ protection but for the public’s protection; Judges should be able to act independently and fearlessly without threat of lawsuit by disappointed litigants; this rational is understandable; it does not, however, justify extending the immunity to judges who act maliciously in order to harm claimants.
My allegations are further substantiated by the OHRC’s history of unwillingness and failure to properly exercise their statutory mandate as per article by S. Peiters listing various reports to guide the commission to improve its performance that are ignored, including 1993 Ombudsman report by Roberta Jamieson. Other examples of failure to properly exercise their statutory mandate are: in March 2000 the Ontario Superior Court squashed two section 34 decisions by the Ontario Human Rights Commission. In Payne v. Ontario Human Rights Commission, a retired commissioner, Mr. Wharton, in his affidavit believed the commission colluded with Payne’s employer. I infer that this commissioner has inside knowledge that the commission in fact at times does collude with discriminating employers. The commission will use the defense that I am just a disappointed litigant/complainant to avoid exposure. I am requesting this judgment seat as per my rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms section 15 (1), 24, and 32 against the commission to review the evidence that Shannon Meadows-Lee is relying upon to willfully refuse to do her statutory duty of referral of a prima facie complaint to Tribunal to prove excess of jurisdiction and therefore tortious behaviour.
39. I plead that I am complying with the provisions of the Public Authorities Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.P.38, and, in particularly, subsection 7(1) thereof. In that regard, the action herein was commenced within the six months of the execution of public and/or statutory duties on the part of these Defendants, with the fabricated case analysis fabricating insufficient evidence only received December 3rd 2004, giving rise to the action herein. As such, the action herein is not statute-barred. In fact, the actions against the commission and the Minister of Attorney General responsible for their agents are still on going as my prima facie complaints have not been submitted to the Tribunal and are now 5 months obstructed.
37. I plead that this continuous attack on my character by Watts Industries, MMP, Xentel, Lyman, and now the OHRC with the fabricated December 2004 case analysis and the addition of a 5th employer Kinros/Laurentide to the same campaign warrants punitive damages and now exemplary damages. The reasons for awarding punitive damages was well stated in Uni-Jet Industrial Pipe v. Canada (A.G.) #91 In Hill, Cory J. stated (at para. 199): Punitive damages can and do serve a useful purpose. But for them, it would be all too easy for the large, wealthy and powerful to persist in libeling vulnerable victims. Awards of general and aggravated damages alone might simply be regarded as a license fee for continuing a character assassination. The protection of a person’s reputation arising from the publication of false and injurious statements must be effective. The most effective means of protection will be supplied by the knowledge that fines in the form of punitive damages may be awarded in cases where the defendant’s conduct is truly outrageous. I feel that this case is truly outrageous even more so since receiving Shannon Meadows-Lee’s case analyses with injurious falsehoods of insufficient evidence for my prima facie complaints against Xentel, Lyman and therefore Watts. This injurious falsehood by commission staff also represents condoning sex in the work place and subjugating women with sex pictures that is automatic breaches of code 5 and 7. Therefore the commission is encouraging these discriminating employers by their condoning sex in the work place to treat me with additional interference to influence additional anti-social mobbing behaviour of repeating items in my complaints with malice and reckless disregard for my rights and the Human Rights Code without stop at Kinros/Laurentide. This is an authoritarian work abuse system or machine that needs the law to severely penalize it to deter it from continuing this character assassination, and condoning of sex in the work place and anti-social behaviour.
38. I plead that by continuing the deceit of denial of wrongdoing demonstrates personalities and collective authoritarian work abuse system without conscience. Our society appears to be evolving at a faster pace developing more personalities and organizations without conscience as referred to in Robert D. Hare’s book “Without Conscience” and law professor Joel Bakan’s book “The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit Of Profit And Power”. The behaviours that I complain about in my statement of claim of the facts and the denials in the defendants’ statement of defense and the commission’s case analysis is congruent with some of the behavioural characteristics in the DSM-IV for anti-social personality disorder/psychopath of the following: callous unconcern for the feelings of others, reckless disregard for the safety of others, deceitfulness with repeated lying and conning others, incapacity to experience guilt, failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviours.
Furthermore, I infer that my cases demonstrates “serial bullying/mobbing” at work in the sense of serial to repeat offending behaviour because it offends me. Serial mobbing is similar to serial rapist and serial murder, in that the displayed behaviour is repeating of modus operanti and leaving calling cards to psychologically intimidate the target. The calling card from Watts to Mackay, to Xentel, to Lyman and to now Kinros/Laurentide, 4 additional employers in a row after my 2000 complaint is repeating items that I complain about in Watts’ Human Rights complaint like subjugation of sexual picture and hostile disparaging remark disguised as joke of “sucks to be you”, and addresses of “Claude” to mock my convictions/complaints. The repeating of vexatious behaviour that I complain about fits the definition of serial, mobbing, scapegoat, section 10 (1) of the Human Rights Code, and section 81.18 of the Quebec labour code to prohibit “psychological harassment”. Therefore the employment contract law needs to advance to deter this trend of these characteristics evolving even more in our work systems with greater penalties, such as exemplary damages being awarded, given out to these white collar perpetrators and rule breakers. I am asking for development of greater penalties to the defendants in this case to deter future occurrences of repeating this anti-social behaviour particularly with my next employer (6th employer) or some other vulnerable target in their workplaces who might not know their rights as well as I do now, or some other complainant to the commission.
40. I plead that my Charter Rights, equal access and benefit of the law, have been violated by the OHRC by their tortious actions with my complaints against the defendants Watts, Xentel, Lyman and Kinros/Laurentide group of companies. The commission process in it self is inconsistent with the Charter. My situation is worsening by the addition of tortious actions by commission staff. Section 7 states: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. For the past 6 years my right to job security and to reach my full potential has been violated due to being a woman whistleblower of sexual harassment in the work place and therefore sex discrimination by five employers, four of them in a row. The process as it is currently set up is a bureaucratic stalling process that needs to be seriously remedied as this process does not fulfill the purpose of the Human Rights Commission to be remedial for eliminating discrimination and prejudices the complainant’s complaint.
I refer to section 15 (1): Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. The Human Rights process takes the average life span of 5 to 6 years when a civil case that supports human rights violation can be settled within 6 months per Barrister David Harris. The process should follow same procedure as in Civil Law moving quickly to Trial where the evidences is exposed in the open and the facts are argued with both sides present and a trained judge of law decides on the outcome to be consistent with the Charter. Other issues with the commission process that is inconsistent with the Charter are: only accept a 2 page complaint from the complainants which does not represent the full set of facts, the investigation process is secretive government controlled process, the information given to the commissioner after the investigation does not include all the evidence nor the complainant’s rebuttal (cross examination of the respondent’s rebuttal), section 34 and 36 (2), and the common law rules for employment termination and precedent cases should also apply in the jurisdiction of Human Rights.
Furthermore, I am being denied the following right per Section 24 (1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances. A section 36 (2) decision to not refer to Tribunal after the investigation process goes through a conciliation and request payment to settle by the respondents violates my Charter Rights. I refer to the argument in Kulyk v. Toronto (City) Board of Education: “It should be troubling to the administration of justice, and we should be cautious where employment situations coupled with human rights violations are used as tools to prevent victims and aggrieved parties, in the correct circumstances, from having access to our courts. “
41. I plead that the current Human Rights Process is a shield against the person seeking redress for the discrimination sought to be remedied by the legislation and therefore needs to be changed. I refer to Belleghem J.’s argument found in Kulyk v. Toronto (City) Board of Education: “The Human Rights Code is remedial legislation. It addresses the need to facilitate the airing of human rights complaints. Though these broader powers attract more complaints, they could not thereby have been intended to curtail the complainant’s right to sue for those same grievances. If the legislation was intended to limit the right to sue, it would have clearly so stated. Workmen’s compensation legislation and auto insurance legislation are obvious examples of a legislative limit on the right to sue. On the other hand, the very removal of the privative provisions from the earlier human rights legislation supports an interpretation that whatever powers the board has, they are in addition to, rather than alternative to, the complainant’s civil rights, including the right to sue. It is inconsistent with the object of the remedial legislation to use it as a shield against the person seeking redress for the very mischief sought to be remedied by the legislation.” Therefore the Charter of Rights under section 15 (1) and 24 do not prevent a plaintiff to bring forth their claims of discrimination to court of competent jurisdiction. LaForme J. in Kulyk agreed with Belleghem J. in Lehman that: “given the deletion of the exclusive jurisdiction clause from the Human Rights Code, it may be intended to permit judicial incursion into areas formerly occupied by the board in a “proper case”.
42. I plead that I am not your typical target of bullying/mobbing as I do stand up against it to the detriment of my health, my personal relationships, and career stoppage. I expose it every time which is why I am being expulse from the work environment at Watts in 2001, and at Mackay in 2003, at Xentel in 2003, Lyman in 2004, and at Kinros/Laurentide group of companies in 2004, that is 4 additional employers in a row after the Watts 2000 Human Rights Complaint, plus now receiving obstruction of justice by the OHRC. I am being seen by these employers as expendable and if I won’t move on of my own volition these employers just invoke their rights as employer to breach the contract for whatever reason they choose to have on that date of expulsion because common law based on law of early Century society says either party can breach the contract at any time. I have been expulse with the following wrongful reasons: constructive dismissal through Human Rights process 2001, Wrongful Dismissal in 2002 with various reasons including gross incompetence with after the fact acquired fabricated facts, Wrongful Dismissal in 2003 of incompetence with notice offer after condoning my low sales prior to my request to the commission for complaint forms 2003, Wrongful Dismissal in 2004 for lay off claim of closing division and later shortage of work and later hiring two women to do work I could be doing, and finally Wrongful dismissal again in 2004 claiming change in business after 3.5 hours of handing my second written complaint to management when offer at interview was promised of full time permanent position. My experience alones shows that the current legal system, in both jurisdiction of the human rights and civil law, is not working to deter these kinds of employment abuses, particularly sexualizing my work environment. My experience shows that sexually oriented practices endanger a woman’s job, undermines her job performance and threatens her economic livelihood” still. These employers and the Commission show that the support, acceptance and collusion surrounding Workplace Bullying is as much a crime against the dignity of working people such as myself as the abuse itself.
The law needs to advance to view Bullying in the same light as Domestic Violence. I refer to article “Mediation is not the way to deal with cases of Workplace Bullying” by Hadyn Olsen, Employment Relations Advisor/Facilitator. In this article he states: “domestic violence and Workplace Bullying actually share many of the same dynamics; they both involve an addiction to power and they are both centered on controlling others in a detrimental way. Domestic violence is now seen as a perpetrator problem; not a victim problem. It is something only the perpetrator can fix. It is not the victim’s responsibility at all. Regardless of the failings and weaknesses of the victim, there is no excuse or reason that justifies the use of violence. The person who uses violence must take full responsibility for their actions. The perpetrator alone must change. Yet in the employment arena this is not so. We continue to perpetuate the belief that if a business/organization is successful then the employer must be all right. The complaining employee is often suspected—after all what is one individual up against many well-qualified and experienced managers? The employee is seen a troublemaker who is rocking the boat. Or even worse, senior management claim that it is not Workplace Bullying that is the problem, but only personality differences. The complaining employee is seen as expendable, is ignored and consequently moves on or out. The Employment Relations Service and the Human Rights Commission currently are bully-friendly. The practice of demanding mediation as the first response to any workplace grievance (including Workplace Bullying) places our society back in the same position it was in the 60’s and 70’s in regard to domestic violence. It is an entirely inappropriate response to this problem. Workplace Bullying and domestic violence are almost identical twins. Why then do we have different ways of dealing with them? There should be no tolerance for the practice of abusing others. “
I can prove that I am seen as a “troublemaker” by this authoritarian work abuse system for just making complaints that I am allowed to do which is breaking the norm of silence by the following incidents: at Watts being addressed as “hi trouble”, at Xentel being terminated at meeting about my complaints, at Lyman fabricating one unsuitable employee misconduct charge regarding my work harassment emails, and at Kinros comment by Nayana of “if I made as many complaints as you I would be a millionaire”. The employment law as it stands today will not deter these employers from continuing this behaviour in our work systems.
43. I plead that what I experienced at Watts and MMP, and repeated at Xentel, Lyman and Kinros/Laurentide group of companies was the premeditative passing around to various members in the work group what pushes my buttons and causes me to complain, particularly sexual items, sucks to be you hostile comment and addressing me with “Claude”. That the none sexual items are used as camouflage to image to the authorities a delusional disorder to discredit the target while continuing to sexually harass her or sexualizing her work environment. I infer that this is a work system problem where employers hide beyond the wordings in their company policies to harass by imaging an internal due process or refusal all together of internal due process, then passing info to harass me with another member causing the cycle to perpetuate so I have to complain again and we go through another imaging of internal due process or refusal of internal due process. An employee should only have to make one sexual harassment complaint not more than 1 in any work place if the system and law were working correctly as more than one complaint infers “poison work environment” and “work group mobbing”, and therefore discrimination practices and illegal labour practices.
I refer to the comments made in Robichaud v. Her Majesty the Queen, as represented by the Treasuary Board [at D/2709, para. 22321]: “The broad remedies provided by section 41, the general necessity for effective follow-up, including the cessation of the discriminatory practice, imply a similar responsibility on the part of the employer. That is most clearly the case with respect to the requirement in paragraph 41 (2)(a) that the person against whom an order is made “take measures, including the adoption of a special program, plan or arrangement…to prevent the same or a similar practice occurring in the future”. Only an employer could fulfill such a mandate.” I like to infer as well that the employer can also influence the work group to continue the same or a similar practice occurring in the future by moving the practice to another employee or next employer. Watts encouraged their employees to continue the harassment by moving the tactics around to various individuals in a systematic campaigned of harassment and I got told by Watts’ HR manager “it may get worst before it gets better” in February 2001. Watts passed this technique to Mackay, and these two employers then passed this technique to Xentel, Lyman, and then these four employers passed this technique on to Kinros/Laurentide group of companies. Only the employer can take measures, including the adoption of a special program, plan or arrangement to prevent or continue the same or a similar practice occurring in the future.
All of these employers fail this test showing they did not take measures or adopt special programs but rather hide behind their harassment policies to continue the harassment within the work group and without the work group. I infer that had I complained at all of these employers after every single sexual comment/gesture/picture it would not stop this tactic as these employers did not want to provide me with respectful work environment nor an internal due process as they were only interested in injuring the target and inducing breach of contract. Also I infer that the commission too fails this test to put measures in place to stop this anti-social behaviour from being repeated against the same complainant by fabricating insufficient evidence when subjugating employee to sexual picture is automatic breach of code 5 and 7.
44. I plead that the problems I am having with the commission is still on going. On December 15th 2004, I supplied Ms. Rioux at the commission with information regarding control test prior to
submitting my new complaints to the commission that was ignored and caused the commissioner
to try a section 34 for Laurentide Manufacturing complaint. According to The 2005 Annotated
Ontario Human Rights Code book with regards to applying a section 34 at page 296-297: “in the
interests of fairness, Section 34 issues should be identified as early as possible in the process,
preferably at intake or upon service of the complaint; if Section 34 appears to apply to a complaint at intake, Commission staff has a responsibility to inquire into basic issues such as a delay,
jurisdiction, an alternative recourse or Section 34 (1)(b) issues and to ensure that the complaint
sets out all the facts that are relevant to a determination of a decision under Section 34.” I had requested from Ms. Rioux to file one complaint that includes all three companies owned by Laurentide Manufacturing that was ignored to label my new complaints vexatious. I advised the commissioner in my reconsideration application that once again Ms. Rioux or her supervisor has demonstrated another obstruction of justice incident that is not in the interest of fairness but for another improper purpose and perhaps prejudice due to legal issues I have commenced civilly against her. Also in her November 23rd email to me Ms. Rioux replaces “dicks” with “chicks” and asks me “what is the incident of sexual harassment? If you are referring to the “men are ruled by their chicks” comment, please note that if does NOT amount to sexual harassment.” My November 15th email to Dina Waik clearly stated “dicks” not “chicks”. As to the commissioner’s decision alleging duplication of complaint from the Kinros Complaint
and no evidence of employee payroll information characterizes vexatious per section 34
I refer to Black’s Law Dictionary: “A pattern of conduct means a regular form of behaviour over
a period of time and requires recurring incidents of related or similar requests on the part of the
requester. Examples of an abuse of the right of access are proceedings without any reasonable
ground; whose purpose is not legitimate, but is designed to harass; situations where a process is
used more than once, revisiting an issue previously addressed. A pattern of conduct that would interfere with the operations of an institution is one that would obstruct or hinder the range of effectiveness of the institution’s activities.” Being scapegoat by 5 employers repeating same items to get me to complain to paint me mentally ill or paint me vexatious litigant is a pattern by
employers being vexatious towards me with the commission encouraging this behaviour by
now labeling my complaints vexatious. Discrimination and Harassment are illegal pattern of conduct regardless of the number of my complaints and should not be so easily dismissed by pointing the blame on the target of discrimination. The number of my complaints proves scapegoat campaign and conspiracy to paint me delusional or vexatious.
Obviously the commission felt I had reasonable ground with my Kinros complaint since 4 of the
staff from Laurentide has been included in that complaint, therefore the commission has failed to
prove that my Laurentide complaint is groundless. This is my first complaint against Laurentide
and not a revisitation and the commission has failed to prove designed to harass Laurentide whose staff harassed me of which the commission has included in the Kinros complaint as respondents.
My complaints in no way interfere with the operations of Laurentide and they have a lawyer to
handle the complaint process.
Furthermore, I like to refer to Black’s Law Dictionary again: “When it has been established that a request has been made in “bad faith” there are no further requirements to be met in finding the request to be “frivolous” or “vexatious”. Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed.) defines “bad faith” to be: “The opposite of “good faith”, generally implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or other contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to ones rights, but by some interested or sinister motive…”bad faith” is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather it implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with a furtive design or ill will.” The commissioner selected vexatious because this is my 7th complaint because 5 employers are participating in a scapegoat campaign which the commission is
obstructing to move my evidence to court room sitting because it would provide adverse outcome.
There is an absence of “bad faith” and “frivolous” in commissioner’s decision which I infer would
demonstrate a lack of “vexatious” conduct by this complainant. In commissioner’s decision, he
does not feel I make complaints in bad faith for sinister motive nor does he feel I make frivolous
complaints, therefore the commission has failed in demonstrating grounds for vexatious to harass
another in order to not deal with my complaint. In fact, the commissioner’s decision and
arguments put forth I infer are vexatious towards the complainant, to harass in the form of causing
frustrations and for improper purpose. The fact that the commission is refusing to do their
statutory duty with all of my other complaints under section 36 (2) with fabrication of insufficient evidence, prior to these section 34 attempts, infers that the commission is encouraging Watts, Xentel, Mackay, and Lyman to interfere with my employment relations at Kinros and Laurentide to paint me a vexatious litigant as well as delusional. The commission is right in one regard that the treatment I am receiving as per my complaints is vexatious thus requiring the commission to do their statutory duty.
45. I plead that I will be able to prove all of my allegations against all defendants based on Bennie J. argument in Employment Manual Litigant book at 7.248 of: “The level of blameworthiness may be influenced by many factors: 1. whether the misconduct was planned and deliberate, 2. the intent and motive of the defendant, 3. whether the defendant persisted in the outrageous conduct over a lengthy period of time, 4. whether the defendant concealed or attempted to cover up its misconduct, 5. the defendant’s awareness that what he or she was doing was wrong, 6. whether the defendant profited from its misconduct, 7. whether the interest violated by the misconduct was known to be deeply personal to the plaintiff.” My evidence and material fact will show that the investigation staff provided me with a sham investigation, concealed my evidence and controlled the witnesses to cover up the misconduct by Watts, Xentel, Lyman and the intake office staff at the commission in 2003/2004. My evidence will show that these employers Watts, Xentel, Lyman and now Kinros/Laurentide attempted in each case to cover up its misconduct validating that they knew that the behaviour was unlawful. Particularly, my evidence shows that Kinros’ attempt to cover up their misconduct with deceitful statement to the Ontario Human Rights Commission that they never received my two complaint letters while I was employed and only received one of these letters after my employment was terminated which does not make sense per what I wrote. This material fact demonstrates that this employer knows what they did is wrong, is covering up that wrong with another wrong of tort of deceit.
46. On June 24th 2004 I applied to ad to an accounting firm, Scott and Associates. Nancy called for interview on August 17th at 1:00 in Burlington at Billings Court just down the road from MacKay. The interview went well and Nancy mentioned she was looking for bookkeeper/accounting clerks for 3 different clients of hers. On August 20th she left me a message that a Jim Westman would be calling me for an interview. I had interview with Jim Westman on August 24th from 4:30 to 6:45. Jim spent most of the interview time discussing processes for cabinet departments at KINROS. He showed me his excel spreadsheet for job costing analysis, and showed me the billing tracking records of completed cabinets leaving KINROS and going to the mother company Laurentide. Jim advised that he needed someone doing both accounting and administration. I said I would not mind 75% accounting and 25% administration. Jim advised that to start there would be administration duties but that as KINROS grew later my position would evolve to mainly accounting position. From this interview I thought there was a healthy flow of invoices being produced for KINROS and healthy cash position. He had several departments that he was developing for the past year: counter tops, pick doors, Como machine, custom design cabinetry, and the granite department. Jim took me on a tour. He advised that he had other candidates to interview before he made his decision and that there would be another interview.
The second interview was with Nayana at Laurentide at 111 Brockley Drive. She asked a few questions. She felt comfortable with Nancy’s interviewing me prior to this meeting at the accountant’s office. Jim drove me back to the KINROS location and advised me in his car that I was the candidate selected for KINROS position. He advised me the start rate was $14.00. I advised that at Mackay I was paid $15.00 to start and after 3-months increased to $16.00. He agreed to start at $14.00 if I work out after 2 months this rate will increase to $15.00 and then after a year it would increase to $16.00. I asked if he could put this in writing in a letter along with required duties and he agreed he would do this letter.
47. I Started working at KINROS Industries on Monday, September 13th 2004. I met Jim Westman at KINROS location at 8:00 only to be advised that I will be working this week at Laurentide Manufacturing and then we went over to the Brockley location in our separate cars. This location is one block away from Lyman Custom Brokers. On September 13th Sue called me “Juliet” followed by “Hon.” I advised her my name is “Claudette.”
48. On September 14th around 3:40 Paul comes to Kindy’s office started while I was sitting on one side and Kindy on the other side of the desk. Paul started the conversation with making “Boobie” comment that he repeated 4 times followed by one comment of “prick. Kindy just reacted with comment “you’re gross”.
49. On September 15th in the morning Raman and Arlene were asking each other what colour of underwear was the other wearing. Arlene said hers is blue. Later they ask Nayana what colour was she wearing. I was sitting in the other office not participating. They advise Nayana they were wearing thongs and Raman advising Nayana it’s not that uncomfortable. At 10:40 Paul is in what they call the service office sitting across from me doing his service work and says in my presence “sucks to be your” all of a sudden. In the afternoon Kindy back to calling me “Colette” twice and both times I correct her.
50. On September 16th at 9:45 Paul coming into the office from behind me calls Kindy today “Honey.”
51. On September 17th at 9:00 Paul comes to service office where I am placed to work on Kindy’s computer. He says “you’re still here?” almost yelling at me. At 9:16 Paul says to Kindy “we will rock”. In the afternoon Kindy says to Paul “let’s rock” and Paul repeats the phrase back to her in my presence in the service office. Near end of day Paul makes comment about having a “heart attack.” I said did you check your blood pressure yet? He said it’s too late at this point. I said oh yen you have to take some pills. In mid afternoon, client of MacKay’s, Mark Palladini, shows up at Laurentide in Kindy’s office. As Kindy and Mark go out the door to go downstairs Mark throws out a sexual comment that I am made to hear at my desk in the service office of a “sex change.” I do KINROS’ payroll and was advised by Nayana that the following employees of KINROS have been transferred to Laurentide: Bernie, Alex, and Jason Jell. At about 4:45 Kindy now says she is having a heart attack. So I asked her why and she says because of the people line up in the hall way waiting for their pay.
52. On September 20th in the morning Kindy is by Nayana’s desk making comment that her bra matches her underwear today.
53. On September 21st, I found note left on my desk for me in the morning of “Where are you?? …honey! Me!”
54. On September 23rd at 12:04 I went to Kindy’s office for work related matter and Paul was with her. He says under his breath as I walk in “sucks to be you.” Kindy was sitting just rolled her eyes. At 2:53 Kindy comes to her old office where Nayana is sitting at my computer and I am standing to the right of Nayana reviewing work related matters. Kindy lifts her breast up with her hands and says “my breast are too big”. Nayana laughs while I ignore the obvious attempt to draw me into a vulgar, unprofessional, and none work related conversation about Kindy’s big breast. Both look at me. Kindy then repeats “my breast are too big” at me trying to get me to make comment and condone this behaviour. I say “I don’t care” and I don’t laugh and I document the incident.
55. On September 24th at 3:15 Clinic clicking her pen today after I went to her desk to ask her of client with broken drawer problem. After 4:00 I met Luis who works in Toronto. He sat at desk across from Nayana’s old desk. I made comment to him that Paul “was providing me with a poison work environment to make me quit.” At 3:48 Clinic comes to Nayana’s desk about Silvestre and she starts clicking her pen like Judy at Lyman, and Ron at Mackay.
56. On September 27th at 1:35 Paul comes to my desk in Kindy’s old office and stands on the other side facing me and calls me “Hon.” I said “its Claudette.” He says “its either Hon or Chickie.” I said “it’s Claudette.” Today the new girl, Sherry, starts to work.
57. On Tuesday, September 28th Paul subjugates me in Kindy’s office with “sucks to be you” again and later he comes into the accounting office by Raman’s desk and yells over to me sitting in the other office and calls me “Red.” I completely ignore his antics. After 4:30 and after Sherry leaves Nayana asked me what I thought of the new girl. I said I thought she was doing ok but a bit slow. Nayana earlier asked me to train her on entering accounts payables in business visions. Nayana made the comment that she was not a go getter like me, looking for work, instead she just sit there waiting for work. Nayana said she likes it when I ask her lots of questions. Nayana says she hopes the new girl picks things up as quickly like I do. I advised Nayana that Sherry knows her stuff and that she should give her a chance.
58. On September 29th I come back to my desk after being at KINROS and I notice Nayana passing on Bank Reek for KINROS to Sherry to do. Nothing is said to me that she was just training her on this one month bank reconciliation. At this point I had received conflicting comments as to when I might be moved to KINROS with management claiming reason for delay is the computer system. They were waiting for the fellow from business visions to come in to clean my computer so that it just contained business visions for KINROS and off the network.
59. On October 1st I went to KINROS and was discussing payroll and time cards with Jim Westman at his desk. He was showing how to retrieve time card information in that software. Brad comes up and advises Jim while he was training me on payroll that his staff was working his balls off and then he said sorry Claudette.
60. On October 5th around 4:00 Jim advised me on the phone that he hears a lot of good things about me and that he joked about Nayana might be stealing me away from KINROS. After 4:30 Nayana advises me again that she wants someone like me working for her here at Laurentide.
61. On October 6th at 12:05 Surinder makes the comment “Brad doing dick over there.”
62. On October 7th in the morning I have a conversation with Sherry about my suits in hopes to counter the obvious defamation of character happening again now at Laurentide to influence this employer to repeating items in my complaints again. At 1:14 Surinder comes to accounting office and sits down at Nayana’s desk and said “Brad is a Troublemaker” and he winks at me.
63. On October 8th at 12:15 Surinder comes to see me in Kindy’s old office and stands to the right of me against the wall/cabinet. He went to grab himself in the groin area with a closed fist. I immediately said “what are you doing? You should not grab yourself there in front of a lady in the office.” He says he was just grabbing his button. I said “it did not look like that to me” as he quickly departs from my desk area going pass Nayana’s desk and out the accounting department by the other door not letting me finish. Later I mentioned this incident to Sherry and she remembers hearing this conversation and I said to her he was grabbing him self like Michael Jackson and what I saw does not look like fixing his button.
64. On Tuesday, October 12th both Clinic and Jim play the pen clicking game when they are around me. Terry stops by to pick up his blades and he tries to hug me. I advise him that I only allow a hand shake and gave him my hand to shake.
65. On October 13th in the morning Sherry is looking at stuff on the internet. She shows me a photo of a naked old lady with her breast hanging down and wearing a thong. I immediately put her on notice that I don’t like those jokes. I advised her of problems I have when others try to project their humor onto me. I said “what one considers funny does not mean another has to accept it.” I told her I filled a stalking survey last night and how my stalker passes info to get others to repeat things I complain about and that my boundary request have been violated for 6 years. In the afternoon, Brad called using the phrase “busting his balls off.” I asked if he would refrain from using it as I find it unwelcoming as it has sexual connotations to it.
66. On October 15th Brad gives me his rates to bill Abruzzi Homes Nayana advised me to speak to Clinic regarding billing this client. Clinic advises me not to bill as they already collected and said will have to pay taxes. I said “yes?” I did not understand why we would not want to pay taxes on billing to client. Late afternoon, I went to Kindy’s office and as I passed Paul out in the hall with some clients he says to me “shut up.” I ignore his hostile remark which is disparaging remark disguised as a joke and went into Kindy’s office. He follows me into her office and bumps his bulging stomach into my body. I was not comfortable with this perverse joke either. I again ignored Paul and went to my desk and documented the incident. Also in afternoon I call Jim up on his cell and responded in french “c’est juste moi.” Jim responded out of the blue with disparaging remark disguised as joke of “is this the hot woman he is hearing about?” I respond “No I’m not a hot woman must be some other french woman.” This is the only unusual comment by Jim to me that made me feel awkward.
67. On October 18th at 8:44 I went to Kindy while she was standing at the photo copier to advise her to talk to Paul and advise him that I did not appreciate his joke on Friday of bumping his body into mine. She said she will speak to him.
68. On October 19th at 8:08 Sherry shows me today a picture of her sisters and her. She makes the comment regarding the size of their breast that the older sister is like Dolly Parton, middle sister like someone else, and Sherry is flat chested. I made no comment and waited till we move away from this conversation. In the morning I had a conversation with Sherry regarding Watts trying to induce a mental illness of a delusional disorder with mobbing from coworkers. She said she has experience watching this behaviour by work group in the past at some of her previous employers. At 11:00 Surinder was outside my office by receptionist desk and calls me “Claudia” smiling with a not so innocent smirk. I said “Claudette.” Clinia walks by me clicking her pen again. I brought this paper documenting the incident with Surinder out at 11:07 to receptionist area making sure he sees me documenting and putting this note in my fanny pack. In the late afternoon we are back to underwear subject with Kindy at Nayana’s desk with her Victoria Secrets catalogue. At 4:33 behind me I can hear Sherry or Raman make the comment “She’s a trouble maker” as they left the accounting office by door by Nayana’s desk.
69. On October 21st I had conversation with Nayana discussing the sabotaging of my work by Mackay which included the use of PC Anywhere to create errors in my work and how I caught all of them. I openly discuss this in case they decide to try sabotaging my work and this was to put the work group on notice that I am exceedingly good at catching people doing this. Sherry heard the conversation.
70. On October 22nd in the morning when I came in I notice Sherry was upset so I asked her why. She said it’s this place and Nayana. She believes Nayana is bullying her. She talked to her husband who advised her to wait as it’s too early to quit or to talk to Kal. I advised Sherry that I did not feel at this time that Nayana was a bully, that she was over stretched, some what over controlling and that it was due to the problems that she is aware of how things were managed here. I advised Sherry to give Nayana a chance. I said because of being defrauded of employment my belief is that everyone should get a chance. In the afternoon Surinder stops by my desk calls me today “Claudia.” I asked him what you call me. He just stands there and smiles showing intent. I said “it’s Claudette.” He says “he forgot.” I said “a lot of excuses yeh?’ Later Surinder advises me that Brad and Pete were not in today and that they may not be coming back. Jim later confirmed this and advised me that Brad is to have meeting with Harry on Monday and that is all he can say. At end of the day Nayana thanked me for my help.
71. On October 25th Sherry called Surinder a “troublemaker.” I said yes he likes to create conflict and he has been bad mouthing Brad to me. By late afternoon Kindy had to make a trip to the bank for some urgent cash flow matter. Kindy was by Nayana’s desk going on about her cleavage and that she had to go to the bank and flirt with her cleavage. I was sitting at my desk ignoring the conversation again. Later while I was at the filing cabinet by Nayana’s desk, Nayana decides to draw me into conversation about young girls like to push out their breast when walking showing she encourages this type of conversation and is attempting to influence me to have these types of conversations. I stated I never did that and that I was not interested in such things, that I was a tom boy. Sherry added to the conversation that she too was a tom boy in school. Today I did up letter for TD Bank that we were closing our account and gave copy to Kindy who was supposed to drop it off to the bank and sign the required forms. I was also advised by Surinder that he collected $3000.00 and Kindy gave to Harry this money on Thursday.
72. On October 26th in the morning Sherry calls in sick. Raman and Nayana advised me that they want me to stay here and not go to KINROS and help Sherry when Nayana goes on maternity leave. They did not feel Sherry could handle it. Raman said that I was more aggressive. I corrected her that I was assertive not aggressive. She also said that Nayana and I work well together. I suggested that for the things that Jim wanted me to do I could just go over there for an hour and do those items and come back here. I said I was easy going about their suggestion. I was moved over today to Sherry’s desk as they were going to move Nayana to my desk and later possibly move me to Nayana’s old desk. Later Nayana got upset with invoices left for client Verbeek that she had advised Sherry not to hold them as this client takes a discount based on date of receipt of invoice. At 3:05 Arlene was sitting at chair in Kindy’s old office when Kindy comes to join her in same chair hugging Arlene. Arlene starts to make comments about “Kindy’s big boobs.” The two of them are giggling away in chair. At 3:33 Surinder in Office with Arlene yells over to me “right Claudia.”
73. On October 27th I discuss with Sherry that Watts has my phone bugged following me around in my interviews and next employers. I mentioned how it took me 5 months this time around before someone would hire me when previously it took a month. I mentioned that I had wonderful letters of praise from Rentway and no reference from last 4 employers that I can use. She said she has letters of praise. I said they may come in handy some day. I also discussed with Sherry that yesterday I was exposed to lesbian behaviour by Arlene and Kindy. I mentioned how people use humour to harass others and that’s what 4 employers did and why I have 5 Human Rights complaints. Arlene was in the room when I said this last part. Later, Sherry and I had conversation on anxiety and mental illness. She discussed her panic attacks that hit her after her son’s accident. I discuss my anxiety being increased at Mackay causing me to take a leave of absence. At 12:00 Surinder comes up to me from behind and says “hi Claude” and I ignore him completely and document incident. Surinder also yells over to my desk asking me if he can borrow $20.00 from me and I ignored that request too. On this day I had a conversation with Nayana regarding the $3000.00 Kindy/Surinder collected from Mike Schutte and I was advised that Nayana is to do an inter company transaction to Mike Schutte for the $3000.00. Surinder advises he has receipts for the $100.00 petty cash he received from me in his van.
74. On October 28th I asked Nayana if I was staying at this location. She now advises that I was going to KINROS as Jim needs me there. At about 10:00 I went over to KINROS to collect hours for payroll. I spoke to Brad and he used “balls” again. I advised him how 4 employers used humour to harass me. As a result, I advised him I have 5 Human Rights complaint and 3 suits on the go. That I have a binder with over 75 cases and that I am pursuing all of this without a lawyer. He asked why I was receiving this behaviour. I said because I am intelligent.
75. On October 29th Peter from CMI comes in accounting office asking if I had a cheque for him. I advised him that I did not. He starts madly clicking his pen now. In late afternoon, Surinder is in the hall by Maria and the photo copier. I went to the photo copier when he says to Maria “how is your ass?” I immediately made comment to him that he better not ask me that ever. Clinia quickly made excuse that Maria hurt her self that’s by Surinder asked this question. Today the Business Vision guy was in office in afternoon. When he sees me he says “your still here” and I said yes they don’t know if I am going. Later when Maria was leaving for the day I asked her how she hurt her ass. She gave no reason, just starts laughing and went into the bathroom.
76. On November 2nd at 9:16 Brad calls me from KINROS and now says the word “fuck” again and right after our conversation the other day where I advised him and Sherry I don’t use that word. So I asked if he can tone it down with the use of “fuck.” In the afternoon, Sherry’s behaviour very immature. She was talking to her self but out loud enough for everyone to hear behind me by the filing cabinet showing her displeasure. She was going on in sarcastic tone about mistakes, and things missing in files. It appeared to be a display to hurt some one of indirect aggressive communication. She was definitely angry about something. I chose to ignore it and stay at my desk and work. At 12:00 Surinder comes to my desk in Kindy’s old office and calls me “Claude” then “Claudia”. I correct him. He says he forgets and I said “no you are doing it intentionally as you saw me write it down and now you repeat.”
77. On November 3rd in morning Sherry complained of her keyboard sticking. I said that Mackay did that change my keyboard to impede my work with sticky keyboard. Sherry’s keyboard was sticking on this day and only this day. At about 10:28 Surinder comes to me and stands by the filing cabinet and today he addresses me as “Claudette” and says “did I call you right?” He laughs showing again intent. Then Sherry immediately says to me “Colette, I don’t know why I called you that.” I said it’s an epidemic and I later said by filing cabinet “mocking.” Later around 1:22 Arlene calls me “Claudine” and I said that’s not nice and mocking and Sherry says yes mocking. I worked today till 5:20 the last hour with Jim in the lunch room reconciling his expense and petty cash items from December 2003 to now.
78. Around this time Nayana mentioned to Sherry and I that the company holds a Christmas Party and she mentioned my husband, Ron, can come. She mentioned that they have Indian dancers. Nayana also mentioned that the company also has a summer barbecue. This sounded like I had a future with the company.
79. On November 4th Surinder came to me to request I have business cards made up for him for KINROS as Sales Representative. Because I did not trust Surinder I went to ask Kal if I should do this task. Kal said to have cards made for Surinder but with no title. At this time he suggested I have cards made up for myself to hand out to vendors. I asked him what title he wanted me to use and suggested Bookkeeper/Administrator. He said no that Office Manager would be a better title.
80. On November 5th I sent email to Dina Waik regarding fax I just sent her of a copy of John Docherty’s September 15th letter regarding our meeting with bantering of a persecution disorder of “people on the floor were not out to get me”.
81. On November 8th I was advised by Kindy to do up a cheque for Hardwoods to pay them $5015.21 to replace cheque for $4990.00 that went NSF. Kindy says she will be giving me the cash to make this payment. By end of day she brings me $1300.00 cash to deposit in the bank not the full $5000.00 she promised earlier.
82. On November 8th I received response back from Dina Waik acknowledging receipt of the fax I sent her regarding John Docherty’s September 15th Letter. Dina Waik also requested from me a witness statement for Lyman and she sent me attachment which I printed and started to work on it.
83. Around this time there was one afternoon where Nayana upset Sherry to the point of tears. On this same day Nayana was nic picking with Sherry about her handling the reconciliation of the Richelieu and Hettich accounts. Nayana was monopolizing the conversation not letting Sherry talk and explain why it is so difficult to reconcile and the problems she was having. I was drawn into this conversation because Nayana felt more confident with me assisting Sherry than Sherry doing it herself. Nayana was not listening to either one of us on the problems we were having reconciling this account and quite frankly she was not making sense and was repeating herself. This was the worst that I saw Nayana with her communication effort to date. And this is when I made the criticism to Nayana that she does not listen. I went back to my desk and worked on KINROS items and time went by and then someone said that the other girl was crying. I turned around and Sherry was not at her desk. Sherry went crying into Kal’s office to complain about Nayana. Later Nayana was called into Kal’s office by Sherry. When they both returned to the accounting office I could see Sherry’s eyes were red from crying. Nayana made some comment that Sherry got upset by Nayana’s communication with her and Nayana apologized to Sherry with some comment that Sherry is soft. I just said I’m tough from all the bullying these past six years. After Sherry left for the day, Nayana takes me aside and started to bad mouth Sherry with me showing that Nayana cannot accept criticism of herself. She made comment that now Kal does not think Sherry would be able to handle the position when she is on maternity leave and wants her to come in the mornings. I advised Nayana that what was discussed in that meeting is between you, Kal and Sherry.
84. On November 10th in the afternoon, Vivian came up to drop off some papers for Sherry. She comes up clicking her pen today. Later I went downstairs to drop off the statement for KINROS, and passed by Terry with client and I advised her of client who stopped by to see her and I have some paper upstairs for her from him. Terry pulled her pants on the right and then on the left which looked like putting on a show for me. I went up stairs. Rick advised me he would get me all the odometer readings to renew the licenses. Nayana and I had argument over $3000.00 that Kindy said she received from KINROS client Mike Schutte for granite job. I wanted to know what happened to the funds that should have gone to KINROS accounts. Nayana said she did not receive $3000.00 from Mike Schutte but rather a draft from Harry Sihra which she deposited in Laurentide’s account. I mentioned that Harry got that fund from Kindy from Mike Schutte so really the funds are from KINROS’ client and should hit his receivable account to be matched to outstanding balance on invoice for granite job. Nayana kept interrupting me not allowing me to explain my opinion and not listening to my comments talking overtop of me. I made comment that I can’t work with this type of accounting. Nayana made comment that just recently I seem upset and something about my wanting to quit. She said I should not concern myself with this transaction as it is an inter company transaction. Nayana advised that I was loosing it. I said “why because I am challenging you.” Nayana took this in the wrong light and said “I don’t need anymore challenges.” I meant challenge in the sense of questioning how she and Kindy are handling the accounting and she took my comment of “challenging” as some kind of threat to the point that she repeats it. I was upset because daily I get calls from vendors looking for payment and I have no receivables for cash to come in to pay these vendors and when I get a receivable the cash goes to Laurentide not KINROS to pay their vendors. Or I get granite job completed by Brad and he gives me the numbers to bill for Abruzzio and Clinia says not to bill as we already collected and would have to charge taxes. This did not seem to be proper accounting to me. Also, based on my interview and the discussion with Jim I thought KINROS had a healthy receivable to collect from and when I start to work I find out that this is not the case. The receivables have a credit balance of $582,074.33 which I cannot collect to pay matching expenses. Also there was no mentioned during my interviews of the number of NSF cheques being issued at KINROS or Laurentide.
When Jim came in I was still upset and asked to speak with him. We went to the stairwell by Denron’s office. I advised Jim what happened and that my concern with Nayana’s communication style and her poor listening skills. I said the way you and I are conversing is communication. I advised him I can’t work with illegitimate business transactions. I made comment about the $1000.00 purchase of steel under the table that he has as expense for $1000.00 cash received. I mentioned if it is not legitimate I don’t want to handle it. I mentioned what Nayana said about me quitting and that it probably came out because of what I said. Jim sounded surprised said that Nayana has very high regard for me and that he was pleased with my efforts. He said he hoped I would not quit as he needed me for KINROS and that it took him time to find me.
Around 2:30 we have a meeting in Kindy’s office to discuss the situation with the granite
department for KINROS which included: Kindy, Jim, Brad, and me. I printed off A/R summary
and highlighted clients that were granite related. During this meeting Jim made comment that we
we’re not at chapter 11 yet, information he forgot to provide me with at my interview. Kindy
request that Brad is to ask all clients for 50 % up front to help pay for the materials. We advise
Kindy now Mondial has us on COD and being difficult sending us stone on order. During this
meeting Kindy made comment that the Banks put customers on list if they deposit $5000.00
in cash for investigation of money laundering. I asked her is that why you gave me $1300.00 to
deposit on Friday and $3700.00 to deposit next day? Later, after 5:00 Jim has a discussion with me
to advise me that all granite jobs will be billed and if Harry and Surinder want to do their deals
these jobs are to be billed through Laurentide and pay 50% up front. Jim also tried to reassure me
that there is future potential for the granite department and that Laurentide has many good points
in its customer base. He mentioned that a lot of builders will be looking for the granite top from
KINROS. I took this conversation to be Jim’s attempt to reassure me that there was a future at
KINROS and it will get better with the cash flow situation.
85. On November 11th in the morning I went to KINROS to collect hours for payroll and talk to Brad. We got on the topic of putting people on notice. Brad mentioned that he knew what I meant when I requested him not to use the term “busting his balls” with me in conversation. He mentioned that he had been a union president so was familiar with harassment. I revealed to him how all this mobbing got started with one male coworker at Rentway and now I am labeled a problem. Marybell was in her office and could hear everything. I knew that the work group was repeating things again out of my human rights complaint since the start of my employment so I kept making these conversations to tell my side of the story in vain hopes to try to counter the defamation of character following me around to next employers in hopes to put a stop to the anti-social behaviour. I told Brad how at Watts Verd would touch another staff and say “can’t do that that’s sexual harassment.”
When I get back to Laurentide I notice Kindy, Nayana, Kal and Harry behind closed doors in Kindy’s office. Shortly after that at 11:22 Paul is at the door to Nayana’s office with Kindy and some other man in conversation. Paul makes mocking comment to the guy “that’s harassment to touch my belly” referring to himself. I look at Sherry who heard it too. Sherry said to me “did you hear this.” I said yes. I felt that my conversation this morning is getting around and the work group is deciding to increase the harassment of repeating things in my complaint to provoke me with disparaging comments disguised as jokes. Sherry too thought it was mocking.
Later Dan of Denron is standing to the right of Nayana in her office and he is clicking his pen. At 3:10 Jen says she is sent by Kindy under the pretext to see me about license stickers. She starts drawing me into conversation with inappropriate question of “why I don’t show off my nice thin body.” I respond simply with “I don’t want attention to my body.” She moves into drawing me into conversation first on Superior/Inferior complex and I comment that “I don’t want to be inferior or superior just an equal.” Jen moves into conversation about muscle and body building and starts to show me her belly with pierced ring. Now that she has my attention and has me smiling and relaxed she then all of a sudden moves the conversation about “men being ruled by their dicks” and gesturing around her crotch like she has a penis. This is the Watts entrapment game to draw me into sex talk in the work place. Sherry laughs at this and I just stare back at this vulgar display. I said “I don’t hang around men like that” showing my distaste for the subject. Jen walks out of accounting department without getting or giving me the alleged license stickers. As I leave at end of day I go to the lunch room and Jen is there and she now makes comment about my ego. I said “I have no ego as I told you earlier I’m only interested in being an equal.” Then Jen makes some comment about my high standards must come from my up bringing. I advised her that I did not get my high standards from my up bringing as my parents were alcoholics. Jen then comments that she was raped by her father. As I walk down the hall I thought she said “and that’s a joke.” So I said “I did not appreciate it nor did I appreciate your earlier joke” and I went downstairs and left to go home.
86. On November 12th I went in and showed Sherry my letter that I was going to hand to Kindy. She said that it would cause the work group to mob me. I said mobbing won’t work on wearing me down to induce me to quit as the last two employers failed at it and had to breach the contract with wrongful dismissal. As soon as Kindy came in I went to her office and gave her my complaint letter and asked her to talk to her father regarding my letter. Next Nayana advises me she is putting copy of my letter in my employee file and that I would receive a meeting with her and Kal later in the morning. At 10:51 Raman comes to Nayana’s desk to the right of her and says “Claudette spank my ass” and then says “Glady’s spank my ass.” I look over and at Sherry and asked her “did you hear that?” Sherry confirmed that Raman said “Claudette spank my ass” first. I said the mobbing mocking has started because of my letter. Later in the hall way Gladys passes me by with a smirk on her face so I asked her what’s so funny she said nothing and walked away.
Around mid morning there was celebration for Indian Christmas with food downstairs. Nayana advised me to go with her to get some food. In the room where the food was I could see Paul Underhill to the left as I entered with a big grin on his face looking at me. Going upstairs Nayana said something to the effect that I thought Paul was harassing Nayana? My letter was very clear it stated Paul was making mocking comment about harassment in Nayana’s office not that he was harassing Nayana. I typed up the hours I needed to make up for Monday’s morning off and gave it to Nayana showing only 1.5 hours to make up. This is when Nayana advised me that she won’t need my help on Saturday and that I can make up the 1.5 hours next week. Previously, Nayana required my help to assist Sherry with catching up on the back log for Laurentide Manufacturing and Custom Woodworking. Sherry was coming in on the weekends with Nayana to catch up.
At about 10:40 I could Arlene snickering and whispering over by Sherry’s desk. At 11:20 Mr.
Glover of Glover Electric came to see me again for cheque replacement. Today he decides to
forget my name is Claudette and brings his sister Pat along. He calls me today Charlotte in a not
very friendly manner rather mocking and contemptuous manner. I just stood there ignoring this intentional behaviour. Then he asks “what’s your name?” “Charlotte?” At 11:46 Sue Kayo
comes to my desk asking “Can I borrow your stapler Hon?” I said “please call me Claudette”. Sue is now not so friendly. Sue made excuse “just a habit.” I responded with “well just a habit
call me Claudette.” She said “I’ll try”.
At noon I took my lunch and did no work, and so did Sherry. Everyone else had left the floor
except Raman and we noted this. Sherry said something about a meeting downstairs and we were
not included. While eating I could hear Sherry say to someone on the phone “Conspiracy going
on.” I asked who is that your husband? I gave her my phone number and address and advised her
that I thought they would move into termination mode because of my complaint and the additional
mocking behaviour we both notice this morning.
At 1:40 I called Kindy on her cell phone and left message asking her to advise who will be doing
the bank runs since she did not respond to my letter regarding paying km charge for use of my car.
It was obvious Kindy was avoiding me all day because of my letter. In mid afternoon Ron from
Denron stops by the door to the right of my desk and winks at me as he advises he will have a
cheque for me before the end of the day. My complaint letter this morning has brought out
additional items out of my Human Right Complaints and hostility today by the work group.
In mid afternoon Jen comes to door by my desk and says very angry can I see you out here. So I
go out and she starts to accuse me that she did not appreciate my complaining to Harry. Jen at
first denied she did the vulgar act and that is when I said this conversation is over. Jen would not let it drop and carried on and I keep saying this conversation is over. I said I have a witness and that Sherry laughed at her joke I did not. I just kept saying that her vulgar communication did not belong in the work place and I have a right not to be drawn into that type of conversation. It was obvious Jen came to me to increase my emotions and provoke a knee-jerk emotional reaction.
Jen was under the impression by Kindy that I was upset by all of the conversation. I advised Jen
that I was not upset by the superior/inferior comment just what I put in the letter and had Kindy come to me about my letter to discuss my issues my comments would not have gotten distorted to Jen. I also stated that Nayana also misinterpreted item in my letter and thought I was accusing Paul of harassing Nayana. Jen said I should have told her at the time that it happened. I said according to law I don’t have to do that and I am telling you in this letter. She said she knows law and says I had to tell her during the incident. I said I did tell you yesterday when I left as when you said you were raped by your father I said I did not appreciate that joke or the earlier joke and I left to go home. Jen offered an apology and which I took and advised her not to bring to me her bar room communication.
When Jim showed up I gave him copy of my letter to Kindy this morning. Around three Jim asked me to come with him to KINROS. As we were leaving the accounting department Jim asks “is Kal still here” and gives me a smirk. At KINROS we discussed my letter and my issues. I said I did not appreciate Harry accusing me of taking advantage with my conversations with Sherry in the morning as I gave the time back and my letter was to advise Harry how I do that by sitting at my desk during lunch doing company work and using my personal car for company business. Jim said I was just like him meaning giving to the company more than we take. I said that I was not in that unlike him I don’t use my visa for company transactions. Jim mentioned that his position was
changing with the company and that he is in discussions with management to be full time during
the day at Laurentide working on fixing their production and process systems, and that’s why he
needed me at KINROS to handle things there. I discuss my Superior Court Suit against Watts and
Mackay, and including being wrongfully dismissed. Jim thought that the company could benefit
from my experience. I mentioned that I was developing a course for employees to protect their
rights from work abuse and bullying. Jim said that he thought I would be good at that because I
had a presence. We went in side to walk around and Jim showed me a room full of left over
cabinets to sell and wanted to know if I needed some or knew of anyone who needs cabinets. He
mentioned plans next March for us to have cash and sell when the weather was good. There was
no mentioned or show of change in business and he included me as employee in March. After
this he showed me Bernie’s design project for the Dentist in Ancaster. Bernie was working on the
cabinets for the whole house that included a library.
We go back to Laurentide and Peter from CMI is waiting for me. He advises that he will now
release order of 24 respirators under the condition I give him the $60.00 petty cash and pay the balance of the invoice next week. I agree to this and he writes me up a receipt.
At end of day Nayana makes mocking comment to me about my complaint. She starts with something about me having high standards, and thinking to high of myself and says I should just ignore it and do my work. Nayana said that she goes to the bank and does not get reimbursed for
kms charges. She thought it was in my contract that I am to do the bank run without being
reimbursed. I said there is nothing in my contract. In fact I don’t have a written contract as Jim kept stalling with excuses to write one up. When I first started working here Nayana did not immediately ask me to go to the bank only after she ran out of people to go to the bank for her.
Once I started going and said nothing about being reimbursed she started using me for regular
bank runs. I was shocked by Nayana’s minimizing comment regarding my complaint. After Nayana left I turn to Sherry and said did you hear that? She said yes. I said that is minimizing and mocking. I also said to Sherry that now I see what she saw in Nayana (earlier bullying comment). After Sherry left Jim comes back to my office takes a chocolate bar. I mentioned to him at the door what just transpired with Nayana that she mocked my complaint. Jim made some face that he was shocked and walked away from me without discussing it and a few minutes later I can hear laughter in Kindy’s office and Paul was with her. I left worked shortly after 5:00 and
Jim was at the door on top of the stairs smiling.
87. On November 14th I faxed to Dina Waik my notice of noting Watts and MMP Limited in default for failure to provide their statement of defence.
88. On Monday, November 15th I went to work with second complaint letter of the manner in which my complaint was being handled and other offensive incidents. I added some legal information to educate my employer as Jim suggested on Friday that the company could benefit from my experience and knowledge. When Nayana got in she saw my letter waiting for her and went into instant defensive mood when she read my comment that I felt she was mocking me on Friday with her comment of my high standards. She said “I was not mocking you.” Nayana made some comment that I encourage Jen. I said I don’t encourage conversation about penises, that it is Nayana that encourages conversations such as Kindy talking about her big breast and underwear. Nayana again makes excuse about Kindy’s behaviour just being girl talk. I have never had a controller of any company come up to me to make comment about her big breast twice to draw my attention to her big breast and Kindy is the first. I stated that that was sexual harassment and Nayana laughed. I stated I had a right to decent environment. Nayana continued to minimize my work issues, particularly when she said “if I made as many complaints as you I would be a millionaire.” Nayana made comment if I don’t like it here I should quit. This is when I asked Nayana is this why I am subjugated with this behaviour to get me to quit? I asked are you breaching the contract. She said no. I just kept repeating to Nayana that it is law, and I have a right to respectful and dignified work environment.
At about 10:15 Nayana came to my desk to move into the nic picking phase regarding my work which I infer was to find cause for dismissal. It is interesting to note that for the past month she left me alone and today after giving her my complaint letter she was giving me a lot of attention. Brad came in asking again about the mileage and I said I did not receive a response and this is when Nayana quickly interrupted and moved into the conversation to advise us that the company pays 25 cents/km. I advised Brad that at Lyman I was paid about $30.00/mth for daily bank runs, but that I went to the bank everyday and here not as much. Nayana came to my desk to check out the PST and GST accounts and I give her my chair to sit on. She notices some error that I made and the corrected entry. She asked me what happened. I said I made a mistake and corrected it. I felt Nayana was moving into the nit picking mode to find fault for reason to terminate my employment since receiving my letter so I stated to her “so now you don’t like my work?” She said no. She asks if I was complete with updating the vendor’s accounts. I said that I thought so. She started complaining about me not updating the taxes. This is when I reminded Nayana of her comments to me that Kindy was to do the taxes not me and the inter company entries. I said I updated the WSIB tax and Source Deductions. She brought to my desk the KINROS bank reconciliation file folder with August and September’s bank statements in the file. She starts to comment that I did not do the bank reconciliation. I advised her that she gave Sherry KINROS’ bank reconciliation to do so I thought she was doing it. This is when Nayana says that she just gave it to Sherry to train her and that it’s my responsibility and I should know to do it. I just stated that I did not know what month Sherry had completed and was waiting to be advised. Nayana started going on that it’s my responsibility to know to do it. I said I don’t know where you put this file with the bank statements and she claims she just found it on the weekend. Interesting to note that she only questions me on the August and September bank statements on November 15th after I handed to her my second complaint letter criticizing how management is handling my complaint.
I asked Nayana when I was moving to KINROS. She said she did not know. I printed off my hiring letter that I typed up in word for Jim as he kept making excuses and had not given me the promised type letter per our discussion during my interview when I accepted the position and requested this letter. I had reviewed this letter with Jim two weeks ago and Jim took copy to make changes and was supposed to give to me the letter back last Monday with corrections and again did not. Nayana found my letter in the printer and started nit picking about this letter saying I was not to write up this letter that Jim was to do this task. I knew Nayana was in the stage where she was going to find fault with anything and everything I did and say at this point so I did not argue with her. She took my letter and I reprinted a copy for me.
I went to the washroom at one point and as I am in there someone, might have been Terry; hells as they pass by “honey your something.” This is a sign of aggression that my letter is getting around the work group and they are showing their resentment with additional hostile mobbing psychological harassment to isolate me to make me uncomfortable by repeating more words in my Human Rights Complaints such as this “Honey your something” while I am in the washroom. I started working on the Bank Reconciliation for August and asked Sherry a question about it and again Nayana immediately interrupts our discussion and took over by printing me the statement off of the gl in utilities for me to manually reconcile to the bank statement. I worked on the bank reconciliation till about 12:13 when I immediately got up to go for lunch and asked Sherry if she still wanted the Greek Salade for lunch. Again Nayana quickly comes to me about what I am currently doing and I advised her its lunch time. It appeared quite obvious that Nayana was being overly monitoring my every statement and behaviour this morning after receiving my complaint letter when previously she left me alone and did not question my actions or statements. At one point in the morning Rick passed by me so I asked if he had the odometer readings and he too shunned me by not responding and walking away. I went to get some lunch at about 12:13 for Sherry and my self. I went down the stairs and saw Citchen and said hello. He shunned me and went in the door to the factory on the left.
I come back to the office with two subs, and as soon as I arrive Jim calls me into his car for termination meeting. I notice he had my employee files right away and said “you have my employee file.” Jim starts off with “why did you not come to me?” I said I don’t have to come to my supervisor every time someone offends me in the office and I did put those individuals on notice at the time they offended me. I asked if he read my letter and he said he did not. I said I am advising you now in this letter. I asked what difference does it make bringing it up now or earlier. I advised Jim that I did not appreciate Nayana’s comment to me of “if she made as many complaints as I she would be a millionaire.” This is when Jim starts his speech about his position changing with the company and hands me my termination letter claiming change in business and that my dismissal is without cause and I will be receiving notice of one week. I asked do you want me to leave now and he said yes. I go upstairs and Jim escorts me to my desk like I am the villain in this situation. I pick up my things and give Sherry her sub and leave. As I go out the door I meet up with Brad and Pete. I advised them that I was just terminated. Brad said you’re kidding and he was shocked. I remembered at this point the balance of the petty cash in my purse and I hand over to Brad $8.07. Then I left.
In the evening I sent email to Dina Waiks at the commission that I was just terminated by fifth employer provoking me with additional items in my Human Rights Complaints. I asked her if I can send my complaint to her. The email did not go through due to firewall protection. On November 16th I sent copy of my email to Dina Waik at the commission with copies of my complaint letters to KINROS by fax.
89. On November 17th I received Dina Waik’s response advising me that all complaints must be filed using the appropriate OHRC Procedures and that I should contact the OHRC Intake Department. I was also advised that my Watts Industries reprisal complaint has been served and actioned and cannot be amended at this point. I sent response that I will be requesting new reprisal complaint then as my opinion is that I should be able to file a complaint if the employer continues to reprise with additional interference at new places of employment for as long at this employer wants to continue to ruin my reputation and employment record.
90. On November 19th I sent back my Witness Statement to the commission for Lyman.
91. On November 23rd I received courier package from KINROS of last cheque, record of employment and requested reference letter from Jim Westman. The reference letter just stated I worked there with no mentioned of the praises that he had received from Nayana, and is not usable. I also notice error with cheque received. Also on this date I received email from Ms. Rioux at the commission requesting additional information on my KINROS complaint. I later sent her responses to her questions and advised her that Kindy’s friend Jen coming to me to subjugate me with sexual comment and gesturing was sexual harassment per the human rights cases I have read including Janzen and that I would send her my response later. I later advised Ms. Rioux that the behaviour pattern shows that unwelcome sexual conduct has invaded the workplace and that concrete employment rewards for refusing to participate in the work group norm of sexualizing the workplace per Janzen, supra, at 1283 [D/6226, para. 44449]. I refer to: the Supreme Court of Canada in Janzen, supra, quotes with approval at 1280 [D/6224, para. 44444] Sexual Harassment in the Workplace (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987) by Arjun P. Aggarwal. “Sexual harassment is any sexually-oriented practice that endangers an individual’s continued employment, negatively affects his/her work performance, or undermines his/her sense of personal dignity. Harassment behaviour may manifest itself blatantly in forms such as leering, grabbing, and even sexual assault. More subtle forms of sexual harassment may include innuendoes, and propositions for dates or sexual favours.” And; “When sexual harassment occurs in the workplace it is an abuse of both economic and sexual power. Sexual harassment is a demeaning practice, and that constitutes a profound affront to the dignity of the employee forced to endure it. By requiring an employee to contend with unwelcome sexual actions or explicit sexual demands, sexual harassment in the workplace attacks the dignity and self-respect of the victim both as an employee and as a human being.”
My refusal to condone work group condoning of sexualizing the work environment endangers my continued employment, negatively affects my work performance and my health causing me to medicate on paxil in order to work in a poison and sexualized work environment, undermines my dignity, and lastly denial of concrete employment rewards for refusing to participate in the form of withholding duties and training, fabrication of dismissal due to change in business (when they have a duty to correctly represent the company and the position in the interview of potential change in business), and later shortage of work. I forgot to add lack of reference for future employment. I ask Ms. Rioux if it was Jim my supervisor making the comment “men rule by their dicks” and him gesturing around his groin area would she then call it sexual harassment? I ask Ms. Rioux is it because Jen is a woman not a man that you don’t consider what she did sexual harassment? I did not receive Ms. Rioux’s response. In her November 23rd Ms. Rioux replaces “dicks” with “chicks” when my November 15th email to Dina Waik I clearly stated “dicks” not “chicks”.
92. On November 24th I faxed to Jim at Kinros letter notifying him of error on last cheque on for 43.5 hours and should be 86.5 hours. I also asked him to advise why he did not include the praises he gave me of my performance in his reference letter. My record of employment has the reason for termination shortage of work which does not agree to reason in my termination letter.
93. On November 26th I received email from Ms. Rioux that she acknowledges receipts of all of my emails and the commission is currently reviewing the information regarding KINROS/Laurentide.
94. On or about December 3rd, 2004, I received the case analysis from the Ontario Human Rights Commission for my Xentel and Lyman Human Rights complaints, and Watts reprisal complaints. Upon reading these reports my body went into nervous shock with elevated levels of anxiety, immediate loss of appetite, and I started to have problems sleeping throughout the night. I went to my family doctor to request increasing my Paxil dose again from 10 to 20 mgs. I was in the process of reducing dosage and was only taking 5 mgs up to December 3rd 2004.
95. On December 6th, 8th, and 9th I sent emails to Ms. Rioux at the commission that I have not received her response back from email dated November 30th regarding filing complaint against KINROS and reprisal against all the other employers that I have filed for passing information now in all four complaints at KINROS.
96. On December 13th I sent another email to Ms. Rioux asking for the complaint forms since sending the commission my request on November 15th a total of 28 days now.
97. On December 15th I received the forms for the discrimination at Kinros/Laurentide and reprisals by pass employers. I filled them out and sent them back to the commission on December 27th 2004. I sent email to Ms. Rioux regarding the “control test” to determine who is the employer, and I advised her that I was looking to receive one complaint for the Laurentide group of companies.
98. On December 16th I received email from Vicky Masellis that the commission received my 20-page response to the Lyman case analysis on December 14th.
99. On December 17th I received email from Yvette Leander that the commission received my 20-page response to the Xentel case analysis.
100. On December 23rd I received email from Shannon Meadows-Lee in response to my inquiry on December 18th to release evidence of the following: “Decisions of the Commission under s. 36 of the Code are administrative in nature, and the Commission is subject to a duty of fairness when it makes such decisions. The Commission’s duty of fairness is met by providing the parties with a summary of the relevant evidence that will be considered by the Commissioners, and giving the parties an opportunity to make a submission in response. The Commission is not required to outline every detail of the case, but instead can give the substance of the key evidence only. In your case the decisions as to whether or not to refer your complaints to the Tribunal for a hearing have not yet been made. The summaries of evidence found in the case analyses and/or disclosure letters meet the Commission’s obligations regarding evidentiary disclosure. Your submissions in response to these analyses and letters will all be placed before the Commissioners when they make their determinations regarding the referral of these complaints.” Shannon Meadows-Lee confirms that the commission has received all of my submission now including the 20-page response to the Watts case analysis.
101. On December 24th I sent another fax to Jim Westman advising him that there is still an error on my November 19th cheque after I received the payment of one week’s notice. I advised that the November 19th cheque should have been for 46.5 hours not 42.5 hours leaving balance still owing of 4 hours as my termination letter stated I would be paid up to 4:30 on November 15th. I asked again why he did not include the praises he made while I was employed in his reference letter. I received no response to this fax or the correction in pay due to me still.
102. On January 21st, 2005, Ms. Rioux advised she has received all my new files/complaints for the discrimination at KINROS/Laurentide but has not as yet been assigned.
103. On February 8th, 2005, I received email from Ms. Rioux to give me an update by advising me of section 34 (1) of the Code which gives the Commissioners the discretion to not deal with complaints and reasons. She mentions that she forwarded my Laurentide complaint to the Commissioner due to similarity to KINROS complaint and no evidence to indicate individuals are employed of Laurentide. By this email, Ms. Rioux ignored completely my argument on December 15th email regarding the “control test” as to who really was my employer.
104. On March 2nd I sent in my request Compliance Officer Sheila Crowe for the evidence that the investigation staff is relying on for the fabricated case analysis for MMP, Xentel, Lyman and Watts.
105. On March 4th, 2005, I received response for the KINROS Complaint with complete denial of all harassment and deceitful statement that they never received my complaint letter till after I was terminated.
106. On March 17th, 2005, Compliance Officer Sheila Crowe from the commission sent me letter acknowledging receipt on March 7th, 2005, of my request for Access of disclosure material that the investigation staff relied upon for their alleged insufficient evidence assessment under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, 1990.
107. On March 17th, 2005, I faxed to Jacqueline Meyer at the commission copy of my rebuttal to the KINROS response to my complaint. I advised her that to date I have not received the commission’s response to my other complaints regarding the other Respondents in this matter and the reprisal complaints.
108. Shortly after March 21st, 2005, I received in the mail copy of commissioner’s form letter advising of exercise of a section 34 (1) (b) of the code for file #NRIX-67PQXL o/a Laurentide Manufacturing: the complaint’s allegations against the corporate and personal respondents are identical to those that are alleged in a separate human rights complaint against another respondent, Kinros Industries and the same personal respondents; that there is no evidence to indicate that the corporate respondent employed any of the personal respondents; therefore, the complaint fails to establish a reasonable basis upon which it can be maintained; accordingly, in the particular circumstances of this case, the complaint can be characterized as vexatious.
109. March 30th, 2005, I faxed back to the commissioner my reconsideration application for file #NRIX-67PQXL Laurentide Manufacturing with the following key disagreement to show the commission lacking in grounds of vexatious complaint: Laurentide Manufacturing being in control of my employment contract not KINROS, I worked at Laurentide Manufacturing during my full employment not at KINROS, employees from both Laurentide Manufacturing and Laurentide Custom Working worked in same office and participated in the harassment therefore their participation is a form of interference with employment relations, only 2 employees from KINROS were involved in the harassment, and finally for all of my other complaints the commission never asked for evidence that the employees work there yet the commissioner is trying to use this excuse for vexatious argument for section 34 for this one complaint.
110. On April 8th received mail from Manager/Reconsideration Ashworth Williams that the status of my reconsideration file for Watts, Xentel and Lyman was sent to me on February 24th that the commission has reconsidered under section 37 (2) and a copy of the application for reconsideration has been forwarded to the respondents for reply.
111. On April 12th Compliance Officer Sheila Crowe from the Commission advise me by phone that she would have the information requested from the investigation process for my prima facie complaints in 2 weeks time being week of April 26th.
112. On April 21st I sent fax to Ashworth Williams at the commission requesting status on the response from the respondents Watts, MMP, Xentel, and Lyman per the commission’s letter February 24th, 2005.
113. On April 25th, 2005, I faxed to Ashworth Williams at the commission inquiry to status of the Xentel, Lyman and Watts reconsideration application under section 37 (2) that were sent to the respondents on February 24th. I asked if the respondents provided the commission with their response, with the strick 15-day time limit, due to the commission on March 11th if not then the commission would be in breach of the duty of fairness allowing respondents more time to respond.
114. I was receiving wages of $14.00/hour for 40 hours per week of $560 gross approximately as at the date of my dismissal of November 15th 2004 from Kinros and I had the expectation of earning greater amounts per month in the future. In fact at our interview, Jim Westman agreed to raise my hourly start amount to $15.00/hour after my 2 month probation period, and to increase this amount to $16.00/hour after one year. I had request for Jim Westman to put this verbal promise in writing and during my employment he kept making excuses of too busy so I drafted a letter for him which he was going to review, make changes and hand back to me when my employment was terminated.
115. I plead that as a result of the Defendants’ lack of conscience, continuous deceit to cover up their wrongdoing, and ruthless conduct, I lost my jobs; my once perfect health record destroyed causing stigmatism and further similar abuses, and refusal of future insurance benefits due to injury to health (depression); lost of skill utilization for future advancements; lost of job references; required to take medication in order to work to reduce condition caused by additional mobbing behaviour to mitigate further injury into reactive depression and suicide ideation; a good standard of living and loss of reputation of my good name.
Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress:
I plead that the acts and omissions of the Defendants noted above were calculated to cause me serious anguish and to suffer in the form of distress, anxiety, depression, hypervigilence and insomnia to induce permanent delusional disorder as a direct consequences of the Defendants conduct noted above and therefore I am entitled to damages. I plead that the Defendants’ conduct was cold, calculated, arrogant, malicious, reckless, vindictive, ruthless, dishonest, without conscious, premeditated, systematic and reprehensible and deserving of the Court’s censure. I plead that I have made reasonable attempts to mitigate my damages and that in the course of mitigating damages I have incurred expenses, the full particulars of which I will undertake to provide to the Defendants prior to trial.
The Plaintiff proposes that the trial of this action be held in the Hamilton Superior Court of Justice.
Courts of Justice Act
backsheet
Losier v. Watts Industries, MMP Limited, Xentel DM Incorporated, 352587 Ontario Ltd., 1290864 Ontario Inc., 1573342 Ontario Inc., 1527934 Ontario Inc., Kindy Sihra, Minister of Attorney General, Ontario Human Rights Commission, Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Leel
File No.
Ontario
Superior Court of Justice
PROCEEDING COMMENCED AT Hamilton
45 Main Street East, Hamilton, Ontario, L8N 2B7
Statement of Claim
Claudette Losier, 80 West 33rd St., Hamilton, Ontario, L9C 5J1, 905-388-7794 fax 905-388-1561
Watts Industries (Canada) Inc. C/O Mr. Trevor Lawson, 416-601-8227 fax 416-868-0673
Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited C/O James D. Higginson (Barrister), 905-525-4545 fax 905-523-4144
352587 Ontario Ltd. C/O Lynette A. Corbett (Barrister), 905-527-6900 fax 905-527-5177
Xentel DM Incorporated, C/O Corporate Office at 10 Kodiak Crescent, Toronto, M3J 3G5, 416-633-4646 fax 416-633-4643
1290864 Ontario Inc., 1573342 Ontario Inc., 1527934 Ontario Inc., and Kindy Sihra at 111 Brockley Drive, Hamilton, Ontario, L8E 3C4 905-561-2022
Minister of Attorney General, Crown Law Office, 720 Bay Street, 8th Floor, Toronto, Ontario, M5G 2K1
Ontario Human Rights Commission, Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee at 180 Dundas Street West, Toronto, Ontario, M7A 2R9, 416-326-9511
Yogananda’s Monks are coming to Toronto weekend of October 15th-17th for my first Kriya Yoga Innitiation. I have been granted permission to do Kriya since June 2010 and experience incredible life force movement in my spine and brain area among other things. Yogananda’s techniques certainly deliver what he promises and there is more bliss and brightness to come to me in the future. Kriya Yoga is the highest form of life force control. Most people do not feel there energy, life force, moving in their bodies because they are restless, meaning cant sit still, and their life force is spending all its time in their 5 senses, muscles and organs rather than in the spine. I have been following Yogananda since 1999 and its taking me a long time to get to this point but I feel I am now progress at a quicken pace with Kriya but also increasing my practicing the presence of God throughout the whole day not just when I meditate plus regular playing and singing those devotional cosmic chants. This has really made the difference. The Kriya October Weekend will be held at the Science Center and the following links provide more information:
Toronto Centre of Self-Realization Fellowship
Welcome to Toronto Centre of Self-Realization Fellowship. The Centre is composed of devoted members and friends of Self-Realization Fellowship, …srftorontocentre.org
Self-Realization Fellowship
The official organization founded in 1920 by Paramahansa Yogananda to teach scientific methods of meditation and principles of spiritual living that lead to …www.yogananda-srf.org
An artist friend mentioned this Adam Dreamhealer and his book had techniques on life force healing which this friend tried and had amazing results. He felt a bolt of life energy enter his body and go the his injured knee and heal it instantly. So naturally I see Yoga connection and I am curious about anything connecting to Yoga, God, Infinity so I check his site out:
Dreamhealer
At Adam’s one day conferences, the experience of activating your own innate ability for healing physically, emotionally and spiritually is transformational. http://www.dreamhealer.com
Adam is a science major but also a Canadian Native combine these two paths in his approach to healing. A lot of what he says based on science has been said by all scriptures particularly that time and space is an illussion, and that we are all one not separate.
I am a practicing Yogi following my Guru Yogananda’s techniques to become one with God which is the same as become one with the Field that Adam talks about which is realizing my true nature which is cosmic energy not matter of a physcial body. I am glad to see someone like Adam, a Native connected to spirit, and working in Science to bring Science back to union with spirit/spirituality like it was in the past instead of separate study of thought something the Yogis and Buddhist and Christ have known for centuries. In his book “the Second Coming” Yogananda analyses the New Testament from a Yoga perspective and it also includes references to sciences such as the book the Field that time and space are an illussion (also found in the scriptures), and neuro-plasticity that the brain can change itself. Yogananda’s self realization also has its own healing project to positively effect the universal consciousness with a divine prayer and life force gestures and the OM vibration. My current realization is in the pranayama stage of life force control with permission to do highest technique called Kriya Yoga. Adam must have come into this life this time almost fully realized to be able to do what he is doing and have the visions he has.
I just read bits on Adam’s energizing exercises in his book to get connected to our energy. Yogananda also has energizing exercises to connect to our internal energies too. Also Christ had similar wisdom in the bible and stated the same thing that we are light/energy and how to connect with it and that we all can connect with it particularly when he said “if the eye be single the body will be full of light.” Yogananda has exercises to see the light in the third eye chakra. I see the Field as God Science is just using different label and language to discribe the same thing. Yoga and all scriptures also have what Adam calls “power of intention” which is the does and dont lists to harmonies our minds, emotions, hearts, and bodies to be intune with God/Field’s harmonious energy. Adam is basically saying the same things about emotions and our negative thoughts creating negative energy patterns leading to diseases that has been said by Yogis of India and saints of all religions. The yogis called it practicing “evenmindedness” which is the similar to “power of Intention”. I love to see how different religions and scientifical thought fits into the concept of universal consciousness, divine, field, or infinity.
God just put a thought in my head that I want to share since we are all one. The future for psychiatry and psychology will be returning to Yoga/spirit and meditation stilling the mind rather current than bandaide approach of numbing the mind by pill pushing mental health practices. Science is already starting to look at spirituality per the experiments being done in neuro-plasticity of checking out the brain activity in the Dalie Lama’s monks who have meditated over 50,000 hours while in nirvana/samadi.
Adam talks of “power of intention” which is also being talked about by Dr. Wayne Dyer and Dr. David Hawkins. Dr. Hawkins is a or was a New York psychiatrist who meditates and went into other fields of science. He wrote the book “Power v. Force” and develop a map of consciousness. There are others in the Science community looking at consciousness of the “I” vs. the “one in all”.
Even our system of Justice is base on scriptures dos and donts showing that God’s consciousness is really in matter not just infinity. The history of justice all stems back to the 10 commandments followed by the Hammurabi Code considered the first writing by man in law:
Search ResultsCode of Hammurabi – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Code of Hammurabi (Codex Hammurabi) is a well-preserved ancient law code, dating to ca. 1790 BC (middle chronology) in ancient Babylon. …
Discovery – Hammurabi – Law – Other copies
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_of_Hammurabi –
Unfortunately, when human law makers have a consciousness that is of the “I” rather than the “One in All” they are led to distort the law and the cheating culture in law such as my experience with the Minister of Attorney General’s, past and present, interpretation of the law particularly Human Rights. Even our Human Rights laws is based on the 10 Commandments, particularly equality means love thy neighbour as thyself. The reason why is because we are all one not separate so when we harm our neighbour we are also harming ourselves.
Yogananda’s Second Coming refers to Lord Christ’s sayings of “Father and I are one” and “Son of Man” Vs “Son of God”. These two statements of being are also reflective of the God as the Field. The son of man is matter of our physical body and “I” ego mind, and the son of God is the pure and harmonious consciousness “one/we” and life force energy in Infinity/Field that is also in matter and in all atoms in matter. Science will never be able to see infinity with mattersold/duality instruments, but rather through going inside our own minds via meditation.
Adam DreamHealer has the same abilities to heal like Lord Christ because he must have a very pure heart and harmonious connectiveness to everything in matter/duality. Since everything is energy including our bodies per today’s Science and past Scriptures, we are all capable to do the same healing that Adam is doing and that Lord Christ did centuries ago but we must get rid of the “I” ego mind to do so and redevelop or realize per my guru Yogananda that “One/we” mind by going within ourselves not outside in matter/duality. This is what Adam calls “power of intention.”
I see meditation not only as the new psychiatry/psychology remedy in the future for today’s restless mattersold minds but also as a vacation destiny! A place we can go to in our minds to get away from it all, matter/duality, stress, restlessness, business, greed, desires, all negations in duality which provides greater release then today’s vacation spots in matter/duality. I did a drawing of me in meditation pose calling it “On Vacation” and I am.
I just received Self Realization’s next magazine and coincidently or not there is an interview article with Edgar Mitchell the austronaut on Apollo 14 who was also in the book Yogananda directed me to read “the Field” and who has helped Adam DreamHealer. When he was on this journey he experience what I hope to experience with Kriya Yoga in the near future – Samadhi. He came back to earth to figure what it was that he experience in the air to continue that experience on earth and has develop a new science in 1972 called Noetics. This is the investigation into universal consciousness no different then what my guru Yogananda is teaching me to do with my mind. Dr. Mitchell meditates too!!!
There is so much more potential in our minds when we rid ourselves of the “I/ego” consciousness of the 5 senses and dependence on outer experiences for our happiness. I feel like this austronaut exploring a new frontier in my mind trusting in Yogananda’s techniques and brilliant spiritual and devotional wisdom. Now I understand what Lord Christ meant by the “Kingdom of Heaven is within you” and its true happiness is an inside job when it it connected to “One” universal consciousness.
I also understand now what Lord Christ meant when he said “men does not leave on bread alone” because I now can feel that other thing that we live by, life force energy, in my spine and brain. In St. Francis of Assissi’s book “the little flowers” he is asked by St. Clare to give her a meal so they go out into the forest and he starts his sermon on God, first course, second, etc. They dont eat physical food. As they are listening their life force energy inside them comes alive and they all move out of their “son of man” body and are lifted up into their “son of God” spirit body. The town folks thought their was a fire at the church and when they got there they saw that the fire was St. Francis, his Friars and St. Clare! This is living scriptures in action no different than the references in the bible of Mosses and Lord Christ in their Spirit bodies. The Towns folks knelt down in reverence to St. Francis and God. Sweet reverence. And I do too.
Yesterday I received a blessing by way of a phone call from the model coordinator’s manager at Sheridan College. Her communication showed she had conflict resolution management and human rights training. The language she used was not put downs or insulting or violating the Human Rights Code, but very positive and collaborative. She rightfully labelled my concerns about unwelcoming touching as my “boundary issues” and that I dont have to comform to other peoples boundary comforts of touchyness. She says Sheridan will be reviewing the model etiquette policy and ensure staff is educated on it.
Now this too is working in harmony with Universal Consciousness God/Field the “one” vs the “I”. I have not received such positive outcome from my boundary request from any employer since my first sexual harassment internal complaint at Rentway in 1989 which has been the cause of all this animosity towards me and towards women’s human rights from my Defendants: Watts, MacKay Mackay Mackay and Peters, Xentel DM Incorporated, Lyman Customs and Freight Forwarding, and Laurentide Manufacturing, Minister of Attorney General, and Commission and staff at the Commission.
Institute of Noetic Sciences
Dedicated to expanding science beyond conventional paradigms. Founded by Edgar Mitchell, the astronaut. The noetic sciences study the mind and its diverse …
http://www.noetic.org/ – Similar
I just checked a few things on this site and came across the Love Study where they are trying to measure the power of love intentions. This is bringing to life the quote I used in an art piece by Pierre Teilhard De Chardin a French Priest who was also a scientist and believed God was at the heart of it all. I came across him several years ago because of a quote he made on love:
Some day we shall harness…the energies of Love,
Then for the second time in the history of the world we will have discovered Fire!
I would add more importantly to harness the energies of Divine Love, oneness, Universal love not current human beings ego imperfect love. The kind of love express by Lord Christ of “Father forgive them for they no not what they do.”
Pierre also wrote papers and had theories on evolution countering Darwin’s zoological lines through natural adaptation and selection to be too simple. The universe is more complex. Pierre’s approach coincides with Noetic Sciences today as he felt “living beings hold together biologically”. I found Pierre’s science in book “8 Spiritual Heroes – Their Search For God” inspirational.
Re: Ontario Human Rights Commission Investigates Kinros Complaint …Re: Ms. Claudette Losier And 1573342 Ontario Inc. et al. File No: NRIX-67PQNK Dear Olanyi Parsons, I have done some further research on the six elements …
losierwhistlebg.livejournal.com/331.html?thread=41035
Supreme Court of Canada – Decisions – Judgments in Leave ApplicationsClaudette Losier et al. v. Attorney General of Ontario, et al. (Ont.) (Civil) ( By Leave) (33962). Coram: Binnie / Fish / Rothstein …
scc.lexum.org/en/news_release/2011/11-03-17.3a/11-03-17.3a.html
Soul’s Love Song To Spirit, Our Eternal Father and Divine Mother Holy Spirit Aum
Heavenly Eternal Father, Divine Mother, and Beautiful Creator of all Life, the Living God and Indwelling Self of man,
I thank Thee for all the test and trials you have sent to me in this life as part of my dark night of the soul to mold me with spiritual maturity into your perfection and likeness so that I can come back to Thy place of rest for Eternity,
For these trials of suffering are only of the flesh and ego manas mind, and do not affect the real mind that belongs to my soul and Thee,
Yoga has taught me that when my neighbours persecute me for doing Thy will and Thy rightousness, discriminate against me taking away my human rights and defame my character in this world of duality they do so due to their attachment to their ego manas mind of the five senses not their real selves,
For our Human Rights Law is a beautiful contemporary restatement of Thy second commandment to love Thy neighbour as Thyself because we are one not separate,
So like Lord Jesus Christ I forgive them for they know not what they do because they do not know their true selves their soul Christ Krishna consciousness,
To give them the other cheek to continue in their evil ways towards me or give them the opportunity to turn towards love instead,
For they are hurting themselves filling the intent of their hearts with the poison of hate,
So like St. Francis I say Lord make me an instrument of Thy peace where there is hatred let me sow love and injury sow pardon,
Real equality in duality will only come into fruit when all human beings cleanse the intent of their heart and consciousness with Thy divine wisdom and will,
Man’s heart must change before Corporations and Governments will change their bottom line quest for money and power to instead real service to humanity.
Their persecution of me has helped me to receive Life’s greatest gift Thy cosmic vibrational presence and bliss from Infinity inside me a for greater gift than any human court award in duality,
Proving Christ’s promise blessed are they who are persecuted for righteousness for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven which is the Eternal now,
These trials have served its purpose to loosen duality’s hold on my mind with dispassion and seeing duality clearly now I am converted, like St. Paul, a lost sheep returning back to the Good Sheppard’s fold,
For my soul is homesick for Thy perfection and love, indescribable pure bliss, and not wanting to be separate from Thee any more,
In my thirties I felt something was missing from my life and through Alanon my desire for Thee was reawakened,
I used their simple method of talking daily to Thee as my higher power and friend never thinking that Thou would actually respond to me,
Then to my surprise Thou rewarded me with a response Thy first gift of Thy Grace of Thy Divine Wine of Bliss and divine love entering my heart at Mount Carmel in 1999 revealing inside me Thy Blissful vibrational life force divine as greater temptation than anything in matter,
Because I was not realized Thou sent another gift, a true and very wise modern day realized Guru to give me the highest wisdom and truth from masters Christ and Krishna, saints and sages of all times to reach Thy Kingdom of Heaven inside me,
At this first meeting with Yogananda at a store purchasing his book the Science of Meditation Thou graced me again to feel Thy Cosmic vibration intuitively speaking to my soul,
That this is my path to release me from my restless mind created by past lives and present seed tendencies and bad habits in my brain’s grooves,
To release me from desires for only Thy matter-sold gifts that only bring a limited shelf life of happiness followed by misery or boredom, and detach from to the fruits of my actions that keep me in body bondage in duality,
To take me off the carousel ride of the 4 psychological states of being that unbelievers and unrealized humans live on of false happiness, false peace, misery and boredom and to bring me to Thy shore of heavenly even-mindedness and ever new joy,
I wasted the first seven years on this path not being regular with my meditations and remaining a beginner because my ego manas mind was in control of my bodily kingdom,
Now my soul is coming alive again inside me and taking over my creature ego manas mind,
I feel my will and desire growning to know and be with Thee helping me with my efforts to be regular and trading material habits for more spiritual habits.
With humility and reverence, I bow down to Lord Guru Yogananda’s blue lotus feet and I am loyal to his path to God Realization because he is the voice of the silent omnipresent God in my life time,
People say there are no realized beings since the great Lords but they are wrong for the omnipresent Mahavatar Babaji has brought salvation to the world since 1861 with his Kriya Yoga life force control technique to escape into Spirit which has helped Lahiri Mayasaya, Swami Yukteswar, Paramahansa Yogananda, St. Lynn, Sri Daya Mata, and many others to be also fully realized in our life time,
I promise to be a loyal disciple practising daily his techniques the energizing exercises, hong sau, aum, kriya yoga and devotion cosmic chants till my mind reaches Thy Cosmic Vibrationless Ocean of stillness and oneness,
For his path is the Raja Royal Yoga highway a new scripture for our times that includes Pantajali’s eight fold path, Christ’s New Testament and Krishna’s Gita song of Spirit that can lead my soul back to its true home and rest in Thee,
For his words and wisdom come from his soul not the mind of the five senses like others who learn by theology courses without realizing Thee in themselves to receive Thy wisdom directly within,
For he accepts other paths as Thy truth and does not exclude them creating more separation consciousness from Thy truth,
Yogananda reveals to your contemporary children how to love Thee perfectly like Christ and Krishna,
Him I shall follow too like Sri Daya Mata because he had no ego in him and acted from his soul only to performed all his actions to please Thee and bring more souls home to Thy Ocean of Bliss,
He promises his little chelas that not by blind faith but by action and effort he will bring us the Honey
of God and he does deliver,
This Honey is Thy Divine Wine of ecstasy Thy cosmic vibrations in the spine and brain within us the real food for our souls filling us with Thy joy and peace and love if we follow his example,
He assures us that we only need to do 25% of the work, and Guru and God will provide us with the rest through their gift of their Grace,
Yogananda’s motivation for us to attain Thee is his truth that there is no difference between him and saints and us other than effort because Thou loves all equally and we are all one not separate in Thy
Cosmic Consciousness,
That we all can reach enlightenment within this life time even possibly within three years with Kriya Yoga depending upon regularity and effort and Thy Grace,
His wisdom is clear where your energy is there is your consciousness and to be in this World but not of it for this World is an illusion in God’s play,
Evidence by today’s physics that we are all particles of energy in Thy field with a living consciousness behind the scenes harmonizing the play of life!
Therefore I follow his great example to adore and worship Thee daily through regular meditation
morning and night and practicing Thy presence the rest of the time making my life one continuous prayer to Thee,
Obeying Christ’s commandment to go into my closet so Thou will see in secret and reward me per Krishna that even a little practise of yoga will save me from my negative emotions and bad seed tendencies,
Making the heart chitta still settling the emotions and resulting in the heart not being troubled by duality’s tests,
Following Christ’s commandment let the days troubles be sufficient for the day to keep the mind in the Eternal now with heavenly even mindedness,
Like Bill W.’s simple slogans for his 12th step program of just for today to help those addicted to live in the moment,
For we are all addicted to Thy matter-sold gifts instead of Thee living with negative emotions in the past and future till we become fully realized,
I will faithfully practice my Kriya Yogas to place all of my life force prana back in the spine so that I too can lift my Kundalini serpent force from the wilderness like Moses,
So that physically the heart and lungs are stilled by distilling the prana out of the breath and reversing decay in the body temple,
Proven by Yogananda at death whose purified body was in a phenomenal state of immutability with no physical disintegration 27 days after death,
By regular fasting giving the life force prana in the body’s internal organs a break helping to reverse the flow of disease and reversing flow of prana back to Thy spinal highway,
For Yogananda predicts the future food for man will be Thy life force energy because it is Thy energy in the body’s organs that uses Thy energy to convert solid food back to Thy energy that the body uses,
To ascend my soul back to where it came from, and rejoice like St. Paul that “I die daily” in Christ,
I regularly sing Yogananda’s cosmic chants to Thee for he says Kriya plus devotion is how to capture Thy grace,
I say his wonderful prayer before taking food at every meal requesting Thee to spiritualize it before it goes into Thy Temple,
When I wake up and when I go to bed I place my mind on Thee not Thy matter-sold gifts following Sri Daya Mata’s wise advise,
I now daily discipline my mind to stop its habit of endless empty wandering thoughts on duality coming from my five senses and ego manas mind because of 1600 monk Brother Lawrence’s wise counsel that it is our thoughts where all the trouble starts,
Like him it matters not that I am in my meditation chair or in the kitchen I work to retain my heavenly even mindedness at all times and say his prayer to Thee for Thy help when I put my mind on outward things that Thou will allow me to continue in Thy presence,
I replace my duality weeds of wandering thoughts by sowing heavenly seed thoughts of Thee as I go about performing my actions in matter without attachment and performing good works to please Thee,
The fruit of this practice will be reaping new impressions and grooves that come from Thee interring
my brain in the subconscious mind and coming out in the conscious mind as spiritual wandering thoughts,
Creating new neuron pathways of thoughts per Neuroplasticity science that changes the frequency of my vibrations from flesh back to spirit making my body full of light per Lord Jesus Christ’s promise,
And now physicists’ definition of the body as an electromagnetic wave agrees with the Lord demonstrating that religion is a science and per Father Thomas Keating statement that Science is God’s other book of Revelations,
Science is now working again with religion per Nobel Prize winner Professor Josephson statement that Hindu phylisophy holds the key to laws that operate the mind,
That the mind is basically made of particles of atomic and molecules coming from the quantum field, with a background of consciousness directing them,
Per Paul Davies, Ph. D., that the vacuum in the field is not empty and particles are not separate from the field surrounding them evidence for spiritual universal consciousness of Oneness,
Physicists now can experiment and record virtual particles coming out of the vacuum and vanishing again which is a good explanation of the Lord’s miracles and resurrection of his body to appear in duality after death.
The only gift I can give to Thee because Thou owns everything is my free choice to give Thee my love,
Obeying Thy greatest commandment to love Thee with all my heart, soul, mind and strength,
And Thy second greatest commandment to love Thy neighbour as Thyself because in reality we are all one not separate individuals in the Kingdom of Heaven Eternal now,
So my new spiritual habit is to silently chant all day long I love Thee God, Lords, and Guru Yogananda, my short prayer to pierce heaven,
Like Yogananda’s lesson affirmation to send a message of love encased in every second because only love can take his place,
Like French Jesuit Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s quote to harness the energies of love and discover fire for the second time that being God’s cosmic vibrations,
Because it is Thy perfect love that my soul desires and seeks which I cannot find in unrealized beings in duality,
With dispassion growing inside me I begin the hard chore of inner renunciation of Maya’s temptations
in matter particularly TV and radio with its endless programming consciousness for empty desires that take our attention away from Thee and create wrong impressions in our subconscious,
Kriya Yoga and new habit of practising Thy presence has made my daily spiritual habits easier and I joyfully now desire to spend more time in deep devotion and communion with Thee,
My meditations are deeper and sweeter with Kriya helping me to perfect my divings for Thee with focus concentration on the life force sensations flowing up the spine to the Third Eye,
I care not to waste any more time on thoughts on duality like those in ignorance for what is perceived by the five senses is unreal and what cannot be perceived in the superconscious by unrealized minds is real,
For Reality is but an hour in the Eternal now so I will spend it in devotion to Thee!
Beloved Eternal Father who lives within my body temple and is the Doer of all my good actions for
Thee does all the works in Creation with the Great Aum by Thy side as it was in the beginning,
Help me to continue along Thy Holy and righteous self realization straight and narrow path that very few desire and will themselves to travel which is Thy will not mine be done,
Release me of all my ignorance and desires for only your duality matter-sold gifts so that I too may receive Thy unspeakable gift of Thy Grace and final Nirvikalpa Samadi Bliss in this life time,
Like the Great Masters in Thee who have realized their true selves by conquering their ego manas mind of the five senses to live and reign in the soul’s body kingdom in the superconscious mind,
By lifting the veil, their son of man duality consciousness plane to the blissful plane of energy and superconsciousness that of the Son of God their true selves,
By turning their life force and consciousness away from their false identity of flesh in duality and disciplining their five senses to stop going out and follow the superconscious mind within,
For the senses are like the worker bees and will with discipline eventually follow the Queen Bee Thy mind inside Thy hive, ego mind to soul then to Christ consciousness and then to Cosmic Consciousness,
Kriya Yoga is the airplane to climb within the great stairway to heaven in the spine that are the seven churches or chakras wheels of Astral body of life force energy that lead to Thy door the Kingdom of Heaven within,
That is always upon us because Thou gave us free will to choose it or to suffer with Thy matter-sold gifts,
For Heaven is a state of consciousness and energy in the Eternal now like samadi and nirvana not a place with time and space,
Kriya distills scientifically the man of science’s electricity in every cell which is the Yogis’ prana out of the senses, muscles and organs into the nadis and chakras and upwards homeward bound to Thee,
These masters experimented with their minds and energy by willing their life force and consciousness to the Third Eye chakra, the Christ Krishna Consciousness Center,
To the Atom which no unrealized human eyes of the senses will ever see,
Making their eyes single and their body full of Thy Divine light and life force prana energy out of Thy mouth in the medulla oblongata for Eternity,
That is the Bread of Life vibratory energy and Living Water that Christ promised to give us proving scientificically that “man does not live by bread alone but by every word that proceed out of the mouth of God”,
Like the example of St. Francis who in the forest who gave St. Clare and his Holy Friars a meal made of God’s words which changed the vibration of their flesh to be full of divine light,
Like St. Joseph whose body elevated in the air upon hearing “word made flesh” revealing the vibrational power in Thy Holy Word,
I too can now feel Thy cosmic vibrations life force in my spine and brain upon reading Thy Holy Word in Scriptures and lives of Thy Saints and Realized Masters which excites my soul within me!
Feeling such sweetness from Thee now makes me cry at times beautiful yoga tears of reverence and love for Thee, and repentance for ignoring Thee!
Making me want to work harder for Thee as Thy spiritual servant and divine warrior by realizing myself and providing others with an example to follow that pleases Thee,
Like my past actions of disciplining my body as an athlete for sports I now tackle the more difficult sport of Yoga of disciplining my wayward mind of its wrong habits and seed tendencies,
By attuning to my Guru I become like him a living scripture of his and Thy wisdom and spirit for he is one with Thee and omnipresent like Thee,
With deepest gratitude, loyalty and devotion, trusting that Yogananda will take me to Thy door Eternal Father and the comforter Divine Holy Spirit Mother will baptize me and Christ will give me his Morning Star so that I will pierce the star in the third eye and go through it,
In pratahara’s sense withdrawn mind field with the trained stillness I will go through the Atom that is the end of duality’s time as there is no time and space in Thy home,
To sup with Christ the bridegroom who will take me to the wedding and union with Thee,
And finally releasing myself from bondage of my false body cage of duality flesh and ego manas mind with endless wandering duality thoughts and desires so that the Lion will lie down with the Lamb,
To seek and realize in me now the Kingdom of Heaven first and within me as the treasure beyond all treasures in my field,
To sing all day long like the Sepharim Angels “Holy, Holy, Holy is the Lord of Hosts, the earth is filled with His Glory”
Where bliss, perfect unconditional love, and full satisfaction of my heart’s and soul’s desires is found,
To reach in me the one great desire for rest in Thee and no more Karma desires that requires actions to perform in duality keeping me in bondage,
I command my spirit back to Thee to rest in Thee in the Eternal now in Infinity,
To be born from above through living water and Spirit with Eternal Life and never again to come back out below with another body flesh garment to suffer in duality with its lesser pleasures,
To be still and know and be one with the living God and receive Thy unspeakable and ever new Samadi Bliss, the true purpose of life!
Aum! Jai! Victory!
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