Gender Equality : Canada slips from 14th to 18th place

Let’s all take a moment to thank Prime Minister Steve for his assistance in moving Canadian women backwards on the road to gender equality. Tell him how much you appreciate him making your life, the lives of our mothers, sisters and daughters, worse. Tell him we knew he could do it. And tell him we can hardly wait to see what he’ll do to us if he ever gets that sacred majority!

May it never come to fruition!

Canada slips from 14th to 18th place in world rankings on gender equality

GENEVA – Canada has slipped a little compared with the rest of the world in providing
gender equality, according to a study by the World Economic Forum released Thursday.

Frank Jordans, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

The annual study ranking 128 countries found Canada had slipped four spots to 18th place
compared with last year.

Nordic countries received the best marks for gender parity in education, employment,
health and politics.

Sweden, which has more women then men holding high public office, topping the list. It
was following in order by Norway, Finland and Iceland.

New Zealand, the Philippines, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, and Spain rounded out the top
10.

The United States finished in 31st spot, down eight places from last year.

Based on a scale in which perfect equality was assigned a score of 1.0, Canada achieved
an overall mark of 0.72.

That included almost perfect marks in the categories of educational attainment (0.999)
and health and survival (0.979).

But it scored lower on economic participation and opportunity (0.74) and much lower
(0.159) on political empowerment, with women making up only 21 per cent of MPs and 23
per cent of cabinet posts in Parliament.

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75 thoughts on “Gender Equality : Canada slips from 14th to 18th place

  1. Geez that’s freakin pathetic and with a conservative government and a guy like Stephen “Dumb ars” Harper I don’t think it’ll get any better till he’s out of office.

  2. Not only is Harper taking back women’s equality he is also delusional profiling those of us who make prima facie sexual harassment and sex discrimination complaints per my UN petition against Harper/Canada/Ontario/Ministry of Attorney General/Ex chief commissioner Mr. Norton. What I am experiencing from this pathetic boys club government is delusional profiling to shut me up which is not working! I am showing the UN violations by Canada particularly the Supreme Court of Canada elevating their rules and acts above human rights, the Charter and the UN treaty see court files #31438, #31517, and #31518. I currently have the Ont. HR Commission now investigating remaining complaint against Kinros when Mr. Norton obstructed justice with the Laurentide complaint in 2005 who owns Kinros and is my employer and has provide judges with defense statement stating they are my employer!!! The Commission removed another investigation on September 24th 2007 after my fax to the OHRC and the UN. My UN petition is so that no other women gets delusional profiled in Canada by this sick system of government.

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  4. The Director of Mediation and Investigation, Neil Edwards discriminates and harasses any and every minority person especially Asians of Korean, Japanese, Chinese, Vietamese, and Taiwanese descent by making up fabricated stories in the form of documented evidence fabricated by himself to have their complaints dismissed without any settlements. He said you people drive BMW’s and can afford to pay $10,000.00 to judicial review us. Our lawyers will fabricate stories in divisional court like always. He said I am a nigger and we’ll use nigger lawyers to defend all Asian judicial reviews. We niggers hate asians. He said we a 70% niggers at the Commission and I make over $120,000.00 a year what are you going to go to the media. We have only 3% asians working at the Commisssion. He called me a Korean Kimchee and a Korean whore. He made a mistaken identity because I am a white woman. I told him that I was a white woman and he called me white trash. What do you make of him?

    • Ontario Human Rights Code is Fraud per Tort of Deceit Court of Appeal File #C50990

      The Ontario Human Rights Code as applied by Minister of Attorney General, Michael Bryant, in 2005 through his department at the Ontario Human Rights Commission is fraud per the tort of deceit with refusal to abide by the public policy of “everyone in Ontario is equal” the positive statement that is fraud in the preamble of the code. This fraud is also a refusal by the Ontario Government to abide by the code public policy to eliminate discrimination which cannot be done when the Minister of Attorney General refuses to manage his department at the Commission and Tribunal, and Judges in our Court System to abide by the policy “everyone in Ontario is equal” and ignores the measures to codify sections 5 to 10 of the code and stare decisis to Human Rights case laws. This includes section 7 that any woman exposed to pornography in the work place has a prima facie complaint of sexual harassment. What the Minister is offering through his departments at the Commission and Judicial Courts System with discretion to decision makers instead of discretion to stare decisis and “everyone is equal” public policy is an image Human Rights Process: It does not matter about the truth it only matters that we provide a process so when they say we disadvantage them we say we provide a process.

      The Minister of Attorney General, Michael Bryant, through the MAG Act is responsible for all justice in Ontario this includes Judges as well as the Commission and part of this management includes training his staff to abide by the United Nations Treaty for women to eliminate discrimination. In open court during the Rule 21 motion that is being appealed the Hamilton Court Justice Lofchik advised me he does not have to abide by the UN Treaty and he refused my arguments using the UN Treaty and left out of his endorsement required any analysis to the UN Treaty. This Judge also stated in open court that the Commission does not have to abide by stare decisis of section 7 of the Code that everyone exposed to pornography has a prima facie complaint made of sexual harassment due to discretion which is one of the material issue in dispute for this Appeal since I was exposed to pornography at my employers place of employment like other successful HR complainants and my complaint was dismissed due to fettering of discretion. Thus the current Minister of Attorney General and pass are responsible for this discriminatory attitude coming from Justice Lofchik and other judges refusing to abide by our equality laws and the UN Treaty. The material issue in this appeal is fettering discretion by Minister of Attorney General, Michael Bryant, in 2005 and his staff at the commission and the judges in our courts refusing to abide by the top law in Canada and public policy of “everyone is equal” to eliminate discrimination and also the UN Treaty.

      I will be arguing for this appeal that the Minister of Attorney General and staff have committed the tort of deceit in that they are not managing the Human Rights process to meet their abligation of the positive statement in the preamble of “everyone is equal” intentionally by refusing to abide by stare decisis that any woman exposed to pornagraphy in the workplace has a prima facie complaints.
      I will also be arguing that the Minister of Attorney General and staff are refusing to be bound by the United Nations Treaty for Women which clearly says that our government must create laws to eliminate discrimination not just provide a process which discriminates the complainants to save money or due to cost allocation as I was told by judge Lofchik.

  5. AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL C50990
    THE APPELLANT, CLAUDETTE LOSIER, APPEALS to the Court of Appeal of Ontario from the final judgment of Justice Lofchik dated August 21st, 2009, for the Crown Defendants (Ontario Human Rights Commission, Dina Waiks, Shannon Meadows-Lee, and Minister of Attorney General (Michael Bryant) only, made at the Superior Court of Justice at 45 Main St., Hamilton, Ontario, L8N 2B7.
    THE APPELLANT ASKS that the judgment made by Justice Lofchik for the Crown Defendants be null and void, and reverse to an order allowing the plaintiff to continue and amend her claims against the Crown Defendants as joint tortfeasors with her employer defendants to these suits (04-13797 and 05-18500) be granted for intentional torts and causes of actions pleaded: Constitutional Tort, Misfeasance of Public Office, Deceit, Defamation, Conspiracy to injure and Intentional Inflection of Emotional Distress.

    THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL are as follows:
    1. Breach of Rule 21 Rule to dismiss Crown’s motion for delay in filing Rule 21 Motion;
    2. Breach of Rule 21 “plain and obvious” test taking advantage of self represented litigants with no law training to write proper statement of claim and creating an unequal justice system;
    3. Abuse of Discretion by Justice Lofchik and Crown Defendants per Discretion Principal of “an intangible principle that is used to bar proceedings that are inconsistent with the objectives of public policy” and that policy is per the Ontario Human Rights Code Preamble “that everyone in Ontario is equal”;
    4. Violation of the United Nations Treaty the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and its Optional Protocol 2000 Article 2, a to f;
    5. Breach of the Charter sections 15, 24, and 52;
    6. Breach of Ontario Human Rights Code preamble that “everyone in Ontario is equal” and sections 5 to 10 the measures to codify;
    7. Seneca College of Applied Arts and Technology v. Bhadauria SCC 1981
    8. Kulyk para 41 – Sopinka J, 1996 S.C.R. Mooring v. Canada (National Parole Board) that stare decisis of human rights cases applies
    9. The Longley v. Revenue Canada case dated 1999 refers to Supreme Court case of Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General) dated 1997 that nullifies all of the Crown’s case authorities particularly Bhadauria case dated 1982 and clearly states that a person who is being discriminated by a government staff or institution or the legislation itself can rely on the Charter as a Constitutional Tort and sue for damages civilly;
    10. Supreme Court of Canada precedent case of Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson dated 1989 after the 1982 Bhadauria case and also nullifies all of the Crown’s case authorities;
    11. Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General) dated 1997 that nullifies the Bhadauria case and Justice Lofchik’s argument in Court left out of his endorsement record that the Commission has discretion to violate my human rights due to time and resources allocation problems;
    12. Error in law in misapplying the common law principal of stare decisis that a judge should not give a judgment contrarory to that of another judge unless it is shown that some binding authority in case law or some relevant statute was not considered such as the United Nations Treaty and SCC’ case law on the United Nations Treaty application in our Justice System;
    13. Error in law of misapplication of the common law principal of stare decisis such as the process referred to as “distinuishing the facts” of opposing precedents when Justice Lofchik ignores all of the applicant’s precedents that make the Crown’s precedents on discretion null and void;
    14. Breach of Rule of Law;
    15. Institutional Bias;
    16. Preferred treatment to Crown evidence of Institional Bias re: Justice Lofchik allowing me to amend my statement of claims against Employers but not the Crown defendants when they are joint tort feasores per principal of joint tortfeasors for tort of Conspiracy and defamation;
    17. Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record is not a proper endorsement record and analysis of material issue in dispute with absolutely no references to my alleged pleadings that he claims are in error per the example of Justice Crane’s endorsement record in KRP Enterprises Inc., et al and Corporation of Haldimand County, et al, [2007] (pg 4 to 6 thumbnail chronology from Statement of Claim, para 25 page 15 facts from statement, para 30 page 18/19, para 33 page 20/21/22 ), and Hunt v. Carey;
    18. Refusing my request to amend my claims with additional facts and continuation of wrong doing through the courts is evidence of discrimination by Justice Lofchik via differential treatment per Crown’s authority HVK pg 16 para 56 Himel J’s decision in rule 21 motion: “in that the pleadings contain bald assertions, I order that particulars be provided with respect to paragraphs 51 to 57 of the claim within 30 days of this decision”
    19. KRP Endorsement record from Justice Crane para 29 page 17: does not contain the typically pleaded essential elements of this cause of action.
    20. Breach of rules of natural justice per Cashin case law by Crown defendants, Justice Lofchik, Divisional Court and Ontario Court of Appeal for 2006 Judicial Review: fair hearing, and impartiality;
    21. Breach of Human Rights Case decision that all provincial and federal human rights legislation is relevant to the interpretation of one human rights statute;
    22. No pleadings of Natural Justice cause of action in statement of claim identified by Justice Lofchik with specific paragraph, because the paragraph pleads breach of natural justice as improper purpose for tort of Misfeasance of Public Office;
    23. Breach of fair hearing as Justice Jofchik on July 2 and 3rd 2009 refused me to submit my rebuttals of the Crown’s argument pleaded no facts to show Justice Lofchik where the facts where pleaded so that he can say in his endorsement no facts pleaded;
    24. Elements of Tort of Misfeasance of Public Office met per Roncarelli v. Duplessis 1959 SCR case para 169 “fraud, malice, collusion…” pleaded sufficiently for improper purpose;
    25. No pleadings of tort of negligence only pleadings of Intentional Torts: Conspiracy to Injure, Deceit, Defamation, Constitional Tort, Misfeasance of Public Office, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress;
    26. Authority of Starline Entertainment Centre Inc. v. Ciccarelli (1995) that no special immunities when public officers act beyond the powers which are accorded to them, and common law court remedies allowed for civil causes of action and not via a Judicial Review;
    27. Bad Faith pleaded sufficiently;
    28. That the precedent case of Westlake set in 1971 was an unconsidered decision prior to the United Nations’ Treaty where there is no immunity for Human Rights Violations, and the Charter in 1982 which the decision in White v. OHRC was based on. The facts and causes of action in Westlake are not similar to this case;
    29. Error in law by not applying the common law principle of “declining jurisdiction” which in turn leads to “exceeding jurisdiction” which removes immunity and allows the Crown Defendants to be sued. That is the principle in law that judicial immunity is lifted if act maliciously in order to harm claimants;
    30. Error in law by not applying the common law principle that of the normal rights of the injured individual can be applied to pursue intentional tort remedies against the administrator: such as Conspiracy to injure, deceit, defamation, Constitutional Tort, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress;
    31. Pleaded sufficiently for the Tort of Conspiracy per precedent case authorities: Cement Lafarge, Chahal v. Khalsa Community School (2000), Hunt v. Carey and Crown’s Authority;
    32. Pleaded sufficiently for tort of defamation per Klar’s Tort law authority;
    33. I have a cause of action for the tort of deceit as the code’s preamble “that everyone is equal in Ontario” is a false positive respresentation and the Ministers of Attorney General are responsible for this fraudulant law in Ontario per the MAG Act;
    34. I have pleaded sufficiently for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress per Clark vs. Canada, and Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse;
    35. I have a valid claim against the ex Minister of Attorney General and the current one per the United Nations Treaty, MAG Act, and case of KRP with continuing causes of actions and damages after date of statements of claims, and the 05 matter clearly stated I was intending to ammend my claim;
    36. Supreme Court of Canada Practice is that they are not a court of error submitted to Justice Lofchik with comment that this results in corruption by lower court judges knowing their decision won’t be overturned;
    37. Institutional bias by Supreme Court of Canada on refused leave to appeal per law clerks’ memo’s on line for my 3 files #31438, #31518, and #31517 due to Ex Minister of Attorney General had connections at the Supreme Court of Canada per recent news events state he use to be a law clerk at the Supreme Court of Canada in 1997 and to protect the career of a political star Mr. Micheal Bryant;
    38. And any other argument that arises before the appeal.

    THE BASIS OF THE APPELLATE COURT’S JURISDICTIONS IS: is the Courts of Justice Act section 6(1)(b), Rules of Civil procedure 61 to 61.12. The judgment appealed from is final. Leave to appeal is not required.
    The Appellant requests that this appeal be heard at the Court of Appeal for Ontario, Osgoode Hall, 130 Queen Street West, Toronto, Ontario, M5H 2N5.

  6. Ontario Court of Appeal C50990 factum filed May 2010 – Crown commits fraud via Human Rights Code

    PART IV – THE ISSUES AND THE LAW

    ISSUE 1: The Court Below erred in law applying the Crown’s definition of discretion based on case law and broadly not narrowly per the OHR Code which shows that the Crown is applying discretion wihout authority of Statute per preamble that “everyone in Ontario is equal” resulting in fraud, with measures to codify per sections 5 to 10 and prima facie HR case laws similar to appellant, with balance, fair and thorough investigations and JR of all of the facts that includes providing appellant investigation documents per her request and interviewing her witnesses. Therefore the Crown is acting without the authority of the Charter and United Nations (“UN”) Treaty per the SCC’s decisions which includes no imunity for HR damages against any institution or organization. As a result the Crown have lost or decline jurisdiction and immunity, and can be sued per intentional torts pleaded, and discretion and immunity does not protect the Crown for intentional torts such as Conspiracy and Defamation per joint tortfeasers legal principal and SCC case authorities.

    ISSUE 2: The Court Below erred in law for Rule 21 analysis by completely ignoring the “plain and obvious test” that facts are to be taken as true, allowance for inadequacies due to drafting deficiencies for unrepresented litigant with no law training, and refusal to dismiss the Crown’s Motion per Rule 21 failure to file motion on timely basis. That this test includes the pleadings of the Employers’ facts in HR complaints, OHRC intentionally flawed investigation and reports pleaded sufficiently and with particularity per CT which can be reviewed in Civil Courts for tort damages against the Crown not in JR Courts and is not an abuse of process for re-litigation per Crown’s case HVK. The Intentional Torts such as Misfeasance of Public Office allows the public legitimate right to Civil Courts against the Crown for abuses of how they did their job including in Bad Faith resulting in damages.

    ISSUE 3: The Court Below erred in law by breaching rule of law by misapplying the common law principle of “stare decisis” by ignoring all of the appellant’s stare decisis authorities including the UN Treaty that he is bound by that voids all of the Crown Defendants’ authorities including the immunity for Commission, and this order is Unconstitutional, instituional bias, and fettering discretion to protect the Crown defendants not save by section 1 of the Charter. The MAG, Michael Bryant, can be sued for various intentional torts per KRP case in his own right for violation of s. 5(b) of the MAG Act and the Code; and the Commission is responsible to this Minister for the administration of the Code per s. 27(2) therefore controlled test met for Crown Agency. The Queen can be added to suit for continuance of action and now again with Justice Lofchik’s conduct.

  7. Factum C50990 cont…

    6. The discretion that is given to all of the Crown defendants (CT 220-224, 566-71),

    Justice Lofchik and all Courts is narrowly and per Charter “access to justice” with

    allowances for drafting deficiencies to unrepresented litigants with no law training how to

    write proper claim (CT 550-51), and the Code preamble that “everyone in Ontario is

    equal” with measures to codify section 5 to 10 to eliminate discrimination in Ontario as

    great as the UN treaty (CT 160-162, 329-39, 844-45, 848-857) which includes judges and

    legislation abolishing all discrimintarory laws, practices, orders and reports that infringe

    the Charter and UN Treaty (CT 745-48, 848-857, 863). Justice Lofchik’s order can be

    set aside per his arguments para #51 to #56 and #61 to 63 when per his agreement the

    facts pleaded is based on personal knowledge of facts in HR’s complaints’ Employment

    events (CT 192-93, 749-757, 758, 759-788), the facts from the Crown’s entire conduct up

    to trial of intentional flawed investigation tactics per reports with regards to all the facts

    in complaints, and new facts of flawed JR appeals by refusing to weigh all the evidence

    and facts (CT 81, 443) and abide by sections 5 to 10 of the Code which are sufficient

    facts not bald allegations of misconduct for the intentional causes of actions pleaded and

    improper purpose for Misfeasance of Public Office, that removes jurisdiction and

    immunity (CT 194-96, 345, 572-73, 615-620, 640-649, 668-729, 740). Justice Lofchik

    errorred at para #52, and #53 when he stated apart from the HR internal reports there is

    insufficient facts for intentional torts so that he can claim I pleaded no facts only bald

    assertions at #54 when I only need the facts of HR reports and complaints for questions

    of fact to show how the defendants abused their job resulting in damages sufficient when

    defendants have already pleaded in response which internal documents was sufficient as

    facts for tort of deceit in Derry case (CT 868-889) and for defamation/libel in Botiuk

    SCC (CT 742, 777-788, 831-35) and Longley case, for Constitutional Tort in HVK case,

    and report for Misfeasance of Public Office in SCC case of Roncarelli to refuse license

    by a Commission.

    Justice Lofchik errored that HR complaints litigated in JR HR’s jurisdiction where the

    court refused to weigh evidence (CT pg 443, 891-899) is a claim for damages against the

    Crown (CT pgs 187-479) therefore abuse of process to litigate same facts in claim in civil

    jurisdiction at para #64 and is an attempt to circumvent intentional torts and legitimate

    rights to civil suit that includes statutory breaches when Crown acts in bad faith causing

    damages and that my claim is not similar to Deep v. Ontario (CT pgs 186, 604-05, 714,

    725, 779-793, 803-04). In Court Justice Lofchik clearly stated “if you’re seeking

    damages for torts…it’s in a proceeding such as this and not judicial review” (CT pg 604),

    therefore this claim is not abuse of process or relitigation of same issues per endorsement

    paras #64, 60, #62, #64 and #45 raised in JR for discrimination damages since the Crown

    were not respondents for those damages. These claims are my first civil suits against the

    Crown for fundamental omissons where a Trial judge will make a determination of the

    facts in HR complaints and reports by weighing the facts with evidence, witnesses and

    cross examinations, and is allowed for civil tort law per Kulyk, Starline, HVK, Botiuk,

    Hunt, Longley, Roncarelli, Odhavji, and SCC (CT 888-889, 897-98. Justice Lofchik’s

    unconstitutional one sided endorsement record refusing to be bound by the UN Treaty per

    SCC is institutional bias of intervening in hearing to favour the Crown (CT 581) and

    evidence that the MAG personally and the Queen Her Majesty refuses to administrate

    justice in Ontario in accordance with the UN Treaty and equality laws for women through

    the HR and Courts jurisdictions per my factum arguments paras #30 to #79 and Court

    Transcript. Justice Lofchik’s order is inconsistent with the purpose of the UN Treaty,

    Charter, and the Code and all are acting without authority, therefore the order and HR

    reports are of no force or effect per the following:

    “WHEREAS recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights
    of all of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the
    world and is in accord with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as
    proclaimed by the United Nations; AND WHEREAS it is public policy in Ontario to
    recognize the dignity and worth of every person and to provide for equal rights and
    opportunities without discrimination that is contrary to law, and having as its aim the
    creation of a climate of understanding and mutual respect for the dignity and worth
    of each person so that each person feels a part of the community and able to
    contribute fully to the development and well-being of the community and the
    Province;

    “The Ontario Human Rights Code should receive an interpretation which advances
    the broad purposes set out in its preamble.”

    “Rights should be interpreted broadly and legislated exceptions to the exercise of
    these rights should be interpreted narrowly.”

    “Justice Sopinka in the case of Mooring v. Canada (National Parole Board) in 1996
    argued this point that Human Rights Boards are bound by stare decisis because
    human rights are an equality issue”

    “In this case the question of the motive which prompted the council to act as it did
    is a question of fact and is one which should be decided at trial. There is a
    developing tort consisting of the infliction of damage by the deliberate abuse of
    public office or authority…which by necessary implication permits a plaintiff…if
    it sustains damages as a result of such an abuse, to come to a common law court
    for its remedy and not necessarily rely on the remedies afforded through judicial
    review of such action.”

    “There are numerous previous legal proceedings relating to the children, including the Crown wardship case brought under the Child and Family Services Act, the custody applications brought under the Children’s Law Reform Act, the Director’s review under s. 68 of the Child and Family Services Act, the costs hearing, the stay motion, the appeal and an application for judicial review. None of these proceedings involved claims for damages.”

    “Although the defendant possessed the power to deprive certain persons from
    participating in the election, he did not have the power to do so for an improper
    purpose.”

    “the mere fact that the alleged misconduct also constitutes a breach of statute is
    insufficient to exempt the officer from civil liability.”

    “In the leading case on the tort of deceit Derry v. Peek, the deceit was contained in a
    company’s written prospectus”

    “all those who participated in or were responsible for the original publication and its distribution must be joined as joint tortfeasors in the original cause of action.”

    “Malice in the proper sense is simply acting for a reason and purpose knowingly foreign to the administration, to which was added here the element of intentional punishment by what was virtually vocation outlawry.”

    “ (b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where
    appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women; (c) To establish legal
    protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through
    competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of
    women against any act of discrimination; (d) To refrain from engaging in any act or
    practice of discrimination against women and to ensure that public authorities and
    institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation; (e) To take all appropriate
    measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization, or
    enterprise; (f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or
    abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute
    discrimination against women”

    “The Constitution is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent
    with its provisions is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. It is
    thus impossible to interpret legislation conferring discretion as conferring a power
    to infringe the Charter, unless, of course, that power is expressly conferred or
    necessarily implied. Such an interpretation would require this Court to declare
    the legislation to be of no force or effect, unless it could be justified under s. 1 of
    the Charter. It follows that an adjudicator, who exercises delegated powers, does
    not have the power to make an order that would result in an infringement of the
    Charter.”

    “As was said in Oakes, supra, at p.136, among the underlying values essential to
    our free and democratic society are “the inherent dignity of the human person”
    and “commitment to social justice and equality”. Especially in light of Canada’s
    ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
    Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc.
    A/6316 (1966), and commitment therein to protect, inter alia, the right to work in
    its various dimensions found in Article 6 of that treaty, it cannot be doubted that
    the objective in this case is a very important one. In Reference Re Public Service
    Employee Relations Act (Alta.), supra, I had occasion to say at p. 349: The
    content of Canada’s international human rights obligations is, in my view, an
    important indicia of the meaning of the “full benefit of the Charter’s protection”.
    I believe that the Charter should generally be presumed to provide protection at
    least as great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human rights
    documents which Canada has ratified.”

    “This Court has repeatedly held that once the state does provide a benefit, it is
    obliged to do so in a non-discriminatory manner.”

    “In the present case, the government has manifestly failed to demonstrate that it
    had a reasonable basis for concluding that a total denial of medical interpretation
    services for the deaf constituted a minimum impairment of their rights.”

    “the government has not made a “reasonable accommodation” of the appellants’
    disability” and “it has not accommodated the appellants’ needs to the point of
    “undue hardship”

    “5(i) shall superintend all matters connected with judicial offices;”

    The 2005 and 2009 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, pgs 1, 2, 3,
    140, and 201, Book of Authorities, Tab 2

    Kulyk v. Toronto (City) Board of Education (1996), 24 C.C.E.L (2d) 63,
    para 29, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41 and 42 (Sopinka J, 1996 S.C.R. Mooring v.
    Canada (National Parole Board), 50-55, Book of Authorities, Tab 15

    Starline Entertainment Centre Inc. V. Ciccarelli, [1995] 25 O.R. (3d), 765, pg 14, Book of Authorities, Tab 22

    H.V.K. v. Children’s Aid Society of Haldimand-Norfolk, [2003] O.J. No 1572, paras 15, 20, 25, 26, 28, 30, 32, 33, 55, 56, and 57, Book of Authorities, Tab 10

    Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263, paras 15, 16, 18 20, 21, 24, 37, 31, 40, and 41, Book of Authorities, Tab 17

    Klar, “Tort Law”, 2003, Thomson Carswell, pages 289, 295, 601, 603, 605 and 682-3, Book of Authorities, Tab 13

    Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121, pgs 123, 140, 141-43, 155-59, 167, 169, and 184-86, Book of Authorities, Tab 19
    The UN Treaty the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
    against Women and its Optional Protocol 2000 Article 2 (b) to (f), pg 5 Book of Authority, Tab 25

    Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, pgs 2, 18 and 19, Book of Authorities, Tab 21

    Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), paras 58, 73, 85, 87, 94, Book of Authorities, Tab 9

    Ministry of the Attorney General Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.17, section 5(i)

    JL’s endorsement record, Motion Factums 04 matter paras 3, 5, Issue 3, #30 to #79 and 05 matter paras #33 to #89, Canadian Press Article, and CT (see above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 1, 6, and 8

    7. Justice Lofchik order can be set aside as facts in HR complaints and the case analyses

    reports are sufficient for full particulars for all torts per Roncarelli, Ashley, Deery,

    Longley, Botiuk, Hunt, Deputy Judge Nairn, and rule of civil procedure 25.06 (2) and (8)

    and I requested adding other facts allowed per HVK with a low threshold (CT 191-94,

    217, 294-99, 581, 615-20, 640-49, 737-40, 789-796). These HR facts pleaded were

    allegedly investigated and have been proven in similar HR cases therefore they are not

    baldly pleaded. The Charter, Code, UN treaty and SCC clearly states the Crown does

    have a duty to the public policy of “everyone is equal” to proceed with every prime facie

    complaint in a “non-discriminatory manner” to Tribunal per factum arguments for 04

    matter at paras #47, 48, 51, 54, 57-60, 62, 63, 65-68, 70-76, 78, and 79, and similarly for

    05 matter that makes all complainants equal so long as the prohibited ground forms one

    of the reasons such as MMP’s rebuttal “long absense”.

    The Code and SCC cases at para #6 invalidates the Crowns section 34 cases of Way and

    Gismondi on discretion when complaint is prima facie made out per the Code: repetitive

    of sexual harassment, exposure to any form of pornography or sexual representation or

    sex solicitation, failure of six elements HR’s test, insurance plan that limits benefits for

    mental disabilities (MMP, and Lyman), firing employee without making inquiries and

    accommodation (MMP), perceived disability discimination, and firing after making

    internal complaints for reprisal. The Crown defendants are personally suable for acting

    in an discriminatory manner of differential treatment by fabricating insufficient evidence

    refusing to look at all facts with intentional flawed investigation and JR into 2010

    sufficient for improper purpose that oust jurisdiction and immunity not protected by

    Charter section 1 (CT 124-26, 237, 745-48, 857). My pleadings of facts show that

    respondents made clear statement concerning one of the grounds which forms one of the

    reasons for their conduct per the code unlawfully ignored by Crown to defame me with

    incompentency falsehoods not baldy pleaded per Deep para 46 and the following:

    “For example, a party might state simply that the party was defamed by the
    other party without stating what the other party said that was defamatory.”

    “A prima facie case of discrimination…is one which covers the allegations
    made and which, if they are believed, is complete and sufficient to justify a
    verdict in the complainant’s favour in the absence of an answer from the
    respondent employer.”

    “the fact that “disability” played some role in the decision taints the entire
    decision.”

    “the law is clear that the prohibitive ground of discrimination need not be the
    only reason for the action taken, so long as it forms one of the reasons.”

    “The Tribunal holds that discrimination occurred when the sole director and officer of the respondents, Albright Drycleaners Ltd., fired Ms. Williams-Wilson without making inquiries into the status of her mental state and without giving her the chance to request accomodation.”

    Rules of Civil Procedure 25.06(2)

    Deep v. Ontario, {2004} O.J. No. 2734, paras 20, 22, 35, 44, 46, 57, 68, and 83, Book of Authorities, Tab 7

    Starline, supra, pg 14 (25.06(8)), Book of Authorities, Tab 22

    The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, pg 201, 43, 59 and 361,
    Book of Authorities, Tab 2

    Margaretta Williams-Wilson v. Albright Drycleaners Ltd (1997), 32
    C.H.R.R., summary paragraph, Book of Authority, Tab 27

    International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local 50 v. Otis Canada Inc., 2004 CanLII 49773 (ON L.R.B.), paras 47, 54, 60, 61, 62, 66, 77, and 79, Book of Authorities, Tab 12

    Statement of Claims #04 paras 8 and 110, motion factum (04 matter para 27, 56, and 58), OHRC documents (showing Respondents collaborative evidence forming one of the reasons), Deputy Judge’s Nairns endorsement record for Lyman’s failed rule 21 2004 motion), and CT (see above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tabs 3, 6, 7, and 10

  8. 8. Justice Lofchik’s order can be set aside because the discretionary power to not deal
    with a complaint is per the Code s. 36 after an investigation not included in his bias analysis at #44 from Crown’s s. 34 case of Way in their factum at page 9 para #30 and #31 (see first quotation below) with changed words from this case (second quotation) which is intervening to favour the Crown. The Way and Gismondi cases with duty under s. 34 to not proceed to investigations are not similar to my case and therefore is an
    illegitimate reason for dismissing investigated complaints under s. 36 by Crown proving intentional unlawful conduct and acting without authority. Justice Lofchik errored in his endorsement at #60 as the Code under s. 34 and 36 does not include statement of
    discretion per endorsement record and Way, nor to breach stare decisis of sections 5 to 10 and Human Rights Case laws similar to my prima facie complaints, or deprived complainants of thorough and full investigation of every fact with lots of fundamental omissions explicitely disregarding facts (CT pgs 130-32, 160-63, 165-185, 199-209,
    218, 263–275-286, 294-99, 345, 363-89, 393-96, 640-49, 754-768) per Odhavji a non Human Rights case not similar to my claim with HR violations; and requires non-discriminatory reason per #6 above, and JR courts to weigh the evidence and order
    production of investigation documents in question when challenged by complainants. All
    are facts of intentional not negligent conduct by all Crown Defendants acting beyond
    powers of the Code’s preamble into 2010 per the following after first three quotations:

    “It is respectfully submitted that the legislation clearly establishes the discretionary
    nature of the Commission’s powers. In fact, the Court has recognized that the
    Commission is not under a public duty to proceed with every complaint placed
    before it.”

    “The Commission is not under a duty to investigate every complaint”

    “34. (1) (b) the subject-matter of the complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or
    made in bad faith;”

    “36 (2) Notice of decision not to appoint inquiry – Where the Commission decides not to refer the subject-matter of a complaint to the Tribunal, it shall advise the complainant and the person complained against in writing of the decision and the
    reasons therefore”

    “its duty is to decide if, under the provisions of the Act, an inquiry is warranted having regard to all the facts.”

    “an investigation had to be at least thorough and neutral for the Commission to have a fair basis on which to evaluate”

    “that where the completeness of the investigation or report is challenged, the underlying investigation documents are relevant and subject to production”

    “If the investigation is flawed to the point where a court can reasonably conclude
    the evidence reported by the investigator is incomplete or inadequate, the court
    must intervene.”

    “She failed to interview the applicant nor any of her witnesses. The Commission
    realized this was a flaw and asked the investigator to interview the applicant’s
    witnesses.”

    “Furthermore, two supplemental witness statements, dated February 15 and 16,
    2001, from CIC’s main witnesses in response to questions put by the investigator to
    CIC were not disclosed.”

    “Ms. Huneault made a clear statement concerning one of the grounds upon which
    the applicant based her discrimination and harassment claims. However, the
    investigator failed to address this issue any further in his report. This omission
    might constitute a “fundamental” omission.”

    Affidavit of Plaintiff, Claims 04-13797 and 05-18300, Motion Factum of the Respondents pg 9 para #30 and #31, Motion Factum 04 matter paras #30 to #79, CT (see above), OHRC documents, Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7

    Way v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [2003] O.J. No. 5099
    (S.C.J.) at para 7, Book of Authorities, Tab 26

    The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, supra, pgs 172, and 184, Book of Authorities, Tab 2

    Ruckpaul v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 149 (CanLII), analysis pgs 7 to 11 particularly paras 42, 45-50, 52-58, 62-
    71 and 75, Book of Authorities, Tab 20

    9. Justice Lofchik’s order and the Crown’s case analyses reports can be set aside for
    fettering discretion acting outside of their jurisdiction when their decision is inconsistent with all equality laws at paras #6 to #8 above infringing the Charter
    and “access to justice” and breaches the principle of stare decisis by refusing to consider all of the appellant’s binding authority. This includes joint tortfeasors doctrine that no judge can ignore per motion arguments that invalidates the Crown’s authorities and is intervening in hearing to favour the Crown institutional bias when MAG appoints Ontario Judges like Justice Lochik per CT ( pgs 161, 179, 218-24, 296, 323, 564, 571, 581, 588-89, 620, 749-
    58, 772-780, 786-87, 793, 817, 825-28, 857) and the following:

    “A judge should not give a judgment contrary to that of another judge of the same court unless at least one of the following situations exists: (1) subsequent decisions have affected the validity of the impugned judgment; (2) it is shown that some binding authority in case law or some relevant statute was not considered;”

    “The fundamental rule in the exercise of discretion is that the choices made must be
    consistent with the purpose of the statute and within its wording.”

    “When officials rule out options that the law requires them to consider they are said
    said to be fettering their discretion.”

    “If the official considering the application ignored the criteria that he was required to apply in making the decision and decided to deny access to the services, the
    individual might be able to successfully challenge the decision in the courts on the
    grounds that the official was acting outside his jurisdiction.”

    “A tribunal may appear to have a built-in bias where one of the parties that appears
    before it is a government department that approves its budget, appoints its members,
    provides its staff, or exercises control in other ways that may suggest that the department has influence over the tribunal’s decisions.” This kind of built-in bias is called institutional bias.”

    “The kinds of activities, conduct, interests, relationships, and associations of a decision maker that may give rise to an appearance of bias includes: intervenes in the hearing process in a way that persistently favours one party over another.”

    Justice Lofchik’s May 14th 2008 order, Affidavit of Plaintiff, Deputy Judge Mongeon’s Endorsement Record for file #1178/04 para 21 and 28,
    and CT (see above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 1, 2 and 10

    Administrative Law: Principals and Advocacy, pg 5, 50, 51, 54, 58, 68, 93 and 94, Book of Authorities, Tab 23

    10. Justice Lofchik’s order can be set aside for ignoring pleadings in claims discussed in
    motion hearing for the Tort of Deceit (CT 149-155, 242-43, 868-889) and Constitutional Tort (CT 240, 244-249, 251, 253-324 disability ground, 323-39, 349-89, 404-07, 567-79-89, 609-611) as there is no analysis per endorsement paras #4 and #51 for these causes of actions which means they were sufficiently pleaded. The Tort of Deceit is per factum para #71 and includes: verbal and written positive misrepresentations one being the Code’s
    preamble “everyone is equal” and sections 5 to 10 and HR cases for prima facie complaints; and the second that my complaints were being “investigated” fairly to mislead me; when there was no fair investigation of every fact which has to include
    complainant’s witnesses and prima facie collaborative evidence from respondents in
    reports and JR weighing all the evidence and facts per Ruckpaul JR case; and the Crown
    defendants knew I would act upon my rights per the Code resulting in damages.

    The Constitutional Tort is per motion factum #66, HVK and Longley cases that includes:
    breaching the Charter, UN Treaty, and the Code per public policy of “everyone in Ontario is equal” with measures to codify section 5 to 10 and HR case laws not save under section 1 of the Charter; and Queen/MAG’s refusal to provide a non-discriminatory Human Rights process which the law requires including JR appeals; discrimination per Charter with differential treatment and retaliation by dismissing prima facie complaints with intentional flawed investigation tactics of all facts in HR complaints to fabricate
    insufficient evidence in case analyses pleaded in claim 04 matter such as paras 17, 26, 28,
    29, 32 (facts at para #36 to #142), and 33, and similarly for 05 matter, and JR Appeals; and additional motive of reprisal for suit #1178/04 filed in Spring against OHRC and
    Intake Staff before December 2004 reports. The fact “unfit to work had I return” in MMP’s case analysis at para #30 is libel and disability discriminatory statement not bald assertion and sufficient for suit per internal report cases at para #6 above. The Crown defendants have lost jurisdiction and immunity, and can be sued civilly for breaching the

    Code’s preamble objective per intentional torts with no pleadings of negligence in claim
    CT 81, 123, 132, 134-35, 156-62, 195-197, 206-216):

    “the tort of deceit involves a false statement of fact made by the defendant directly to the plaintiff. This positive misrepresentation can be in either verbal or written
    form. In the leading case on the tort of deceit Derry v. Peek, the deceit was contained in a company’s written prospectus.”

    “the defendants were liable for fraud based
    upon “active non-disclosure.”

    “Transit told the media that Dixon was dismissed after a performance review. That statement was deliberately misleading because it failed to say that it was after a performance review that failed to disclose any cause for dismissal.”

    “Secondly, the Charter may be infringed, not by the legislation itself, but by the
    actions of a delegated decision-maker in applying it. In such cases, the legislation
    remains valid, but a remedy for the unconstitutional action may be sought
    pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter.”

    “In R. v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933, Lamer C.J.C. set out the fundamental approach to s. 15(1) at p. 922 as follows: The court must first determine whether the claimant has shown that one of the four basic equality rights has been denied (i.e. equality before the law, equality under the law, equal protection of the law and equal benefit of the law).”

    “…an adjudicator exercising delegated powers does not have the power to make an order that would result in an infringement of the Charter, and he exceeds his jurisdiction if he does so.”

    “the Charter applies and that, “A Society and a social worker preparing a Society’s case are obvious instruments of government within the meaning of subsection 32(1). In my view, a children’s aid society is an arm of the state and where there are breaches of the charter by the Society, it may be held responsible. Actions of directors or employees as agents of the society are, therefore, subject to scrutiny under the Charter.”

    Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record paras 4, 51, and 54, Affidavit of Plaintiff, Claims 04-13797 (paras 22, 27, 26, 28, 29, 32, and 33) and 05-18300 (4, 15, 30, 33, 36, 40, and 41), Motion Factum, CT (See above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6

    Klar, supra, pages 601, 603, 605, Book of Authorities, Tab 13

    Dixon v. British Columbia Transit (1995), 9 B.C.L.R. (3d), front page, paras 37, 39, 40, 41, 58, 66, 69, and 76-81, Book of Authority, Tab 8

    Longley v. Minister of Revenue SCC case and (Slaight Communications
    Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, paras 82, 83, 92-95, 97-100, 108- 109, 115-117, 135-37, and 141, Book of Authorities, Tab 16
    H.V.K., supra, page 2 para 2, para 32, Book of Authorities, Tab 10

  9. 11. Justice Lofchik’s order can be set aside for fettering discretion as there is no absolute immunity per Westlake, White and Smith for the Commission a Crown Agency under
    control of MAG per section 27 of the Code when in suit for possessing powers contrary
    to Code’s purpose “everyone in Ontario is equal” with personal staff of OHRC, it is only
    immune if sued by its self in its own rightper Smith and Starline (CT pgs 63-88-91-99,
    327-30). The Court errored that Starline dismiss Major and Commission for absolute
    immunity per Westlake or that Major had shared immunity with Commission when they
    were dismissed for failure to serve notice to Crown (CT 88-91, 100-09, 110-112). Justice
    Lofchik affirms in his endorsement record paras #45-#54 that I pleaded “they acted
    deliberately” with “quality of the investigation” of unlawful conduct of staff selecting
    only facts and evidence unfairly with bias to Employers in the reports and not
    investigating or including all the facts per HR law and refusing to provide me with their evidence into 2010 with improper purpose to discriminate and defame and breach Natural
    Justice in Bad Faith with malice that declines jusisdiction per Ruckpaul and Cashin, and
    for collatoral advantage (CT 142, 162, 194-97).

    These are questions of motive prompting these Crown Defendants to act as they did for improper purpose to breach natural justice and statute (CT 296-306, 345) and is a question of fact per intentional torts not negligence with no special immunities to be determined at a Trial not Rule 21 motion per SCC’s decision in Roncarrelli, Berardinelli, Nelles, Starline and other cases per factum arguments at paras #35 to #79 (CT 95-328), the UN Treaty and section 5(2) and 23 of the Proceedings Against the Crown. These authorities give right to sue for intentional conduct with other improper motives of
    collusion, discrimination and defamation with respondents that is contrary to public purpose in Code’s preamble, section 36, and Charter which invalidates Justice Lofchik’s argument at #49 and #50 base on Lacosse and Oren Nimelman and JR when my claims are not similar (CT 206-207, 234-36, 572-73, 592-99, 603-05, 626-27, 640-49, 706, 745-
    48) per the following:

    “The Commission is responsible to the Minister for the administration of this Act.”

    “All provincial and federal human rights legislation is relevant to the
    interpretation of one human rights statute.”

    “Instead, the courts examine the relationship between that body and the Crown, as
    represented by the ministers of the Crown. If that relationship is one of control by a
    minister, then the controlled body is an agent of the Crown.”

    “Section 5 of the Public Authorities Protection Act makes it clear that the Crown can be liable in tort if its servants or agents have committed a tort. It is also clear
    that Crown agencies are included under the Act.”

    “public bodies must not use their powers for purposes incompatible with the purposes envisaged by the statutes”

    “It would appear on the basis of the authorities cited that, in general terms public
    officers are entitled to no special immunities or privileges when they act beyond the
    powers which are accorded to them by law in their official capacities. It would
    follow, then, that where a public officer, a servant for the Crown exceeds the powers
    of his office or acts improperly in fraud of his duties and powers, or acts with malice in the discharge of his duties, he does not have immunity from civil suit and where, by reason of such excess of power or improper motive, he causes damage he may be civilly liable in damages. This, indeed, seems clear as far at least as it may concern public servants who act in administrative capacities.”

    “should be resolved in favour of the person whose right of action is being truncated”

    “proceeding in tort in respect of such act or omission may be brought against that servant or agent or the personal representatitve of the servant or agent.”

    “23. Where this Act conflicts with any other Act, this Act governs”

    “To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by
    any person, organization, or enterprise.”

    “serious and obvious errors also oust jusidiction and hence remove the immunity”

    “The Court allows Cashin’s application and refers the matter back to the
    Canadian Human Rights Commission because Cashin was not afforded the opportunity to know the specific evidence against her and to answer it. The Court finds that the requirements of natural justice were not met.”

    “its duty is to decide if, under the provisions of the Act, an inquiry is warranted having regard to all the facts.”

    “There was no need for giving a notice of action as required by art. 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as the act done by the defendant was quite beyond the scope of any function or duty committed to him”

    The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, pgs preamble, 1, 2, 43, 53, 58-60, 62-64, 67, 68, 74, 140-42, 146, 149, 172, 184, 191, 201, 302, 359, 361, 447, 448, and 468; and The 2009 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, pg 2 and 3, Book of Authorities, Tab 2

    Starline Entertainment Centre Inc. v. Ciccarelli, supra, pg 1, 7, 8, 9, 10,
    11, 12, 14, 15 and 16, Book of Authorites, Tab 22

    Crown Agency Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.48

    Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, ss. 1, 5 (1) and
    (2), and 23

    UN Treaty, surpa, Article 2 (e), Book of Authority, Tab 25

    Klar, supra, pg 289, Book of Authority, Tab 13

    Roseann Cashin v. Canadian Human Rights Commission (1984), 5 C.H.H.R. D/2234, paras summary, 18875-78, Book of Authority, Tab 4

    Ruckpaul v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 149 (CanLII), analysis pgs 7 to 11 particularly paras 42, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49,
    50, 52-58, 62-71 and 75, Book of Authorities, Tab 20

    Roncarelli, supra, pgs 123, 140, 141-43, 155-59, 167, 169, and 184-86, Book of Authorities, Tab 19

    Statement of Claim 04-13797 para #24, Motion Factum 04 matter paras #35-43 (42 JR), and 44-79, CT (See above), Appeal Book and
    Compendium, Tabs 3, 4, and 6

    12. Justice Lofchik’s order can be set aside for error in law at his paras #30, #45, #51-54,
    #57, #62 and #66 alleging: 1) that complainants do not have right to thorough investigation of all facts (CT pgs 754-68) or suit for improper purpose of breach of statute with unlawful discretion without authority or intent of Code; 2)
    that “obstruction of justice” and “breach of natural justice” were pleaded as causes of actions in themselves rather than to support torts (CT pgs 258-261, 296-99, 605-607, 620-25, 706); and (3) that my pleadings for intentional torts that includes words of deliberate conduct of
    fabrication of insufficient evidence, sham investigation, slanting the case analysis, distorting and imaging the truth, controlling witnesses, concealing evidence, colluding, defaming, “targeted malice”, obstruction of justice and breach of Code is the law of negligence, can only be question through a JR, are inflamatory and not allowed when they are appropriate words to plead for deliberate conduct per conspiracy cases of Chahal, SCC case of Hunt and others. The pleadings at para #20 in 2004 claim denote unlawful and bad faith conduct equated with dishonesty for refusal to acknowledge prima facie facts and evidence sufficient for improper purpose for abuse of office per SCC cases of Roncarelli and Longley, Ruckpaul at para #8 above and HVK case para #56, and is not negligently
    making innocent mistake. I pleaded them as the deliberate and improper conduct for the
    cause of action of Misfeasance of Public Office (Ct pgs 124-189-224, 232-393, 394-407, 408-420, 789), Discrimination and other intentional torts (CT pgs 135-37, 163-64, 640-49, 779-889) allowed per Odhavji similar to breach of statute (CT pg 394).

    Justice Lofchik agrees that I pleaded the intentional torts per his para #51 and #54 with
    “they acted deliberately”; and he intentionally ignores my pleadings with motives at para
    20 in 04 matter and para #6 and #31 in 05 matter that I had filed suit against commission
    and intake staff #1178/04 in Spring 2004 and received case analyses in December 2004
    sufficient for reprisal and collateral advantage motive, and campaign to induce mental
    illness of delusional disorder and/or depression which are sufficient pleadings per
    intentional tort law (CT 704-729, 754-68, 793-818). Justice Lofchik is breaching the
    authority of SCC cases of Roncarelli and Longley similar to mine in that the Crown
    knowingly misleads complainant as to the legality of prima facie complaints by
    fabricating insufficient evidence in case analyses, and I pleaded at para #24 “targeted
    malice” with reckless disregard for the truth (CT 877-878) per Uni-Jet all sufficient per
    motion factum para #47 to #79 that allows suits against the Crown and Justice Lofchik’s
    order can be set aside per the following:

    “I plead that the facts as stated in Shannon Meadows-Lee from the investigation office at the commission in her December 2004 MMP case analysis are injurious falsehoods and the tort of deceit from the commission colluding with now MMP Limited to protect Watts Reprisal campaign from being exposed by concealing evidence and controlling witnesses who would provide adverse outcome to the facts presented in these case analyses.”

    “The concealment of evidence is the concealment of the material facts in this statement listed from #36 to #142.”

    “a conspiracy to injure me with a mental illness of the type of “people out to get me”

    #20 “fraudulently, deceitfully or negligently suppressing, distorting and misrepresenting the results of medical and scientific research on the disease-causing effects of asbestos.”

    “Just as a public officer who breaches a statute might be liable for negligence, so too might a public officer who breaches a statute be liable for misfeasance in a public office. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool would only be relevant to this motion if the appellants had pleaded no more than a failure to discharge a statutory obligation.”

    “In light of the allegation that the Chief’s failure to segregate the officers was delibersate, this is not a sufficient basis on which to strike the pleading.”

    “Malice has been described as “improper purpose”. That it has a wider meaning than spite, ill-will or a spirit of vengeance, and includes any other improper purpose, such as to gain a private collateral advantage.”

    “bad faith” is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather it implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with a furtive design or ill will.”

    “Persons exercising such quasi-judicial powers…in the absence of fraud, collusion or malice, are not liable to any civil action at the suit of any person aggrieved by their decisions.”

    “Minister of National Revenue was liable for the tort when officials in its department knowingly misled the plaintiff by refusing to acknowledge the legality of a tax avoidance scheme that the plaintiff had concocted. The court held that the defendant had therefore knowingly acted outside of its statutory authority where damage to the plaintiff was probable satisfying the second form of the tort.”

    “Good faith” in this context…means carrying out the statute according to its intent and purpose; it means good faith in acting with a rational appreciation of that intent and purpose and not with an improper intent and alien purpose”

    Statement of Claim #04-131797 paras 6-10, 13, 20-22, 24-26, 28, 30-33, 118-140, and #05-18300 paras 3, 6, 10-16, 22, 24, and 30-45, Motion Factum 04 matter para #47 to 79, and CT (see above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 3, 4, and 6

    Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959 (S.C.C.), paras 4 (#19 and #20), 8, 9, 21, 23, 26-39, 46, 47, 52, 54 and 57, Book of Authorities, Tab
    11

    Odhavji, supra, para 31 and 37, Book of Authorities, Tab 17

    Starline, supra, pg 12, Book of Authorities, Tab 22

    The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, supra, page 302, Book of Authority, Tab 2

    Roncarelli, supra, pgs 123, 140, 141-43, 155-59, 167, 169, and 184-86, Book of Authorities, Tab 19

    Longley, supra, pg 446, paras 82, 83, 85, and 86, Book of Authorities, Tab 16

    13. Justice Lofchik’s order can be set aside for breaching stare decisis of my authorities per my factum paras #31 to #85 per HR facts (CT pgs 777-877-899). My pleadings are sufficient for defamation/libel tort with 2 employers’ injurious falsehoods of incompetency being repeated by Crown plus falsehoods of insufficient evidence of Code violations for prima facie facts, and MAG approving it through the Appeal Courts; thus they all have made the libel per SCC case of Hill. Lawful discretion does not protect the Crown under the Tort of Conspiracy (CT pgs 174-193, 253-290, 305-24, 420-427, 640-49, 704-729, 793-818), Defamation (CT pgs 112-118, 119-20, 154-155, 238-241, 252, 342, 742, 818-836), and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (CT pgs 397-99, 836-862-868) per my motion factum, in court arguments and the following:

    “Any act or omission done or made by a public official in the purported performance of the functions of the office can found an action for misfeasance of public office.”

    “At the pleadings stage, it is sufficient that the statement of claim alleges that the plaintiffs have suffered mental distress, anger, depression and anxiety as a consequence of the alleged misconduct.”

    “Sekhon persisted in his unjustified allegations of the plaintiff’s misbehaviour with teachers it was a basis for terminating the plaintiff. This according to Varner v. Morton supra, is an overt act of conspiracy.”

    “The manner and the orchestration of the termination is evidence thereof as well as the defendants purpose of terminating the plaintiff on spurious causes and the defamation of the plaintiff at the May 18th meeting and subsequent are all conduct that is tortious in itself.”

    “A second form of actionable conspiracy exists when two or more combine to injure a third person by unlawful means – eg. the commission of a crime or tort, or the infringement of a guaranteed constitutional right…In such a case it is irrelevant that the objects of the conspirators in using those means may be legitimate…Hence a conspiracy may be actionable if either the end or the means, or both, are unlawful.”

    “to do unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means”

    “Mr. Hunt had suffered personal injury…suppress information the defendants had created a foreseable risk of causing harm which he in fact suffered.”
    “the violation of the right itself is sufficient injury.”

    “The so-called “single publication rule” does not apply to concurrent tortfeasors, who can be defined as persons whose torts concur, or run together, to produce the same damage.”

    “three instances: agency, vicarious liability, and concerted action.”

    “As set out in Hill, supra, “if one person writes a libel, another repeats it, and a third approves what is written, they all have made the defamatory libel.”

    “The Declaration and Report are by their terms inextricably interrelated. By their actions, the appellants become joint tortfeasors. Further, they, as lawyers, signed the Declaration without undertaking any investigation. For Lawyers to act in this way constituted reckless behaviour.”

    Odhavji, supra, para 18, 20, and 41, Book of Authorities, Tab 17

    Chahal v. Khalsa Community School (2000), 2 C.C.E.L. (3d), paras 110-115, 118, 119, 122, and 124, Book of Authorities, Tab 5

    Canada Cement Lafarge Ltd. v. British Columbia Lightweight Aggregate Ltd., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 452, pgs 8 to 12, Book of Authority, Tab 3

    Hunt, supra, paras 4 (#19 and #20), 8, 9, 21, 23, 26-39, 46, 47, 52, 54 and 57, Book of Authority, Tab 11

    Klar, supra, pgs 289, 293, 294, 601, 603, 605, 628, 636, 672, 682 and 683,Book of Authority, Tab 13

    Botiuk v. Toronto Free Press Publications Ltd. 1995, 126 D.L.R. (4th), paras 38, 39, 42, 43, 47, 48, 53, 61, 62, 69, 73, 74, 76-80, 98, 99, 103, Book of Authorities, Tab 1

    Clark v. Canada (1994), 20 C.C.L.T. (2d), pg 241/42, and paras. 4-8, 15, 18, 23, 27, 58, 59-65, Book of Authorities, Tab 6

    Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record; Affidavit of Plaintif; 04-13797 claim para 141; Motion Factum paras #31 to 85; MMP’s HR rebutal and 3 defence statements with no incompetence allegations (2 after case analysis); CT (see above); Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7

    14. The appellant has a valid cause of action against the MAG personally and Her Majesty the Queen similar to the KRP case for intentionally refusing to properly enforce the Code their duty to act to prevent discrimination like the police’s duty to act to prevent crime (CT 220) by mismanagement of the departments under their control per sections 27(2) and 29 para #11 above, and the Appeal courts per MAG Act when MAG appoints
    Ontario Judges with concerted action of dismissing everything to avoid trial resulting in
    damages that includes benefits of making me whole per the Code per motion factum paras 2 -5, 16, Issue 3, 24-26, 28, 37-39, 43, 45-49, 53, 54, 58, 59, and 75-79 and CT.

    My pleadings against the MAG/Queen are all the paras dealing with the unlawful
    investigation by Crown defendants and HR facts, and now includes the JR Courts
    refusing to weigh evidence per their legal duty, approving a written libel, and part of the
    discovery rule of additional facts of misconduct with all now acting without statutory
    authority of the MAG Act, OHR’s Code, UN Treaty and Charter (CT pgs 148, 220 (broadly discretion error) -224, 250, 323-43 390-92, 689-700 and 777-899). Justice
    Lofchik’s order can be set aside per the following:

    “The plaintiffs pleaded that this acquiescence was a violation of s. 5(b) of the MAG Act. Section 5(b) of the MAG Act states that the Attorney General shall see that the administration of public affairs is in accordance with the law.”

    “alleged OPP failure to enforce the Henco injunction depriving them the benefits of their contracts”

    “(b) shall see that the administration of public affairs is in accordance with the law;
    (c) shall superintend all matters connected with the administration of justice in
    Ontario;”

    “The court refused to summarily dismiss a defamation action as limitation-barred, applying the “discoverability rule” to the alleged defamation.”

    “An amendment will be granted after commencement of trial unless there is prejudice.”
    KRP, supra, Justice Crane’s endorsement record paras 7, 10, 12, 14, 23,
    28, 29, 30, 33, Crown’s Factum, paras 18, 23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 31, 38, 40, book of Authorities, Tab 14

    Ministry of the Attorney General Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.17, s. 5 (b)

    Rules of Civil Procedure 21.03 pgs 525 and 531, and 26.01 pg 612

    Affidavit of Plaintiff; Motion Factum 04 matter para 2, 7, 16, Issue 3, 24, 26, 38, 45, 48, 49, and 53; Article on Bryant as MAG; and CT (see above),
    Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 2, 6, and 8

    15. Justice Lofchik’s paras #36 and #59 that “allegations based on assumptions and speculations” not to be taken as true is based on “exception to the Rule” from the Crown’s factum page 11 para 39 of SCC case of Operation Dismantle Inc. of speculation
    of future event of testing cruise missiles because damages could not be proven. Violence
    is done to Rule 21 where allegations of pass events of fabricated insufficient evidence
    from flawed investigations in 2004 are capable of proof per trial case of Chahal. The
    correct Rule 21 test to apply is the “plain and obvious” per SCC of Hunt v. Carey pages 7
    to 15 dated 1990 that includes this Appeal Court’s decision and references Operation Dismantle 1985 case but not the exception to the rule used by Justice Lofchik’s (CT pgs 148, 217, 250, 628-631, 633-660, 704-729, and 777-900).

    Justice Lofchik’s order can be set aside for breaching rule 21, Hunt and KRP cases that state a judge is required by law to read generously with allowance for the plaintiff’s drafting deficincies due to no law training on how to write a proper statement of claim
    per my factum paras 50 to 55. His arguments from para #1 to #70 are all due to drafting
    dificiencies which includes not properly expressing the elements of each tort clearly but
    rather repeating them throughout the whole claims. Deputy Judge Nairn’s Rule 21 endorsement dismissing Lyman’s 2004 Rule 21 motion is a proper analysis of the law for same facts against Lyman for Small Claims matter dropped for claim 05-18300. Justice Lofchik admits to my inadequacies in his endorsement para #30, CT and his May 14th
    2008 order. His order can be set aside for refusing to order amendment of claim for Crown defendants who are joint tortfeasors with Employer defendants which is bias to
    intervene in the hearing process to favour Crown Defendants, as is refusing to dismiss their motion for delay in filing in 2008 when they received the claims in 2005:

    “We are not, in my opinion, required by the principle enunciated in Inuit Tapirisat, supra, to take as true the appellant’s allegations concerning the possible consequences of the testing of the cruise missile. The rule that the material facts is a statement of claim must be taken as true for the purpose of determining whether it discloses a reasonable cause of action does not require that allegations based on assumptions and speculations be taken as true. The very nature of such an allegation is that it cannot be proven to be true by the adduction of evidence. It would, therefore, be improper to accept that such an allegation is true. No violence is done to the rule where allegations, incapable of proof, are not taken as proven.”

    “The Plaintiff in this case is unrepresented and there are clearly deficiencies in the drafting of her Statements of Claim. That being said however, I do not believe it would be appropriate to strike out these claims at this point because of the Plaintiff’s lack of legal training or her inability to express herself concisely. Reviewing the material that she has provided, I cannot conclude that her claims are “ridiculous” or
    “incapable of proof”. While she may characterize the Defendants’ conduct using a variety of terms, in essence she has alleged that her co-workers have acted improperly and as a result, she is entitled to damages.”

    “I indicated at the outset that the Statement of Claim in both actions, as drafted, cannot stand and should be struck out with leave to deliver fresh statements of claims, which comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure.”

    “Delay in bringing a Rule 21 motion is a sufficient ground to dismiss the motion, and not merely a matter affecting costs.”

    “I had occasion to affirm this proposition in Operation Dismantle Inc. v R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, 12 Admin. L.R. 16, 13 C.R.R. 287, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 481, 59 N.R. 1 Fed.]. At pp. 486-87 I provided the following summary of the law in this area (with which the rest of the court concurred): “The law then would appear to be clear. The facts pleaded are to be taken as proved. When so taken, the question is do they disclose a reasonable cause of action ie a cause of action with some chance of success.”
    “The test remained whether the outcome of the case was “plain and obvious” or “beyond reasonable doubt”

    “In my view, these arguments go to form as opposed to substance. In accordance with the guidelines set out by Dickson J. (as he then was) in Operation Dismantle, supra, the claim must be read as generously as possible, with a view to accommodating any inadequacies in the form of the allegations due to drafting deficiencies. With this principle in mind, I am satisfied that these pleadings may stand.”

    “I am required to read the Statement of Claim so as to see the substance from the form.”

    “the Court will apply principles that are informed by Charter values of access to justice”

    Operation Dismantle Inc. v. R. (1985), 18 D.L.R. (4th) 481 (S.C.C.) pg 9, Book of Authorities, Tab 18

    Justice Lofchik’s May 14th 2008 order and August 21st 2009 endorsement record para 30, 36 and 59; Affidavit of Plaintiff; Statement of claims; Crown’s motion factum page 11 para 39; Plaintiff’s 04 factum para 27, 50 to 57; documents of October 11 cancel motion hearing by Defendants; Deputy Judge Nairn’s endorsement for Lyman’s failed Rule 21 Motion; and CT (see above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tabs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, and 10

    Rules of Civil Procedure 2005, page 525, Tab

    Hunt, supra, paras 4 (#19 and #20), 8, 9, 21, 23, 26-39, 46, 47, 52, 54 and
    57, Book of Authorites, Tab 11

    KRP Enterprises Inc, et al and Corporation of Haldimand County, et al, [2007], O.J. No. 114/2006-CP. paras 8, 10, 14, and 30, and MAG’s factum for KRP suit, page 10 para 23, Book of Authorities, Tab 14

    16. The Minister of Attorney General, Michael Bryant, was a law clerk at the SCC prior to 1999 which is sufficient evidence of apprehension of bias with connections with Law
    Clerks who decide what is placed before the Judges per the SCC practice rules which was
    not my appeal application documents or appeal argument per my factum para #37 and #38 but their memorandum resulting in refuse leave to appeal in January 2007. The SCC practice (CT pgs 890-899) results in abuse of lower courts breaching rule of law per
    the following:

    “provided with an objective summary and a memorandum prepared by staff lawyers which contain analysis of the issues in order to ferret out the issue of public importance.”

    “We are not a court of error”

    Supreme Court of Canada Practice 2005, Thomson Carswell, pgs 381 and 383, Book of Authorities, Tab

    Affidavit of Plaintiff; Motion Factum para 37 and 38; SCC Appeal Documents; News Articles on Bryant; CT (see above); Appeal Book and Compendium, Tabs 2, 6, and 8

    PART V – RELIEF SOUGHT

    17. The appellant seeks the order to amend her statement of claim with the Crown Defendants, including the Commission, Mag and Queen, for discriminatory application of the Code, and as joint tortfeasors per Justice Lofchik’s 2008 order for Employer Defendants. The appellant request the August 21th 2009 order be voided and cost on a substantial indemnity basis be charged to the Crown respondents.

    April 26, 2010
    ALL OF WHICH RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED BY: Claudette Losier (Appellant)

  10. Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC

    1. During the 8 day motion hearing Justice Lofchik’s comments was evidence of
    Discriminatory attitude, bias and intervening in the hearing process in a way that persistly favours the Crown and acting as trier of fact which also includes his argument in his endorsement record that I pleaded no facts. In Court Justice Lofchik admits I pleaded facts. Justice Lofchik’s arguments presented to me for refusing to be bound by the United Nations Treaty per SCC Slaight case, joint tortfeasors defamation legal doctrine, Crown Agency Act, and others are not based on law. For some of his arguments he refuses my right to provide me with the law so that I had an opportunity to defend my claims and is a breach of natural justice. These comments are found in the Court Transcripts per the following:

    a) Pg 89 breach of natural justice by JL: “Well, I’m still not sure that the Human Rights Commission fits the description of a Crown Commission, or a Crown agent or Grown agency. The authority is there; whether the authority applies to the Human Rights Commission is the thing that I’m not…” “So how do we figure that out to make sure that we are sure?” “I’ll tell you what I decide.” “Bu I need to have an opportunity to argue whatever…” “Well, I thought you had.” “No, because you’re saying…” “I’ve heard your argument. I’m going to take what you said, I’m going to look at this, and I am going to make a decision. I don’t intend to debate this for the next two days.” “Yeah, but the Crown Agency applies.” “Well, that’s what I’m saying, as I’m not sure it does on the interpretation of the Act.” “What part of the interpretation? A Crown Agency is in all purpose of an agent fo Her Majesty and its powers may be exercised…”

    Ontario Human Rights Code section 27 says the authority applies to the Commission Body and this Judge is ignoring the code to protect Minister of AG who superintends his office:

    (1) The Ontario Human Rights Commission is continued under the name Ontario Human Rights Commission in English and Commission ontarienne des droits de la personne in French and shall be composed of such persons, being not fewer than seven, as are appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council.

    (2) The Commission is responsible to the Minister for the administration of this Act.

    (3) The Lieutenant Governor in Council shall designate a member of the Commission as chair, and a member as vice-chair.

    (4) The Lieutenant Governor in Council may fix the renumeration and allowance for expenses of the chair, vice-chair and members of the Commission.

    (5) The employees of the Commission shall be appointed under the Public Service Act.

  11. Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC

    b) Pg 90 JL not applying Code s. 27 which clearly says Lieutenant Governor and Minister: “I’m not sure that the Human Rights Commission is a commission operated by Her Majesty or the government of Ontario or under the authority of the legislature or the lieutenant governor in council.” “It is owned by the Ontario government.” “Well, I’m not sure it is.” “Then who owns it?” “I don’t think it’s owned by anybody. It’s an independent board.” “It’s owned by somebody.” “I’m not sure it is, just as this court isn’t owned by anybody.”

    Ontario Human Rights Code section 27 says the authority applies to the Commission Body and this Judge is ignoring the code to protect Minister of AG who superintends his office:

    (1) The Ontario Human Rights Commission is continued under the name Ontario Human Rights Commission in English and Commission ontarienne des droits de la personne in French and shall be composed of such persons, being not fewer than seven, as are appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council.

    (2) The Commission is responsible to the Minister for the administration of this Act.

    (3) The Lieutenant Governor in Council shall designate a member of the Commission as chair, and a member as vice-chair.

    (4) The Lieutenant Governor in Council may fix the renumeration and allowance for expenses of the chair, vice-chair and members of the Commission.

    (5) The employees of the Commission shall be appointed under the Public Service Act.

  12. Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC

    Pg 94 “But you are also bound by section 23 of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.” Justice Lofchik “Well, I’ve heard your argument on that. Let’s carry on. You’ve got your – I’m at paragraph 43 of your factum now. I can tell you that the United Nations as far as I’m concerned, a great organization, they do good work, but they have no binding affect on me so I am not going to pay any attention to that argument.”

    Pg 221 evidence J. Lofchik is making up the law when UN treaty part of Code preamble and SCC cases “Okay, but the board also operates under the United Treaty, which says that they do have a duty to eleminate discrimination against women.” “I am not going to go there. The United Nations Treaty just become operative on courts and boards when they become law passed by the legislature. The government can trot around and sign all the treaties it wants but until they are enacted into law they don’t affect you and I as citizens necessarily.”

    Pg 856 J. Lofchik making up the rules again re: SCC’s decision HR as high as UN treaty: “I understand your position to be, he wasn’t doing it in compliance with the Human Rights Code – or they weren’t doing it in compliance with the Code, they were deviating from the duties under the Code, and that’s what caused the mental suffering.” “If that’s the case, then I don’t think we need to get into all this Human Rights – United Nations stuff, because I’m presuming that the Code is valid legislation for the purposesm of this lawsuit.” Losier “My reference to this is the overt statement which I argued yesterday, which is at number 30 in the MMP case…” Losier “…is not allowed, per discretion, to make a libelous and discriminatory statement that I was unfit to work opinion by…” J. Lofchik “Well, all right…” “…the investigation statement.” “…I understand – all right, I take that point.” “I still don’t know where the United Nations Treaties on Human Rights and all that comes into play with respect to that. But…” Losier “…per the United Nations Treaty, it says to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practice which constitute discrimination against women. That includes these discriminatory comments by a Commission staff. And…” J. Lofchik “All right; I have that point.” Losier “…there’s also – the United Nations also refers to that it is against – that I can have a Human Rights complaint or suit against any person, any organization, any enterprise. That includes the Crown, there is no immunity. That’s how it relates…” J. Lofchik “Well, all right, I don’t think United Nations Charters overrule Canadian law; so, let’s get on with it.”
    Losier ”Well, the Supreme Court says that it does.” J. Lofchik “Well, that’s not how I read it.”

    Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Slaight says Justice Lofchik and the Crown are to apply the Human Rights Code and Charter as high as the United Nations Treaty:
    “As was said in Oakes, supra, at p.136, among the underlying values essential to
    our free and democratic society are “the inherent dignity of the human person” and “commitment to social justice and equality”. Especially in light of Canada’s
    ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
    Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), and commitment therein to protect, inter alia, the right to work in its various dimensions found in Article 6 of that treaty, it cannot be doubted that the objective in this case is a very important one. In Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), supra, I had occasion to say at p. 349: The content of Canada’s international human rights obligations is, in my view, an important indicia of the meaning of the “full benefit of the Charter’s protection”. I believe that the Charter should generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human rights documents which Canada has ratified.”

  13. Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC

    Court Transcript Pg 123: j. Lofchik “Well, I take it your point is that your claim against the employees of the Commission is not just in negligence. You are claiming misfeasance. “I’m not – I’m not claiming any negligence.” “All right. Then you are claiming misfeasance.”

    Pg 142 “I accept the proposition that if a government employee exceeds the bounds of their office or acts with malice to cause, deliberately cause somebody harm, contrary to their duties under that public office then that’s not negligence, it’s a separate tort. So I don’t know what else you’re getting at here.” Losier “My argument was that my friend here was stating that that was
    negligence…” J. Lofchik “Well, all right, I…” Losier “ …which is the material issue in dispute and that’s to be decided at trial and not in a motion hearing.” J. Lofchik “All right.”

    Pg 155 J. Lofchik “All right. So your point here is that there was in affect information withheld in the Commission’s report, or information didn’t go in there that you feel should have gone in there.” Losier “That were intentionally omitted.” J. Lofchik “All right, intentionally omitted, and that that causes – that gives rise to the tort of deceit.” Losier “Deceit, and misfeasance of public office, conspiracy, injurious falsehoods, and defamation of character, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The case analysis does state I got the dollar raise. If I got the dollar raise there was no incompetency per common law on employment law.”

    Pg 160-161 Losier “Any omission, and I wouldn’t be here today if it was just one omission, but we’re taking – we’re talking about a lof of omission, serious ommissions. Not just serious omissions but an act of pretend execution of the Ontario Human Rights Code which I discussed earlier as both Mackay and the case analysis admit I was exposed to a sex picture on March 8th, I believe, the 2nd day of work. It was a pornographic faxed image of a couple copulating from behind. They admit that. That is sufficient evidence, a violation of code five and seven. I don’t need any more evidence other than that.” J Lofchik “Ah, that’s not quite the same thing. The tribunal doesn’t hear every case. They have a discretion as to which cases to hear. That doesn’t mean there wasn’t a violation, it just means that given the amount of time and resources they have, they have to chose which cases they feel are serious enough to deal with.” Losier “They have to apply the code per the code. The code says a pornographic image, which I already referred to Your Honour…” J. Lofchik “Well, that – but, and there is not question about that, but they still have to make a qualitative decision. They don’t prosecute every case. I think there is case law that says that they are not obliged to prosecute every case. They can pick the cases that they in effect feel are serious, enough to prosecute. Otherwise, every time a mechanic puts up a Playboy calender up on his back wall there is a case before the Human Rights Commission and that just – the system will crumble under the weight of what they have to do.” (Discriminatory attitude by this judge)

    Losier “Well that’s not eliminating discrimination against women and according to the United Treaty.” J. Lofchik “No, it’s not, and it may very well not be, but the question is does not prosecuting every case amount to a tort of misfeasance in public office? That’s the real issue that we have here.”

    ***Justice Lofchik is making up the rules stated there are case laws but refusing to provide me copies of these laws he is basing his decision which he refuses also to review what the Human Rights Code says and the preamble says “everyone in Ontario” not just some complainants in Ontario!

    Pg 192 J Lofchik acting as trier of fact: “All right. So the issue is how does the pleading of those facts prove collussion as opposed to mere negligence?” Losier “Well, we’re not here to prove.” J. Lofchik “Well, you say it proves.” Losier “We are here to say that those facts, the wording, is collusion, obstruction of justice, slanting this analysis, that’s not a pleading in negligence. That is a pleading in misfeasance for improper purpose, and the improper purpose is…”

    Pg 194-95 J. Lofchik “The difficulty of having a statement of claim that reads more like a novel then a statement of claim is that it’s hard to pick out the important stuff from narrative…” Losier “Yes. If you look at the back part, Your Honour, there are from 122 to about 142 I go through the case analysis point by point and show the error made, which is fabrication or incorrectly stating the facts. An additional proof of that, Your Honour, if I may, is that if you go to my tab four…” Losier “If you look at number one; “The defendant pleading denies the allegations contained in paragraphs two throug 134 of the statement of claim.” Losier “So they are denying even the rebuttal to the Commission. They are denying even the validated sexual harassment, two complaints that I made internally. Those are facts they are to admit per the rule 25.07(3) I believe, and because they are not admitting them there are costs consequences at another rule, 57.” J. Lofchik “Again, that’s another – that’s for another time and place.” Losier “Okay, but this validates my claim that they are not being truthful, that I have a valid claim against all parties. We went through bad faith, okay. Yesterday my friend said that negligence refers to anything I say. Regardless of anything that Ms. Losiers calls, it is all negligence…” Losier “…which is an error in law, as we’ve already gone through, that an omission is not the tort of negligence, it is the tort of misfeasance of public office.” J. Lofchik “Well, that’s not quite true either, but you can have negligence through omission or commission.”

    Error by Justice Lofchik per Human Rights Case law of Ruckpaul that all facts are to be investigated and also the complainant’s witnesses and for appeal c50990 no complainant witnesses were interviewed:

    “its duty is to decide if, under the provisions of the Act, an inquiry is warranted having regard to all the facts.”

    “an investigation had to be at least thorough and neutral for the Commission to have a fair basis on which to evaluate”

    “that where the completeness of the investigation or report is challenged, the
    underlying investigation documents are relevant and subject to production”

    “If the investigation is flawed to the point where a court can reasonably conclude
    the evidence reported by the investigator is incomplete or inadequate, the court
    must intervene.”

    “She failed to interview the applicant nor any of her witnesses. The Commission
    realized this was a flaw and asked the investigator to interview the applicant’s
    witnesses.”

    “Furthermore, two supplemental witness statements, dated February 15 and 16,
    2001, from CIC’s main witnesses in response to questions put by the investigator to
    CIC were not disclosed.”

    “Ms. Huneault made a clear statement concerning one of the grounds upon which
    the applicant based her discrimination and harassment claims. However, the
    investigator failed to address this issue any further in his report. This omission
    might constitute a “fundamental” omission.”

  14. Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC

    Court Transcript:
    j) Pg 196-97 J Lofchik acting as trier of fact based on Crown’s defence that all is negligence when I clearly pleaded deliberate to injure: “No, but failure to record a complaint properly or accurately may or may not be negligence. It could be negligence just she wrote it down wrong, or she developed the wrong attitude toward it, she misunderstood, and number of things. It can be negligence…” “…or it can be deliberate act of misfeasance, and we’re gone around this mulberry bush a lot of times now and it seems to me the law says, subject to what counsel has to say, that an act of negligence is in effect not suable but an act of deliberate misfeasance with intent to injure is. We don’t – we’ve gone around that mulberry bush…” Justice Lofchik “…so that the issue is, and I understand your argument, that you are characterizing these actions as deliberate acts of misfeasance with effectively a deliberate attempt to cause you injury.”

    k) Pg 220 discretion duty per preamble and s. 29(d) with Crown Defendants duty to eliminate discrimination, and Crown’s discretion is to be narrowly interpreted not broadly per Code Book pg 3 which contradicts J Lofchik’s comment of: “The difficulty is that there is a considerable body of case law that supports that proposition, that is that they are not obliged to forward every case to the tribunal, that they have a discretion. In fact, there are cases that say that the Commission is in effect a gatekeeper to the Tribunal and they have a broad discretion as to –the difference being this. The police have a duty to prevent crime. They have a duty to act. They must; I mean, that’s part of their raison d’etre. That’s why they’re there. That’s not the function of the board. It doesn’t have a duty, statutory duty, to forward every case to the tribunal. In fact, it’s statutory duty is otherwise. The statute gives it, under section 34 and 36, the right to say it stops here, so factually the proposition that Justice Crane rejects doesn’t have an awful lot do do with the statute that the board operates under.”
    ***Problem – judges ignoring the code and basing decision on case law and for this rule 21 only 4 cases were presented which had to do with section 34 not section 36 per my 4 prima facie complaints not properly investigated

    l) Pg 221 evidence JL is making up the law when UN treaty part of Code preamble and SCC case: Losier “Okay, but the board also operates under the United Treaty, which says that they do have a duty to eleminate discrimination against women.” J. Lofchik “I am not going to go there. The United Nations Treaty just become operative on courts and boards when they become law passed by the legislature. The government can trot around and sign all the treaties it wants but until they are enacted into law they don’t affect you and I as citizens necessarily.”

    m) Pg 223 favouring the Crown per J Lofchik’s comment: Losier “My last argument, I think, is almost my last argument, per KRP, courts can review discretion of police staff and the Minister of Attorney General, so therefore they can also review a discretion, abuse of discretion, by staff at the Commission.” J. Lofchik “That’s what we call judicial review.” Losier “That’s what we call misfeasance of public office that the courts can review.” Losier “But Justice Crane said that they also could be reviewed by a court in a civil matter, and this is a civil matter, KRP, not a judicial review matter.” J. Lofchik “oh, I see what you are saying.”

  15. Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC

    Court Transcript:

    n) Pg 224 J Lofchik trying to deny me right to argue other torts: Lofchik “ Well, I thought that you were making those allegations with respect to those torts. I think we’ve – you mentioned conspiracy.” Losier “I haven’t mentioned my case law for conspiracy and all the other elements.” Lofchik “You mean what constitutes Conspiracy?” Losier “Yeah.” Lofchik “I don’t think we have to go there.” Losier “But the employers are going there and my friend here has offered a case on that matter, so those are the improper purpose for the misfeasance of public office. That’s what I’m referring to.” Lofchik “Okay”

    o) Pg 249-50 Lofchik “All I’m saying is, as I indicated at the outset, I think your statement of claim will ultimately have to be redrafted for these reasons.”

    ***Rule 21 allows plaintiffs to amend claims for drafting deficiencies and here Lofchik admits but later writes up order to dismiss!

    p) Pg 267-276 Lofchik “Now what facts are there any facts pleaded with respect to the conclusion that the defendants have no honest belief in their statement of gross incompetence?”
    ***termination letter with no allegations of gross incompetence plus $1.00 raise at 3 mth probation and no warning letter plus 3 defence statement by MMP with no similar fact of incompetence per the fabricated case analysis by the OHRC!

    q) Pg 275-76 JL acting as trier of fact again (sufficient for pleadings per Ruckpaul case of distorting the truth and flawed investigations) : J. Lofchik “Well, it’s not so much distorting facts as coming to an improper conclusion on the facts or ignoring the facts, perhaps.” Losier “For distorting the facts, because they leave out the other three incidents afterwards.” Lofchik “Well, distorting the facts to me means the facts are one thing and then they say another; nothing to do with the conclusion drawn from the facts.” Lofchik “Did the report indicate that the people at Mackay admitted that they did whatever you say they did?” Losier “Yes.” Lofchik “The report says that.” Losier “Yes” Lofchik “So then it’s not distorting that fact.” Losier “No, but the distortion is saying that those facts are insufficient evidence.” Lofchik “Well, my – and you can correct me if I’m wrong, but my understanding of distorting the facts is, in effect, saying that the facts are something other than what they are, not from the point of view of a legal conclusion but just from the point of view of statement of fact.”
    ***distorting end result via fabricating insufficient evidence by ignoring some of the facts and not interviewing any of the plaintiff’s witnesses is wrongful distorting the facts per Human Rights Case of Ruckpaul:

    “its duty is to decide if, under the provisions of the Act, an inquiry is warranted having regard to all the facts.”

    “an investigation had to be at least thorough and neutral for the Commission to have a fair basis on which to evaluate”

    “that where the completeness of the investigation or report is challenged, the
    underlying investigation documents are relevant and subject to production”

    “If the investigation is flawed to the point where a court can reasonably conclude
    the evidence reported by the investigator is incomplete or inadequate, the court
    must intervene.”

    “She failed to interview the applicant nor any of her witnesses. The Commission
    realized this was a flaw and asked the investigator to interview the applicant’s
    witnesses.”

    “Furthermore, two supplemental witness statements, dated February 15 and 16,
    2001, from CIC’s main witnesses in response to questions put by the investigator to
    CIC were not disclosed.”

    “Ms. Huneault made a clear statement concerning one of the grounds upon which
    the applicant based her discrimination and harassment claims. However, the
    investigator failed to address this issue any further in his report. This omission
    might constitute a “fundamental” omission.”

    r) Pg 285 Lofchik “Well, that’s right, and my question to you is, other than saying, look at there’s other evidence that they didn’t accept my version of the facts, apart from that, are there facts pleaded that show conspiracy or collussion or are you saying because they only accepted the employer’s version of the facts and ignored mine, there must be collussion and there must be a conspiracy. Does your pleading to beyond that?”
    ***Ruckpaul Human Rights Case clearly shows OHRC has to investigate all facts and include them in their report and have to interview all of plaintiff’s witnesses and provide their investigation documents when challenged which should have been during the reconsideration application in 2004/2005

    s) Pg 296 Losier “Yeah, I repeat those facts when I say the facts listed between – my material facts are listed between 36 to 142.” Lofchik “That doesn’t count for very much, does it?” Losier “Well, it’s dated, it’s logical, it’s by date order. And I also pleaded in paragraph 23, the first statement of claim 45.
    ***Here Lofchik ignores paras 36 to 142 written same as case of Hunt v. Carry as to the invents and list the who, what, when, where and how particulars

  16. Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC

    Court Transcript:

    t) Pg 323 Lofchik “Same thing. That’s a complaint against the process. What I’m asking, what I’m looking for is facts pleaded wherein these employees, facts that support an allegation of misfeasance in public office” Losier “Well, 32, Your Honour, I do list the material facts listed at 36 to 142. If you’d like we can go through those facts.” Lofchik “Well, yeah, but…” Losier “They include the two sexual harassment complaints, they include my termination…” Lofchik “All right. No, no, 32 I have and I think it’s all in a nutshell. Really your complaint is the last sentence, I think, on that first paragraph, I have that, that they violate your Charter rights because of misfeasance by providing sham investigation, et cetera.” Losier “Yeah” Lofchik “I have that.”
    ***In pleading stage I only have to plead that their behaviour was deliberate which per Lofchik’s comment here is sufficient to not dismiss the Crown defendants’ from this suit

    u) Pg 564 Losier “So there may be a statute for the Minister of the Attorney General.” Lofchik “Well, the onus is on you to find it.”
    ***The onus is on the Crown and Lofchik to apply the law properly particularly when faced with litigants who are unrepresented and have not gone to law school otherwise the Minister of AG has created an unequal justice system to take advantage of us who cant afford lawyers particularly when we sue the Minister of AG

    v) Pg 571 Lofchik “All right. So maybe the way we’ll have to deal with this is I’ll render my decision in this case. And I am going to order that the statement of claim be amended to comply with the rules. But I am – I still don’t see any harm in doing it twice. One step at a time. Let’s get this part right.”
    ***Error the Crown defendants are joint tortefeasors per defamation and conspiracy tort law so makes no sence to separate the rule 21 motions for the Crown from the employer defendants particularly when allowing me to amend claim for employer defendants not crown!

    w) Pg 578-579 J Lofchik ignored the Constitutional tort in his endorsement: Losier “Well, the legislation, I agree, but the constitutional torts against the staff is not just because of the legislation; it’s because of the conduct of those staff.” Losier “That I am being discriminated against.” Lofchik “Well, and that’s part of your claim for damages here.” “I understand that.” Lofchik “And the other road is a claim for damages for people acting for the Commission under the statute as it exists. It’s got nothing to do with the wording of the statute or anything. Your complaint is their actions…” Lofchik “…are discriminatory, no matter how the statute is written.”
    ***Lofchik admits my claims for tort of constitution here as pleaded sufficiently for trial yet dismisses the Crown defendants and in his endorsement record no analysis at all of this tort!

    x) Pg 581 Losier “Same set of facts.” Lofchik “Well, same facts but maybe different liabilities and different responsibilities.” Losier “Yeah, so then there are facts.”

    y) Pg 586-90 JL acting as trier of fact again Lofchik “The fabrication of incompetency. The fabrication…” Lofchik “Well, again, it’s – the facts are – they make a comment that you disagree with, and therefore, you say ‘because I don’t agree with what they said, that must be fabricated.’” Losier “They’re not allowed to fabricate.” Lofchik “No, they’re not allowed to fabricate…” Lofchik “…to make some evaluation of the evidence.” Lofchik “And my point is that other than the fact that you disagree with what they said, what facts are there to show that those are fabricated? Number one, it could be a mistake, they misapprehended the evidence.” Losier “The allegations of incompetency is a fabrication. I’ve provided you evidence with the defendant’s Mackay’s statement of defence where they’re not using those same allegations, disarray of books…”
    Losier ”If it was not a fabrication, it would have been in Mackay’s statement of defence, plus their affidavit of documents that I’ve already received with absolutely no documents relied upon for those disarray of books to prove allegations of incompetency. So to me, the whole…” Lofchik “But could that not be something as simple as someone from the Commission going to Mackay’s and being told, ‘Look at this, this place is a mess. Her workplace was a mess. She wasn’t doing her job.’ The Commission person accepts that. It might be wrong, it might even be a lie. But does that make it a fabrication on the part of the Commission person?” Losier “That’s the issue here. We need – and I have a right to a trial to decide that. Not through a Rule 21 motion. We’re arguing items here that I feel that are for the trial judge to decide.” Losier “And it can be proven.” Lofchik “And you heard arguments yesterday to say, well, no, you don’t accept those allegations as true. That’s something I’m going to have to analyze.” Losier “The other argument that I have, too, is some of those after-the-fact arguments were not in Mackay’s rebuttal to the Commission, the original rebuttal. Therefore, it’s quite possibly that they didn’t interview anybody, I mean, because that’s just right now he said/she said, Mrs. Meadows-Lee saying that, “Yeah, we interviewed those people.” There’s no corroborating evidence to say that they actually did interview those people.” Lofchik “…to decide what it takes for an allegation in a statement of claim to be accepted at face value. That’s really what it comes down to.

  17. Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC

    Court Transcript:

    z) Pg 604 evidence of favouring Crown per endoresment record alleging my claim is abuse of process when in court J Lofchik said: Losier “But she’s lumping all these other torts as well, it can only be through a judicial review.” Losier “And that’s not the correct jurisdiction for these courts. And I’ve given you factums, in my factum arguments.” Lofchik “I don’t need to go there. I accept your submission that…” Lofchik “…if you’re seeking damages for torts…” Lofchik “..it’s in a proceeding such as this and not judicial review. You don’t have to argue that.”
    ***Lofchik’s endorsement reasoning to dismiss was abuse of process that this claim was the same as the Judicial Review when the Crown were not respondants in the JUdicial REview

    aa) Pg 615-19 J Lofchik acting as trier of fact again: Losier “It mentions here, “It’s no longer sufficient to make bald allegations of malice in the statement of claim. The extension of this rule is consistent with its purpose.” And then it says something here that it is important to allege to the wrongdoer, to be able to understand what is to the wrongdoer, to be able to understand what is alleged of him and her with precision and be placed in a position that allows a response. Well, fabrication of insufficient evidence in the case analysis…” Losier “…does fit that.” “…it’s still an allegation of…” “Fact. That my fact differs from their fact, that they didn’t fabricate.” Lofchik “Well, I guess that’s the issue, or is it a conclusion? Because you disagree with what they find, you say it’s a fabrication.” Losier “Then they’re facts in there is also a conclusion. Because they say that’s the truth.” Lofchik “Well, no, there’s no question they draw conclusions. But all I’m saying is there’s a distinction between an erroneous conclusion made in the course of doing whatever they do and deliberately fabricating. And you use this term, what is it, fabrication of lack of evidence?” Losier “Insufficient evidence.” Lofchik “Yeah. But fabricate, when I think of fabricate in the terms of evidence, I think of somebody making up evidence.” Losier “Exactly.” Lofchik “Well, what evidence have they made up?” Losier “They made up the incompetency allegations, the after-the-fact incompetency allegations. We went through that on the other day.” Lofchik “Well, that’s not – but that’s not fabrication of insufficient evidence. That’s fabrication of – that’s, in effect…” Losier “It’s tied into – the full case analysis, at the end of it, it says, “insufficient evidence of discrimination of reprisal of sexual harassment.” “Whatever you say is fabricated.” “The after-the-fact incompetency allegations that are in the case analysis…” “And most of them is the disarray of books…” “…that was not written in the original MMP rebuttal and is not in their defence, not in my termination statement.” Lofchik “So you’re saying since they don’t raise it in their defence, she couldn’t have been told that in her investigation? That’s your position?” Losier “So for the purpose of pleadings, it’s whether a defendant can properly defend themselves and according to those pleadings, it is quite easy for the defendant, Ms. Rue (ph) and Ms. Waik to properly defend, basically saying, ‘We didn’t fabricate.” Lofchik “Well, I would – that’s going to have to be re-written anyway, even if I agree with me.” Lofchik “I mean, it seems to me the reasonable way to deal with that is that Ms. Meadows – is it Meadows-lee – says in her report, stated that she was told this, this and this by the Defendants, when in fact she was not told this, this and this and that she fabricated those facts. Nowhere succintly does your pleading set that out. I suppose if we pick through it, we can ultimately find those bits and pieces and put them together, but it’s not very well put, let’s put it that way, even if it’s sustainable.” Losier “Yeah, but my argument is that I’m deficient in writing.” Lofchik “Oh well, yeah, I appreaciate that. All I’m saying is that it’s going to have to be rewritten anyway.” Losier “yep, yep. And I have no argument.” Losier “And you’re – you say you should have the opportunity to re-write it, as long as the bare bones are there.” (HVK allows for rambling deficiencies of bits and pieces!)
    ***Ruckpaul HR Cases and Botiuk SCC on defamation clearly shows that the investigation staff cannot provide the type of investigation that Justice Lofchik is arguing that Crown is allowed to provide complainants in this motion!

    bb) Pg 620 evidence J Lofchik did not read the statement of claim paragraphs 36 to 140 which can be read by all: Losier “The concealment of evidence is the concealment of the material facts in the statement listed.” There’s where the material facts are, point 36 to 140 total.” Lofchik “Okay, Well, I can tell you that when you re-write this pleading, you should set out those specific facts because anybody who’s reading this statement of claim isn’t going to have 36 to 42 in front of them, so they have no idea what you’re talking about.”
    ***Anyone reading my claim as paras 1 to 142 in front of them and can read #36 to 42(s/b 142)!

    cc) Pg 754 Lofchik “Now, as I understand, this last argument is, well, there are relevant facts that might be made by way of amendment. I think the argument should be more focused on the issue of facts supporting the allegation of breach of statutory duty, because it seems to me that becomes the crux of the claim against the Human Rights Commissioner.” (HVK and Deep allows for amendments)

    dd) Pg 754 J Lofchik’s arguments on discretion not based on law but him making it up (I query) and refusal to provide me with his case law breaching natural justice again as I have a right to defend/argue against his law authority (as a given), and lack of resources argument not sufficient per SCC: Lofchik “Obviously they have a discretion…” LOfchik “…in the way they carry out their duties.” Lofchik “The fact that there are – how shall I put this – I guess I can’t put it any other way – the fact that there are facts supporting your claim that may or may not have been investigated as thoroughly as you wish might very well have much to do with the claim against the other employers, and whether there are sufficient facts pleaded to maintain the claims against them.” Lofchik “Now, there’s a duty ot investigate. However, there’s a great deal of discretion on how an investigation is carried out. And I query whether there’s a statutory duty to investigate every lead, every fact, every aspect of every complaint.”

    I request these authorities and J Lofchik responds “Well, I can tell you, I’m taking that as a given, based on all kinds of case law that says that there’s a great discretion on the way they carry out their investigation; and indeed whether they recommend that any particular case go the Tribunal.”
    ***This is breach of natural justice as I have a right to these case laws that Lofchik is basing his decision on to read them and make sure they are accurate and not Lofchik making up the law to protect the Minister of AG and Crown defendants!

    Lofchik “They also have a discretion as to, ‘We only have so many resources and we can only pursue so many complaints, and therefore, we pick and choose the ones that we’re going to recommend and send to the Commission.”
    ***Discretion is per the Code section 36, 27, 29, preamble “everyone in Ontario is equal”, and it is broadly per complainants point of view and narrowly per Crown’s discretion which I found out after this Rule 21

    ee) Pg 757 accepting uncorroborated he said she said evidence is breach of statutory duty J Lofchik’s response Lofchik “Okay; that can be said in one sentence. Let’s carry on.” Lofchik “All right; but here’s the point: rather than going through all of the facts that you say weren’t properly investigated, et cetera, if your point is the breach of statutory duty here is failing to follow up every fact and accepting some evidence as uncorroborated, that can be said in, as I say, a sentence or two, rather than going through your whole statement of claim pointing out instances where that happened.”
    ***Lofchik refusing me right to show him the facts in claim so that he can write in his endorsement there are no facts pleaded to dismiss crown defendants

    ff) Pg 758 Lochik “Well, you’ve pleaded lots of facts.” Lofchik “But the issue is, a lot of those facts relate to your alleged complaints against the former employers and their employees. And the issue then becomes, how does that relate to the claim against the Human Rights Commission? And you’ve in one sentence really, it seems to me, dealt with that, unless there are other issues. And that is, failure to follow up all of these facts, or to merely accept the evidence of statement of people by – and without further investigation, is what you say is the breach of statutory duty.” Lofchik “I mean, I know you’ve pleaded lots of facts here. And if the basis of your complaint against the Commission is merely accepting people’s statements as to the truth or untruth of your allegations with respect to those facts, if that’s what you say is breach of statutory duty, that seems to me is dealt with in that part of the argument.”
    ***LOfchik’s endorsement analysis that complainant’s do not have right to suit for how the Crown did their job based on internal reports which is contradicted by tort case law particularly Botiuk defamation SCC case and Roncarreli Misfeasance of public office case

  18. Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC

    Court Transcript:

    gg) Pg 759 J. Lofchik “…haven’t said in your statement of claim is – you say, ‘Well they didn’t talk to everybody.’ What you don’t say is, ‘If they’d talked to Sam he would’ve said something else.” “The suggestion is that there’s somebody out there who might have given evidence or information contrary to what was told to the investigator.” Losier “I said it right here on paragraph – page 77-61” “If they had spoken to Les directly…”
    ***Evidence Justice Lofchik did not read my statement of claim and is making things up

    hh) Pg 760 Tony Millington’s address to Claude J. Lofchik’s response “But he may not have said that” ***is favouring the Crown and JL acting as trier of fact in a rule 21 motion not allowed

    ii) Pg 761-4 J. Lofchik “What I said was, that there have been facts pleaded with respect to the alleged harassment and incidents involving former employers and their employees.” J. Lofchik “And what I tried to suggest is, point me at the pleadings of facts that support, you say support your allegation of breach of statutory duty.” J. Lofchik “And now you’ve said to me in your argument that failure to carry a balanced, out a balanced investigation by not interviewing witnesses who you think maybe would’ve been favourable to you is part of the breach of the statutory duty. That’s what I take from what we’ve just been talking about.” Losier “Yes, not one witness.” Losier “They only interviewed me. Okay; so that was paragraph 21. Then my friend went to paragraph 24 – oh, I should maybe just go back to 21.” Losier “…image perception because Shannon Meadows-Lee worked on the next two employers case analysis showing I started…” Losier “And then I state clearly where the breach of statutory duty is. Shannon Meadows-Lee on behalf of the OHR – in her own words demonstrates image perception of perceived impairment at 30. It appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position.” Losier “That is a fact, a statement made; that is the what. And the where is that the Commission, in the case analysis, that is a breach of statutory duty – ‘cause this here is defamation. That’s not it in complete detail, but we’d have to actually look at the copy of the case analysis. But I’ve written it in several paragraphs that particular phrase that was in the case analysis.” Losier “The Commission and any members of the justice system do not have the right per discretion to libel people. And then I go on to say that this is imaging behaviour, because Shannon Meadows-Lee worked on the next two employers case analysis showing that Xentel and Lyman – showing I started part-time position on January 10th, 2003 – incompetiency issues to do with sales not accounting – or alleged incompetency – and a full-time position on February 10, 2003, no incompetency issues.” Losier “I worked at two places of employment, full-time and a part-time job, showing I was fully capable of handling the position had I gone back to MMP. And I had previously stated that this particular argument is what my friend here calls speculation and conclusion, which Ms. Meadows-Lee cannot prove because I never returned back to MMP.” Losier “But I can prove, as a basis for breach of statutory duty, collusion, defamation, libel, tort of deceit and misfeasance of public office, abuse of discretion. They did not have the right to fabricate facts or make libel statements.” Losier “And I also noted at the bottom half here of this paragraph 21, also the statement at 30 alone represents discrimination by the Ontairo Human Rights Commission of a perceived disability which leads to refusal of doing their statutory duty – there’s the breach – of proper investigating the facts and evidence that led to the decision to refuse referring my prima facie complaint to the tribunal.”
    ***Ruckpaul Human Rights Case clearly shows how Commissions are to do a proper investigation of all the facts!

    jj) Pg 771-777 the following represents J. Lofchik overstepping his boundary and acting as trier of fact: “Might I suggest, that rather than go through all that – in a nutshell, your position is, I have pleaded facts that justifies my claim against the employers. These were facts that I made known to the investigators for the Commission. They didn’t properly investigate them. That’s really where you’re at, isn’t it?” Losier “Not just that they did not properly investigate them, Your Honour, they fabricated.” J. Lofchik “Well, I suppose that’s arguable, in the sense that they told by some of your former employers that you weren’t doing the job, and they accepted that at face value without investigating it further.” Losier “No, Your Honour” J. Lofchik “You mean, they just made it up out of the blue?” Losier “Yes, Your Honour.” Losier “The facts in my statement of claim says that the employer allegedly told the Commission.” Losier “But the facts also show in my statement of claim that the employer gave me three defence statements for this suit with absolutely no same allegations…
    ”…that the Commission is stating is in the case analysis.” J. Lofchik “…doesn’t that still come down to what I just said, that there were allegations by the employers that they took at face value and they didn’t investigate them further. And that’s really an improper investigation.” Losier “Improper purpose” J. Lofchik “So, all I’m saying is, I don’t know whether we need to go through every paragraph of your statement of claim where you’re pointing to me where there are allegations against your former employers, and then setting out why you think that there was an improper investigation, or fabrication, whatever you want to call it.” J. Lofchik “Your position is set out in the nutshell that I put to you, I think. The facts that you plead with respect to the improper investigation are really the fact that there’s another side to the story which you plead in your statement of claim, which they didn’t investigate. Is that fair?” Losier “No” J. LOfchik “Well, you say “fabricating”, but they’re not – “fabricating” to me means there’s absolutely no evidence from anybody that they can either choose to accept or not accept, but that they’ve been making something up out of the blue.” J. Lofchik “I don’t see that as what comes out of your statement of claim. What I see comes out of the statement of claim is, there are statements being made which you say are untrue by the employer. So, maybe the employers are fabricating, and the investigators are accepting these things at face value without going behind them or testing the truth of those statements.” J. Lofchik “Now, that to me doesn’t mean that the investigator is fabricating, it just means that he’s maybe – or she – are accepting what you say is a fabrication by the employers.” J. Lofchik “And the fabrication on the part of the employers is part of your claim against them, which we’re not really dealing with here. We’re dealing with breach of statutory duty of the investigators. Whether it’s fabrication or not by the employers, misleading the investigators is for another day.” Losier “Not according to this argument that I presented Your Honour earlier by Dixon on page 55 of my factum. Their assessment requires the consideration by the jury of the entire conduct of the defendant prior to the publication…” J. Lofchik “Well, yeah, but that’s the test of what goes on at a jury trial, not the test of what an investigator is supposed to do.” Losier “My claim of breach of statutory duty, and to do with the facts of the incompetency, are also the tort of libel and defamation, therefore…” J. Lofchik “And I picked up on that” Losier “…therefore, it is the entire conduct continuing through to trial. Which includes my – the Crown defendants receiving statement of defence – three of them – from MacKay, MacKay, and Peters, with absolutely no allegations of these so-called incompetency facts that are written up in the case analysis…” J. Lofchik “All right; no, I picked up on that. Part of your claim is, again, there’s these allegations made which they’ve picked up on, haven’t properly investigated and then repeated in their report, which you say are libelous. That hasn’t escaped me.” Losier “No, no, you didn’t understand my point. My point is that, information has come to light to them of defence statements from MMP saying there was no allegations of incompetency.” Ms. K. “MMP’s legal positioning with respect to a statement of defence is not relevant in this matter.” J Lofchik “And that’s an unproven allegation, at best.” (same applies to Crown defendants alleged investigation that is unproven) J. Lofchik “I mean, that can be a situation where there was an allegation of incompetency,, it was repeated by the investigator; and now the people at MMP realize they’re out on a limb and decide to deny it in a statement of defence. That’s not proven that it wasn’t made.” Losier “But my argument is, Your Honour…” J. Lofchik “Well, your argument…” J. Lofchik “…that’s part…” J. Lofchik “…it was repeated…” Losier “…no, no, no, no, my argument is that for my statement of claim to continue on, that not only do I get to include that fact, but I also get to include the fact that that has become – made to light for the Crown defendants.” Losier “And according to laws and rules, that once new evidence has come into light, that some true statement was made false, then they are to do what is right, not just to continue the fabrication of the incompetency in this motion trial and in the appeal process.” Losier “And two of these defence statements were given to the Crown after the case analysis; and that includes all the way up to the Supreme Court.” J. Lofchik “But their statement’s in a statement of defence. That doesn’t…” Losier “That there was no incompetency…” J. Lofchik “…but that doesn’t mean they’re true, which I think is counsel’s point.” Losier “Yes, and that’s right. And it’s a matter of the trial judge, not a motion judge, to decide what is true.”
    ****J. Lofchik acting as trial judge in Rule 21 motion
    ***SCC case of Botium for defamation clearly shows that the Commission investigation staff being members of law are to properly investigate the facts and per Human Rights Case of Ruckpaul they are to investigate all the facts and all of the complainant’s witnesses:
    “The Declaration and Report are by their terms inextricably interrelated. By their actions, the appellants become joint tortfeasors. Further, they, as lawyers, signed the Declaration without undertaking any investigation. For Lawyers to act in this way constituted reckless behaviour.”

    ***The Crown’s investigation of my 4 prima facie complaints under section 36 was reckless!

  19. Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC

    Court Transcript:

    ***The Crown’s investigation of my 4 prima facie complaints under section 36 was reckless!
    Proof: $1.00 raise at 3 month probation and no warning written letter per Employment law means no incompetence – Crown ignores this fact which they are not allowed to do per Ruckpaul and Botiuk

    kk) Pg 777-792 same as Botiuk case and therefore I have proper pleaded facts and cause of action against the Crown per J Lofchik’s comments of “Because your point is that, as I say, that they were accepted by investigators and repeated by investigators without properly being investigated and considered. Fine; I have that point.” J. Lofchik “Frankly, that could all be dealt with, in so far as the Commission is concerned, in a relatively short paragraph or two in the statement of claim. What you’re doing here is pleading evidence. And, as I indicated way back at the beginning, that’s not what a statement of claim is all about.” Losier “I’m pleading facts…” J. Lofchik “Well, you’re…” Losier “…the evidence are of physical documents.” J. Lofchik “But the facts you rely on so far as the Commission is concerned, is that they took statements from the employers at face value without properly investigating them; repeated them in their report; and some of those statements are libelous. As I say, that – in a statement of claim, that’s all that’s required. What you’re pleading, all this other stuff here is what you do at trial to prove those claims. And that’s why, as I indicated to you at the outset, this statement of claim has to go.”
    ***Per Justice Lofchik’s statement here in the transcript I pleaded sufficiently for tort of defamation then he writes up unconstitutional order to dismiss the Crown to protect them because the Minister of Attorney General superintends his office!

    J. Lofchik “The only issue is whether the Commissioner stays in as a defendant or not, because it’s not a proper statement of claim.” J. Lofchik “Because the Commissioner obviously is vicariously liable for the staff.” J. Lofchik “Well, it’s the facts, it’s the facts with respect to the Commission, not the facts with respect to your other employers and the other defendants that are relevant to me here.”
    ***The facts of the employers are relevant to the Crown Defendants because it shows how they abused their job per tort of Misfeasance of Public Office allowed per Botiuk, Roncarreli, and other cases, and Justice Lofchik is making up the rules here

    J. Lofchik “And I think that argument still is that, so far as the Commission is concerned, you haven’t pleaded – as I understand the argument, you haven’t pleaded facts to support the claim of collusion and breach of statutory duty.”
    ***I did plead facts, employer facts in all of my human rights complaints which the Crown were to proper investigate all facts per Human Rights Case law of Ruckpaul – here J. Lofchik is again making up the rule to ignore all my facts from employment in human rights complaints – this does not make any sense other then institutional bias to protect the Minister of Attorney General’s wrong doing at the Commission

    J. Lofchik “You’ve pleaded lots of facts so far as what you say the other employers did and said, there’s no question about that.” Losier “Well, I have, according to my authorities in the law. Again, I’ll go – repeat Chahal and also Dixon; it’s the publication of libel continuing through to the conclusion of trial. “Libel includes those libelous statements by the defendant employers.” Losier “And the Crown.” J Lofchik “Yes.” J. Lofchik “If they’re repeated in the report.” J. Lofchik “Or if they make statements that you say are libelous. The issue then becomes, though, if they’re made in good faith, as opposed to – of an intent to, in effect, harm you…” J. Lofchik “…then they’re probably protected by their statutory duty. So, it really then comes back to, again, what are the facts that take them out of the realm of the …” J. Lofchik “Of good faith.” J. Lofchik “…protection of the statutory protection.”
    ***In Rule 21 all I have to do is plead it which I did not prove it here again J. Lofchik is acting as trier of fact to protect the Crown and Minister of Attorney General

    Losier “And I have provided Your Honour with those arguments as well.” j. Lofchik “Well, you have; but I don’t know that you’ve done that this morning.”

    Losier “Okay. According to Deep, paragraph 64 in the defendant’s authority book: Bad Faith is a legal conclusion. It has been held to involve an allegation of an intent to deceive or to make someone believe what is false.” Losier “So, this point at number 30 in the case analysis, this fact that the case – number 30 by Shannon Meadows-Lee…” Losier “It appears that even if the complainant returns with a decision after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position” Losier “This is a fact of behaviour of manipulating the case analysis to discredit the complainant. It has nothing to do with the defendants at MMP giving her any facts that she investigated, this is Shannon Meadows-Lee making a libelous, opinionated statement.” Losier “And that is sufficient evidence of bad faith.” J. Lofchik “All right. Well, we’ve already looked at that and you’ve made the argument.” Losier “Okay, I’m just – bad faith, it has been held to involve an allegation of intent to deceive to make someone believe what is false. This is Ms. Meadows-Lee – if she wrote that one statement, then I have the right to prove that all the other statements were an intent to deceive and were not investigated, were just her writing up comments. My pleadings of fabrication of insufficient evidence, incompetency and sham investigation to image the truth is that allegation of an intent to deceive or make someone believe what is false by the Crown defendants that led to the following believe what is false solely by – as being Crown staff – and nothing else.” Losier “Mr. Norton and judges in the appeal courts have now attempted to make Justice Lofchik believe what is false by dismissing my claims against them. Where a plaintiff claims – includes an allegation of bad faith, the pleading must support sufficient particulars that support a legal conclusion of bad faith.” Losier “That particular statement, plus the incompetency allegation, is an example of bad faith. My pleadings of bad faith – and I’m getting to it – termination letter by MMP – okay, my pleadings of bad faith temination by MMP defendants warning the Wallace damage – and I won’t go through that case ‘cause Your Honour said that you’re very familiar with Wallace damages.” Losier “Is sufficient per the Supreme Court case of Wallace v. United Grain Growers that the Crown defendants by association ignoring the legal doctrine of bad faith for the employer in Wallace case, where an employer must be honest at the time of termination as to the reason for termination to the employee and by changing their reason for cause have demonstrated beyond bad faith, particularly when their defence statement after the – their defence statement after the date of the fabricated Human Rights case analysis dated December 2004 does not use the defence of incompetence that they have – and they’re co-conspirators with the Crown defendants – are using in the Human Rights jurisdiction. These facts are sufficiently pleaded.” Losier “Page 88 – these are relevant facts against the Crown as well as MMP.” Losier “it is my paragraph 107. On or about January 29th, 2003, I received a courier at my home – a termination letter signed by Mrs. Page stating cause to be: We have received and reviewed the report from Workplace Safety and Insurance Board that does not substantiate your allegation. The employment standard claim for overime hours was in process and not decided upon as of January 20th, 2003 termination letter. I went on sick leave August 14th; I was terminated on January 20th, sufficient time for the defendants to put in their statement of claim (s/b termination letter) all the allegations of incompetency that are in the case analysis – this is relevant. This is relevant also to the tort – or the bad faith intent to deceive or make someone believe what is false. According to Wallace, at the time of termination, the employer is to be honest – reason of termination to the employee, and changing the reason for cause have demonstrated beyond doubt particularly when their defense statement – after the date of the fabricated case analysis dated summer 2004 does not have the defence of incompetency that they and their conspiractors – the Crown defendants – are using in the Human Rights jurisdiction. These two facs are sufficiently pleaded. These two facts are relevant to all of the torts against the Crown as the defendants; as well as the principle of bad faith. The Crown accepting MMP’s bad faith termination reason, ignoring the Supreme Court case, are demonstrating their bad faith, and these facts have been pleaded numerous times in a sufficient particularity. Other examples of bad faith are: the particulars need to be added, as the Crown defendants accepting Mrs. Page’s uncorroborated he said-she said witness statement, when she has demonstred bad faith per termination reasons in the Wallace case legal doctrine.”

    Ms. K “Your Honour, again we’re getting into an area where Ms. Losier claims to want to add facts, as opposed to describing what is contained in the existing pleading which we’re dealing with today” (KRP & Deep has rebuttal allowed to add facts if supports cause of action) Losier “Yes; and they’re relevant to the bad faith argument. And if I have a cause of action with these other particulars, then I have the right to amend my statement of claim. And the reason why I didn’t add them, because I had no legal knowledge or training. Had I had that legal knowledge and training – how to write a proper statement of claim – they would’ve been included.”

    J. Lofchik “Well, that argument only gets you so far. Ultimately, I still look at the statement of claim to see whether it discloses a cause of action. Now, I hear what you’re saying and I’ll take that into consideration. Let’s just get on with it.”
    ***Another error by Justice Lofchik per Rule 21 litigants with no law training and are unrepresented have a right to amend their pleadings otherwise we have lawyers taking advantage and creating an equal justice system for all Canadians and this is unconstitutional

    Losier “Another example of bad faith, only interviewing respondent’s witnesses, two persons who did not work with me at the time of employment, and no witness for the plaintiff.” J. Lofchik “I thought from our earlier discussions I made it clear to you that I understand that’s part of your claim.”
    Losier “But I didn’t make that in reference to bad faith.” Losier “That’s why I’m, I’m dealing with right now bad faith.” Losier “And it’s relevant to that.
    ***Here J. Jofchik agrees that I pleaded this fact and it is sufficient for the torts pleaded per Human Rights case of Ruckpaul and Botiuk Supreme Court of Canada case for defamation

    Losier “As well as not interviewing any of my witnesses, because that demonstrates bias, unbalanced investigation and part of the fabrication of insufficient evidence by controlling the – or the plaintiff’s witnesses which also form a – there’s also a form of concealing evidence by not interviewing anybody; which to me are all a part of my allegations of bad faith conduct. Again, that definition is, an attempt to deceive or make someone else believe what is false.” Losier “In the ’05 matter, it’s fabricating insufficient evidence of sexual harassment when the Commission staff did not interview any of the sexual harassers; plus, left out of the case analysis validated and corroborated sexual harassment and internal complaints validated by Xentel and Lyman in their rebuttals to the Commission. All of my allegations that they validated; and with Lyman there were several. This too represents bad faith, an attempt to deceive or make someone believer what is false.”
    ***Ruckpaul Judicial Review case clearly shows these facts I pleaded above to be improper investigation and the Crown to carry on that they have discretion to behave like this from 2004 till now 2010 is a show of recklessness and absolute power corrupts and no auditing of the Minister of Attorney General and his departments Commission and Justice System:

    “She failed to interview the applicant nor any of her witnesses. The Commission
    realized this was a flaw and asked the investigator to interview the applicant’s
    witnesses.”

    “Furthermore, two supplemental witness statements, dated February 15 and 16,
    2001, from CIC’s main witnesses in response to questions put by the investigator to
    CIC were not disclosed.”

    “Ms. Huneault made a clear statement concerning one of the grounds upon which
    the applicant based her discrimination and harassment claims. However, the
    investigator failed to address this issue any further in his report. This omission
    might constitute a “fundamental” omission.”

    ll) Pg 792-3 Losier “And according to this case of Chahal, it’s a meeting; so therefore, if there really was an investigation, that is where the collusion between MMP and the Crown comes in: to orchestrate those facts of incompetency during the Human Rights process; to orchestrate injurious falsehoods of gross incompetency – because it wasn’t – it wasn’t before the Human Rights process that they came out and not after are they coming out – by fabricating facts during the employment and after employment, refusing to provide the plaintiff with the specific evidence of these allegations – such as the disarray of books – both in the Human Rights process and in MMP’s affidavit of documents and the Crown’s affidavit of documents; ignoring the dollar raise, a fact that’s in my statement of claim; termination letter for cause of WSIB denying non-incompetency to avoid referral to the tribunal.” J. Lofchik “I think you should move on…”
    ***J. Lofchik refusing to acknowledge these facts sufficient for claim for damages against the Crown

    Losier “But I’m just responding to the Crown’s allegations that there is bald allegation and no facts.” J. Lofchik “Well, yeah, but you’ve done that before too.” Losier “There are facts. And I want to make sure that Your Honour is aware of them, and how they’re meant to be read per the allegations.” J. Lofchik “Yes, all right; I have your point.”

    mm) pg 817 tort of conspiracy J. Lofchik “Well, I don’t doubt that you pleaded facts with respect to that issue; so just carry on.”
    ***J. Lofchik’s endorsement record ignores this comment that I pleaded facts to that issue to dismiss the Crown Defendants

    mn) Pg 823 J Lofchik’s argument re: tort of libel is not based on any law as he refuse to give me his authorities and is a breach of natural justice not allowing me to review his authorities to defend my claim:

    J. Lofchik “If the investigator is under a duty to report – a legal duty to report, then query whether that doesn’t raise an issue of qualified privilege on the part of the investigator” and

    J. Lofchik “But if the report is solely internal within the Commission under a duty to report, then query that’s
    considered to be a publication of the libel.”
    ***J. Lofchik again making up the law not based on defamation law ignoring my arguments that internal docuements sufficient based on Supreme Court of Canada case law of Botiuk for defamation, and for tort of deceit:

    “In the leading case on the tort of deceit Derry v. Peek, the deceit was contained in a company’s written prospectus”

    “all those who participated in or were responsible for the original publication and its distribution must be joined as joint tortfeasors in the original cause of action.”

    mm) Pg 824 J Lofchik’s argument re: tort of libel is not based on any law as he refuse to give me his authorities and is a breach of natural justice not allowing me to review his authorities to defend my claim:
    J. Lofchik “Well, I suppose what I’m saying is, I’m not sure that this is a totally accurate statement of the law” and I request a copy of what is he responds with “I’m sure I do somewhere, but not here today, Carry on.” (he never provided me with his copy of law)

    nn) Pg 828 tort of libel on joint tortfeasors J. Lofchik’s comment making up the rules again “All right; that’s trite law, we don’t need to get into that. I mean you’re just repeating what you said before.” Losier “Well, no, this is back to the reading of that other one whether – it it’s reproduced, who is responsible for it. So, here it’s saying each time defamatory material is communicated to a new person, it is a fresh and actionable defamation.” J Lofchik “There’s no quarrel with that.”
    ***fact of incompetence written in case analysis, each time a defamatory material is communicated to a new person, it is a fresh actionable defamation – and J. Lofchik’s ignores this law and fact and dismisses the Crown

    oo) Pg 846 J. Lofchik “All right; so your point is what? That departure from the standards is an infliction of …” Losier “Emotional Distress” J. Lofchik “All right I have your point.”

    pp) Pg 856 J Lofchik making up the rules again re: SCC’s decision HR as high as UN treaty: J. Lofchik “I understand your position to be, he wasn’t doing it in compliance with the Human Rights Code – or they weren’t doing it in compliance with the Code, they were deviating from the duties under the Code, and that’s what caused the mental suffering.” J. Lofchik “If that’s the case, then I don’t think we need to get into all this Human Rights – United Nations stuff, because I’m presuming that the Code is valid legislation for the purpose of this lawsuit.” Losier “My reference to this is the overt statement which I argued yesterday, which is at number 30 in the MMP case…” Losier “…is not allowed, per discretion, to make a libelous and discriminatory statement that I was unfit to work opinion by…” J. Lofchik “Well, all right…” Losier “…the investigation statement.” J. Lofchik “…I understand – all right, I take that point.” J. Lofchik “I still don’t know where the United Nations Treaties on Human Rights and all that comes into play with respect to that. But…” Losier “…per the United Nations Treaty, it says to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practice which constitute discrimination against women. That includes these discriminatory comments by a Commission staff. And…” J. Lofchik “All right; I have that point.” Losier “…there’s also – the United Nations also refers to that it is against – that I can have a Human Rights complaint or suit against any person, any organization, any enterprise. That includes the Crown, there is no immunity. That’s how it relates…” J. Lofchik “Well, all right, I don’t think United Nations Charters overrule Canadian law; so, let’s get on with it.”
    Losier ”Well, the Supreme Court says that it does.” J. Lofchik “Well, that’s not how I read it.”

    ***Again Justice Lofchik making up the law and ignoring Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Slaight Communications Inc case of the following which clearly states the Charter as high as International treaty:
    “As was said in Oakes, supra, at p.136, among the underlying values essential to our free and democratic society are “the inherent dignity of the human person” and “commitment to social justice and equality”. Especially in light of Canada’s
    ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), and commitment therein to protect, inter alia, the right to work in
    its various dimensions found in Article 6 of that treaty, it cannot be doubted that the objective in this case is a very important one. In Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), supra, I had occasion to say at p. 349: The content of Canada’s international human rights obligations is, in my view, an
    important indicia of the meaning of the “full benefit of the Charter’s protection”.
    I believe that the Charter should generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human rights
    documents which Canada has ratified.”
    ***Justice Lofchik’s arguments in court is evidence that the Minister of Attorney General and Queen’s Park are not fullfilling their obligation to the United Nations Treaty and our Charter as they are to educate judges like Lofchik of the correct human rights law to eliminate the Crown’s discriminatory attitude towards human rights complainants, practices, rules and laws

  20. Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC

    Court Transcript:

    qq) Pg 862 J. Lofchik “And so, as far as the statement of claim in respect of your claim for damages – that is, your claim you were harmed by these actions – as far as that’s concerned, I’m satisfied that there’s pleading in there to that effect.” J. Lofchik
    “Because I’m content that you’ve pleaded in your statement of claim that the actions of the defendant caused you emotional harm. And that’s all this is dealing with.”
    ***Therefore per this comment in court left out of Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record I have pleaded a cause of action and his dismissal order is for improper purpose to protect the Minister of Attorney General

    rr) Pg 888 Losier “And also my friend here, the Crown made submissions that – earlier that it was her versions of facts – or her version of events was the actual words she used – which events are facts – and therefore admitting I have pleaded facts. And that her version of events are the material issue in dispute.” J. Lofchik “Right” Losier “Your Honour’s discretion in this Rule 21 is to – not to decide the question of fact motive which prompted the Commission staff to act – being to write deceitful facts in case analysis based on uncorroborated he said-she said evidence…” J. Lofchik “No, my job is to decide wheter the statement of claim…” J. Lofchik “…pleads sufficient material facts to establish the basis of a cause of action in a claim. That’s my job.” Losier “And in my factum I had also pleaded at page 43, paragraph 59, that ommissions were done in bad faith.”
    J. Lofchik “Yes” Losier “or by unlawful means.” Losier
    “Unlawful means also includes accepting uncorroborated he said-she said evidence by respondents. Which is collusion, a one-sided investigation, per my facts, stated facts.”
    ***And per Ruckpaul Judicial Review Human Rights Case law:

    “its duty is to decide if, under the provisions of the Act, an inquiry is warranted having regard to all the facts.”

    “an investigation had to be at least thorough and neutral for the Commission to have a fair basis on which to evaluate”

    “that where the completeness of the investigation or report is challenged, the
    underlying investigation documents are relevant and subject to production”

    “If the investigation is flawed to the point where a court can reasonably conclude
    the evidence reported by the investigator is incomplete or inadequate, the court
    must intervene.”

    “She failed to interview the applicant nor any of her witnesses. The Commission
    realized this was a flaw and asked the investigator to interview the applicant’s
    witnesses.”

    “Furthermore, two supplemental witness statements, dated February 15 and 16,
    2001, from CIC’s main witnesses in response to questions put by the investigator to
    CIC were not disclosed.”

    “Ms. Huneault made a clear statement concerning one of the grounds upon which
    the applicant based her discrimination and harassment claims. However, the
    investigator failed to address this issue any further in his report. This omission
    might constitute a “fundamental” omission.”

    ***Another rule made up by Justice Lofchik is that the Crown has a “broad” discretion which is not so per the Annotated Human Rights Code book which he never bothered to refer to in court or in his endorsement record:

    “Rights should be interpreted broadly and legislated exceptions to the exercise of these rights should be interpreted narrowly.”

    The 2005 and 2009 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, pgs 1, 2, 3, 140, and 201, Book of Authorities, Tab 2

    Therefore Human Rights complainants’ rights are to be broadly applied and the Crown’s discretion narrowly applied!

  21. Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC

    Court Transcript:

    Mr. Norton and the Ontario Human Rights Commission and Minister of Attorney General through Judicial Review and Appeal Court in 2005 to 2006 have denied my rights to see their investigation evidence. It is my position this refusal is because there was no investigation only imaging an investigation. Anyone can write up the case analysis reports that Shannon wrote up by picking facts here and there in the complain and rebuttal. The Ruckpaul Judicial Review case has paragraph where the Commission in that matter notice a flaw and immediately tried to rectify it. THis is not the case with the ONtario Human Rights Commission who continued one wrong doing after another. So Justice Lofchik’s arguments for negligence doing their job does not stand as they are continuing the wrong doing into trial and now this motion order dismissing the Crown from suit.

  22. Ontario Court of Appeal File #c50990 losier vs Micheal Bryant (MAG), Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, OHRC

    Court Transcript:

    MMP and Xentel DM Incorporated defamation is incompentency allegations that the Crown defendants approved and repeated in case analysis, section 37 report, and Appeals which per Supreme Court of Canada in Hill is all libelous defamation when per MMP $1.00 raise at 3 month probation and Xentel Termination with severance pay means there was no incompetency:

    “The so-called “single publication rule” does not apply to concurrent tortfeasors, who can be defined as persons whose torts concur, or run together, to produce the same damage.”

    “three instances: agency, vicarious liability, and concerted action.”

    “As set out in Hill, supra, “if one person writes a libel, another repeats it, and a third approves what is written, they all have made the defamatory libel.”

    “The Declaration and Report are by their terms inextricably interrelated. By their actions, the appellants become joint tortfeasors. Further, they, as lawyers, signed the Declaration without undertaking any investigation. For Lawyers to act in this way constituted reckless behaviour.”

    ***For investigators and Minister of Attorney General to ignore facts of a raise and severance pay when they are members of the law society is reckless behaviour!

    Botiuk v. Toronto Free Press Publications Ltd. 1995, 126 D.L.R. (4th), paras 38, 39, 42, 43, 47, 48, 53, 61, 62, 69, 73, 74, 76-80, 98, 99, 103, Book of Authorities, Tab 1

  23. Ontario Court of Appeal C50990 September 22nd 2010 update
    posted on Saturday, May 1st 2010

    July 8th, 2010

    Court of Appeal For Ontario

    Osgood Hall

    130 Queen Street West

    Toronto, Ontario

    M5H 2N5

    Attn.: Sandra Leal

    File: C50990 – Losier v. MMP Limited et al (appeal against the Crown Defendants

    only) ? Appeal date September 22nd 2010

    Fax: 416-327-6256

    Dear Ms. Leal,

    Per our conversation the other day I am sending you my fax request for Motion by Conference to List Judge for more time for oral arguments as per my factum certificate approximately 20 hours is required to appeal an 8 day Rule 21 Motion hearing by Justice Lofchik.

    Your standard letter only gives 20 minutes and is insufficient time for an unrepresented appellant with no law school training to appeal an 8 day Rule 21 Motion Hearing with more than one issue to be discussed: discretion without authority of the Code, no immunity and loss of jurisdiction, the correct plain and obvious rule 21 test, Human Rights Employer complaints and case analysis facts pleaded sufficient for particularity in pleadings for all intentional torts pleaded, court transcript, no negligence tort pleaded, Minister of Attorney General can be sued in his own right without vicarious liability legal doctrine, and then the six intentional torts pleaded in claim.

    This standard time of 20 minutes barely gives me time to plead part IV the issues and law and maybe paragraph #6 in my factum particularly if the judges interrupt and ask questions, and 20 minutes seriously disadvantages my appeal. I respectfully request more time per my factum certificate. My position is that 20 minutes is prejudicial to my appeal, unconstitutional, and favours the Crown Respondents particularly the Minister of Attorney General who superintends all judicial offices in Ontario.

    I look forward to hearing from you. Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated.

    Sincerely,

    Ms. Claudette Losier

    Copy: Maria Kotsopoulos Fax: 416-593-5437

    My Appeal C50990 includes the Crown applying the Code fraudulantly with the positive misrepresentation being the Code’s preamble and purpose that “Everyone In Ontario Is Equal” with measures to codify per stare decisis of section 5 to 10 of the code being completely ignored by the Crown’s Human Rights process in both jurisdicition human rights and … See Morejudicially. My appeal includes the Crown acting without authority of the Code applying section 34 (no investigation) alleged rules of discretion to dismissed 4 complaints under section 36 (investigation) prima facie complaints made out without investigating any of complainant’s witnesses. My Appeal has been set for September 22nd in Toronto allowing insufficient time of 20 minutes to argue 8 day Rule 21 Unconstitutional Motion order that includes judge refusing to abide by the UN Treaty and you can read my factum arguments for Women’s Human Rights at:Gender Equality : Canada slips from 14th to 18th place ” Politics’n’PoetryComment by Claudette Losier ? November 9, 2007 @ 10:04 pm | Reply … THE APPELLANT, CLAUDETTE LOSIER, APPEALS to the Court of Appeal of Ontario from … politicsnpoetry.wordpress.com/2007/11/08/gender-equality-canada-sli… – 211k – CachedThank you for your support

  24. July 8th, 2010

    Court of Appeal For Ontario
    Osgood Hall
    130 Queen Street West
    Toronto, Ontario
    M5H 2N5

    Attn.: Sandra Leal

    File: C50990 – Losier v. MMP Limited et al (appeal against the Crown Defendants
    only) – Appeal date September 22nd 2010

    Fax: 416-327-6256

    Dear Ms. Leal,

    Per our conversation the other day I am sending you my fax request for Motion by Conference to List Judge for more time for oral arguments as per my factum certificate approximately 20 hours is required to appeal an 8 day Rule 21 Motion hearing by Justice Lofchik.

    Your standard letter only gives 20 minutes and is insufficient time for an unrepresented appellant with no law school training to appeal an 8 day Rule 21 Motion Hearing with more than one issue to be discussed: discretion without authority of the Code, no immunity and loss of jurisdiction, the correct plain and obvious rule 21 test, Human Rights Employer complaints and case analysis facts pleaded sufficient for particularity in pleadings for all intentional torts pleaded, court transcript, no negligence tort pleaded, Minister of Attorney General can be sued in his own right without vicarious liability legal doctrine, and then the six intentional torts pleaded in claim.

    This standard time of 20 minutes barely gives me time to plead part IV the issues and law and maybe paragraph #6 in my factum particularly if the judges interrupt and ask questions, and 20 minutes seriously disadvantages my appeal. I respectfully request more time per my factum certificate. My position is that 20 minutes is prejudicial to my appeal, unconstitutional, and favours the Crown Respondents particularly the Minister of Attorney General who superintends all judicial offices in Ontario.

    I look forward to hearing from you. Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated.

    Sincerely,

    Ms. Claudette Losier

    Copy: Maria Kotsopoulos Fax: 416-593-5437

    The Court of Appeal responded with conference call for this Thursday July 22nd at 9:00 for me to argue for more time than 20 minutes for this appeal set for September 22nd in Toronto.

  25. Go to Canlii(google) website to read Justice Lofchik’s bias endorsement record where there is no references to any of my pleadings made to substantiate his analyses as in other Rule 21 cases such as SCC case of Hunt v. Carey and Crown’s case of Deep. He does not write or refer specifically to any paras in my pleadings to show where I am deficient like Hunt and Deep and all other Rule 21 motions presented by the Crown because my pleadings are sufficient and he did not want to draw attention to that fact! Nor did the Crown defendants in their factum for the Rule 21 Motion and this here Appeal as compared to the Factum found in case of KRP against the same Minister. This is called imaging the truth.
    Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21
    Superior Court of Justice — Ontario
    allegations — suable — pleading — complaints — judicial review

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  27. 27.Go to Canlii(google) website to read Justice Lofchik’s bias endorsement record where there is no references to any of my pleadings made to substantiate his analyses as in other Rule 21 cases such as SCC case of Hunt v. Carey and Crown’s case of Deep. He does not write or refer specifically to any paras in my pleadings to show where I am deficient like Hunt and Deep and all other Rule 21 motions presented by the Crown because my pleadings are sufficient and he did not want to draw attention to that fact! Nor did the Crown defendants in their factum for the Rule 21 Motion and this here Appeal as compared to the Factum found in case of KRP against the same Minister. This is called imaging the truth.
    Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21

    Appeal C50990
    Crown’s Authorities:

    Crown’s factum pg 9 para24.: subsection 30(1) of the Code further provided that no person who is a member of the Commission was required to give testimony in a civil suit or any proceeding as to information obtained in the course of an investigation under this Act. Dudnik v. York Condominium Corp. No. 216, (1990), 12 CHRR D/325 at para. 75, reversed on other grounds (1991), 14 CHRR D/406 (Decision June 20th 1990)

    Dudnik v. York Condominium para 75:
    In our view, s. 29(1) prohibits the Chief Commissioner and any other Commissioner from being required to give testimony in an inquiry or to produce documents. However, s. 29(2) allows a Commission employee, other than a Commissioner, to be compelled to give testimony or produce documents in any inquiry. Documents produced in response to a subpoena issued to a human rights officer or other employee would be admissible so long as relevance was established by the respondent, and there was no sustainable ground of privilege claimed by the Commission.

    Stare decisis legal doctrine says this 1990 ruling no longer applies because binding authority of new statute created in 1990 the Proceedings Against the Crown Act dated in 1990 s. gives litigants right to sue per sections 5, 8 and 23 which invalidates the Crown’s authority

    Liability in tort
    5. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, and despite section 71 of Part VI (Interpretation) of the Legislation Act, 2006, the Crown is subject to all liabilities in tort to which, if it were a person of full age and capacity, it would be subject,
    (a) in respect of a tort committed by any of its servants or agents;
    (d) under any statute, or under any regulation or by-law made or passed under the authority of any statute, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 5 (1); 2006, c. 21, Sched. F, s. 124.

    Where proceedings in tort lie
    (2) No proceeding shall be brought against the Crown under clause (1) (a) in respect of an act or omission of a servant or agent of the Crown unless a proceeding in tort in respect of such act or omission may be brought against that servant or agent or the personal representative of the servant or agent. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 5(2).

    Discover
    8. In a proceeding against the Crown, the rules of court as to discovery and inspection of documents and examination for discovery apply in the same manner as if the Crown were a corporation,

    Conflict
    23. Where this Act conflicts with any other Act, this Act governs. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 23.
    ***This includes the Human Rights Code Act s. 30(1) or 29(1)

    Other argument is that section 30(1) is unconstitutional and violates my rights (see arguments in Wilson re: SCC Nells):
    Pg 4 Para 18 “Lamer J., as he then was, speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court in Nelles concluded that these policy considerations, while possessing some merit, did not justify absolute immunity. They had to give way to the right of a private citizen to seek a remedy when a prosecutor acts “maliciously in fraud of his duties”.

    Pg 5 para 20 “First, absolute immunity for prosecutors cannot be permitted. The existence of absolute immunity would be a threat to the individual rights of citizens who have been wrongly and maliciously prosecuted by agents of the Attorney General. It would be alarming if such wrongdoers, despite being persons from whom we expect the highest standard of conduct in exercising an important public trust, could not be held accountable to their victims.

    Human Rights cases of Cashin 1984 and Ruckpaul 2004 allows for complainants to received Crown’s investigation evidence because it is a human and constitutional right

    Region Plaza Inc. v. Corporation of the Regional Municipality of Hamilton-Wentworth et al. (Municipal law – Action against councilors)
    Pg 751
    “If the plaintiff does not at the outset have knowledge of facts that give rise to the conclusions of malice, breach of duty, conspiracy to injure, or abuse of power, then it is improper to make such bald allegations in the statement of claim. It was not sufficient to simply say that the supporting facts were within the knowledge of the defendants.”
    ***Not same as my claim where I plead and rely on all facts from employment human rights complaints and reports, and the only facts that are alleged within the defendants knowledge on the investigation witness statements from Mrs. Page, Mr. Clarke and 2 others which I don’t need to prove breach of natural justice and can prove all torts with and/or without this evidence of Crown conspiring with MMP and a refusal to provide me with this evidence substantiates my pleadings of breach of natural justice per Cashin’s Federal Judicial Review case breached by Justice Lofchik and Appeal Courts which is Crown continuing cause of action Abuse of Office
    ***The facts within knowledge of Crown Defendants of their alleged investigation evidence and witness statements from Mrs. Page, Mr. Clark and 2 others I don’t need to proved fabrication of evidence and if the Crown does not want to show this evidence they cant prove there was an investigation and that it was fair so it’s the Crown that needs these facts and evidence as I can prove wrong doing with or without them and that is why all my legal matters is being dismissed and additional evidence that this is so is Justice Lofchik and the crown refusing to refer in writing in their endorsement record and factums any paragraphs of my pleadings in claims like all other Rule 21 motions and now the Appeal Court refusing my right to include the Court Transcripts as part of this appeal which includes my arguments based on my paragraph pleadings in claims pleaded sufficiently and with particularity
    ***Crown’s argument of Code to deny their evidence from investigation is overruled by the Proceedings Against the Crown Act sections 8 to provide their evidence just like a corporation has to and section 23 that conflicts with the Code this Act overrules the Code, and Judicial Review case laws clearly shows that the Code book rule that the Crown relies on is unconstitutional as other Human Rights Jurisdictions say the Commission has to give the complainant all of their evidence: Cashin & Ruckpaul Federal Courts, and that all of the complainants evidence and facts are to be investigated to show fair and unbias investigation per other Judicial Review cases Cashin, Ruckpaul, Lewis v. Standen,

    Pg 752 – “The statement of claim as amended provided as follows: (list 2 to 19)
    ***Not same as Justice Lofchik’s Rule 21 motion with no references to stmt of claim pleadings and evidence of differential treatment and hiding my pleadings because they are sufficiently pleaded

    Dawson v. Rexcraft Storage and Warehouse Inc. (1998), 164 D.L.R. (4th) 257 (C.A.) at para. 10 and contour argument para 11
    Crown’s factum pg 11 para #28 “absence of a necessary element of the cause of action will constitute a defect” and refers to case of Dawson pg 10 para 10:
    “In other cases, however, the statement of claim may be defective because it has failed to allege the necessary elements of a claim that, if properly pleaded, would constitute a reasonable cause of action”

    Para #11 contours this argument and aligns with “plain and obvious” test that includes reading generously with allowances for inadequacies due to drafting deficiencies such as the plaintiff had no lawyer or law school training to plead like a lawyer and any missing element of a tort is an oversight and she is allowed to amend per Charter values of access to justice:
    “To illustrate the second situation, suppose, for example, that P sues D for damages for malicious prosecution. To recover for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must establish these elements: institution of criminal proceedings by the defendant without reasonable and probable cause; an improper purpose in instituting the proceedings such as malice, or a primary purpose other than that of carrying the law into effect; termination of the criminal proceedings in favour of the plaintiff; and damages: J. Fleming, The Law of Torts (8th ed., 1992, The Law Book Co. Ltd.) at 610. If P fails to plead favourable termination of the criminal proceedings, D may move to strike out the statement of claim on the ground that P failed to allege a necessary element of the tort. P’s failure to plead favourable termination may simply be an oversight. If so, the court should allow P to amend the statement of claim to add this allegation, and the lawsuit will proceed. See AGF Canadian Equity Fund v. Transamerica Commercial Finance Corp. Canada (193), 14 O.R. (3d) 161 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 172-74 (Gen. Div.)

    Way v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) – Application for Judicial Review not statement of claim
    1st page
    HR Discrimination reason – 1978 job interview for a teaching position told that she would be hired if she reconciled with her ex-husband – she applied for position repeatedly and never considered due to 1978 interview comments – Commission’s discretion is based on S. 34 not S. 36 for reasons of vexatious (no details as reason why vexatious) and brought outside the six-month limitation period

    Code book page 301/302 measures/guidelines to codify vexatious are: instituted without sufficient/reasonable grounds, groundless, to embarrass or harass respondent, respondent makes reasonable offer of settlement and complainant refuses, apparent absurdity or manifestly has no basis in fact clear on the face of the complaint ie male alleging gender discrimination for interview job refused when all who were interviewed where male
    *discretion to not refer complaint per this case is only if it is groundless and not prima facie complaint made out per other successful Human Rights cases as in my situation for 4 complaints dismissed under s. 36 by way of fabricating insufficient evidence from a unfair and bias investigation process: Watts reprisal, MMP, Xentel and Lyman

    Para 6 and 7 s. 34(1) discretion – Commission pursuant s. 34(1)(b) and (d) – Section 34 of the Code permits the Commission to sift through complaints and remove a number of them from the time consuming process of investigation – The Commission is not under a duty to investigate every complaint

    Para 8 vexatious for gender/marital status complaint – without reasonable or probable cause or excuse, not acting bona fide, not calculated to lead to any practical result
    ***Not same as my claim with 5 employer 4 in a row exposing me to sex picture and retaliation with termination after I make several internal complaints

    Gismondi v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) Application for Judicial Review not a statement of claim

    Commission dismissing his claim as being outside the limitation period (Age Discrimination)

    Para 11 – Commission not satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith

    Para 16 –
    London (City) v. Ayerswood Development Corp., [2002] O.J. No. 4859, the Court of Appeal stated, at para 10:
    “When considering an allegation of a denial of natural justice, a court need not engage in an assessment of the appropriate standard of review. Rather, the court is required to evaluate whether the rules of procedural fairness or the duty of fairness have been adhered to. The court does this by assessing the specific circumstances giving rise to the allegation and by determining what procedures and safeguards were required in those circumstances in order to comply with the duty to act fairly. See Moreau-Berube, (2002), 209 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.), at paras 74-75.
    ***My Judicial Review only used due deference to decision makers and violated my charter rights and said it was fair that the Commission not interview any of my witnesses or sexual harassers which is contradicted by Ruckpaul Case that not interviewing any of the complainants witnesses was a “Flaw” – the rules of procedural fairness or the duty of fairness was not adhered to by the Commission and by Judicial Review and Appeals Courts in Ontario per Cashin and Ruckpaul (Federal Courts) and Lewis v. Standen JR (BC Court) cases – this shows that the Human Rights Governmental abuses I am receiving is specific to Ontario’s Justice System and therefore the Queen and Minister of Attorney General in Ontario, not other provinces – the Supreme Court of Canada’s refuse leave is based on Minister of Attorney General Micheal Bryant used to work there and had connections with law clerks who were the ones who decided what when in the memo given to the judges to decide leave and did not give my documents but only their memo per SCC practice book

    Para 23
    U.E.S. Local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048, para 53 of her judgment, L’Heureux-Dube J. said:
    The rule has been that decisions classified as discretionary may only be reviewed on limited grounds such as the bad faith of decision-makers, the exercise of discretion for an improper purpose, and the use of irrelevant considerations.
    ***Bad faith and improper purpose are elements for intentional torts Misfeasance of Public Office therefore abuse of discretion can be reviewed in civil courts not in judicial review courts

    “that Discretionary decisions – must be made within the bounds of the jurisdiction conferred by the statute“
    ***such as statute preamble everyone in Ontario is equal and sections 5 to 10 including exposure to porn is automatic prima facie complaint of sexual harassment made out

    “However, discretion must still be exercised in a manner that is within a reasonable interpretation of the margin of manoeuvre contemplated by the legislature, in accordance with the principles of the rule of law (Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [959] S.C.R. 121), in line with general principles of administrative law governing the exercise of discretion, and consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Slaight Communications Inc. V. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038).”
    ***This argument substantiates my appeal argument at #6 per discretion per Slaight that the Charter/Code’s protection is as great at that afforded in UN International Human Rights documents such as the UN Treaty article 2 for protection of women from all forms of discrimination including from our governments and Ministers of Attorney Generals and their staff Judges and Commission bodies and personals
    ***manoeuvre means measurements such as s. 34 a to d measures to prove without grounds, and s. 5 to 10 measures to prove grounds for next step investigation and referral to Tribunal***

    Para 24 The fundamental purpose of the Code is to establish a legislative framework “to ensure that all members of our society enjoy the essential right to be free from discrimination on racial and other grounds” : Payne v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (2000), 192 D.L.R.
    *Factum arguments #6

    acting in an investigative and administrative screening capacity
    *not judicial or quasi-judicial capacity

    The combined effect provided by the legislature in s. 34 is to enable the Commission to sift through the complaints and remove a number of them from the time-consuming process of investigation.
    *not refusal of referring to Tribunal as per J. Lofchik’s endorsement record and Crown’s factum analysis of law and not after s. 36 investigation with intentional flawed investigation tactics

    ***Para says “Commission is not under a public duty to proceed with every complaint” which is only in context with s. 34 to not investigate every complaint based on measures that the complaint is not based on any grounds or passed limitation period or refusal to accept a settlement offer that the Commission deemed appropriate
    ***Crown/Justice Lofchik did not provide any case law of section 36 dismissed complaints after investigation with discretion of “not under a public duty to proceed with every complaint” nor any section 36 judicial review complaints dismissed where the case analysis or the court’s endorsement records includes statement by Crown that the complainant had merit per the Code but were allowed to use discretion to refuse referral to Tribunal due money management of the commission department and this is justified under section 1 of the Charter per Oaks test and demonstrate that it had reasonable basis for concluding that total denial of benefits of making complainant whole is a minimum impairment of her rights and that it has accommodated the appellant’s needs to the point of “undue hardship”

    Para 30 The analysis concluded that “it appears appropriate for the Commission to exercise its discretion, and to decide not to deal with the complaint pursuant to only Section 34(1)(d) of the Code” (i.e. the untimeliness provision)

    Para 28 “natural justice arguments are not well founded” (age discrimination – s. 34 outside limitation period)
    ***per s.36 my breach of natural justice arguments are well founded in federal court law being ignored and breached by Ontario provincial courts per Cashin that includes refusal to provide me with the specifics of the alleged disarray of book into 2010 when this case says the Commission has to provide me with the specifics of all incompetence allegations that should include the following: which month the actual disarray of books took place and what part of the books was in disarray such as accounts receivable or payables or wages, and did I enter the source documents in their accounting soft ware or did prior hire Diana Hall or prior bookkeeper Karen Tarpos (who entered data in the books from my excel spreadsheets for receivables and payable monthly files) – Whose incompetency if there was any was it?

    Para 37 Mr. Moore submits that where a tribunal is required to give reasons for its decision, those reasons must be responsive to the issues raised and must set out the analysis undertaken in connection with those issues. A mere statement of conclusion, or a bare recital of preconditions to the exercise of a discretionary power is not sufficient. See Leung v. Ontario (Criminal Injuries Compensation Board) (1995), 24 O.R. (3d) 530 (Div. Ct.) at 535-536
    ***Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record and Crown’s factums are nothing but bare recital of preconditions to the exercise of a discretionary power under s. 34 not s. 36 (for 4 complaints dismissed under s. 36 material issue in my claims) and Rule 21 motions and not responsive to issues raised by me in court: bound by UN Treaty in our Canadian Laws Code and SCC cases, joint tortfeasors legal doctrine, Justice Lofchik wrote order to allow amendment for employer defendants excluding crown when they are joint tortfeasors, defamation made out, tort of deceit and Constitutional Tort made out no analysis in endorsement record, Facts in Employment HR complaints sufficient for all torts as to how the Crown did their job, and no references to my paragraph pleadings to validate all of his analysis in his endorsement record per Hunt, KRP, and Crown’s cases for this appeal Deep, Dyce, etc.

    Para 44 If the Commission were to proceed on a different recommendation or to base its decision on factors or considerations undisclosed to the complainant and the others there would be no opportunity to respond and the right to fairness would be infringed.
    *Cashin and Ruckpaul – MMP no disclosure of disarray of books specifics to the complainant to defend her self, Xentel and Lyman complaints no reference to sexual harassment incidents in complaints, for all 4 s. 36 complaints/reports no complainant’s witnesses investigated

    Para 48 The Commission has control over its screening process under s. 34(1) of the Code
    *no such reference or authority provided by J. Lofchik and Crown for s. 36 investigation cases – whereas I have provided such case law: Cashtin & Ruckpaul & (Crown case of Lewis v. Standent of all evidences) ***Also Cashin argument “behind the back of the other” Ruckpaul’s argument “disclosure of documents”
    Cashin paras 18875 and 18876 per argument from SCC Kane v. Board of Governors of U.B.C.:
    “Whoever is to adjudicate must not hear evidence or receive representations from one side behind the back of the other”
    and Cashin: “While the Applicant had the opportunity to tell her own story and clearly has a general motion of the points made against her, she was refused the actual evidence and had no opportunity to controvert specific evidence against her”

    Para 52 Gismondi commenced civil action against the City but not the Commission or its staff
    ***not same as my claim

  28. Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21 Ontario Court of Appeal file Appeal C50990 for September 22nd 2010

    Lacasse v. Corporation of the City of Otttawa et al. (Union Local 502)
    (unreported) 2003/04/15

    Para 2 The Applicant seeks the following relief by way of an Application – Application dealing with Union not same as my statement of claim
    *This is not a statement of claim or rule 21 motion to dismiss but an application not similar to my claim and therefore does not apply but rather other case laws such as SCC Hunt decision for tort of conspiracy and SCC Longley Case for defamation and Misfeasance of Public Office, Roncarelli applies

    (d) Janet Barrett’s of the Commission, failure to properly review the file and her minimizing the serious allegations, some sort of wrongdoing by another Commission employee, Connie Cooper, some sort of misconduct against the Commission the Commission itself, and
    *Not a statement of claim with pleadings based on torts such as Conspiracy, Deceit, Defamation/Libel, Misfeasance of Public Office, Constitutional Tort, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
    *no mention if s. 36 or an investigation – 2001 Janet Barrett was my intake office to the Watts Industries settled 2001 complaint – failure to properly review the file per intake process
    *Rule 21 not reason judge dismissed this application
    *Commission staff are respondents not defendants in Lacasse Application
    *not same as Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record says I pleaded “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation and apart from the facts of employment events” which is all that is required per intentional torts

    Para 3 and general damages against the Commission for failing in “there (sic, their) fiduciary duty and denying me the benefit and protection of law.”
    *also not similar to my claims of intentional torts with no pleadings of “fiduciary duty”

    Para 4 At all times the Applicant was an employee, or former employee, of the city a member of Local 503, and was covered by the terms and conditions contained in a collective agreement between the union and the city.
    *Application not a statement of claim with intentional torts after a fraudulent unfair and bias investigation with absolutely no interviews of sexual harassers other than Mrs. Page, and none of Complainant’s witnesses

    Para 5 reasons why Application must be dismissed
    (b) The claims pursued in this proceeding by the Applicant cannot be the subject matter of an Application. The claims made in this Application are not claims that are authorized by either a statute or by the rules of court.
    (c) Given the confusing nature of the several claims and the other obstacles faced by the Applicant listed hereunder, I am not prepared to grant him leave to convert this proceeding into a proceeding “by action” (i.e. by a “statement of claim”) (See Rule 38.10)
    (e) complaint to the Ontario Labour Relations Board – dismissed – issue estoppel
    (f) Ontario Human Rights complaint against the city and its employees still pending before the Commission
    *Also not same as mine with 4 prima facie complaints dismissed under s. 36 in 2004, and Judicial Review in 2006 and its now 2010
    (g) The Ontario Labour Relations Board has exclusive statutory jurisdiction to entertain the Complaints
    *not same as mine per Kulyk and the Commission’s privative clause for exclusive statutory jurisdiction was removed allowing right to sue the Commission and staff
    (l) Proceedings to attack the conduct of, or the decisions of the Commission, must be made by way of an Application for Judicial Review (Judicial Review Procedure Act, Courts of Justice Act and the Rules). In any event, the complaints are still pending and no decision has been rendered. Therefore the proceedings against it are premature.
    ***Not same as my claims that were dismissed in 2005-2007 and the proceedings to attack the conduct of the Commission and staff that results in damages can be made only by way of Proceedings Against the Crown Act 1990 s. 5 (liability), s. 8 (the rules of court as to discovery and inspection of documents and examination for discovery apply in the same manner as if the Crown were a corporation), and s. 23 (where this Act conflicts with any other Act, this Act governs and this includes acts in conflict such as the Code act, Judicial Review Procedure Act, Courts of Justice Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure), Crown Agency Act 1990, and per 6 intentional torts: Misfeasance of Public Office, Defamation/Libel, Conspiracy, Deceit, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Constitutional Tort,
    (n) Commission employees are not subject to being sued for damages caused by their alleged negligence
    ***not same as mine for their alleged intentional abuse of office per J. Lofchik’s endorsement record I pleaded “they acted deliberately with quality of the investigation” which includes serious flawed omissions of not interviewing any of the complainant’s witnesses nor all the sexual harassers and leaving out all the sexual harassment incidents out of 2 case analysis validated by respondents, Xentel and Lyman, to misinform the reader of the case analyses of the strength of the complainant’s prima facie complaints
    (p) Although the Applicant relies on the Charter, no Charter breaches are detailed in the Application
    ***not similar to mine which references the Charter s. 7, 15, and 22/24 plus Human Rights Case Law per s. of Code 5 to 10 (legislative facts) proving prima facie facts in claim (04 Matter para 15, 26, 28, 29, 32, 33)
    (r) No specific relief is claimed against the Respondents Barrett and Cooper
    *not similar to a statement of claim when Crown are defendants not respondents and specific relief for damages per intentional torts for lost of wages/career/pension/make complainant whole, both infringement of right and defamation is at large, expenses for disability of anxiety with depressed moods that is acute of paxil and sleeping pills,

    York Advertising Ltd. V. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) [2004]
    Injunctions not a statement of claim or rule 21 motion to dismissed

    Motion by York Advertising Limited and Murphy for an interlocutory injunction restraining the respondents, the Ontario Human Rights Commission, Doe, Hetherington and Richland Marketing Incorporated from publishing, disclosing, communicating, disseminating, distributing or circulating a decision of the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal.

    Pg 9 para 23 (a) There is no evidence of real damage before the court – the damages are purely speculative.
    *this is true per Operations Dismental’s exception to rule similar to future damages from misiles because until the event happens there is no damages
    Exception to this rule that facts not to be accepted as true are only those facts that are speculative on future damages per the following 3 cases that are not similar to my claim per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement “apart from the facts of employment events” (Crown Factum pg 11 para #29):
    a) Operations Dismantle of Future cruise missiles no damages till event happens
    b) York Advertising v. OHRC case was for injunctions for potential damage in future from disclosing tribunal results against York and judge dismissed per Operations York Pg 9 para 23 (a) There is no evidence of real damage before the court – the damages are purely speculative.
    c) in Region Plaza Inc pg 751 “It was not sufficient to simply say that the supporting facts were within the knowledge of the defendants” therefore the judge ruled it was speculative per Operations but allowed plaintiff to still amend claim
    d) Dyce (fishing expedition): “The plaintiff frankly concedes that he has no other information because as he alleges he has been to unable to obtain it”
    ***Justice Lofchik and the Crown do not provide any case law that pass event facts from employment human right and commission investigation pass events are speculative, and they do not provide in their endorsement record or factum paras in claim of the facts that they alleged are speculative per Operations/York/Region therefore their analysis/argument is bald conclusion

    Pg 12
    Para 31. “The Commission is responsible to the Minister for the Administration of the Code. Members of the Commission and the Tribunal are appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council.
    *Legal Capacity to sue the Commission Body as Crown Agent per Proceedings Against the Crown Act 1990 s. 5, 8, and 23, and per Crown Agency Act 1990

    para 32 “Section 47 stipulates that the Code binds the Crown and every agency of the Crown.”

    Para 33 “Section 5 of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act provides that, except as otherwise provided, the Crown is subject to all liabilities in tort to which, if it were a person of full age and capacity, it would be subject in respect of a number of matters. The listed matters do not encompass the type of claim with which we are here concerned.
    *this case does not apply to mine

    Pg 13
    Para 36 “Nothing in the Code constitutes either the Commission or the Tribunal as a body corporate nor is there anything in the Code that provides that either is liable to suit. The Respondents rely on Houlden J.’s, as he then was, decision in Westlake et al. v. The Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario, 21 D.L.R. (3d) 129, aff’d 26 D.L.R. (3d) 273, (O.H.C.)(Q.L.) , where he noted that the Ontario Securities Commission, which was constituted by the Securities Act, did not have anything conferred upon it that would result in its being able to sue or be sued . At p. 133 of his decision he said:
    There is nothing in the Securities Act, 1966 or the Labour Relations Act which confers upon the Commission or the Board the power to enter into contracts to acquire and hold property and to dispose of same, or to carry on any commercial activity.
    ***It still acts in providing a service to the public and can cause damages which makes its liable to those it harms by improper actions

    If a statute confers powers of this type upon a non-corporate entity which it brings into existence, the as Taylor, J., pointed out in Bank of Montreal v. Bole, [1931] 1 W.W.R. 203, it flows as a necessary intendment from the enactment that the statutory body is to be amenable to the ordinary processes of Court.

    Para 37 These Respondents also rely on the following at p. 135 of the Westlake decision:
    In the present case, on a careful review of the powers conferred upon the Commission, I cannot imply that the Legislature intended the Commission to be subject to an action for damages.
    (6) It will obvious from what has been said that there is a sixth category of statutory bodies and it is in this category that, in my opinion, the Ontario Securities Commission belongs. These are non-corporate bodies which are not by the terms of the statute incorporating them or by necessary implication liable to be sued in an action for damages, but who are legal entities in that their actions may be reviewed in proceedings brought against them by way of the extraordinary remedies or certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.
    Pg 14 Para 38
    In White v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [1999] O.J. No. 2034 (C.A.) (Q.L.) Catzman J. A., made the following endorsement:
    The legal issue in this appeal is the question whether the Ontario Human Rights Commission is, in law, an entity that is capable of being sued. There are precedents in this court, in the Supreme Court of Canada and the New Brunswick Court of Appeal that uniformly establish the (legal principle that the Commission is not an entity that can be sued, and whatever sympathy we have for the appellate position, we are bound to apply the principle.

    Para 39
    In Smith v. New Brunswick (Human Rights Commission)(1997), 143 D.L.R. (4th) 251, [1997] N.B.J. No. 29 (C.A.) (O.L.), the New Brunswick Court of Appeal held that the New Brunswick Human Rights Commission was not a suable entity because it lacked the legal status and capacity required either by virtue of legislation or inference, i.e., it was essentially a statutory body exercising a quasi-judicial function. Bastarache J.A.., as he then was, followed Houlden J.’s reasoning by the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada and that the decision had been consistently followed.

    Para 40
    At Para. 19 of his decision, Bastarache J.A., said:
    There is nothing in the governing legislation that establishes directly that the Commission has the legal status and capacity required. The powers of the Commission do not suggest that legal status and capacity required.
    ***Legal status and capacity exists as they provide service to public which can cause damages and therefore suable for those damages
    ***All cases for immunity and non suability 1999 White v OHRC and 1997 Smith v. NHRC all refer back to 1973 case of Westlake with following legal reasoning: 1) Nothing in the Code constitutes either the Commission or the Tribunal as a body corporate nor is there anything in the Code that provides that either is liable to suit, 2) Ontario Securities Commission, which was constituted by the Securities Act, did not have anything conferred upon it that would result in its being able to sue or be sued, 3) I cannot imply that the Legislature intended the Commission to be subject to an action for damages, 4) a sixth category of statutory bodies and it is in this category that, in my opinion, the Ontario Securities Commission belongs, 5) these are non-corporate bodies which are not by the terms of the statute incorporating them or by necessary implication liable to be sued in an action for damages, 6) not a suable entity because it lacked the legal status and capacity required either by virtue of legislation or inference, i.e., it was essentially a statutory body exercising a quasi-judicial function, and 7) there is nothing in the governing legislation that establishes directly that the Commission has the legal status and capacity required.

  29. 30.Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21 Ontario Court of Appeal file Appeal C50990 for September 22nd 2010

    Error in Law there is legislation that establishes directly that a Commission Body has the legal status and capacity required to be sued:
    1) Neither Westlake 1972/73, Smith v. NHRC 1997, White v. OHRC 1999, Oren 2002, and York Advertising Ltd v. OHRC, Wanxia and Zakaria refer to or analysis in their legal arguments for immunity two new legislation in 1990 that establishes that any Commission Body a Crown Agency has now legal status and capacity to be sued that nullifies all these cases as no longer valid per legal doctrine of stare decisis and all are evidence of institutional bias to protect the wrongdoing with the Commission of providing a discriminatory human rights process not allowed per discretion of the Code
    2) The Ontario Human Rights Commission is not governed by the 1966 Securities Act but rather by the OHR Code Act
    3)1990 Legislative Acts of The Proceeding Against the Crown Act and the Crown Agency Act and the Code plus the United Nations Treaty included in the Code’s preamble combine establishes legal capacity to be sued plus legal arguments found in Starline Case (pages 7 to 16) for the Commission Body as Crown Agent acting in administrative capacity and control test for minister control of commission and Human Rights Act as long as tortuous liability requirements are met such as the elements for Misfeasance of Public office or other intentional torts like defamation
    4) The 1990 Crown Agency Act now replaces Westlakes’ definition of a commission as a sixth category of statutory bodies based on definition in the 1966 Securities Act not the Code and so Commissions now are agents and no longer a sixth category of statutory bodies and a Crown Agent can be sued per the Proceedings Against the Crown Act 1990 s. 5
    5) Control Test states if Minister is responsible for the statutory body then it becomes an agent of the Crown
    6) OHRC clearly establishes directly that the Commission has the legal status per s. 27 (2) because the Commission is responsible to the Minister for the administration of this Act, and s. 29 that they are to eliminate all forms of discrimination, and per the code make complainants whole as if there was no discrimination therefore compensable damages are available for wrong actions
    7) The Proceedings Against the Crown Act establishes legal capacity to be sued per sections 5 liability, 8 as if the Crown were a corporation therefore all their evidence is available for suit, and 23 this act governs over all other acts in conflict with it that includes the Securities Act in Westlake,and the Code
    8) United Nation Treaty the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and its Optional Protocol 2000 Article 2 (b to f) prohibiting all discrimination against women, effective protection of women against any act of discrimination, to refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation, eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization, or enterprise, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitutes discrimination against women
    8) if a statute confers powers of this type upon a non-corporate entity which it brings into existence, the as Taylor, J., pointed out in Bank of Montreal v. Bole, [1931] 1 W.W.R. 203, it flows as a necessary intendment from the enactment that the statutory body is to be amenable to the ordinary processes of Court such as 1990’s Crown Agency Act and the Proceedings Against the Act
    9) Starline Entertainment Centre Inc. v. Ciccarelli 1995 case Ontario Court Epstein J. arguments for no immunity: distinction drawn between public officials exercising judicial and administrative capacity, administrative capacity deserves additional scrutiny, issue of immunity a trial was required to be considered within a factual basis, no special immunities or privileges when they act beyond the powers which are accorded to them by law, acts in fraud of his duties and powers, or acts with malice, excess of power or improper motive he cause damages
    10) new argument found in Wilson v. Toronto (Metropolitan) Police Service para 18, 19 and 20 – floodgate of litigation excuse used by Crown does not justify absolute immunity for Commission or its staff or Minsiter per Westlake, Smith, White and all other Crown authorities based on these 3 cases

    Pg 14 para 42: In light of the foregoing precedents, I must, therefore, conclude that, indeed, neither the Commission nor the Tribunal is a suable entity and that, insofar as the Tribunal’s decision or the Commission’s conduct are concerned, the Moving Parties are compelled to challenged them through the process of judicial review, assuming that they are granted status.

    Oren Nimelman by Next Friend Cheryl Katz et al. v. The Ontario Human Rights Commission, Nancy Pocock, Christopher McKinnon and Keith Norton (unreported) 2002
    Rule 21 for an order striking out the Statement of Claim

    Para 4 “there is no reason to consider that the analysis of the applicable principle in Westlake v. The Queen (1971) 21 D.L.R. 129 at 131 to 132 and 134 (Ont. H.C.) is not determinative of the issue as regards the Commission.
    *not a proper analysis to my arguments as new statutes with the Code and UN treaty establishes capacity to be sued not address by Spence J.

    Para 8 “The Statement of claim does not plead particular provisions of the Charter. Ms. Katz’s factum invokes s. 7, 9, 12, and 15 of the Charter but the statement of Claim does not plead any facts which would support a claim based on those sections.

    Para 9 “The Statement of Claim invokes the Charter of Rights at the following paragraphs of the Statement dealing with the following allegations:
    18: biased and flawed report
    21: sending the complaints back
    25: dismissal of the complaints
    29: duty to remedy the wrong suffered by the plaintiffs
    “None of these paragraphs supports a s. 7 claim in a self-evident way. No facts are alleged that would afford a basis for invoking s. 7.
    ***Not same as mine as Justice Lofchik makes no comments to my pleadings of Charter violations which is the Constitutional tort and validates facts “apart from facts from employment events” and that I pleaded “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation”

    Para 10 “The plaintiffs claim for breach of statutory duty. The Ontario Human Rights Code does not provide for a civil cause of action for breach of statutory obligation. No basis is pleaded for the claim of breach of statutory duty. See Canada v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (1983), 143 D.L.R. (3d) 9 at 24 (S.C.C.)
    ***Error in Law per SCC decision in Odhavji corrected the misapplication by lower courts of their decision in Saskatchewan Wheat Pool that it does not establish that the breach of a statute cannot give rise to liability if the constituent elements of tortuous responsibility have been satisfied. Not same as mine pleadings for Misfeasance of Public Office & 5 other intentional torts, the tortuous responsibility, which breach of statute can be improper purpose and/or unlawful conduct per these torts and Justice Lofchik made no proper analysis with elements of these torts and my pleadings where I am deficient and validates that I pleaded “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation” and “apart from the facts of employment events”

    Para 11 The plaintiffs claim for abuse of office and malicious conduct. Paragraph 33 of the Statement of Claim alleges, in respect of the defendants Pocock and McKinnon, malice or ulterior or improper motive as set out in that paragraph, i.e. (a) on the part of Pocock, as “payback” against Katz (b) on the part of McKinnon, to support Pocock and cover up her “wrongdoing and (c) on the part of both of them, to divert criticism away from themselves. The problem with this pleading as to motive is that it pleads inferences without pleading any facts that would support the inferences.
    *Not same as my claim and Justice Lofchik does not substantiate his analysis that is by listing my paragragh in statement of claim same as this as he makes no mentions to any paragraphs in my statement of claim and validates I pleaded “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation” and “apart from the facts of employment events” which is all that is required per Rule 21 to continue suit against the Crown

    04 Matter pleading para #20:
    I plead that the facts as stated in Shannon Meadows-Lee from the investigation office at the commission in her December 2004 MMP case analysis are injurious falsehoods and the tort of deceit from the commission colluding with now MMP Limited to protect Watts Reprisal campaign from being exposed by concealing evidence and controlling witnesses who would provide adverse outcome to the facts presented in these case analyses. The concealment of evidence is the concealment of the material facts in this statement listed from #36 to #142. This concealment of evidence and material facts demonstrates a breach of fairness by the OHRC. I had already commenced a civil suit for misfeasance of public office against the commission for colluding with the third and fourth employers in this campaign in 2004 prior to receiving these case analyses. I infer the commission has a need to avoid the truth from being exposed at the Tribunal because of their participation with this campaign in 2003/2004 and this is the criminal action of accessory after the fact. The most obvious injurious falsehoods is the allegation of gross incompetence and the concealing of my termination letter in direct violation of the criminal code 425.1 by both MMP Limited and Shannon Meadows-Lee and Dina Waik (investigating officer) to obstruct natural justice of referring my prima facie complaint to the Tribunal were the evidence will contradict the commission’s finding of fact.

    Para 12 “Paragraph 34 (b) alleges misfeasance and abuse of public office on the part of the defendants by neglecting to carry out their duties. This is a claim of negligence and not of intentional conduct, which is necessary for a claim of misfeasance in public office.
    ***Not same as mine as no where in my claim do I use the words negligence or neglecting rather I use deliberate words such as fabricating, distorting, imaging the truth
    ***Oren claim shows allowed to question decisions of Commission civilly for intentional torts such as Misfeasance of Public Office per the requirement for deliberate actions and its not collateral attacks for abuse of process rule

    Para 13 “There are no other facts pleaded that would support a finding that any of the individual defendants acted otherwise than for the public purpose of their offices, so there is no basis for the pleadings of abuse and misfeasance.
    Para 14 “The plaintiffs claim for negligence on the part of the individual defendants.
    ***Not same as mine per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement that I pleaded “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation” and Oren was not suing employer defendants with Crown defendants

    Senechal v. Muskoka (District Municipality) 2003
    Limitations of actions – actions against municipalities – liabilities of municipalities – negligence

    Pg 2 Held: Application allowed in part. The actions were not statute-barred. Most of the allegations of negligence were struck out. The plaintiffs were given leave to amend their statements of claim through the provision of facts that would support their allegations of negligence.

    Pg 4 para 15: The test governing the application of Rule 21.01(1)(a) is the same as that governing the application of Rule 21.01(1)(b) enunciated in Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959 at pp. 967-8 and 980, that is whether, on the facts as pleaded, and any evidence admitted, is it plain and obvious that the claim discloses no reasonable cause of action and cannot succeed: MacDonald v. Ontario Hydro (1994), 19 O.R. (3d) 529 (Gen. Div.); affirmed (1995), 86 O.A.C. 37 (Div. Ct.).
    ***on the facts as pleaded and any evidence admitted would include MMP’s defence statement that they deny they wrongly dismissed me with no such same allegations of incompetence per the Commission’s case analysis such as disarray of books and pleaded sufficiently!

    Pg 9 para 50: A pleading must, at a minimum, disclose sufficient material facts, but not evidence, to enable the opposite party and the Court to ascertain precisely the issues in dispute and to enable the other party to respond to the allegations in its pleadings. It is improper to baldly plead conclusions without any supporting facts.

    Pg 10 Para #52 borrows and repeats para 20 from George v. Harris [2000] O.J. No. 1762 (S.C.J.): A pleading that demonstrates a complete absence of material facts will be declared to be frivolous and vexatious.
    ***Not same as my claim or Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record without listing the paras of employment event facts to show they are deficient per Senechal para 53:
    “The impugned pleadings against the Municipality are as follows: list pleadings a to l “

    Pg 11 Para 54: The statement of claim contains only the following material facts specific to the Municipality :
    (a) The Defendant [the Municipality] is a corporation duly constituted pursuant to the provisions of the [Act]. This Defendant and its predecessors, servants, agents, employees or contractors, for whom they are in law responsible, had jurisdiction, control and responsibility for the maintenance, supervision, construction, design, repair, signing and safety pertaining to the subject portion of Muskoka Road 118, at or near its intersection with Muskoka Road 7, in the Township of Muskoka Lakes, in the District Municipality or Muskoka, in the Province of Ontario; and
    (b) The allegations in clauses (k) and (l) respecting the danger created by parked trucks and the absence of “no parking” and warning signs.

    Plus paras 53 to 66 with additional analysis of specific paragraphs in plaintiff’s claims with analysis why they are deficient not same as my claim per Justice Lofchik’

    Para 63 I do note that the Municipality was able to plead to the allegations of the plaintiffs without the need to ask for particulars under Rule 25.10.
    ***Crown in my case also was able to plead to the allegations per their motions records book that includes their defence statements and never once request for particulars per rule 25.10 a fact and law ignored by Justice Lofchik to favour the Crown Defendants and additional Institutional bias

    Wilson v. Toronto (Metropolitan) Police Services 2001
    Rule 21 Striking out statement of claim – damages for malicious prosecution, misfeasance of public office, conspiracy, wrongful imprisonment, negligence and several breaches under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

    Held: It was not enough to plead that Barry negligently failed to learn facts that could have fixed him with the knowledge that reasonable and probable grounds did not exist. The claim against the Attorney General failed since it was based on vicarious liability for Barry’s actions.

    Pg 4 Para 18 “Lamer J., as he then was, speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court in Nelles concluded that these policy considerations, while possessing some merit, did not justify absolute immunity. They had to give way to the right of a private citizen to seek a remedy when a prosecutor acts “maliciously in fraud of his duties”.

    Para 19 In reaching this conclusion, Lamer J. paid particular attention to the “chilling effect” and “floodgates” arguments, and concluded that absolute immunity was not necessary to prevent a flood of litigation.

    “This high threshold of liability is evidenced by the small number of malicious prosecution suits brought against police officers each year. In addition, since 1966, the Province of Quebec permits suits against the Attorney-General and Crown prosecutors without any evidence of a flood of claims. Therefore, I find unpersuasive the claim that absolute immunity is necessary to prevent a flood of litigation.

    Pg 5 para 20 “First, absolute immunity for prosecutors cannot be permitted. The existence of absolute immunity would be a threat to the individual rights of citizens who have been wrongly and maliciously prosecuted by agents of the Attorney General. It would be alarming if such wrongdoers, despite being persons from whom we expect the highest standard of conduct in exercising an important public trust, could not be held accountable to their victims.
    *** These 3 arguments from SCC also applies to Minister of Attorney General and his agents the Commission and staff and not reviewed in Crown’s authorities for immunity based on Westlake per stare decisis

    pg 12 para 51 “A pleading that merely asserts a particular tort, without alleging material facts capable of supporting it, discloses no cause of action”

    para 52 “I turn at last to the plaintiff’s pleadings respecting reasonable and probable cause. What does the plaintiff alleged in respect of this element of malicious prosecution? I would summarize his allegations as follows.” List pleadings from statement of claim from a. to p.
    *Justice Lofchik does not list any pleadings and the specifics in them like this rule 21 motion

    pg 14 para 57 “The question remains whether I should permit the pleading to be amended”
    *Justice Lofchik allowing amendment due to deficiencies in claims against Employer defendants but not Crown is Institutional Bias to favour the Crown and shows I do have facts and causes of actions particularly in the joint tortfeasors torts such as conspiracy and defamation

    pg 15 para 59 “malice would be made out if they were to find that:
    …the respondents continued the prosecution either for an improper purpose, or in reckless disregard of evidence which would have disclosed the unreliability of the information provided by the [complainant], or or out of ill will, spite or for selfish purposes, or because [the complainant] wanted them to do so. (in my claim the complainant is the respondent wanted them to do so )
    ***reckless disregard of facts and evidence proving unreliability: 1) of MMP and Xentel’s evidence of incompetency is a termination letter from MMP 5 month after off on sick leave for depression with no allegations of incompetency plus $1.00 raise at 3 month probation and no sign warning letter at probation or during MMP employment, and for Xentel a termination letter with severance/notice and release form for notice and Xentel settled claim in 2007, and 2) no witnesses of the complainant’s interviewed at all and no sexual harassers interviewed at all for Lyman and Xentel complaints and only Ms. Page for her breast comment incident interviewed, and 3) no witnesses at all interviewed to prove or disprove Watts retaliation/delusional profiling campaign of contacting next employer and passing info in complaints
    ***There was no interview of my witness Karen Tarpos who was the one not Mrs. Page to train me on new duties and not retrain on the alleged old duties that I was incompetent on and is fundamental omission proving conspiracy to injure me with damages of refusal to refer to tribunal, injure me with personal injury of delusional disorder and to discredit me

  30. 31.30.Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21 Ontario Court of Appeal file Appeal C50990 for September 22nd 2010

    para 60 “Lamer J. Stated , at p. 640 of Nelles, that to succeed in an action for malicious prosecution against the Attorney General or Crown counsel, the plaintiff would have to prove malice “in the form of a deliberate and improper use of the office of the Attorney-General or Crown Attorney, a use inconsistent with the Statute of “minister of justice”. He went on to say that in his view, this amounts to a requirement that the prosecutor “perpetrated a fraud on the process of criminal justice and in doing so has perverted or abused his office and the process of criminal justice.”
    *like discretion by my Crown Defendants that discriminates against complainants with the only difference between me and other female complainants succeeding at Tribunal for exposure to porn in workplace is a misdiagnosis of a delusional disorder when Watts, MMP, and Lyman validated my sexual harassment complaints of exposure to porn in the workplace and Crown deliberately left that out of case analysis for Lyman and is fundamental omission to cause injury to plaintiff not an innocent mistake due to the Crown’s persistence into 2010 that they are allowed to live this prima facie fact and evidence out of case analysis per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record and in court comments per the Court Reports unlike the Commission in Ruckpaul who realized that not interviewing complainant’s witnesses is a flaw and corrected their wrongdoing

    pg 16 para 62 “Borins J.A. noted, at paragraph 49, “that the core meaning of malice is the use of the criminal justice system for an improper purpose, the proper use of it being to bring before the Court a person whom the prosecutor has reasonable and probably cause to believe has committed a criminal offence.” He went on to say that:
    “although the prosecutor may have reasonable and probable cause to commence a prosecution, if the prosecutor obtains information which suggests that the person probably did not commit the offence, or recklessly disregards advice that such information could be obtained through routine investigative steps, the prosecutor lacks reasonable and probable cause to continue the prosecution, and malice may be inferred.
    *Same applies to the Commission and Staff and Minsiter responsible for the Code malice is the use of the human rights process both board and courts jurisdiction for not the proper purpose to eliminate discrimination per the Code, Charter and United Nations Treaty, and SCC cases making all complainants that is everyone is equal before the law per public policy in Ontario and Canada that includes the Crown accepting facts and evidence validating prima facie complaints and investigating it properly being all facts and evidence submitted by complainants including her witnesses
    *Malice can be inferred by facts and evidence ignored by the Crown that proves prima facie complaints from Employer events listed in claims therefore per Justice Lofchik’s comment in endorsement record of “apart from the facts from Employer events there is nothing” I have pleaded valid facts and claims and right to amend by claims with Crown defendants included

    para 63 Could recklessness of this sort give rise to an inference that Crown counsel deliberately and improperly used the office of the Crown Attorney, that such use is inconsistent with the statuts of “minister of justice”, and that it amounts to the prosecutor perpetrating a fraud on the process of criminal justice and in doing so, perverting or abusing his or her office and the process of criminal justice? For the purpose of this motion, I will assume it could.
    ***MAG suable per this case and argument

    Pg 17 para 66 “Where fraud, misrepresentation, breach of trust, malice or intent is alleged, the pleading shall contain full particulars, but knowledge may be alleged as a fact without pleading the circumstances from which it is to be inferred.
    ***Fraud of the Code everyone equal per sections 5 to 10 and fair investigation is pleaded with sufficient facts from employer events and fact that none of complainant’s witnesses where interviewed nor all sexual harassers, and judicial facts from law of other complainants’successful human rights complaints differ from my judicial review court who refused to weigh evidence and are sufficient facts for malice and recklessless

    para 68 “Here, the plaintiff alleges as fact no more than that Barry knew or ought to have known facts that deprived the prosecution of reasonable and probable cause.
    *Not same as my pleadings per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record that I pleaded “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigations” and “apart from the facts from the employer events”
    which are all the facts required for prima facie complaints made out and given to the Crown by me and the respondents in their rebuttal since all the respondents validated I made internal sexual harassment complaints and that these validations which are collaborations of facts proving prima facie complaints were obstructed by Crown

    Pg 18 Para 73 “the minimum level of material fact disclosure has been reached, making the pleading regular and relief by way of particulars potentially available”
    *not same as my case when Justice Lofchik’s endorsement records says my pleadings includes “facts from employer events” and “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation” – motion/order for particulars is available to me as Justice Lofchik does not say in endorsement that the “facts from employment events” are deficient with specific examples from pleading paragraphs in claims

    Dawson v. Rexcraft Storage & Warehouse Inc. 1998
    Rule 20.04(4) genuine issue exists as to material facts requiring trial
    Case dealing with Investors?
    Misrepresentation

    Deep v. Ontario 2004 Spence J.
    Striking out pleadings
    Pg 1 “Deep’s claim related to the withholding that was effected from his fees from 1982 to 1984 and a second withholding of fees initiated in 2000 that was continuing.”

    Pg 2 “Deep’s mere allegation of a breach of statute was insufficient to found a cause of action. He failed to plead material facts that would support an allegation that the College or Crown owed him a private law duty of care or to support his allegations of abuse of power and that the Crown and College acted with malice against him. Deep’s assertions that he offered full cooperation was without merit. The Ministry of Health was not a proper party and was not a suable entity at law. The statement of claim failed to disclose a cause of action against the individual defendants in their personal capacities. There was nothing in the factual context of the case that would support a finding of impugnable discrimination. Deep’s claim for prohibition of the continued withholding of fees had to be raised by way of judicial review. The allegations relating to the first time period were barred by the limitation period.

    Pg 5 “Background
    “Statement of Claim: Relief Sought
    para 18 “In summary, the plaintiff asserts the following claims for relief: 1 to 6 items from claim
    “The Statement of Claim: Principal Allegations
    para 19 “The following statements taken from the following numbered paragraphs in the Statement of Claim state the principal allegations of the plaintiff: lists 4 to 25 (pg 5 to 7)
    pg 7 “The Statement of Claim: Further Details – para 20 to 28 details from plaintiff’s claims
    ***this is evidence of differential retreat by Justice Lofchik as no where in his endorsement records does he make any references to paragraphs in claims with specifics to validate his analysis of the claim as deficient because my pleadings are sufficient per his other comment that I pleaded “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation” and “apart from the facts from the employer events” when I only need the facts from the employer events to show an intentional flawed biased investigation and reports and Judicial Reviews and Appeals to injure me that includes not interviewing any of my witnesses at 3 places of employment therefore to say insufficient evidence in Case Analysis without interviewing my witnesses is to fabricate insufficient evidence and fundamental omission per Ruckpaul’s Federal Court Judicial Review

    pg 10 para 37
    25.06 (1) Every pleading shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the party relies for the claim or defence, but not the evidence by which those facts are to be proved.
    (2) A party may raise any point in law in a pleading, but conclusion of law may be pleaded only if the material facts supporting them are pleaded.
    (8) Where fraud, misrepresentation, breach of trust, malice or intent is alleged, the pleading shall contain full particulars, but knowledge may be alleged as a fact without pleading the circumstances from which it is to be inferred.

    Para 38 Allegations of legal conclusions are not facts and are insufficient for the purposes of pleading. This is particularly so where allegations of intentional or malicious conduct are made. A plaintiff must plead circumstances, particulars or facts which are sufficient to enable a trier of fact to properly infer intentional or malicious conduct.”
    *See Wilson arguments on malice and recklessness proven by facts of improper investigation with serious omissions no witnesses interviewed for the complainant pleaded sufficiently and with particularity per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record “they acted deliberatedly with the quality of the investigation” and “apart from the facts from the employer events” which is all I need to show intentional flawed investigation of employer events and manipulated reports per MMP’s case analysis at #30 discriminatory and libelous opinion of “unfit to work had I return” to injure plaintiff

    Para 45 “However, in the present case, there is a motion for summary judgment with affidavits from both sides. In these circumstances it seems to be only fair to take into account the affidavits and their bearing upon the summary judgment motion before making a final determination whether to strike a pleading that is factually deficient. Otherwise, it would be possible, at least in theory, to end up with a decision that would strike a pleading as factually deficient while at the same time granting the motion for summary judgment based on the facts established on the motion. Such a result would seem prima facie repugnant to good sense and fair process.

    Para 46 “A typical instance of this kind of deficiency is the pleading or affidavit that states as a fact what is really a conclusion without a stated factual basis. For example, a party might state simply that the party was defamed by the other party without stating what the other party said that was defamatory. Such a statement fails to assert a fact and accordingly does not enable the other party to identify the factual basis of the case which it is required to meet.”
    ***My pleadings clearly state that the defamatory facts are fabrication of incompetency (MMP that includes disarray of books plus other items including overtime pay request not owed to me when another Government Department the Labour Board clearly stated to MMP it was owed to me and I received $1.00 raise at 3 month probation, and for Xentel incompetency allegations proven as fabrication to get rid of complainer per sexual harassment complaint that resulted in termination meeting after I advised Manager I was seeking 3rd party involvement when Xentel offered notice with release), that the MMP Case Analysis report at #30 was libelous opinion with “unfit to work had I return”, and lastly injurious falsehoods of insufficient evidence of discrimination, sexual harassment and reprisal to discredit me without a fair proper investigation of all the facts and interviewing harassers and witnesses and reliance on unreliable witnesses such of Mrs. Page and Mr. Clarke with proven Bad Faith conduct per MMP’s termination letter and changing cause 5 times

    Para 50 “The plaintiff asserts a claim for breach of natural justice. Breach of natural justice is not a cause of action known in law. So it is plain and obvious that the statement of claim does not disclose a reasonable cause of action”
    *not same as my claims in that breach of natural justice is like breach of statute per Saskatchewan argument in Odhavji that it does not, however, establish that the breach of a statute cannot give rise to liability if the constituent elements of tortuous responsibility have been satisfied and same applies to breach of natural justice and it can be improper purpose or unlawful conduct for intentional torts that are the tortuous responsibility

    04 Matter Pleading para #9
    I plead that the misdiagnosis of a delusional disorder is behind conspiracy campaign resulting in the additional harassment at Mackay and 3 more employers, and the commission obstructing natural justice of not referring 4 prima facie complaints to the Tribunal.
    *Here I stated it as a fact of behaviour/conduct to prove conspiracy campaign with Crown with MMP of leaving out prima facie facts and evidence out of case analysis report to obstruct natural justice are per this pleading the facts are:
    Dasha Page treated me less favorably by alleging incompetence and reduction of work and she made one indirect comment of “delusion” in my presence in March and she made the comment that I said “people were out to get me” to both WSIB and the Ontario Human Rights commission, and finally Dasha Page abdicated her duty to care and never contacted me once about my health nor to provide accommodation for my injury to health, nor pay me 5 sick days per policy or respond to my November/December letters to her. Plus Mrs Page sends to my home on January 20th 2003 a termination letter in direct violation of the Occupational Health and Safety Act section 50 and the criminal code 425.1 demonstrates Retaliatory Discharge. Based on this pattern alone by Dasha, which demonstrates discrimination and reprisal, I can only infer the case analysis by the commission to not refer to the Tribunal is collusion with MMP and a form of accessory after the fact someone who helps a person who has committed a crime to escape detention or capture as outlined in section 23 of the Criminal Code. That crime is not just discrimination but a conspiracy to injure me with a mental illness of the type of “people out to get me”.
    *This pleading does not say I plead cause of action of obstruction natural justice but rather the tort of Conspiracy of which to achieve a conspiracy with employer defendants it requires the Crown defendants to obstruct natural justice which is an improper purpose and/or unlawful action per tort of conspiracy and Misfeance of public office to refuse tribunal which causes injury to plaintiff, and by siding with Page per Wilson Case accepting unreliable witness evidence by ignoring all of my evidence and refusing to interview my witnesses particular Karen Tarpos on the alleged incompetency when she was the one training me not Page nor the two alleged witnesses per Case Analysis
    ***another fundamental omission in report no mention how MMP accommodated my disability before terminating my employment proving no investigation of this fundamental disability discrimination fact

    04 Matter Pleading Para #13:
    I plead that the defendants Mrs. Page and Mr. Clarke and Watts Industries, deliberately and knowingly made false and erroneous allegations which were/are defamatory and were made to cause me economic harm and damage that adversely affected my relationship with co-workers, WSIB, Ontario Human Rights Commission, the Employment Standards Office, and Small Claims Court (precedent case: Duke v. Puts, 2004). This defamation of my character by defendants Watts and MMP with the commission resulted in the December 2004 case analysis from Shannon Meadows-Lee of the investigation department of the OHRC with many injurious falsehoods that are easily disputed to obstruct natural justice of referring my prima facie complaints against MMP and Watts to the Tribunal, and later refusal to refer decision by Chief Commissioner Keith Norton. These case analysis also represents the commission’s misfeasance of public office and other tortious actions such as deceit, defamation, conspiracy to injure, intentional emotional distress (acting on their knowledge of my injury to health vulnerability), injurious falsehoods; and criminal action of obstruction of justice, accessory after the fact, adding and abetting, concealing my evidence, and controlling witnesses to avoid adverse outcome.
    ***Here I clearly state this defamation and many injurious falsehoods to obstruct natural justice which is a fact of conduct, and criminal action of obstruction of justice not tort of breach of natural justice which denotes unlawfulness per Conspiracy tort element, and facts being items in the case analysis which would include injurious falsehoods of incompetency and insufficient evidence of sexual harassment, discrimination (gender and disability perceived and real) and reprisal
    ***Also it is unlawful conduct for tort of conspiracy and improper purpose for misfeasance of public office

    Additional facts pleaded that includes paras #2 to #134 in claim where facts of each sexual incident and Crown’s alleged factual basis in case analysis to refuse referral:
    I also infer that the commission is colluding with both Watts and Mackay as they were late in submitting their defense statement causing noting in default, and motions to set aside default to file defence till closer to date of the OHRC’s submission of their case analyses, and both deny the material facts from #2 to #134 with general denials and are asking for stay of proceedings till the commission has made their decision in their original defence. I believe this due to the fact that MMP’s statement of defence only give general denials with no material fact to back up the denials particularly why they summary dismissed me with cause and no notice per rule 25.07 (3). I believe that both MMP and Watts would have submitted a motion to dismiss my claim based on the case analyses fabricating insufficient evidence provide to them by the OHRC as per their original defence statement. A stay of these proceedings should not be granted per the following reasons: it’s been already 2 years since my dismissal, collusion and obstruction by the OHRC, and I am currently unemployed again as a direct result of additional interference and repeating of items in my Human Rights Complaints, and I am having more difficulty finding replace work than I did in 2002. Plus the arguments found in Kurlyk v. Toronto (City) Board of Education of: ample precedent for allowing parallel proceedings which may result in different findings, deletion of exclusive jurisdiction clause permitting judicial incursion into areas formerly occupied by the commission, and assessment of damages is not beyond the ken of this court and the commission. The case of Skoptiz v. Intercorp Foods allowed an extension of the common law notice, consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Wallace, based on a finding that the employer had violated the Human Rights Code by not accommodating the plaintiff’s medical disability. It is feasible that a plaintiff may use both the civil claim and the human rights process in tandem.
    04 Matter Pleading Para #15
    I plead that the extent of Watts’ defamation of my character extends beyond Watts Industries interference at Mackay and includes defaming my character with the Ontario Human Rights commission to cause an obstruction of natural justice and injurious falsehoods by the commission staff of insufficient evidence of prima facie complaints.
    *Here I clearly say to cause an obstruction of natural justice and injurious falsehoods with the breach part of the defamation tort and reference to improper investigation all conduct to discredit the complainant with reader of case analyses
    *Per Deep I have sufficiently pleaded per tort of defamation with damages being at large and for the infringement of a guaranteed right
    *I continue in this pleading with the certain facts for defamation as:
    The defamation of my character can easily be demonstrated based on my pass memos of performance by others prior to working at Mackay and MacKay’s description of my work ethics during my employment that they submitted to the Ontario Human Rights commission in their rebuttal to my complaint, in the December 2004 case analysis, and Mr. Clarke’s comments in his letter to the Employment Standards Office. I can show that in 1992 I was promoted to branch administrator; in 1993 I was recognized by my manager for my attention to Quality; in 1996 that same manager stated that my solid and reliable performance is appreciated; in 1999 from Watts manager being noted that I was a strong performer in accomplishing tasks and 2001 rating of 4 exceeding expectations in receivable duties; in 2002 reference letter from employer before Mackay that I was a conscientious, punctual employee who took her responsibilities very seriously; and then from Mackay claiming performance issues without progressive discipline process for wrongful dismissal excuse after they received my Human Rights complaint against them when original reason for termination is reprisal action under the Code and violation of criminal code 425.1. I can also show fabrication of warning letter at Watts Industries to paint me a trouble-maker and lacking in team spirit which was successfully challenged in fax to commission in May 2001.

    MacKay’s defamatory reference for me in their response to Human Rights commission was the following: the respondents state that the employment was terminated following a significant absence and due to performance issues (proving discrimination based on real disability); Dasha Page was upset by the conversation given the nature of the conversation and the bizarre accusations that were being made, the Respondents considered terminating the employment immediately during the probationary period; it became clear that the Complainant could not handle the full responsibilities of the position and was really just not competent enough to perform to work in a busy office; Dasha Page denies that there was any conversation regarding quitting; the Respondents could have let her go during the probationary period but elected to try and preserve her position as she made it apparent that she needed the job; the Complainant was unable to operate the accounting duties and the Respondents were required to bring in additional help in order to do the accounting; there was significant damage done to the Respondents by virtue of the administration system implemented by the Complainant; and the Complainant maintained that extensive overtime was necessary in order for her to do the job, while the job had previously been done without the necessity of overtime. I submitted an excellent rebuttal to this fabrication causing additional fabrication by the defendants in the commission case analysis of disarray of books that were not mentioned in their rebuttal to my complaint that I received and was allowed to cross examine.
    *Last line are facts to the breach of natural justice therefore not conclusion

    My reputation as a good worker has been defamed by Watts Industries, and now Mackay to the point of not being able to receive fair employment without this continuation of Watts’ mobbing campaign at next employer nor good references for future job opportunities due to their actions, plus not being giving the appropriate work environment to grow and improve my skills, and is career stoppage. I also have the added problem of now having my Charter Rights obstructed by the OHRC. My excellent health record destroyed by the actions by these two employers causing intentionally injury to my health which resulted in loss of insurance benefits in 2003 at fourth employer in this campaign due to the fact now I have to reveal that I have suffered from depression when previously I did not.
    ***facts of Damages

    04 Matter Pleading para #18:
    I plead that I mitigated my loss of employment at Mackay by starting a part time telemarketing job on January 10th, 2003, and a full time accounting job on February 10th, 2003, and working at both jobs till September 15th 2003. The full time position rate of pay of $35,000/year exceeded the rate of pay at MMP and I was also wrongfully terminated in March 2004. I continue to mitigate my damages but finding difficult to find work with 3 additional employers participating in this campaign and not receiving proper reference letters from these participants too. This difficulty in finding replacement work is demonstrated by the following: in 2003 it took only 1 month to be rehired, in 2004 it took 6 months, only to be wrongfully dismissed after only 2 months and complaining again of sexual environment, and now currently unemployed since November 15th 2004. Also I mitigated my damages to my health by first challenging the misdiagnosis with the Ontario College of Surgeons and Physicians and closing of that file in September 2002. Then by seeking another assessment for my injury to health via trained psychologist who listens to their patients, which I received on October 2002 of anxiety with depressed moods that is acute, and changing my medication to match the correct assessment. I changed my medication from Anti-Psychotic Perphenzine to Paxil around December 5th 2002 and continue to medicate on Paxil. I am currently still taking this medication to continue to mitigate my health damages as a result of additional mobbing stress at 3 more employers plus obstruction of natural justice by the OHRC that causes abnormal levels of anxiety and anger to avoid another episode of reactive depression and suicide ideation that leads to attempts.
    *Here it’s the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress which I called (mobbing stress) as a result of the “FACTs” of 1) Crown’s conduct of obstruction of natural justice (the refusal to refer prima facie complaints to tribunal like other complainants with same facts) which is the Overt statement/action causing the stress – “Fact” of anxiety and anger requiring to medicate on Paxil (proven illness of abnormal anxiety)
    *Per SCC of Odhavij this is sufficient for pleadings for Tort of Intentional Inflection of Emotional Distress
    ***facts for damages

    04 Matter pleading para #20:
    I plead that the facts as stated in Shannon Meadows-Lee from the investigation office at the commission in her December 2004 MMP case analysis are injurious falsehoods and the tort of deceit from the commission colluding with now MMP Limited to protect Watts Reprisal campaign from being exposed by concealing evidence and controlling witnesses who would provide adverse outcome to the facts presented in these case analyses. The concealment of evidence is the concealment of the material facts in this statement listed from #36 to #142. This concealment of evidence and material facts demonstrates a breach of fairness by the OHRC. I had already commenced a civil suit for misfeasance of public office against the commission for colluding with the third and fourth employers in this campaign in 2004 prior to receiving these case analyses. I infer the commission has a need to avoid the truth from being exposed at the Tribunal because of their participation with this campaign in 2003/2004 and this is the criminal action of accessory after the fact. The most obvious injurious falsehoods is the allegation of gross incompetence and the concealing of my termination letter in direct violation of the criminal code 425.1 by both MMP Limited and Shannon Meadows-Lee and Dina Waik (investigating officer) to obstruct natural justice of referring my prima facie complaint to the Tribunal were the evidence will contradict the commission’s finding of fact.
    *Here I plead the tort of injurious falsehoods again and the tort of deceit that includes the fact of unlawful conduct by Commission staff of obstruct natural justice and breach of fairness for the deceit tort
    *Per Wilson case pg 15 para #59 – Malice and reckless disregard of evidence which discloses unreliability of information provided by employer defendants particularly Mrs. Page and Mr. Clarke and facts from employer events as to what was unreliable pleaded and sufficient for continuing suit against the Crown defendants
    *Defamation per injurious falsehoods includes facts of the case analysis just like Botiuk SCC case, facts of conduct of concealing evidence and controlling witnesses listed at paras in claim from #36 to #142, fact of injurious falsehoods of incompetency, fact of conduct to obstruct natural justice of referring my prima facie complaint to Tribunal
    ***Tort of deceit – misrepresentation – my claims were being investigated fairly – fact of an investigation implies that the Crown investigates fairly, fact concealing my termination letter, and fact of conduct concealment of evidence and material facts demonstrates a breach of fairness by the OHRC per list #36 to #142
    ***Tort of Conspiracy – Colluding with MMP to protect Watts reprisal campaign by conduct of concealing evidence and controlling witnesses part of the conduct of obstruction of justice

    Additional facts for conclusion of conspiracy, deceit and injurious falsehoods with judicial facts from case law:
    I claim that the defendants have no honest belief in their statement of gross incompetence because they do not use this defense in common law because there is no defense for cause of gross incompetence without a progressive discipline process and a couple of signed warning letters from me but apparently the commission feels there is such a defense in the Human Rights jurisdiction. I like to argue that this is abuse of statutory duty and authority by the commission as per the following in Pritchard v. OHRC: “while administrative boards have the delegated authority to determine their own procedure, the exercise of that authority must be in accordance with natural justice and the common law.” Also, the defendants allege reduction of work which would be considered to be a demotion which is a breach of contract and supports a constructive dismissal suit. My evidence of fact to the commission shows increase in work load not reduction. By fabricating falsehoods of reduction of work, the defendants at MMP and the OHRC demonstrate they intended to breach contract not to mention wrongful interference with contract. The MMP defendants and the commission are attempting to rely on the common law defense of after-acquired cause with the alleged disarray of books which I feel are facts that should have been readily available to me from the outset between March to August 2002 for the defendants to provide me with a progressive discipline process while employed and/or at least include this alleged fact in their January 20th 2003 dismissal letter that I received after my 5 month absence due to injury to health.

    04 matter para pleading #28 clearly denoting the obstruction of natural justice as fact of conduct/behaviour and not cause of action:
    I plead that the commission being a quasi-judicial process relies and hides behind their immunity status to abuse their authority and statutory duties. I feel that this is a case where the commission acted outside its limit (collusion). I infer that the commission improperly exercises its judicial powers with criminal behaviour of obstruction of natural justice, concealing evidence and controlling witnesses who would provide adverse outcome are types of misconduct that amount to sufficient excesses of jurisdiction and are thus not protected by an absolute immunity. By alleging facts and evidence in her case analysis of gross incompetence as cause for my dismissal, refusing to review and note January 20th 2003 termination letter with retaliatory discharge reason for dismissal plus the lack of credibility by the defendants at MMP, refusing to question witness on bantering of disability of persecution with “people out to get me”, and statement made that had I return I would not be mentally capable of handling my duties when facts show I moved on very quickly to part time and full time employment, Shannon Meadows-Lee and Dina Waik demonstrate sufficient excesses of abuse of jurisdiction and targeted malice. I refer to page 289 of Klar’s Tort Law #146: Judicial immunity is defended on the ground that it is not for judges’ protection but for the public’s protection; Judges should be able to act independently and fearlessly without threat of lawsuit by disappointed litigants; this rational is understandable; it does not, however, justify extending the immunity to judges who act maliciously in order to harm claimants.
    ***Per Wilson case shows malice and reckless conduct

    Deep pg 12 para #51 “Since there is no nominate tort of statutory breach in Canada, the plaintiff’s mere allegation of a breach of statute is insufficient. Rather, any purported breach of a statute must be considered in the context of a claim of negligence: Canada v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool [1983] 1 S.C.R. .
    ***error in law per Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse SCC dated 2003 invalidates this legal argument see my appeal factum pg 22/23 para in case #31 as SCC judge corrects the error made by SCC in 1983:
    “I wish to stress that this conclusion is not inconsistent with R. v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 205, in which the Court established that the nominate tort of statutory breach does not exist. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool states only that it is insufficient that the defendant has breached the statute. It does not, however, establish that the breach of a statute cannot give rise to liability if the constituent elements of tortuous responsibility have been satisfied. Put a different way, the mere fact that the alleged misconduct also constitutes a breach of statute is insufficient to exempt the officer from civil liability. Just as a public officer who breaches a statute might be liable for negligence, so too might a public officer who breaches a statute be liable for misfeasance in a public office. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool would only be relevant to this motion if the appellants had pleaded no more than a failure to discharge a statutory obligation. This, however, is not the case. The principle established in Saskatchewan Wheat Pool has no bearing on the outcome of the motion on this appeal.
    ***This legal argument also applies to Breach of Natural Justice or obstruction of Natural Justice – that there is no tort of Breach of Natural Justice but the 1983 case does not establish that the breach of natural justice cannot give rise to liability if the constituent elements of tortuous responsibility have been satisfied as also part of liability for misfeasance in public office –such as my position one of the improper purpose or unlawful conduct for tort of Conspiracy or tort of deceit and defamation

  31. 32.31.30.Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21 Ontario Court of Appeal file Appeal C50990 for September 22nd 2010

    04 Matter para pleading #25:
    , that exposure to sex picture is automatic breach of code 5 and 7 and proves poisoned work environment under the code

    “When the respondent’s treatment of the complainant is partly reprisal for contacting the Commission, there is a breach of section 8.” Therefore Watts’ treatment of the complainant by interfering with her employment relations for filing her 2000 complaint with the phrase “sucks to be you”, address of Claude, and additional exposures to sexual pictures is a breach of section 8.
    ***“breach of a statute” I make references to breach of code 5 and 7 at para #25, code 8 at para #26, and breach of fairness which has to do with the tort of deceit and misrepresentation that my complaints were being investigated fairly and without bias (one sided investigation)
    04 Matter para pleading #20:
    I plead that the facts as stated in Shannon Meadows-Lee from the investigation office at the commission in her December 2004 MMP case analysis are injurious falsehoods and the tort of deceit from the commission colluding with now MMP Limited to protect Watts Reprisal campaign from being exposed by concealing evidence and controlling witnesses who would provide adverse outcome to the facts presented in these case analyses. The concealment of evidence is the concealment of the material facts in this statement listed from #36 to #142. This concealment of evidence and material facts demonstrates a breach of fairness by the OHRC.

    This alleged fact of gross incompetence alone is evidence of Bad Faith and unfairness of an employer’s dismissal investigation and the commission’s statutory duty, breach of fairness, aggravated an injury to the plaintiff and therefore magnified the award of damages for mental distress, warrants punitive and now exemplary damages.

    04 Matter para pleading #26:
    I plead that by imaging a sham investigation fabricating insufficient evidence and controlling the witnesses at the employers that Watts interfered with such as MMP the commission demonstrates biase towards Watts and discriminating employers, breach of fairness, and has violated my Charter Rights section 15 (1) of: Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination. Thus fabricating insufficient evidence at MMP will naturally result in fabrication of insufficient evidence at Watts, particularly when the commission only interviewed the managers at MMP who are the other defendants in this suit.

    04 Matter para pleading #27:
    I plead that there is evidence of defamation in 2001 by the commission that Ms. Meadows-Lee is concealing regarding my 2000 Watts Complaint. At #17 in Watts’ case analysis Ms. Meadows-Lee alleges insufficient evidence obtained during investigation to indicate that Watts defamed the complainant’s character during the mediation process which is additional imaging of the truth. The 2000 complaint was submitted in the fall and the deadline for Watts’ rebuttal was in January. In February my intake officer left a message with my husband to advised me that this complaint was being sent to the investigation department, and then the commission allowed Watts to send me their rebuttal in April demonstrating breach of fairness by the commission.
    ***Intake officer was Janet Barrett (lacasse case)

    Deep para #57: “As noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Cooper, the statute is the only source of the Crown decision-maker’s duties, private or public. Apart from the statute, a Crown decision-maker is in no different position from the ordinary man or woman on the street. If a duty to the plaintiff is to be found, it must be in the pertinent statutory provisions. If the statute does not provide for a private law duty of care, so such duty exists and there can be no claim of negligence.:
    *Code provides for duty to apply Code to eliminate discrimination for everyone in its preamble, sections 5 to 10, and s. 29 function of commission (a) to forward the policy that the dignity and worth of every person be recognized and that equal rights and opportunities be provided without discrimination that is contrary to law and (d) to develop and conduct programs of public information and education and untertake, direct and encourage research designed to eliminate discriminatory practices that infringe rights under this Act, and to provide damages such as making complainant whole

    Deep para #60: “The plaintiff at paragraph 29 pleads that the defendants were “negligent in their exercise of statutory powers and breached the duty required of them…” but has failed to plead material facts to support any allegations that the defendants owed him a private law duty of care. The allegations of negligence in the statement of claim fail to give rise to a reasonable cause of action and it is plain and obvious that any such claim cannot succeed.”
    ***not same as my claim with no such pleading as at Deep para #29 and both Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record and Crown Defendants factum make no reference to a paragraph in my claim where I did but rather make bald conclusions of law

    Deep para #64: “Bad faith is a legal conclusion. It has been held to involve an allegation of an intent to deceive or to make someone believe what is false. It has been said to be equivalent to an allegation of dishonesty. Where a plaintiff’s claim includes an allegation of bad faith, the pleading must be supported by sufficient particulars that support a legal conclusion of bad faith. If it does not, the pleading should be struck.”

    Deep para #65: “The plaintiff’s allegations of bad faith are found inparagraph 17 of the statement of Claim (allegation that the College has a long history of dealing unfairly with him), paragraph 30 of the Statement of Claim (allegations that the defendants improperly proceeded with mala fide and reckless disregard of the consequences of its decisions, their conduct was reprehensible and aggravated damages are warranted), paragraph 31 of the Statement of Claim (allegation that the defendants acted in a high handed vindictive manner with callous disregard to the plaintiff and his rights) and paragraph 32 of the Statement of Claim (allegation that the action of the defendants was intentionally directed against the plaintiff and his property warranting punitive damages). Nor is there any affidavit evidence to support a claim of bad faith.
    *Not same as my claim since Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record or the Crown Defendants’ factums arguments are unsupported by no reference to paragraphs in my claims where I pleaded insufficient bad faith so their arguments are bald conclusions of law per Deep para #66

    Deep para #66: “All of these allegations state legal conclusions unsupported by any particulars of the conduct that constitutes bad faith.”
    Deep Para 46: “A typical instance of this kind of deficiency is the pleading or affidavit that states as a fact what is really a conclusion without a stated factual basis. For example, a party might state simply that the party was defamed by the other party without stating what the other party said that was defamatory. Such a statement fails to assert a fact and accordingly does not enable the other party to identify the factual basis of the case which it is required to meet.”
    ***Justice Lofchik does not provide in endorsement record nor Crown in their factums any paragraphs in my claims of a typical instance of this kind of deficiency per Deep but are both wrongfully lumping the employment event facts from human rights process all into the argument only allowed to review via Judicail review which is also not per Deep’s Appeal careful and comprehensive reasons (154 paragraphs) dealing with all of the issues, including procedural issues relating to Rules 20, 21 and 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and substantive issues raised by the appellant and both sets of respondent
    ***My pleadings clearly state what the defamatory facts per Justice Lofchik of “apart from facts of employment events” are fabrication of incompetency with Bad Faith (MMP that includes disarray of books plus other items including overtime pay request not owed to me when another Government Department the Labour Board clearly stated to MMP it was owed to me and that MMP contravene the Labour Act and I received $1.00 raise at 3 month probation, and for Xentel incompetency allegations when Xentel offered notice with release), that the MMP Case Analysis report at #30 was libelous opinion with “unfit to work had I return”, and lastly injurious falsehoods of insufficient evidence of discrimination, sexual harassment and reprisal without a fair proper investigation of all the facts and interviewing harassers and witnesses which includes the Crown finding my witness statement to be uncredible over Mrs. Page and Mr. Clarke with proven Bad Faith conduct per their termination letter left out of case analysis report pleaded sufficiently

    04 Matter para #8:
    My claim of a scapegoat campaign to induce a mental illness of persecution type is further substantiate by the fact that Mrs. Page breaches her fiduciary duty and sets out to deceive the WSIB in August 20th letter with false fact that I made no complaints, and later that I said to her “people were out to get me”, acts in bad faith by providing me one reason for termination in letter dated January 20th, 2003, which is different from termination reason provided to Ontario Human Rights commission and later to Small Claims Court in Burlington, and no reason for dismissal with cause in her defense for Superior Court claim, and finally new reason of disarray of books in the commission case analysis that I only received in December 2004.
    04 Matter para #11:
    My termination clearly states that my employment was terminated because my WSIB claim was denied and my allegation not substantiated, that is a discipline measure of termination because I provided information to a person whose duties include the enforcement of provincial law. The injurious falsehoods of gross incompetence of disarray of books only being used by the Human Rights commission only in December 2004 is additional retaliation and now violation of section 425.1 of the criminal code. Also, MMP’s behaviour of continuously changing the reason they dismissed me after I out argue the original reasons demonstrates bad faith termination and creates Wallace damages.

    04 Matter para #20:
    The concealment of evidence is the concealment of the material facts in this statement listed from #36 to #142. This concealment of evidence and material facts demonstrates a breach of fairness by the OHRC.

    Sproats’ Wrongful Dismissal Handbook of: malice has been described as the absence of bona fides proven or reasonably inferred from the facts; malice in the law of injurious falsehoods is sometimes equated with dishonest or improper motive; honest belief in an unfounded claim is not malice but the nature of the unfounded claim may be evidence that there was not an honest belief in it. In my case the purpose of false claims in one jurisdiction and not the other for the sole purpose of avoiding a referral to Tribunal where the evidence will be exposed is malice and absence of bona fides.

    I claim that the defendants have no honest belief in their statement of gross incompetence because they do not use this defense in common law because there is no defense for cause of gross incompetence without a progressive discipline process and a couple of signed warning letters from me but apparently the commission feels there is such a defense in the Human Rights jurisdiction. I like to argue that this is abuse of statutory duty and authority by the commission as per the following in Pritchard v. OHRC: “while administrative boards have the delegated authority to determine their own procedure, the exercise of that authority must be in accordance with natural justice and the common law.” Also, the defendants allege reduction of work which would be considered to be a demotion which is a breach of contract and supports a constructive dismissal suit. My evidence of fact to the commission shows increase in work load not reduction. By fabricating falsehoods of reduction of work, the defendants at MMP and the OHRC demonstrate they intended to breach contract not to mention wrongful interference with contract. The MMP defendants and the commission are attempting to rely on the common law defense of after-acquired cause with the alleged disarray of books which I feel are facts that should have been readily available to me from the outset between March to August 2002 for the defendants to provide me with a progressive discipline process while employed and/or at least include this alleged fact in their January 20th 2003 dismissal letter that I received after my 5 month absence due to injury to health.

    Furthermore, there are cases showing precedent that if the Employer contributes to the incompetence, or the employee’s performance deteriorate because of illness, especially a stress-related one caused by the employer, or the employer fails to give opportunity to respond to allegations of cause the court will consider this factor in determining whether cause for summary dismissal exists. I refer to Casey V. General Inc. (1988), 24 C.C.E.L. 142, 73 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 103 (Nfld. S.C.). This fact in law is also represented in the Human Rights decision in Morrison v. Motsewetsho which the investigation staff is intentionally ignoring: “Sexual harassment may justify an employee’s poor work performance.” This alleged fact of gross incompetence alone is evidence of Bad Faith and unfairness of an employer’s dismissal investigation and the commission’s statutory duty, breach of fairness, aggravated an injury to the plaintiff and therefore magnified the award of damages for mental distress, warrants punitive and now exemplary damages.

    *As well I pleaded fabricating insufficient evidence in several paragraphs throughout the claim which is an allegation of an intent to deceive or to make someone believe what is false equivalent to an allegation of dishonesty sufficient for allegation of Bad Faith per Deep para #65

    Deep para #70 elements of abuse of public office:
    that the defendant is a public officer
    the defendant exercised his/her power as a public officer
    the defendant was acting with malice or improper purpose
    the plaintiff has sufficient legal interest to sue
    there is causal connection between the wrongful exercise of power by the defendant and the plaintiff’s harm
    the plaintiff must prove his/her damages

    Deep para #72: “The plaintiff has failed to plead facts to support his allegations with respect to the defendants’ purported abuses of power. Specifically, he has failed to plead material facts describing the following: which of the defendants has or have committed such abuses; what specific powers were abused; how and when such powers were abused; or that the plaintiff himself was the object of the impugned conduct.”

    Deep para #73: “Moreover, the plaintiff has failed to plead any facts that would support the allegation that the defendants (or any of them acted with malice towards him; with the knowledge that their conduct lacked statutory authority, with the intent to injure him; or with knowledge that their acts would injure the plaintiff.”

    Pg 17 Deep para #78: “The plaintiff has failed to plead any specific facts with respect to any allegations that the predominant purpose for any impugned legal proceeding was improper.”

    Deep para #83: “A claim against a Minister of the Crown is a claim against the Minister personally.”

    Deep para #90: “The plaintiff claims that the General Manager’s decision to suspend payments to him pursuant to the Health Insurance Act violates his rights under s. 7 of the Charter “to life, liberty and security of the person,” because it limits his “right to choose his occupation and where to pursue it”. The plaintiff relies on the decision of the Court of Appeal of British Columbia in Wilson v. British Columbia (Medical Services Commission) (1988), [1989] 2 W.W.R.1., 30 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, 53 D.L.R. (4th) 171, (leave to appeal refused [1988] 2 S.C.R. vii, [1988] S.C.C.A. No. 352).
    *Not same as my pleading
    04 Matter para pleading #32 with grounds of gender and disability perceived and real resulting in last of jobs s. 7 right to not be deprived:
    I plead that my Charter Rights, equal access and benefit of the law, have been violated by the OHRC by their tortious actions with my complaints against the defendants Watts and MMP Limited as per the material facts listed at #36 to #142. The commission process in it self is inconsistent with the Charter. My situation is worsening since filing my first complaint in 2000 and by the addition of tortious actions by commission staff from 2003 onwards. Section 7 states: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Section 15 (1) states: Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. For the past 6 years my right to job security has been violated due to being a woman whistleblower of sexual harassment in the work place and therefore sex discrimination by five employers, four of them in a row. The OHRC’s statutory duty affects the employment contract as they are to make the complainant whole as if the discrimination never occurred. This includes all loss in wages. Therefore, the violation to the charter applies to the commission due to their misfeasance of public office by providing me a sham investigation and fabricating insufficient evidence to not refer my prima facie complaints to the Tribunal where I can recover full loss in wages as if the discrimination had never taken place.

    Deep pg 20 para #97: “Section 15(1) of the Charter provides that “every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination…”. In order to succeed under s. 15 of the Charter, the plaintiff must prove that he has been subjected to differential treatment based on an enumerated or analogous ground and that the differential treatment is discrimination in the sense that it deprives him of his human dignity.
    Deep pg 21 para #98: Although the plaintiff pleads that “no other physician in Ontario was subjected to total withholding of payments”, there is no suggestion that he is being treated any differently from any other doctor who repeatedly violates his or her obligations to cooperate with MRC inspectors under s. 40.2 of the Health Insurance Act.”
    Deep para #99: “Even if the plaintiff were treated differently from other doctors as he has alleged, it is clear that his rights under s. 15 have been been infringed. To infringe his s. 15 rights, that difference in treatment would have to be based on an enumerated or analogous ground, and would have to deprive him of his human dignity. The payments were not suspended, for example, on the facts pleaded, because of his race, ethnic background, gender, citizenship status or any other enumerated or analogous ground.”
    *Unlike my claim for ground of gender and disability perceived and real
    Deep pg 22 para #105: “At paragraph 8 of the statement of claim, the plaintiff alleges that “no other physician in Ontario was subjected to total withholding of payment in these circumstances”. The plaintiff does not in the paragraphs up to and including paragraph 8, allege any particular “circumstances”. In the paragraphs that follow, the plaintiff asserts a number of adverse allegations about the conduct of the defendants. These allegations do not alleged facts that would support a finding that the treatment the plaintiff received was discriminatory in comparison with the treatment received by other persons in similar circumstances to those of the plaintiff.
    *Not same as my case with judicial facts of case law such as Jones, Janzen, Budge V. Thorvaldson Care Homes Ltd. Cited and others

    04 matter para pleading #25;
    . Ms. Waik is supposed to be an expertise in fact-finding and she leaves out of her report submitted to Ms. Meadows-Lee the following material facts for MMP as listed from #36 to #114: my termination letter in direct violation of criminal code 425.1, that exposure to sex picture is automatic breach of code 5 and 7 and proves poisoned work environment under the code,

    04 matter para pleading #32:
    I plead that my Charter Rights, equal access and benefit of the law, have been violated by the OHRC by their tortious actions with my complaints against the defendants Watts and MMP Limited as per the material facts listed at #36 to #142. The commission process in it self is inconsistent with the Charter. My situation is worsening since filing my first complaint in 2000 and by the addition of tortious actions by commission staff from 2003 onwards. Section 7 states: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Section 15 (1) states: Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. For the past 6 years my right to job security has been violated due to being a woman whistleblower of sexual harassment in the work place and therefore sex discrimination by five employers, four of them in a row. The OHRC’s statutory duty affects the employment contract as they are to make the complainant whole as if the discrimination never occurred. This includes all loss in wages. Therefore, the violation to the charter applies to the commission due to their misfeasance of public office by providing me a sham investigation and fabricating insufficient evidence to not refer my prima facie complaints to the Tribunal where I can recover full loss in wages as if the discrimination had never taken place.

    04 Matter para pleading #26 that includes facts of conduct imaging a sham investigation fabricating insufficient evidence and controlling witnesses plus judicial recognized facts of case law to show how I am being treated differently with these other complainants particularly Jones whom the Commission referred to the Tribunal with absolutely no sexual harassment complaints validated by Jone’s respondent whereas I do have Respondents validation/collaboration per MMP, Xentel, and Lyman Complaints:
    I plead that by imaging a sham investigation fabricating insufficient evidence and controlling the witnesses at the employers that Watts interfered with such as MMP the commission demonstrates biase towards Watts and discriminating employers, breach of fairness, and has violated my Charter Rights section 15 (1) of: Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination. Thus fabricating insufficient evidence at MMP will naturally result in fabrication of insufficient evidence at Watts, particularly when the commission only interviewed the managers at MMP who are the other defendants in this suit.

    I used the following arguments in Human Rights in my reconsideration application to convince the Chief Commission to reconsider one of my reprisal complaints against Watts. I did not have anyone make hostile comment of “sucks to be you” to me in my work places till Watts Industries, and than repeating this hostile remark and variations of it in mocking manner at four employers in a row. That in its self is enough of a link to require the commission to do its statutory duty and process the reprisal complaint against Watts. The repeating of ‘sucks to be you” particularly links interference by Watts as this disparaging remark disguised as joke was repeated and variations of it at all of these places of employment after filing a successful Human Rights Complaint against Watts Industries in 2000 where one of the incident involves this specific phrase by Lynn Shea. I refer to the argument in case of Moffatt v. Kinark Child & Family Services (1998), 35 C.H.R.R. D/205 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry): “Section 8 requires an actual or threatened retaliatory act linked to the making of a complaint under the Code. The link can be established in two ways: proof the respondent intended to retaliate or the perception of the complaint, on a “reasonableness” standard.” At MMP the repeating of a variation of the hostile remark “sucks to be you” on top of exposing me to sexual picture, addressing me as “Claude”, Ross Clarke fiddling with his pants in my presence and withholding the sexual harassment policy till August 9th when he uses that policy to intimidate me, Ross Clarke bantering in my presence about another staff caught looking at pornography on his computer, use of double speak to create errors in my work, and lastly Mrs. Page’s bantering the word “delusional” and later alleging I said to her that “people were out to get me” is enough of a retaliatory act linked to the making of the Watts’ complaint under the Code. Not only are these incidents right out of my 2000 complaint proof the respondent retaliated it is the perception of the complainant on a “reasonable” standard.

    I also refer to the case of deSousa v. Gauthier (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 5053, 43 C.H.R.R. D/128, [2002] O.H.R.B.I.D. No. 9 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry); Bryan v. Premark Canada Inc. (November 6, 1998), Doc. 98-18 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry); Elkas v. Blush Stop Inc. (1994), 25 C.H.R.R. D/158 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry): “When the respondent’s treatment of the complainant is partly reprisal for contacting the Commission, there is a breach of section 8.” Therefore Watts’ treatment of the complainant by interfering with her employment relations for filing her 2000 complaint with the phrase “sucks to be you”, address of Claude, and additional exposures to sexual pictures is a breach of section 8. I refer to the case on reprisal of Donaldson v. 463963 Ontario Ltd. (Jan. 14, 1994), No. 83 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry): “The issues under section 8, following a complaint of sexual harassment, are whether the complainant feels threatened by the respondent’s acts and whether she believes the acts constitute an act of retaliation. In this case, the respondent kept contacting the complainant at home after she left her employment with him; a breach of section 8 was found.” In my case, Watts and the other employers interfere with my employment relations by contacting next employer to pass on information in my complaints to get this new employer to repeat the same items that I complain about like the hostile disparaging remark of “sucks to be you.”

    I refer to case of Jones v. Amway of Canada Ltd. (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 1191, 159 O.A.C. 331, 2002 C.L.L.C. 230-030 [2002] O.J. No. 1504 (Ont. Div. Ct.); see also Moffatt v. Kinark Child & Family Services (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 5891, 35 C.H.R.R. D/205 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry) and Bryan v. Premark Canada Inc. (November 6, 1998), Doc. 98-18 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry): “An internal complaint pursuant to the employer’s harassment policy is sufficient to trigger protection under section 8. Moreover, the employee’s right to this protection is not affected by the employer’s rejection of the internal complaint.” Therefore, an external Human Rights Complaint pursuant to the Code is sufficient to trigger protection under section 8. I refer to case of Aboucher v. Toronto (Metro) School Board (No. 3) (1998), 31 C.H.R.R. D/411 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry): “Where the employer discriminates against a job candidate because the candidate has made a human rights complaint against another employer, this constitutes reprisal under section 8.” By repeating items that I complained in my previous complaints is because the candidate has made a human rights complaint against another employer particularly exposure to sexual picture on second day of hire at MMP. Lastly I refer to the following argument from case of Broadfield v. De Havilland/Boeing of Canada Ltd. at #139: “the line of reasoning that underlies this principle begins with the notion of indirect action by an employee which puts the employer in breach of the Code by way of s. 8. The point was made in Fu v. Ontario Government Protection Service (1985), 6 C.H.R.R. D/2797 at D/2800, para. 22922: Where the individual employer himself takes no direct action or discrimination but authorizes, condones, adopts or rectifies an employee’s discrimination, then the employer is himself personally liable for contravening the Code…as it is the employer himself who has infringed or done, directly or indirectly, an act “that infringes a right under this Part” (section 8). Section 8 of the Code says “No person shall infringe or do…anything that infringes a right…” The employer is infringing or doing something by its mere passive inaction of allowing an infringement of a right in the workplace when the employer could rectify the situation. To do nothing can be, in the circumstances, to “do” something that “infringe a right” within the meaning of section 8.” The Commissioner did reconsider based on these and other arguments that I put in my reconsideration application.

    Thus based on the above reprisal cases and material facts that link back to Watts’ 2000 complaint I will also succeed on the civil tort of interference with employment relations. I refer to Ontario Court of Appeal’s guidance on the tort of interference found in case of Reach M.D. Inc. v. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Assn. Of Canada (2003), 17 C.C.L.T. (3d) 149: “To establish the tort of interference with economic relations, the plaintiff must prove: 1) that the defendant intended to injure the plaintiff; 2) that the defendant interfered with the plaintiff’s business by illegal or unlawful means; and 3) as a result, the plaintiff suffered loss. With respect to the first part of the test, the Court held that it was not necessary that the defendant was predominantly motivated in its actions to injure the plaintiff; mere targeting of the plaintiff was sufficient to ground liability.” Mere targeting such as passing information that sexual pictures and the phrase “sucks to be you” annoys me to promote others to harass me with this same phrase again plus sexualizing my work environment is unlawful means and result in financial loss of wrongful termination on January 20th 2003, another loss of proper reference letter, and loss in gross income in 2002.

    04 Matter para pleading #21 (disability discrimination by Crown defendants reason behind discrediting plaintiff’s validated sexual harassment complaints):
    I plead that by not including in the December 2004 case analysis the material fact that Dasha Page in her witness statement to WSIB and her rebuttal to my complaint made comments that I said to her “people were out to get me” after my March 18th meeting regarding Watts passing on slanderous information was bantering of a disability of delusions shows Shannon Meadows-Lee is colluding to protect the conspiracy to injure with permanent delusional disorder Watts campaign. Also, Dasha Page claims she reduced my work and was considering terminating my employment for performance issues in March yet in June’s appraisal meeting she refused to provide me with a list of performance issues where I can improve showing she was not interested in me improving or giving me that opportunity. I infer that these facts were not investigated because they provide adverse outcome to the December 2004 case analysis. This behaviour by the defendant shows she was treating me based on perceived disability less favorably than others and Shannon Meadows-Lee is concealing the evidence and controlling the witnesses to slant this case analysis to protect MMP and ultimately Watts.

    Furthermore, the perceived disability of delusions has to do with the belief of harassment and being persecuted and the fact remains that I was harassed and persecuted to promote these thoughts to give the appearance to authorities that I have this disorder. I provided a copy of the DSM-IV description of this disorder to Dina Waik and therefore the commission should have interviewed all the staff involved in the harassment incidents in my complaint that I requested per material facts listed from #36 to #114: Mrs. Page, Ross Clarke, Karen Tarpos, John Kuzmichuk, Alice Reid, Vincent Julian, Tony Millington, Les Rozahagi, Bill at commercial photo, Kin Lau, Kevin Diamond, Ron Cherubin, Reinhold Schuele, Marguerite of Marchildon Zimmerman Associates, Norma Lawson, and Dave Mancini. The commission only interviewed Dasha Page, Ross Clarke and two other witnesses who may or may not have worked with me during my employment because these individuals would be less than truthful. This exemplifies controlling the witnesses who may provide adverse outcome. Moreover, based on article “Perceived-Disability Discrimination An Often Overlooked But Potentially Problematic Area Of The ADA” the author states: it is important to remember that the focus of any perceived-disability case is on the employer’s perception of an individual’s actual or perceived impairment. I infer that the defendants at MMP’s plus the commission’s perception or imaged perceptions are a perceived impairment. Shannon Meadows-Lee, on behalf of the OHRC, in her own words demonstrates this imaged perception of perceived impairment at #30 “it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position.” I say imaged perception because Shannon Meadows-Lee worked on the next two employers case analysis showing I started part time position on January 10th 2003 (incompetence issue to do with sales not accounting) and full time position on February 10th 2003 (no incompetence issues). I say imaged perception because of comment by Mr. Wharton in Payne v. OHRC of “apparent tendency of Commissioners to follow unquestioningly any staff recommendations.” I received from Mr. Keith Norton, Chief Commissioner his decision in 2005 with standard commission form alleging again insufficient evidence and ignoring evidence I provided him with of no claim of incompetence civilly. Keith Norton’s decision represents abuse of natural justice and common law. Also, this statement at #30 alone represents discrimination by the Ontario Human Rights Commission for perceived disability which leads to refusal of service of doing their statutory duty of proper investigation of the facts and evidence that led to decision to refuse referring my prima facie complaint to the Tribunal.
    ***Also case of Cashin and Ruckpaul are additional proof of differential treatment as the Crown are to investigate all facts and evidences and witnesses and are to provide complainant with their evidence when challenged per breach of natural justice and this includes judicial review judges
    04 Matter para pleading #34 (facts as to my work situation worsening, damages, and dignity injury):
    I plead that I am not your typical target of bullying/mobbing as I do stand up against it to the detriment of my health, my personal relationships, and career stoppage. I expose it every time and I do not reward it with my silence, which is why I am being expulse from the work environment at Watts in 2001, and at Mackay, and 3 additional employers after Mackay in a row, plus receiving obstruction of justice by the commission. I am being seen by these employers and the OHRC as expendable and if I won’t move on of my own volition these employers just invoke their rights as employer to breach the contract for whatever reason they choose to have on that date of expulsion because common law based on law of early Century society says either party can breach the contract at any time. I have been expulse with the following wrongful reasons: constructive dismissal through Human Rights process 2001, Wrongful Dismissal in 2002 with various reasons including gross incompetence with after the fact acquired reason, Wrongful Dismissal in 2003 of incompetence with notice offer after condoning my low sales prior to my request to the commission for complaint forms 2003, Wrongful Dismissal in 2004 for lay off claim of closing division and later shortage of work and later hiring two ex female employees to do work I could be doing, and finally Wrongful dismissal again in 2004 claiming change in business after 3.5 hours of handing my second written complaint to management when offer at interview was promised of full time permanent position. My experience alones shows that the current legal system, in both jurisdiction of the human rights and civil law, is not working to deter these kinds of employment abuses. My experience shows that sexually oriented practices endanger a woman’s job, undermines her job performance and threatens her economic livelihood” still. These employers show that the support, acceptance and collusion surrounding Workplace Bullying is as much a crime against the dignity of working people such as myself as the abuse itself.

    04 Matter Para Pleading #136:
    I plead that the commission’s case analysis is distorted again at #30 of: the evidence does not indicate that the complainant requested any form of accommodation, or indicate to the respondent that her performance issues were related to disability; the evidence indicates that the respondents provided the complainant with further training after extending her probation period, but her performance did not improve; it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position. Shannon omits facts supplied of: that I notified the defendants in August 2002 of my injury to health with my doctor’s note requesting leave of absence due to negative stressors in the work place causing my inability to function at work at my job; that the respondents made no effort to offer of accommodation prior to sending the January 20th termination letter; that I was waiting for a response to my November and December letter for sick pay; that the training was on new duties not old duties; and no written warning notice signed by me of “her performance did not improve”. The facts show that while I was employed Dasha Page requested I contact male coworker, Kenny, who was off on WSIB to request when he might return to work and I expected the same treatment when I was off and there was no such phone call from my employer. The facts and evident that I have contradict Shannon Meadows-Lee’s allegation here that “her performance did not improve” and proves my point of collusion with MMP Limited with injurious falsehoods of gross incompetence to obstruct natural justice of referring my prima facie complaint to the Tribunal and a form of inducing breach of contract and wrongful interference with contractual relationships.
    *Similar facts to successful disability case of Margaretha Willems-Wilson v. Allbright Drycleaners Ltd (1997) prior to Crown’s 2004 case analysis

    04 matter para pleading #133:
    I plead that the commission’s case analysis distort the facts at #28 of: facts that I provided to the commission were not investigated and would fail six elements of the reasonableness test suggested in the Canadian Human Rights decision per case Budge V. Thorvaldson Care Homes Ltd. Cited: (2002), 42 C.H.R.R. D/232 (Man. Bd. Adj.): 1) it is aware that sexual harassment is prohibited conduct (yet Mrs. Page did not know that a joke about a hung penis was sexual in nature showing no investigation of this copulation joke about a hung penis, and the sexual harassment policy was withheld after requesting it in March), 2) a complaint mechanism is in place (yet when I complained to Mrs. Page she did not follow through on this mechanism per their own internal policy, did not document or make notes of the meetings, and the policy was withheld from me after requesting it, and she lies to the WSIB saying I made no complaints, and says to Michelle Spaate at WSIB that I made no complaints because I made none in writing), 3) it acted with alacrity in handling the complaint (no follow up with me after the complaint by Mrs. Page, I received no counseling on their policy, and the harassment policy was withheld from me after requesting it till August 9th after Ross Clarke attempted to intimidate me about not handing him signed copy of sexual harassment policy), 4) it dealt with the matter seriously (Mrs. Page later makes a comment about penis in a crew workbook, plus later a conversation about her breast, plus no writing documentation of my complaint, plus lying to Workers Compensation that I made no complaints and than later admitting I made a complaint but she did not know that a joke about a hung penis was sexual in nature, plus withholding the harassment policy after I requested it), 5) it has met its obligation to provide a healthy work environment (if the environment was healthy I would still be working there and I would have received a copy of the harassment policy as requested, and Mrs. Page would have provided me with memo to inform the complainant and would not need to lie in her August 20th letter to WSIB), and 6) it met its obligation to inform the complainant of its response (absolutely no written notice by Mrs. Page after I made my complaint to avoid any evidence I made complaints except for receiving my supervisor’s statement from the workers’ compensation investigation and copy of her August 20th letter, and my employment is terminated after I blow the whistle on their illegal behaviour with the WSIB and Employment Standards). Mackay fails this test. Shannon omits the fact that I presented the above argument of this failed test to the commission in my rebuttal to MMP’s rebuttal in her case analysis along with my argument from Workplaceca on a progressive discipline process. Shannon was not going to provide copy of my rebuttal along with my evidence to be presented to the commissioner for the commissioner to make an inform decision of my complaint.

    04 Matter para Pleadings #134:
    I plead that the facts that were not investigated by the commission plus the facts that were investigated clearly shows discrimination based on sexual harassment and sex per Janzen et al v. Platy Enterprises Ltd.: Sexual harassment in the workplace may be broadly defined as unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that detrimentally affects the work environment or leads to adverse job-related consequences for the victims; it is an abuse of both economic and sexual power; sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination within s. 6(1) of the Human Rights Act. The fact not investigated by the commission are: that Kin Lau came very close to having his lap in my face which is sexual to me, and that Dasha and Kin Lau attempted to entrap me into a leering of Kin Lau’s lap to charge me with leering. The commission did not investigate per the case analysis a very important material fact that Ross Clarke’s used the sexual harassment policy to intimidate me on August 9th, 2002, and he came to my desk angry because I did not give him signed copy of the policy when management refused to provide me with a copy, and after this conversation he gives me a copy to type in the computer but does not bother to ask for his signed copy again. The facts are that comments of “penis joke in crew book”, “breast enlarge due to pregnancy”, “so you don’t want any sex”, “can’t say ass” on top of Ross Clarke’s behaviour on August 9th do have a sexual meaning and/or is evidence of poison work environment because it annoys me and therefore discrimination. The commission omitted these items to protect MMP and Watts from exposure of wrongdoing which is obstruction of justice.

    04 Matter para Pleading #135 (differential treatment per legal doctrine of progressive discipline process requirements):
    I plead that the commission’s case analysis distort the facts at #29 of: there is insufficient evidence to indicate that the complainant was treated unequally or subjected to harassment in the workplace because of her disability; it does not appear that the respondents exaggerated the complainant’s performance issues because she had or was perceived to have a disability; there is insufficient evidence regarding the allegation that the respondents knew about her disability, conspired with staff from Company B or treated her in a discriminatory fashion when she was off on sick leave. Shannon omits the following facts in her case analysis for obvious reasons of: March 18th I made complaint that Watts passed on slanderous information and I am receiving the same tactics; Dasha distorts my words to a delusional bantering of “people out to get me”; that she advises the commission that my behaviour was bizarre and they had performance issues to warrant dismissal before my 3-mth performance review; I requested in June letter for list of areas where I can improve to protect my performance of allegations of gross incompetence and none was supplied in writing contradicting that there was performance issues prior to 3-mth probation; I received $1.00 raise at my 3-mth probation to match Marshall’s hourly rate; my August 7th email from Karen Tarpos of June’s Month End duties and training on Thursday night; January 20th 2003 termination letter for cause to be WSIB claim denied and my allegations of poisoned work environment not substantiated and no mentioned of any incompetence issue; and the defendants allege gross incompetence for summary dismissal with cause only in the jurisdiction of the Ontario Human Rights but do not use this defense in their statement of defenses civilly. Shannon intentionally omits my cross examination remarks in my rebuttal of: I refer to the article at Workplace.Ca on Criteria for an employer to prove an employee Incompetence: the adjudicator noted the requisites for an employer to build a case for innocent incompetence as follows: the employer must define the level of job performance required; the employer must establish that the standard expected was communicated to the employees; the employer must show it gave reasonable supervision and instruction to the employee and that it afforded the employee a reasonable opportunity to meet the standard; the employee must establish inability on the part of the employee to meet the requisites standards to an extent that renders him incapable of performing the job and that reasonable efforts were made to find alternative employment within the competence of the employee; the employer must prove that reasonable warnings were given to the employee that a failure to meet the standard could result in dismissal; that Mackay fails this requisite for an employer to build a case for incompetence.

  32. Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21 Ontario Court of Appeal file Appeal C50990 for September 22nd 2010

    Deep v. Ontario (2005) appeal pg 3 para #5:
    “The appellant appeals the motion judge’s decision. In our view, the appeal must fail. The motion judge wrote careful and comprehensive reasons (154 paragraphs) dealing with all of the issues, including procedural issues relating to Rules 20, 21 and 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and substantive issues raised by the appellant and both sets of respondents. We explicitly record our agreement with the motion judge’s reasoning, which we regards as sound, and with his dispositions of the three motions.”
    ***Not same as my appeal:
    1) Justice Lofchik making no references to any pleadings in my two claims therefore ignoring substantive issues raised by appellant,
    2) Refusing to accept Employment Human Rights complaints and HR case analyses reports facts for all torts pleaded which is all I need to prove they abused their job and their job was to investigate all of these facts fairly and without bias, and provides no legal authority to ignore these facts completely
    3) Justice Lofchik acknowledges I pleaded “facts of the Employer events” with “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigations” and this counters his other arguments that there are no facts or that I pleaded negligence or that I have not pleaded cause of action
    4) no analysis in endorsement record of issue of two torts pleading: tort of deceit and constitutional tort
    5) breach of rule of law and stare decisis of all complainants authorities that invalidate the Crown’s authorities relied upon in endorsement record
    6) no analysis of intentional torts listed in his endorsement records with elements and showing where pleadings are deficient when Justice Lofchick admits “I pleaded they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation” and “apart from the facts of employment events” and he is allowing me amend claims against employer who are joint tortfeasors with Crown for Conspiracy and defamation
    7) Defamation/libel tort made out per SCC Botiuk and Hill, and per Deep para #46 pleading sufficient facts of what I feel is defamatory to discredit my character by reader of the case analysis and proven fact per Mr. Norton’s Report and Judicial Review appeals of fabrication of incompetence and insufficient evidence of sexual harassment, discrimination and reprisal, and Crown defendants do not provide this Court with an argument or case law to counter SCC Botiuk and Hill in their submissions, and Crown defendants have pleaded in defence that they acted in good faith nor request the complainant to provide particulars of the defamation
    8) Intentional Inflection of Emotional Distress Tort and Misfeasance of Public Office made out per the requirements in SCC case of Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse
    pg 16 para 40: “In the defendant officers’ submission, the essence of the plaintiffs’ claim is that they were deprived of a thorough, competent and credible investigation. And owing to the fact that no individual has a private right to a thorough, competent and credible criminal investigation the plaintiffs have suffered no compensable damages. If this were an accurate assessment of the plaintiffs’ claim, I would agree. Individual citizens might desire a thorough investigation, or even that the investigation result in a certain outcome, but they are not entitled to compensation in the absence of a thorough investigation or if the desired outcome fails to materialize. This, however, is not an accurate assessment of the plaintiffs’ submission. In their statement of claim, the plaintiffs also allege that they have suffered physically, psychologically and emotionally, in the form of mental distress, anger, depression and anxiety as a direct result of the defendant officers’ failure to cooperate with the SIU.”

    Para #41: “Consequently, even if the plaintiffs could prove that they had suffered psychiatric damage, in the form of anxiety or depression, they still would have to prove both that it was caused by the alleged misconduct and that it was of sufficient magnitude to warrant compensation. But the causation and magnitude of psychiatric damage are matters to be determined at trial. At the pleading stage, it is sufficient that the statement of claim alleges that the plaintiffs have suffered mental distress, anger, depression and anxiety as a consequence of the alleged misconduct.”
    Para #42: In the final analysis, I would allow the appeal in respect of the actions for misfeasance in a public office. If the facts are taken as pleaded, it is not plain and obvious that the actions for misfeasance in a public office against the defendant officers and the Chief must fail.”
    ***Justice Lofchik errored in relying on this SCC case para #40 for a criminal investigation not Charter investigation that I do not have a right to thorough investigation in a Human Rights jurisdiction per Judicial Reviews of Cashin and Ruckpaul I do have a legal right of every fact and evidence being properly investigated and noted in case reports, and therefore the tort of Misfeasance of Public office per this case is made out per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement comments I pleaded “they acted deliberatedly with the quality of the investigation” and that I pleaded facts that were investigated with his comment “apart from the facts of the employment events”
    ***Per this case Justice Lofchik errored in refusing to accept facts as pleaded of Employer Human Rights complaints and investigation reports per his endorsement comments “apart from the facts of the employer events there is no facts” ignoring issue I pleaded sufficient facts for all torts per the employment human rights complaints and case analysis reports facts
    *** “And owing to the fact that no individual has a private right to a thorough, competent and credible criminal investigation the plaintiffs have suffered no compensable damages”. Not same for human rights jurisdictions as there are compensable damages because the Code requires the commission to make the complainant whole who have prima facie complaints made out by a thorough investigation of every fact per Ruckpaul Federal Court Judicial Review, plus letting complainant see the specific of their investigation evidence of incompetency of the disarray of books (a generalized bald statement)
    9) no comprehensive analysis on tort of negligence per Odhavji case pg 17 -23 paras 45 to 72

    Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse
    Pg 3
    “The officers’ alleged failure to cooperate with the SIU investigation and the Chief’s alleged failure to ensure that they did cooperate both constitute unlawful breaches of statutory duties under the Police Services Act. The allegation that the officers’ acts and omissions “represented intentional breaches of their legal duties as police officers” satisfies the requirement that the officers were aware that their conduct was unlawful and that it was intentional and deliberate. The allegation that the Chief deliberately failed to segregate the officers satisfies the requirement that he intentionally breached his legal obligation to ensure compliance with the Police Services Act. However, the same cannot be said of his alleged failures to ensure that the officers produced timely and complete notes, attended interviews, and provided accurate and complete accounts. A mere failure to discharge obligations of an office cannot constitute misfeasance in a public office and the plaintiffs must prove the failures were deliberate. The allegation that the officers and the Chief “ought to have known” that their misconduct would cause the plaintiffs to suffer must be struck from the statement of claim because misfeasance in a public office is an intentional tort requiring subjective awareness that harm to the plaintiff is a likely consequence of the alleged misconduct. Lastly, at the pleading stage, it is sufficient with respect to damages that the statement of claim alleges mental distress, anger, depression and anxiety as a consequence of the alleged misconduct, but the plaintiffs will have to prove at trial that the alleged misconduct caused anxiety or depression of sufficient magnitude to warrant compensation.
    ***My claim made out since Justice Lofchik states in endorsement record I pleaded “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation” and no pleading of “ought ot have known”

    Pg 10 para 18 Ashby v. White (1703) – officer who maliciously and fraudulently deprived Mr. White of the right to vote
    ***Similar to my allegations of tort of deceit – Crown Defendants’ fraudulently misrepresentation of a fair and proper investigation when there was no fair and proper and unbias investigation and also J. Reviews and Appeals with MAG and Queen continuing the cause of action additional facts to be added to claim (per Wilson case and my facts accepting unreliable evidence from Mrs. Page and Mr. Clark, and absolutely no interview of any witnesses, respondents or sexual harassers for Xentel and Lyman complaints)

    pg 11 para 19: Roncarelli – the tort is not restricted to the abuse of a statutory or prerogative power actually held.
    *Crown defendants applying the Code without authority of preamble and s. 36 for 4 prima facie complaints with prima fact of exsposure to sex picture at 3 places of employment allegedly investigated under section 36 of the code not section 34 per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record and Crown’s appeal factum

    para 20: Northern Territory of Australia v. Mengel (1995) – “Any act or omission done or made by a public official in the purported performance of the functions of the office can found an action for misfeasance in public office.

    Garrett v. Attorney-General , [1997] 2 N.Z.L.R.332, the Court of Appeal for New Zealand considered an allegation that a sergeant failed to investigate properly the plaintiff’s claim that she had been sexually assaulted by a police constable. Blanchard J. concluded, at p. 344, that the tort can be committed “by an official who acts or omits to act in breach of duty knowing about the breach and also knowing harm or loss is thereby likely to be occasioned to the plaintiff.
    ***Similar to my claim and pleadings no investigation interview of sexual harassers or my witnesses for the Crown’s bald conclusion of insufficient evidence of discrimination and retaliation by Watts

    Pg 11/12 para 21: Three Rivers Disctrict Council v. Bank of England (No. 3), [2000]
    “the House of Lords concluded that “the tort can be constituted by an omission by a public officer as well as by acts on his part”

    pg 12 para 23: “In each instance, the tort involves deliberate disregard of official duty coupled with knowledge that the misconduct is likely to injure the plaintiff”

    para 24: “that a failure to act can amount to misfeasance in a public office, but only in those circumstances in which the public office is under a legal obligation to act”

    “If there is a legal duty to act and the decision not to act amounts to an unlawful breach of that legal duty, the omission can amount to misfeasance [in a public office].”
    ***Same as my claim there is a legal duty to investigate fairly, and thoroughly and without bias every fact and evidence supplied by both parties not just one side being the Respondents per Ruckpaul, Cashin, and Lewis Federal and BC Judicial Review Courts (and only one Human Rights Statutes so Ontario has to accept and follow the ruling of these federal cases per argument in Ontario Human Rights Code Book in my appeal books)

    Pg 12/13 para 25:
    (i) an intentional illegal act; and (ii) an intent to harm an individual or class of individuals.”

    “where a public officer is shown either to have exercised power for the specific purpose of injuring the plaintiff (i.e. to have acted in “bad faith in the sense of the exercise of public power for an improper or ulterior motive”) or to have acted “unlawfully with a mind of reckless indifference to the illegality of his act” and to the probability of injury to the plaintiff.”

    Pg 13 para 26:
    “to prevent the deliberate injuring of members of the public by deliberate disregard of official duty”

    “legal system based on the rule of law executive or administrative power ‘may be exercised only for the public good’ and not for ulterior and improver purposes”

    “a public officer who could have discharged his or her public obligations, yet willfully chose to do otherwise”

    Pg. 14 para 31: R. v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 205, in which the Court established that the nominate tort of statutory breach does not exist. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool states only that it is insufficient that the defendant has breached the statute. It does not, however, establish that the breach of a statute cannot give rise to liability if the constituent elements of tortious responsibility have been satisfied. Put a different way, the mere fact that the alleged misconduct also constitutes a breach of statute is insufficient to exempt the officer from civil liability. Just as a public officer who breaches a statute might be liable for negligence, so too might a public officer who breaches a statute be liable for misfeasance of a public office. Sasketchewan Wheat Pool would only be relevant to this motion if the appellants had pleaded no more than a failure to discharge a statutory obligation. This, however, is not the case. The principle established in Saskatchewan Wheat Pool has no bearing on the outcome on this appeal.
    ***same applies to my claim with 6 intentional torts including defamation and conspiracy with employers to discredit the complainant to unlawfully refuse to do their statutory duty

    Pg 14 para 32: To summarize, I am of the opinion that the tort of misfeasance in a public office is an intentional tort whose distinguishing elements are twofold: (i) deliberate unlawful conduct in the exercise of public functions; and (ii) awareness that the conduct is unlawful and likely to injure the plaintiff. Alongside deliberate unlawful conduct and the requisite knowledge, a plaintiff must also prove other requirements common to all torts. More specifically [page 287] the plaintiff must prove that the tortious conduct was the legal cause of his or her injuries, and that injuries suffered are compensable in tort law.

    Pg 16 para 40:
    “And owing to the fact that no individual has a private right to a thorough, competent and credible criminal investigation the plaintiff have suffered no compensable damages”

    “Individual citizens might desire a thorough investigation, or even that the investigation result in a certain outcome, but they are not entitled to compensation in the absence of a thorough investigation or if the desired outcome fails to materialize”
    ***This may be so for criminal courts jurisdiction but not true for human rights jurisdiction where complainants are entitled to thorough investigation of every fact in human rights complaints per Ruckpaul and Cashin Federal Court Judicial Review cases (additional evidence that in Ontario the Crown/MAG is intentionally misapplying the Code), and complainants are entitled compensation of damage of making them whole per the Code when Crown intentionally does no thorough investigation of every fact in complainants with fundamental omissions of no complainant’s witnesses interviewed or all sexual harassers interviewed only interviewing Mrs. Page with proven bad faith conduct per Wallace SCC case with termination letter, and leaving out of report prima facie facts from respondences validated complaint that proves that their action was based on one of the grounds, and accepting proven unreliable and bad faith witness evidence from Mrs. Page and Mr. Clarke at MMP

    pg 16/17 para 41: “At the pleadings stage, it is sufficient that the statement of claim alleges that the plaintiffs have suffered mental distress, anger, depression and anxiety as a consequence of the alleged misconduct.”
    04 Claim:
    Para 6 (emotional distress with Watts collusion)
    Para 12 (This passing on items that annoys me is in the form of practical joker passing around
    sladerous information for the purpose of malice to wear me down emotionally and is the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. I refer to Wilkinson v. Downtown where one joke induced a state of nervous shock and prolonged mental and physical suffering Why not it worked from 1998 to 2001 and landed me in the psych ward with suicide attempt in June 2001 and a misdiagnosis of delusional disorder so lets do it again. Anger is a symptom of depression and so by daily repeating items in my 2000 complaint and creating new tactics to annoy me and to provoke my anger or an emotional knee jerk reaction the MMP defendants demonstrates premeditation to injure me. At Mackay it worked and only took 5 months as per the material facts listed from #36 to #114 to reopen this injurious psychiatric wound to reach reactive depression levels again with overwhelming anger and anxiety, loss of appetite and weight, suicide ideation and attempt and hospitalization in August 2002.) ( This misdiagnosis is evidence of my emotional distress as a result of harassment at MMP per the material facts listed from #36 to #114.)
    Para 13:
    This defamation of my character by defendants Watts and MMP with the commission resulted in the December 2004 case analysis from Shannon Meadows-Lee of the investigation department of the OHRC with many injurious falsehoods that are easily disputed to obstruct natural justice of referring my prima facie complaints against MMP and Watts to the Tribunal, and later refusal to refer decision by Chief Commissioner Keith Norton. These case analysis also represents the commission’s misfeasance of public office and other tortious actions such as deceit, defamation, conspiracy to injure, intentional emotional distress (acting on their knowledge of my injury to health vulnerability), injurious falsehoods; and criminal action of obstruction of justice, accessory after the fact, adding and abetting, concealing my evidence, and controlling witnesses to avoid adverse outcome. ) ( material facts from #2 to #134)
    Para 24:
    Shannon Meadows-Lee from the commission claims there is evidence to support gross incompetence to refuse referral to the Tribunal and without this excuse for my termination she would have no choice but to refer my prima facie complaint to the Tribunal. Ms. Meadows-Lee conceals the material fact of my termination letter as she makes no mention of it in the case analysis for MMP and my termination letter is in direct violation of criminal code 425.1 which is strong evidence of reprisal. By doing so, Ms. Meadows-Lee is going against natural justice and common law. In addition, Shannon Meadows-Lee slanted the case analysis at #30 to discredit me with mental illness being the cause for my alleged incompetence with her comment of “it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position.” By making this statement Shannon Meadows-Lee over stepped the boundaries of her duties and willfully misrepresented the facts to do harm to discredit the complainant with the commissioner reading her decision, with the judge in my civil suit reading her case analyses, and this demonstrates improper purpose. She is well aware that I commenced part time position on January 10th 2003 and full time position on February 10th 2003, and that I worked both till September 15th 2003. There was no allegation at fourth employer of gross incompetence in accounting duties and I worked there for 13 months. She wrote up the case analysis for these two employers as well.

    These case analyses by the commission staff causes remedies that I am now seeking with regards to MMP Limited, additional defamation by Watts. I seek remedies against the commission investigation staff, the commission and the Ministry of Attorney General for: misfeasance of public office, injurious falsehoods, deceit, conspiracy to injure, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and inducement of breach of contract with false allegations of gross incompetence.
    ***Typo error Ministry s/b Minister per title in heading of claim on first page which clearly says Minister of Attorney General

    Para 142:
    As a result of the Defendants’ lack of conscience, continuous deceit to cover up their wrongdoing, and ruthless conduct, I lost my jobs; my once perfect health record destroyed causing stigmatism and further similar abuses, and refusal of future insurance benefits due to injury to health (depression); lost of skill utilization for future advancements; lost of job references; required to take medication in order to work to reduce condition caused by additional mobbing behaviour to mitigate further injury into reactive depression and suicide ideation; a good standard of living and loss of reputation of my good name.

    Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress:
    I plead that the acts and omissions of the Defendants noted above were calculated to cause me serious anguish and to suffer in the form of distress, anxiety, depression, hypervigilence and insomnia to induce permanent delusional disorder as a direct consequences of the Defendants conduct noted above and therefore I am entitled to damages. I plead that the Defendants’ conduct was cold, calculated, arrogant, malicious, reckless, vindictive, ruthless, dishonest, without conscious, premeditated, systematic and reprehensible and deserving of the Court’s censure. I plead that I have made reasonable attempts to mitigate my damages and that in the course of mitigating damages I have incurred expenses, the full particulars of which I will undertake to provide to the Defendants prior to trial.

    Canada Cement Lafarge Ltd. V. British Columbia Lightweight Aggregate Ltd.
    SCC 1983

    Pg 2 “The tort of conspiracy exists: (1) if the predominant purpose of defendant’s conduct is to cause plaintiff injury, whether or not defendants’ means were lawful; or (2) where defendants’ conduct is unlawful and directed towards the plaintiff (alone or with others) and in circumstances that the defendants should know that injury to the plaintiff is likely to, and does, result—notwithstanding the fact that the predominant purpose of defendants’ conduct be not necessary to cause injury to the plaintiff.”
    ***As in my situation that the Crown’s conduct of unfair investigation of bias selected unreliable heresay alleged evidence by only respondents Mrs. Page and Mr. Clarke with proven unreliable Bad Faith evidence per Wallace SCC case per termination retaliatory discharge of WSIB denied allegations of poisoned work environment not substantiated (reprisal per Code ignored by Crown and not in case analysis and is fundamental omissions) and later changing reasons for termination 4 more times, plus refusing to accept collaborated facts and evidence supplied by complainant and refusing to interview any of her witnesses plus all the sexual harassers not just Mrs. Page, and leaving out of Xentel’s and Lyman’s case analysis all sexual validated incidents and internal complaints, refusal to interview any harassers repeating Watts Industries items in their 2001 HR Complaint to show reprisal except for Mrs. Page with her unreliability and proven Bad Faith, and breach of natural justice by refusing to provide the specifics of their alleged evidence of disarray of books for complainant to defend her complaint properly. The predominant purpose of this conduct plus continuing the fabrication by Minister of Attorney General of Ontario Micheal Bryant and current one through Judicial Review and Appeal Courts and now Justice Lofchik’s Rule 21 dismissal of Crown Defendants is to cause plaintiff injury and this conduct is unlawful not allowed per Code, Charter, UN Treaty, Federal Court Judicial Review cases of Cashin and Ruckpaul. The defendants arrogantly know that injury to the plaintiff has resulted.

    Pg 4 “tort of conspiracy both elements: (a) the intent to injure the plaintiff; and, (b) the agreement to employ unlawful means.”

    “(a) the tort of conspiracy requires ‘the predominant objective of injury to the plaintiff’

    Pg 9 “it is only acts done in execution of the agreement that are capable of doing that. So the tort, unlike the crime, consists not of agreement but of concerted action taken pursuant to agreement.”

    Pg 10 “where the predominant purpose of the conspiracy is to injure the plaintiff and damage in fact results. Thus the concerted action to give effect to the intent completes the tort, and if an unlawful object is necessary (assuming damages have been suffered by the plaintiff), it is but the object to injure the plaintiff.”

    “A combination of two or more persons willfully to injure a man in his trade is unlawful and, if it results in damage to him, is actionable.”
    ***In my case the Crown’s conduct of refusal to refer 4 prima facie complaints due to unlawful investigation and reports and judicial reviews/appeals and now Justice Lofchik’s unlawful Rule 21 order is willfully to injure me in trade/employment and refusal to make me whole as if the discrimination had never occurred, instead the Crown have discriminated against me and rewarded discriminators and contributed to ruin accounting career stoppage.

    Pg 11 “A second form of actionable conspiracy exists when two or more combine to injure a third person by unlawful means –e.g. the commission of a crime or tort, or the infringement of a guaranteed constitutional right…In such a case it is irrelevant that the object of the conspirators in using those means may be legitimate. Combinations of this kind must be contrasted with what might be called “Quinn v. Leathem conspiracies,” where the means are legitimate but the object is not…Hence a conspiracy may be actionable if either the end or the means, or both, are unlawful.”
    ***Like an alleged private Crown investigation with refusal to provide the complainant their evidence because there is none, and no proof an investigation of the respondents took place other than the Crown’s word they did an investigation. An investigation where the Crown agrees to protect the discriminating employer defendants by only alleged interview for MMP Complaint Mrs. Page, Mr. Clark and 2 others who did not work for me nor reveal their alleged names plus their witness statement to complainant per Ruckpaul Judicial Review Federal case, refusal to provide specifics of disarray of books breaching natural justice, not interviewing any respondents at Xentel and Lyman, not interviewing any witnesses for complainant, not interviewing in 3 companies with more than 40 sexual harassment incidents combine any sexual harassers but Mrs. Page with proven Bad Faith unreliability evidence, accepting only unreliable and heresay evidence from respondents and mainly from their rebuttal not personal interviews particularly with Xentel and Lyman complaints, leaving out of reports prima facie collaborated sexual and disability facts and evidences, etc. This per Misfeasance of Public Office is sufficient omissions and actions of fundamental nature per Cashin and Ruckpaul Federal Court Judicial Review case of abuse of office. Neither the Crown nor Justice Lofchik provided me with a case law of Ontario Judicial Review Courts of complainants’ section 36 dismissed complaints after an investigation to show that they are allowed to do the type of investigation I received. Instead the Crown and Justice Lofchik are relying on two section 34 Ontario Judicial Review dismissed complaints a process before an investigation which is an illegitimate legal argument and shows the Crown is intentionally and arrogantly acting without authority of the Code.

    Pg 12 “Therein, [1960] S.C.R. 265, and Gagnon v. Foundation Maritime Limited, [1961] S.C.R. 435, in support of its submission that once the unlawfulness of the means has been established, an enquiry into the predominant object of the conspiracy, that is an intent to injure, is unnecessary.”

    “In light of these observations, it becomes unnecessary to embark upon the difficult exercise of determining whether or not a breach of s. 22(1) of the Labour Relations Act gives rise to a statutory cause of action because when inquiry is “made of the statute law” in the present case it discloses, as has been said, that the means here employed by the appellants were prohibited, and this of itself supplies the ingredient necessary to change a lawful agreement which would not give rise to a cause of action into a tortious conspiracy, the carrying out of which exposes the conspirators to an action for damages if any ensue therefrom.”
    ***Defamation and discrimination are both unlawful conduct by Crown is prohibited and unlawful which changes a lawful agreement into a tortious one and proof of that is injurious falsehoods of incompetency ignoring $1.00 raise and notice given proving no incompetency not allowed per common/employment law, and discrimination per case analysis #30 discriminatory and libelous opinion by Crown of “it appears she would be unfit to work had she return”. Per Trial Case of Chahal ignored by Justice Lofchik with no analysis in his one sided endorsement record the alleged investigation meeting and reports and conduct of continuing the fabrication of incompetence and insufficient evidence of discrimination is all tortious conduct of conspiracy and to do so into 2010 is a continuing cause of action

    “A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means.”

    Pg 13 “Where the acts agreed on and done are in themselves lawful then, even if their doing damnified the plaintiff, no action of conspiracy will lie unless the object of the conspirators was to injure the plaintiff. If this was the object, then the acts become unlawful. The subject of inquiry is lawfulness or unlawfulness.”
    ***Now per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record and the Crown’s factum arguments I can prove that their acts were not lawful for dismissing 4 prima facie complaints under section 36 with a section 34 before investigation legal argument, plus all my arguments in appeal factum #6 including violating, ignoring and acting for a reason and purpose foreign to the purpose of the statute/Code at preamble and section 29 to eliminate all forms of discrimination that includes as high as the Charter and UN Treaty per the Code. Lawful behaviour would be caring out the statute according to its intent and purpose; it means good faith in acting with a rational appreciation of that intent and purpose and not with an improper intent and alian purpose.” Nowhere in Justice Lofchik’s or Crown’s submissions do they show any appreciation of the intent and purpose of the Code’s preamble “everyone is equal” and section 29 to eliminate all discrimination for everyone in Ontario is equal and they continue to repeat their discriminatory discretionary right to treat complainants unequally.

    “But suppose that the acts agreed on and done are not lawful acts, but are unlawful acts. Is an inquiry into the object of the conspiracy then necessary? I think not. The unlawfulness of the acts has been established, it is inherent in the nature of the acts, and an inquiry into their purpose becomes superfluous. The requirements of Willes J.’s definition have been fully complied with.
    ***Per my pleadings “quality of investigation” is unlawful conduct with predominant purpose to injure the plaintiff with fabrication of insufficient evidence for tribunal referral and facts of not interviewing my witnesses and the sexual harassers except Mrs. Page with her proven bad faith and unreliable witness statements proves this conclusion

    ”(1) whether the means used by the defendants are lawful or unlawful, the predominant purpose of the defendants’ conduct is to cause injury to the plaintiff; or,
    (2) where the conduct of the defendants is unlawful, the conduct is directed towards the plaintiff (alone or together with others), and the defendants should know in the circumstances that injury to the plaintiff is likely to and does result.”

    “The Court of Appeal does not appear to oppose the view that the tort conspiracy is confirmed to conduct where there is a real or constructive intent to injure the plaintiff. On the facts in these proceedings, the Court found such an intent, probably in constructive form, to be present, and concluded at p. 89 that: the plaintiff was a competitor of the defendants…It is idle, in the light of these facts, to suggest that the plaintiff was not one of the targets of the conspiracy.”
    ***Same applies to my case that the plaintiff had her complaints investigated by Crown defendants and it is idle in light of these facts to suggest that I was not one of the target of conspiracy
    Pg 17 “It seems to me, however, for reasons already given, that the conclusions are not based upon findings of fact, but in part upon an error in law as to the necessary elements for an action for conspiracy to injure, as well as errors in law relating to causation and remoteness, and the proper consequence of unlawful activity on the part of the defendants.”
    ***Therefore my appeal also should be granted as Justice Lofchik intentionally ignores employment human rights facts per his endorsement record of “apart from the employment facts there are no facts” and only lists the intentional torts pleaded in claim without any reference of pleading paragraphs like other Rule 21 reports and errors in laws by making no analysis as to the necessary elements for an action for conspiracy and other torts, no relating to causation and remoteness, or proper consequence of unlawful activity, and absolutely no reference to two intentional torts pleaded being tort of deceit and constitutional tort

    D.G. Jewelry Inc. v. Cyberdiam Canada Ltd. 2002
    Arbitration-agreement to arbitrate- validity of agreement- stay of proceedings- striking out pleadings

    Pg 7 para 32: “The pleadings in an action for conspiracy must include particulars of: the parties and their relationship; an agreement to conspire; the precise purpose or objects of the alleged conspiracy; the overt acts which are alleged to have been done by each of the conspirators; and the injury and particulars of the special damage suffered by the plaintiffs by reason of the conspiracy.

    Pg 8 para 34: “Finally, the plaintiffs lump all the defendants together and fail to particularize the claim against each individual in their claim for conspiracy to cause a breach of the employment contracts.”

    Para 35: There is no allegation of an agreement to conspire. The plaintiffs claim that an agreement is implicit by their pleadings that the defendants “conspired to” take certain actions. (Paragraph 17 of the Statement of Claim). This assertion, however, is, in my view, pleading the conclusion.
    ***Unlike my claim which pleads facts of conduct of Crown leaving out prima facie facts and evidence out of reports and including libelous/discriminatory comment in MMP’s report at #30 and Justice Lofchik in his endorsement record makes no reference to para in statement of claim like this judge too!

    Pg 11 para 51: “The question of “who did what to whom” cannot be readily discerned from the pleadings, and as such, the pleadings do not allow the defendants to know the case to be met.”
    ***Not same as mine which clearly says the Crown defendants/who intentional did unlawful investigation of facts and evidence or no investigation at all just wrote up bias and unfair reports leaving out prima facie facts and evidence not allowed to discredit complainant/what and the to whom is me the plaintiff.

    Para 52: “it may be that the claims that remain can be reframed so as to comply with the principles of pleadings discussed above.”

    Hobson v. Canada (Attorney General) 1998
    Claim was statute barred and not saved by discoverability rule

    Pg 9 para 25: “I have culled the following particulars from the amended statement of claim which, for purposes of proceeding with this motion, must be deemed to be true and proven: (list 14 para from statement of claim pg 9 and 10)

    Pg 10/11: “Fittingly, the courts are reluctant to prevent a plaintiff from having his or her day in court. Over the years, the courts have established some general principles with respect to statements of claim and Rule 21 motions. These may be synthesized as follows:
    1) The statement of claim must disclose a cause of action found in law;
    2) The test which the plaintiff must meet is a very low one;
    3) The material facts pleaded are to be taken as true unless they are patently ridiculous or incapable of proof;
    4) The statement of claim is to be read generously with allowances for inadequacies due to drafting deficiencies;
    5) It does not matter that the allegations are serious or that the case appears hopeless;
    6) The length and complexity of the issues are irrevelant to the issue of whether a cause of action exists;
    7) If the cause of action is founded in law, it is irrelevant that the cause of action is novel; indeed, at this stage of the proceedings, the court should not dispose of matters of law that are not fully settled in the jurisprudence;
    8) It does not matter whether the defendant has a very strong defence.
    ***Justice Lofchik forgot these general principles particularly the plaintiff must meet is a very low one when he is allowing me to amend my claims against the employer defendants but not the Crown defendants when I have pleaded joint tortfeasor torts such as conspiracy and defamation!

    Para 28: “The tort of intentional infliction of nervous shock requires an overt act or statement by the defendants which must be calculated to produce harm and which actually does cause harm consisting of a recognized psychiatric illness and not merely mental distress. The act or statement must be “extreme”, “flagrant”, “outrageous” or “beyond mere insult”: Wilkinson v. Downtown, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57 (Eng. O.B.); Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99 (S.C.C.); Rahemtulla v. Vanfed Credit Union (1984), 29 C.C.L.T. 78 (B.C.S.C.)
    ***Per Crown’s authority of Odhavji SCC case 2003 an improper investigation as an act is sufficient as an overt act or statement to cause intentional infliction of nervous shock therefore I have met the requirements plus even more so since it was known to Crown Defendants that I was hospitalized after second suicide attempt, misdiagnosed delusional and diagnosed correctly with anxiety with depress disorder and on medication prior to receiving 4 section 36 case analysis with intentional injurious falsehoods that is differential treatment from other complainants who are sexually harass in the workplace to cause an additional injury and/or seriously delay the recovery from this anxiety depression suffered

    pg 15 para 59: “The defendants submit that the plaintiff complains of acts which are immune from civil liability. While at common law, the Crown cannot be liable for a tort, the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act modifies that common law. Under that Act, if a Crown servant would be personally liable to the plaintiff for a tort, then the Crown is vicariously liable. Absent the liability of a Crown servant, the Crown retains the common law right to immunity: see s. 3 and s. 10; see also the discussion by Rosenberg, J.A. in Al’s Steak House and Tavern Inc., supra.

    Amertek Inc. et al v. Canadian Commercial Corporation et al 2005
    Torts – Deceit

    Para 63: The trial judge, relying on Derry v. Peek (1889), 14 App. Cas. 337, [1886-90] All E.R. Rep. I (H.L.), and Lewis N. Klar et al., Remedies in Tort, vol. I, looseleaf (Scarborough: Carswell, 1987), at 5-11 and 5-14, correctly set out the elements of the tort of deceit:
    (a) the defendant made a false representation of fact to the plaintiff; [page256]
    (b) the defendant
    (i) knew the representation was false;
    (ii) had no belief in the truth of the representation; or
    (iii) was reckless as to the truth of the representation
    (c) the defendant intended that the plaintiff should act in reliance on the representation;
    (d) the plaintiff did act on the representation;
    (e) the plaintiff suffered a loss by doing so.

    Lewis v. Standen 1989 British Columbia Supreme Court
    Damages suffered as a result of being refused a Class 1 Drivers’ license in April, 1980

    Pg 4
    “Mr. Lewis then instituted proceedings by way of judicial review, in December, 1979 naming the Superintendent of Motor Vehicle as respondent.”

    “He found that the Superintendent had “refused the license solely by application of an inflexible rule and without regard to the actual fitness or ability of the applicant to drive a vehicle of the type in question” (p. 309). The court ordered that the Superintendent reconsider Mr. Lewis’ fitness and ability to operate a Class 1 vehicle and, in so doing, gave the following direction: In redetermining the petitioner’s fitness and ability to drive or operate Class 1 motor vehicles, the respondent must consider all of the evidence relating to the petitioner’s driving fitness and ability including his driving history, the fact that he has driven Class 1 vehicles in the past, all of the medical reports, the results of the driving tests and written examination completed by the petitioner, and any other evidence available to the respondent.”
    ***Another Judicial Review case showing that my Judicial Review case was improper and institutional bias to protect the Minister of Attorney General and Crown Defendants as my Judicial Review endorsement record says they don’t have to weigh all the facts and evidence when Federal Judicial Review Case of Ruckpaul says they do and now this BC Judicial Review case also stating the government agent in my case Commission/Judicial Review Courts do have to consider all of the evidence related to the petitioner which in my case means not interviewing any of my witnesses or sexual harassers!

    Crown’s Factum:
    Pg 11 “A second area of confusion raised in the paragraph from the submission on behalf of Mr. Lewis to which I have already referred, is the suggestion that there may be a cause of action for breach of statutory authority. As pointed out by counsel for the defendants, there is no independent tort of “breach of statutory authority”, as was made clear by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of the Queen v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (1983), 143 D.L.R. (3d) 9. To the extent that there has been a breach of statutory authority in a particular case, that breach may be considered within the context of the general law of negligence.”
    ***This is error in law in this case also in Oren and Deep per Crown’s authority of Odhavji
    Deep pg 12 para #51 “Since there is no nominate tort of statutory breach in Canada, the plaintiff’s mere allegation of a breach of statute is insufficient. Rather, any purported breach of a statute must be considered in the context of a claim of negligence: Canada v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool [1983] 1 S.C.R. 205.
    ***Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse SCC dated 2003 invalidates this legal argument see my appeal factum pg 22/23 para in case #31 as SCC judge corrects the error made by SCC in 1983:
    “I wish to stress that this conclusion is not inconsistent with R. v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 205, in which the Court established that the nominate tort of statutory breach does not exist. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool states only that it is insufficient that the defendant has breached the statute. It does not, however, establish that the breach of a statute cannot give rise to liability if the constituent elements of tortuous responsibility have been satisfied. Put a different way, the mere fact that the alleged misconduct also constitutes a breach of statute is insufficient to exempt the officer from civil liability. Just as a public officer who breaches a statute might be liable for negligence, so too might a public officer who breaches a statute be liable for misfeasance in a public office. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool would only be relevant to this motion if the appellants had pleaded no more than a failure to discharge a statutory obligation. This, however, is not the case. The principle established in Saskatchewan Wheat Pool has no bearing on the outcome of the motion on this appeal.
    ***Therefore Saskatchewan also has no bearing on my appeal as I pleaded more than breach of statute but also breach of fairness, defamation, conspiracy, injurious falsehoods, deceit, differential treatment and discrimination/constitutional tort and retaliation, intentional inflection of emotional distress

    Smith v. New Brunswick (Human Rights Commission)
    White v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) 1999
    Catzman J.A. endorsement does not include analysis of new 1990 laws of Proceedings Against the Crown Act, Crown Agency Act nor Starlene Case, Code section 27 that Minister is responsible for the Commission and the Code therefore control test met:

    “There are precedents in this court, in the Supreme Court of Canada and the New Brunswick Court of Appeal that uniformly establish the legal principle that the Commission is not an entity that can be sued, and whatever sympathy we have for the appellant’s position, we are bound to apply that principle.”
    ***These cases are no longer valid and courts are not bound per stare decisis legal doctrine to apply them because it is shown that some binding authority in case law or some relevant statute was not considered per 1990 Proceedings Against the Crown and Crown Agency Acts, Code preamble and s. 27 and 29, and UN Treaty

    Wanxia Liao v. The Ontario Human Rights Commission 2002
    Arising out of its disposition of her complaint about a grade given on a paper.
    She sought production of the Defendant’s investigation file.

    “Ms. Liao acknowledges that the major reason for her initiating this action is to get discovery which she had learned, through the litigation referred to above, she may not have in the context of an application. She argues that the matter must, in any case proceed by action as there are disputed facts and as there are allegations in her action which do not appear in the 1998 application, these being matters that took place in 2000.”
    ***Not same as my claim as I really don’t need the Crown’s alleged evidence of witnesses statements and gross incompetency to prove my allegations of intentional torts the Crown’s evidence would be just extra. On the other hand the Crown does need this evidence to prove they did an investigation and that it was fair and unbias. I can prove it was unfair and bias with all the information I supplied to the Crown plus the Crown’s case analyses and employer defendants rebuttals and defence statement alone which are pleaded sufficiently.

    “In my view the action is ill-conceived. The defendant is not an entity capable of being sued (see Smith v. New Brunswick Human Rights Commission et al (1997) 143 D.L.R. (4th) 251 (N.B. C.A.) leave to appeal dismissed [1997] S.C.C.A. N. 169, and White v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) [1999] O.J. No. 2034 (C.A.)). The claim is an application for judicial review.”
    ***Again no analysis of statute that nullifies SCC’s definition of Commission Body found in Westlake of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act and Crown Agency Act of 1990, Starlene 1997 that says Commission is Crown Agency and can be sued, and the Code section 27 that says Minister responsible for the Commission and the Code

    “It is the Divisional Court that has jurisdiction over application for judicial review, and in my respectful view, it would be more appropriate to defer to the Divisional Court the question of whether the proceeding should be dismissed as an abuse of process”

    Mohammed Bilai Zakaria v. the Ontario Human Rights Commission Date? 19?
    “The Ontario Human Rights Commission is not an entity capable of being sued see Westlake v the Queen 1971”
    ***This too is not a proper analysis of the law when the Proceedings Against the Crown Act and the Crown Agency Act of 1990 nullifies the argument in Westlake set by SCC in 1971 based on Securities Commission Act and not these two Ontario Acts plus Starlene Case which clearly states a Commission Body is a Crown Agency not any longer a 6th category of statutory entities.

    George v. Harris 2000
    “George’s brother was fatally shot in an incident involving the Ontario Provincial Police. George brought an action in negligence against the provincial Premier, Harris, and members of his cabinet.”

    Pg 5 Para 20:
    The next step is to consider the meaning of “scandalous”, “frivolous” or “vexatious”. There have been a number of descriptions provided in the multitude of authorities decided under this or similar rules. It is clear that a document that demonstrates a complete absence of material facts will be declared to be frivolous and vexatious. Similarly, portions of a pleading that are irrelevant, argumentative or inserted for colour, or that constitute bare allegations should be struck out as scandalous. The same applies to a document that contains only argument and includes unfounded and inflammatory attacks on the integrity of a party, and speculative, unsupported allegations of defamation. In such a case the offending statements will be struck out as being scandalous and vexatious. In addition, documents that are replete with conclusions, expressions of opinions, provided no indication whether information is based on personal knowledge or information and belief, and contain many irrelevant matters, will be rejected in their entirety. See: ACIC (Canada) Inc. v. Merek & Co. (1995), 62 C.P.R. (3d) 362 (F.C.T.D.); Solid Waste Reclamation Inc. v. Philip Enterprises Inc. (1991), 49 C.P.C. (2nd) 245 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)); Innovation and Development Partners/IDP Inc. v. Canada, [1993] F.C.J. No. 6-02 (F.C.T.D.) and Waverly (Village) v. Nova Scotia (Acting Minister of Municipal Affairs) (1993), 16 C.P.C. (3d) 64 (N.S.S.C.), aff’d (1994), 30 C.P.C. (3d) 205 (C.A.), leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada refused March 23, 1995.
    ***Claims based on 4 prima facie Complaints dismissed under section 36 passing section 34 considerations of “scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, bad faith, which the Commission deemed I acted at all times in good faith to move these complaints to the investigation process. It is only now that I am suing them that they are alleging scandalous, frivolous, or vexatiousness and abuse of process.
    ***Justice Lofchik’s endorsement says there are facts “apart from the facts of employment events” and it is these facts that are the material issues in both claims not the other facts that he says are insufficient to sue the Crown Defendants to wrongfully apply bald assertion legal doctrine
    ***Neither Justice Lofchik nor the Crown state in writing what portions of pleading paragraphs are irrelevant, argumentative or inserted for colour are scandalous like this case pages 7 to 9 paras from Dyce’s claim 6, 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 23(b), 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, to allow the plaintiff to make a defence another breach of natural justice and therefore is nothing but bare conclusions and recital of law per argument in Gismondi by Mr. Moore
    ***Allegations of defamation are most definitely supported by facts per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation” and “apart from the facts from the employment events” and case analysis with injurious falsehoods of incompetence, disarray of books, unfit to work had I return, fabrication of insufficient evidence of evidence of prima facie complaints for sexual harassment, gender, disability, reprisal
    ***Indication that information is based on personal knowledge validated by Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record comments of I pleaded “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation” and based on personal knowledge of “apart from the facts from employment events” which are the only facts that the Crown defendants’ alleged investigated fairly part of the quality of the investigation

    ***Not same as my claim when Justice Lofchik notes in endorsement record “apart from employment event facts there are no facts” and nowhere in his endorsement record does he state the law that allows him to just ignore all of my facts which are employment event facts that are in the human rights complaints and case analyses reports for all torts because that is all I need to show how the Crown abused their job, fraudulently, to discredit and discriminate against unlawfully the complainant, and conspiring with employers during the investigation and with bias case analyses
    ***Also per Deep para 46 “without stating what the other party said that was defamatory” not same as mine as I clearly stated what was defamatory in the case analyses per the following pleadings:

    04 matter para #13:
    This defamation of my character by defendants Watts and MMP with the commission resulted in the December 2004 case analysis from Shannon Meadows-Lee of the investigation department of the OHRC with many injurious falsehoods that are easily disputed to obstruct natural justice of referring my prima facie complaints against MMP and Watts to the Tribunal, and later refusal to refer decision by Chief Commissioner Keith Norton. These case analysis also represents the commission’s misfeasance of public office and other tortious actions such as deceit, defamation, conspiracy to injure, intentional emotional distress (acting on their knowledge of my injury to health vulnerability), injurious falsehoods; and criminal action of obstruction of justice, accessory after the fact, adding and abetting, concealing my evidence, and controlling witnesses to avoid adverse outcome.

    I also infer that the commission is colluding with both Watts and Mackay as they were late in submitting their defense statement causing noting in default, and motions to set aside default to file defence till closer to date of the OHRC’s submission of their case analyses, and both deny the material facts from #2 to #134 with general denials and are asking for stay of proceedings till the commission has made their decision in their original defence. I believe this due to the fact that MMP’s statement of defence only give general denials with no material fact to back up the denials particularly why they summary dismissed me with cause and no notice per rule 25.07 (3). I believe that both MMP and Watts would have submitted a motion to dismiss my claim based on the case analyses fabricating insufficient evidence provide to them by the OHRC as per their original defence statement. A stay of these proceedings should not be granted per the following reasons: it’s been already 2 years since my dismissal, collusion and obstruction by the OHRC, and I am currently unemployed again as a direct result of additional interference and repeating of items in my Human Rights Complaints, and I am having more difficulty finding replace work than I did in 2002. Plus the arguments found in Kurlyk v. Toronto (City) Board of Education of: ample precedent for allowing parallel proceedings which may result in different findings, deletion of exclusive jurisdiction clause permitting judicial incursion into areas formerly occupied by the commission, and assessment of damages is not beyond the ken of this court and the commission. The case of Skoptiz v. Intercorp Foods allowed an extension of the common law notice, consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Wallace, based on a finding that the employer had violated the Human Rights Code by not accommodating the plaintiff’s medical disability. It is feasible that a plaintiff may use both the civil claim and the human rights process in tandem.

    04 Matter para #15
    I plead that the extent of Watts’ defamation of my character extends beyond Watts Industries interference at Mackay and includes defaming my character with the Ontario Human Rights commission to cause an obstruction of natural justice and injurious falsehoods by the commission staff of insufficient evidence of prima facie complaints. The defamation of my character can easily be demonstrated based on my pass memos of performance by others prior to working at Mackay and MacKay’s description of my work ethics during my employment that they submitted to the Ontario Human Rights commission in their rebuttal to my complaint, in the December 2004 case analysis, and Mr. Clarke’s comments in his letter to the Employment Standards Office. I can show that in 1992 I was promoted to branch administrator; in 1993 I was recognized by my manager for my attention to Quality; in 1996 that same manager stated that my solid and reliable performance is appreciated; in 1999 from Watts manager being noted that I was a strong performer in accomplishing tasks and 2001 rating of 4 exceeding expectations in receivable duties; in 2002 reference letter from employer before Mackay that I was a conscientious, punctual employee who took her responsibilities very seriously; and then from Mackay claiming performance issues without progressive discipline process for wrongful dismissal excuse after they received my Human Rights complaint against them when original reason for termination is reprisal action under the Code and violation of criminal code 425.1. I can also show fabrication of warning letter at Watts Industries to paint me a trouble-maker and lacking in team spirit which was successfully challenged in fax to commission in May 2001.

    MacKay’s defamatory reference for me in their response to Human Rights commission was the following: the respondents state that the employment was terminated following a significant absence and due to performance issues (proving discrimination based on real disability); Dasha Page was upset by the conversation given the nature of the conversation and the bizarre accusations that were being made, the Respondents considered terminating the employment immediately during the probationary period; it became clear that the Complainant could not handle the full responsibilities of the position and was really just not competent enough to perform to work in a busy office; Dasha Page denies that there was any conversation regarding quitting; the Respondents could have let her go during the probationary period but elected to try and preserve her position as she made it apparent that she needed the job; the Complainant was unable to operate the accounting duties and the Respondents were required to bring in additional help in order to do the accounting; there was significant damage done to the Respondents by virtue of the administration system implemented by the Complainant; and the Complainant maintained that extensive overtime was necessary in order for her to do the job, while the job had previously been done without the necessity of overtime. I submitted an excellent rebuttal to this fabrication causing additional fabrication by the defendants in the commission case analysis of disarray of books that were not mentioned in their rebuttal to my complaint that I received and was allowed to cross examine.

    My reputation as a good worker has been defamed by Watts Industries, and now Mackay to the point of not being able to receive fair employment without this continuation of Watts’ mobbing campaign at next employer nor good references for future job opportunities due to their actions, plus not being giving the appropriate work environment to grow and improve my skills, and is career stoppage. I also have the added problem of now having my Charter Rights obstructed by the OHRC. My excellent health record destroyed by the actions by these two employers causing intentionally injury to my health which resulted in loss of insurance benefits in 2003 at fourth employer in this campaign due to the fact now I have to reveal that I have suffered from depression when previously I did not.

    04 Matter para #22:
    I plead the tort of defamation was committed by the investigation staff particularly with the case analysis statement at #30: “it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position.” This statement is defamation per se unfit to work had I returned in January 2003 to MMP Limited I would be unfit to work. This defamatory statement is an opinion not fact and does not reflect reality and is for the sole purpose of influencing the reader of this statement and therefore constitutes libel. Ms. Waik and Ms. Meadows-Lee worked on the next two employers case analysis showing I started part time position on January 10th 2003 till September 15th 2003 (incompetence issue to do with sales not accounting), and full time position on February 10th 2003 till March 19th 2004 (no incompetence issues rather fabrication of shortage of work). This shows not only was I fit to return to work in January 2003 but that I was fit to work at two employers at the same time from February to September 2003. This is with the aid of Paxil as I have learned my lesson that I need medication in order to work in an abusive work environments otherwise the same injury on the abusive work environment inducing me into reactive depression that hit me in June 2001 and August 2002 would have been repeated in 2003/2004.

    04 Matter Para #24:
    I plead that the staff in the investigation office of the OHRC has committed the act of Misfeasance of Public Office in the targeted malice line of cases where the public officer recklessly disregards the means of ascertaining the extent of his or her power. Particularly, the statement at #30 in MMP’s case analysis represents this recklessness and targeted malice. I refer to Uni-Jet Industrial Pipe v. Canada (A.G.) on the test for abuses of public office of: 1. an intentional illegal act, which is either: i) an intentional use of statutory authority for an improper purpose; or ii) actual knowledge that the act (or omission) is beyond statutory authority; or iii) reckless indifference, or willful blindness to the lack of statutory authority for the act; 2) intent to harm an individual or a class of individuals, which is satisfied by either: i) an actual intent to harm; or ii) actual knowledge that harm will result; or iii) reckless indifference or willful blindness to the harm that can be foreseen to result. I infer that I received a sham investigation process that is use of statutory authority for an improper purpose. What I received as an investigation is the following: because it doesn’t matter about the truth it only matters that they have provided an accepted process so that when you say they disadvantaged you they can say they followed an established process.

    Shannon Meadows-Lee from the commission claims there is evidence to support gross incompetence to refuse referral to the Tribunal and without this excuse for my termination she would have no choice but to refer my prima facie complaint to the Tribunal. Ms. Meadows-Lee conceals the material fact of my termination letter as she makes no mention of it in the case analysis for MMP and my termination letter is in direct violation of criminal code 425.1 which is strong evidence of reprisal. By doing so, Ms. Meadows-Lee is going against natural justice and common law. In addition, Shannon Meadows-Lee slanted the case analysis at #30 to discredit me with mental illness being the cause for my alleged incompetence with her comment of “it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position.” By making this statement Shannon Meadows-Lee over stepped the boundaries of her duties and willfully misrepresented the facts to do harm to discredit the complainant with the commissioner reading her decision, with the judge in my civil suit reading her case analyses, and this demonstrates improper purpose. She is well aware that I commenced part time position on January 10th 2003 and full time position on February 10th 2003, and that I worked both till September 15th 2003. There was no allegation at fourth employer of gross incompetence in accounting duties and I worked there for 13 months. She wrote up the case analysis for these two employers as well.

    These case analyses by the commission staff causes remedies that I am now seeking with regards to MMP Limited, additional defamation

  33. RemoveClaudette Losier via The Elders: There is a lot of Deafening Global Silence towards Human Rights around the World including in Ontario Canada. My Appeal C50990 includes the Crown applying the Code fraudulantly with the positive misrepresentation being the Code’s preamble and purpose that “Everyone In Ontario Is Equal” with measures to codify per sta…re decisis of section 5 to 10 of the code being completely ignored by the Crown’s Human Rights process in both jurisdicition human rights. My appeal includes the Crown acting without authority of the Code applying section 34 (no investigation) alleged rules of discretion to dismissed 4 complaints under section 36 (investigation) prima facie complaints made out without investigating any of complainant’s witnesses or sexual harassers. My Appeal has been set for September 22nd in Toronto allowing insufficient time of 40 minutes to argue 8 day Rule 21 Unconstitutional Motion order that includes judge refusing to abide by the UN Treaty and you can read my factum arguments for …See More
    Sri Lanka’s disturbing actions met by ‘deafening global silence’ | The Elders
    theelders.org

  34. Evidence Ontario and Canadian Governments are not doing their Code, Charter, and United Nations Treaty duty to Human Rights:

    One last comment regarding yesterday, Toronto School of Art has a policy on how models are to be treated by staff and student which is what I abide be and expect that includes not touching models at all and they do not use excuse mind reader when its in their company policy and everyone is to read and be aware so that no incidents happen in the first place per Human Rights Code section 29 which is proactive conflict resolution. Other companies have similar policies and human rights policies which the Ontario Government is supposed to be educating its colleges and universaties per the Code section 29 to eliminate these conflicts from happening in the first place including Sheridan and that is why I am suing the Ontario Government for discrimination because they are not doing their job per the Code and Charter and United Nations Treaty. Meg works at Toronto School of Art so perhaps she could provide Sheridan with their wonderful policy on model treatment. In fact, last class I modelled for her she mentioned these things to the students as part of her job to educate model ediquitte which I greatly appreciated and shows a great high respect to the model unlike what I received yesterday. In fact I do believe Brenda as well did the same. So two female instructors can do it then so can your male instructors.

    Please note it is not for the model to conformed to others european ways of being touchy feelly per the Human Rights Code. I am not a Joanne nor a Jordie and I do not have to conform to earopean ways per Human Rights. In addition I dont require thank you for a job well done in the form of unwelcoming touching in the class and outside the class. I receive sufficient thank you by the pay cheque I receive but more importantly by seeing beautifully rendered lines and forms from my physical body and gestures inspiring your students creativity. Thats my thank you.

    If my modeling work for you that includes who I want to work for or not is problematic to you, rather than interrupting the class I am working in creating conflict which everyone in that class, the instructor and students, and Mark’s class next store could hear, I would suggest that you select to terminate my employment privately. As I mentioned that the unwelcome touching started in class and I selected not to make a scene which you appreciated yet you elected to come to my class so that everyone could hear our discussion which created a scene and negative energy emptying that room of the positive creative energy I was creating with the students. A proper conflict resolution of such discussion should have been privately in your office and if you felt you needed a witness you could have invited your Human Resource staff at Sheridan to come and take notes. I am surprised that Sheridan College has not given you training on appropriate conflict management. I hold Sheridan and the Ontairo Goverment responsible for that not you.

    Until the Ontario Government does its job and properly educates its Colleges and Universities on Human Rights per the Code, Charter, and UN Treaty Law I wont waste my energy at Sheridan with these types of conflicts by Students or Instructors. I am not looking for a response from you as mentioned because the Ontario Government and Canadian Government are not doing their jobs abiding by its duty to eliminate discrimination against everyone in Ontario and are discriminating against me so all my energy will be on them not Sheridan per my Appeal against them on September 22nd in Toronto which includes their duty to properly train its colleges and universities and others in Ontario on Human Rights. If my email is upsetting to you please do not come to me publicly in class or in the hall way to advise me.

  35. The incident Friday was in the hall way male instructor Jordie comes up to thank me squeezing my left shoulder when I was quietly not paying attention and sketching an elephant in hallway. He had already thanked me in class for my modeling work so it was not necessary to come to me in the hall way again to again stroke my shoulder with unwanted touching so I told him not to do it and continue my focus on my sketch. This was the first time working for him, other than this instructor interrupting a life drawing workshop with Students at MTM to give them instructions.

    Now I had no attentions to file a complaint because that would be a waste of my time because the Ontario Government is not doing their duty per the Code and Minister of Attorney General Act 1990
    and are discriminating against me per my September 22nd Appeal against them file C50990,
    and are connected to all colleges and universities through their funding programs and per the Crown Agency Act 1990 which includes all Universities as Crown Agencys. Jordie, the male instructor, filed a complaint against me with the model coordinator for rejecting his unwelcome touching. Joanne should have never come to me while I was modeling in the class to reprimand me for rejecting Jordies unwelcome touching to increase the conflict but wait to see if I filed a complaint. Her reprimand and comments yesterday are discriminatory showing the Ontario Government still in 2010 not doing their duty to education joanne. Since I was not filing internal complaint Joanne should not come to me to fish for one with her typical discriminatory justifications ready to put women down of “not a mind reader” and “European Ways of Touchy Feelly Comformatty” and put down “over exaggerating” when I was not even making an internal complaint! She also ignores the fact she knows I am a Human Rights Activist per our discussions these past 4 years. She never got the full story and was told by Jordie only touchy feely once in the Hall way.

    Now I will wait to receive the retaliation that usually comes after such conflicts and from sending this email either in the form of increasing the conflict, reduction of work and/or termination of employment at Sheridan because the Ontario Government is not doing their job per their duty of their Ontario Human Rights Policy to eliminate discrimination in Ontario which includes discriminatory attitudes such as I received yesterday to justify violating the Code of “not a mind reader” and “European Ways of Touchy Feely Conformaty”.

    Ontario Human Rights Code 2005 – by Bowland

    Section 7 – harassment because of sex(gender) in workplace

    Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd., [1989} 1 S.C.R. 1251; Impact Interior Inc. v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (1998), 35 C.H.R.R. D/477 (Ont. C.A.); Olarte v. De Filippis (1983), 4 C.H.R.R. D/1705 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry); affirmed

    “Unwanted touching constitutes sexual harassment”

    Impact Interior Inc. V. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (1998), 35 C.H.R.R. D/477 (Ont. C.A.); Drummond v. Tempo Paint & Varnish Co. (1998), 33 C.H.R.R. D/175 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry)

    “Behaviour which is not explicitly sexual may amount to harassment because of sex. It must be viewed in the overall context.”

    Slobodian v. Adamès Warehouse Burlington Ltd. (May 2, 1994), No. 94-009 (Ont. BD. of Inquiry) and see deSousa v. Gauthier (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 5053, 43 C.H.R.R. D128, 2002 O.H.R.B.I.D. No. 9 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry)

    For sexual statements to be perceived as humour, the person making the comment and the person hearing the comment must share a similar viewpoint. (same applies for unwelcome touching)

    Saunders v. Morsal Developments Ltd. (August 23, 1995), No. 718 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry)

    Conduct is vexatious where the complainant finds the comments and conduct worrisome, discomforting and demeaning.

    This has been the law since 1995 so why in 2010 after the harasser complains to the model coordinator that I rejected his European touchy feelly character or personality come to me to reprimand me trying to force me to comform to her none human rights standands and disregard my human rights attitude

    The answer is due to the Ontario Government and Canadian Government are not doing their duty per their own Code and Charter policy to education everyone that everyone has an equal right to harassment and discrimition free work environments.

  36. The Ontario and Canadian Government are not doing their duty to eliminate discrimination in Ontario and Canada per the United Nation Treaty which includes discriminatory attitudes such as I received on Friday at Sheridan to justify violating the Code of “not a mind reader” and “European Ways of Touchy Feely Conforming” which are excuses that are old hat probably has been used since the 1970s and in human rights case laws. Its now 2010 and Human Rights has been around long enough for the Ontario Government to get its act together at its Colleges and Universities to work towards proactive conflict management to reduce and/or eliminate the conflict. This is also their duty per the United Nations Treaty which is part of our Canadian Law system in the Ontario Code preamble and in Supreme Court Cases such as Slaight.

    The UN Treaty the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and its Optional Protocol 2000 Article 2 (b) to (f), pg 5 Book of Authority, Tab 25

    b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women; (c) To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination; (d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation; (e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization, or enterprise; (f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women”

  37. 34.Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21 Ontario Court of Appeal file Appeal C50990 for September 22nd 2010

    Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record at para #60 states: The plaintiff has failed to plead facts which support a claim of bad faith, abuse of power or malice toward her. Referring to the passages of a Case Analysis Report with which she disagrees just does not do it. This is so particularly when the Divisional Court in her judicial review application found that “there was an abundance of evidence to support the findings upon which the discretion of the Commission was exercised.” And that, “the Applicant has failed to establish that the decisions are arbitrary, capacious or made in bad faith.”

    This analysis by Justice Lofchik is imaging the truth as he does not refer to law that says case analysis does not do it nor shows where I pleaded insufficiently in 2 claims like all other Rule 21 cases including Deep.

    The Law per HVK, Crown’s authority for this Rule 21 that they did not include for this appeal because it benefits my case and is my authority now clearly states a case analysis is sufficient. Crown’s authority of Wilson also states case analysis is sufficient. HVK allows for suits for bad faith and damages after a judicial review per pg 2 held:

    The plaintiff’s claim was not a re-litigation of the previous proceedings (Judicial Review), as they did not involve any claim for damages. It was possible that the court could find that the decisions of the directors and employees was motivated by bad faith and not protected by any limitation of liability.

    Suits for damages against Commission and staff are allowed after Judicial Reviews when Judicial Review is based on human rights jurisdiction lesser rules to violate our Charter Rights then Rules of Civil Procedure for evaluation of facts and evidence so not the same. My Judicial Review was based on due difference to decision makers at the Commission and judges refusal to weigh evidence per their own words in their endorsement record found in Court Transcript which the Appeal Court is refusing to review for this September 22nd Appeal to protect the Crown and wrong doing by Justice Lofchik. The Court Transcript is full of comments by Justice Lofchik validating I have facts and pleaded sufficiently, but he refuses to accept employment facts in 4 prima facie complaints (the “apart from facts” at para #60) because Judicial Review.

    My judicial review endorsement record is also like Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record a bare recital of the law with no analysis per items in complaints and reports particularly where none of my witnesses were interviewed per Federal Court Judicial Review of Ruckpaul 2004 which clearly says that is a flaw and that the Commission in this case realizes it is a flaw. Not so here in Ontario because of the corruption by the Minister of Attorney General who continues per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record to alleged the Crown has a discretion to dismiss complaints without interviewing any witnesses for the complainant whent that is a major flaw and fundamental ommission in the Federal Courts!

    The Crown’s authority of Gismondi, Mr. Moore quotes the law that this type of judicial analysis, both Judicial Review and Justice Lofchik, is not allowed of Bare Recital of the Law with generalizing what is in the claim without making any references to show that I am deficient per the Claims!!! A proper judicial review is being done in Federal Courts for human rights per the case of Cashin and Ruckpaul. These two cases validate my allegation of a sham Judicial Review and Appeal in 2006/2007 which I did not have this case at that time and Ontario Judges taking advantage of litigants who are unrepresented. Also, a judicial review court cannot be trier of fact of Bad faith or malice per civil jurisdiction for tort law of Misfeasance of Public Office per Justice Lofchik’s legal reasoning in his endorsement record above, and I have a right to a trial that includes cross examination and witnesses in court. To dismiss my appeal base on this reason will only support my allegations further that the Minister of Attorney General is and was behind the improper investigation tactics in the first place because I filed a small claims court suit in Spring 2004 against the Commission and intake staff 1178/04 prior to the investigation and report in December 2004, and that the Minister of Attorney General has persistantly with concerted action provided me with judges who are bias to protect his wrong doing.

    Deep v. Ontario (2005) appeal pg 3 para #5:
    “The appellant appeals the motion judge’s decision. In our view, the appeal must fail. The motion judge wrote careful and comprehensive reasons (154 paragraphs) dealing with all of the issues, including procedural issues relating to Rules 20, 21 and 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and substantive issues raised by the appellant and both sets of respondents. We explicitly record our agreement with the motion judge’s reasoning, which we regards as sound, and with his dispositions of the three motions.”
    ***Not same as my appeal:
    1) Justice Lofchik making no references to any pleadings in my two claims therefore ignoring substantive issues raised by appellant,
    2) Refusing to accept Employment Human Rights complaints and HR case analyses reports facts for all torts pleaded which is all I need to prove they abused their job and their job was to investigate all of these facts fairly and without bias, and provides no legal authority to ignore these facts completely
    3) Justice Lofchik acknowledges I pleaded “facts of the Employer events” with “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigations” and this counters his other arguments that there are no facts or that I pleaded negligence or that I have not pleaded cause of action
    4) no analysis in endorsement record of issue of two torts pleading: tort of deceit and constitutional tort
    5) breach of rule of law and stare decisis of all complainants authorities that invalidate the Crown’s authorities relied upon in endorsement record
    6) no analysis of intentional torts listed in his endorsement records with elements and showing where pleadings are deficient when Justice Lofchick admits “I pleaded they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation” and “apart from the facts of employment events” and he is allowing me amend claims against employer who are joint tortfeasors with Crown for Conspiracy and defamation
    7) Defamation/libel tort made out per SCC Botiuk and Hill, and per Deep para #46 pleading sufficient facts of what I feel is defamatory to discredit my character by reader of the case analysis and proven fact per Mr. Norton’s Report and Judicial Review appeals of fabrication of incompetence and insufficient evidence of sexual harassment, discrimination and reprisal, and Crown defendants do not provide this Court with an argument or case law to counter SCC Botiuk and Hill in their submissions, and Crown defendants have pleaded in defence that they acted in good faith nor request the complainant to provide particulars of the defamation
    Intentional Inflection of Emotional Distress Tort and Misfeasance of Public Office made out per the requirements in SCC case of Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse
    pg 16 para 40: “In the defendant officers’ submission, the essence of the plaintiffs’ claim is that they were deprived of a thorough, competent and credible investigation. And owing to the fact that no individual has a private right to a thorough, competent and credible criminal investigation the plaintiffs have suffered no compensable damages. If this were an accurate assessment of the plaintiffs’ claim, I would agree. Individual citizens might desire a thorough investigation, or even that the investigation result in a certain outcome, but they are not entitled to compensation in the absence of a thorough investigation or if the desired outcome fails to materialize. This, however, is not an accurate assessment of the plaintiffs’ submission. In their statement of claim, the plaintiffs also allege that they have suffered physically, psychologically and emotionally, in the form of mental distress, anger, depression and anxiety as a direct result of the defendant officers’ failure to cooperate with the SIU.”

  38. Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21 Ontario Court of Appeal file Appeal C50990 for September 22nd 2010

    Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record at para #60 states: The plaintiff has failed to plead facts which support a claim of bad faith, abuse of power or malice toward her. Referring to the passages of a Case Analysis Report with which she disagrees just does not do it. This is so particularly when the Divisional Court in her judicial review application found that “there was an abundance of evidence to support the findings upon which the discretion of the Commission was exercised.” And that, “the Applicant has failed to establish that the decisions are arbitrary, capacious or made in bad faith.”

    This is error in law per Crown’s Case of Wilson
    pg 15 para 59: malice would be made out if they were to find that: …the respondents continued the prosecution either for an improper purpose, or in reckless disregard of evidence which would have disclosed the unreliability of the information provided by the [complainant], or out of ill will, spite or for selfish purposes, or because [the complainant] wanted them to do so.
    ***Therefore the Case Analysis by the commission and staff as part of an investigation is sufficent for Malice, Bad Faith, and Abuse of Power. This is a criminal case and the complainant is the person who gave evidence for the wrongful prosecution– in my case it would be the investigation staff accepting unreliable evidence from respondence such as fabrication of incompetence by MMP when MMP’s termination with no allegations of incompetence but prima facie reprisal cause because my WSIB was denied and allegations of poisoned work environment not substantiated we are terminating your employment which was given to me 5 months after I went on sick leave sufficient time for MMP to discover any after the fact incompetence and put it in this termination letter. This termination letter and the conduct of changing the reason for termination several times with final reason in MMP’s defence statement for this suit with generalized denials of we deny we dismissed her wrongfully and no allegations of incompetence that is in the Crown’s case analysis!!!! This in its self is proof the Minister of Attorney General is behind this wrong doing and is using his position of power with the current Minister of Attorney General to dismissed this suit per Justice Lofchik’s generalized and bias endorsement record ignoring these facts which show the commission investigation staff accepting MMP”s proven Bad Faith per Wallace SCC Case creating Wallace Damages in this same claim. This is per Wilson accepting unreliable evidence but my claim includes more examples than this and reason why Justice Lofchik and the Crown’s factum make absolutely no reference to any pleadings in 2 claims like all other rule 21 motion cases.

  39. Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21 Ontario Court of Appeal file Appeal C50990 for September 22nd 2010

    Ontario Human Rights Commission Immunity per the Law:
    Crown’s factum pg 2 para 2 (e) and (f), pg 15/16/17 paras 47, 48 Smith, 49 (White, York, Oren, Lacasse, Wanxia, Zakaria), bare recital of disrection no analysis of authorities that invalidate SCC decision of Westlake)
    Westlake et al. v. The Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario 1971/1973 SCC
    White v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) 1999
    Smith v. New Brunswick (Human Rights Commission) 1997
    York Advertising v. OHRC 2004
    Oren Nimelman by Next Friend Cheryl Katz et al. v. The Ontario Human Rights Commission, Nancy Pocock, Christopher McKinnon and Keith Norton (unreported) 2002
    Wanxia Liao v. The Ontario Human Rights Commission 2002
    Mohammed Bilai Zakaria v. the Ontario Human Rights Commission Date? 19?

    York validates my arguments from Starline that the Commission is a Crown Agency and suable per the Proceedings Against the Crown ACt:
    Pg 1 Held: However, neither the Commission not the Tribunal was a servant of the Crown or the Crown. They were not suable entities, and York and Murphy were compelled to challenge them through the process of judicial review.
    *** Crown Agency Act, S.O. 1998, c. 15 is listed but no analysis to this act with regards to suability in this case. The judge is correct the Commission is not a servant but why did this Judge not address the fact that the Commission is an Agent and suable as an Agent of the Crown when the Crown Agency Act was an authority in this case?
    “A Crown agency is for all its purposes an agent of Her Majesty and its powers may be exercised only as an agent of Her Majesty. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.48, s. 2.

    Proceedings Against the Crown Act includes both Servants and Agents!

    Pg 12 Para 31. “The Commission is responsible to the Minister for the Administration of the Code. Members of the Commission and the Tribunal are appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council.
    *legal Capacity to sue the Commission Body as Crown Agent per Proceedings Against the Crown Act 1990 s. 5, 8, and 23, and per Crown Agency Act 1990 that per stare decisis invalidates all of the Crown’s and Justice Lofchik’s authorities based on SCC Westlake 1972/73 decision based on Commission being a 6 category entity
    para 32 “Section 47 stipulates that the Code binds the Crown and every agency of the Crown.”
    Para 33 “Section 5 of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act provides that, except as otherwise provided, the Crown is subject to all liabilities in tort to which, if it were a person of full age and capacity, it would be subject in respect of a number of matters. The listed matters do not encompass the type of claim with which we are here concerned.
    ***This analysis on liability per matters of an injunctions for potential future damages does not apply to my case which is a claim for liability due to past actions resulting in damages and makes no mention to Agents such as the Commission Body.
    Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 27
    Liability in tort
    5. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, and despite section 71 of Part VI (Interpretation) of the Legislation Act, 2006, the Crown is subject to all liabilities in tort to which, if it were a person of full age and capacity, it would be subject,
    (a) in respect of a tort committed by any of its servants or agents;
    Where proceedings in tort lie
    (2) No proceeding shall be brought against the Crown under clause (1) (a) in respect of an act or omission of a servant or agent of the Crown unless a proceeding in tort in respect of such act or omission may be brought against that servant or agent or the personal representative of the servant or agent. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 5(2).

    “A judge should not give a judgment contrary to that of another judge of the same court unless at least one of the following situations exists: (1) subsequent decisions have affected the validity of the impugned judgment; (2) it is shown that some binding authority in case law or some relevant statute was not considered;”

    Error in Law there is legislation, binding authority in case law of Starline and relevant 1990 statute, that establishes directly that a Commission Body has the legal status and capacity required to be sued if the requirement have been met which are intentional wrong doing not negligence being ignored by all Judges in Ontario to protect wrong doing by the Commission and Minister of Attorney General:
    1) Neither SCC decision in Westlake 1972/73, nor cases of Smith v. NHRC 1997, White v. OHRC 1999, Oren 2002, and York Advertising Ltd v. OHRC, Wancia Liao, Mohammend Bilai Zakaria, Justice Millenitti or Justice Lofchik refer to or due analysis in their analysis of the law for immunity to two new legislation in 1990 that establishes that Commission Bodies are Crown Agents and have since 1990 legal status and capacity to be sued for intentional torts not negligence that nullifies all these cases as no longer valid per legal doctrine of stare decisis. The 1990 Crown Agency Act now replaces Westlakes’ definition of a Commission Body as a sixth category of statutory bodies based on definition in the Securities Act 1966 when the Human Rights Commission is not governed by the Securities Act 1966 but by the Human Rights Code. Commission bodies now are agents and no longer a sixth category of statutory bodies which was validated by judge in Starline case that includes SCC Crown Agency decision in Berardinelli v. Ontario Housing Board in 1979. The Proceedings Against the Crown Act establishes legal capacity to be sued per sections 5 liability, 8 as if the Crown were a corporation therefore all their evidence is available for suit, and 23 this act governs over all other acts in conflict with it that includes the Securities Act in Westlake,and the Code.
    2) Argument from Starline re: Westlake: if a statute confers powers of this type upon a non-corporate entity which it brings into existence, the as Taylor, J., pointed out in Bank of Montreal v. Bole, [1931] 1 W.W.R. 203, it flows as a necessary intendment from the enactment that the statutory body is to be amenable to the ordinary processes of Court such as statutes of 1990’s Crown Agency Act and the Proceedings Against the Act s. 5, 8, and 23 that Crown Agency’s are amenable to the ordinary processes of Court.
    3) The Ontario Human Rights Commission is not governed by the 1966 Securities Act but rather by the OHR Code Act. OHRC clearly establishes directly that the Commission has the legal status per s. 27 (2) because the Commission is responsible to the Minister for the administration of this Act, and s. 29 that they are to eliminate all forms of discrimination, and per the code make complainants whole as if there was no discrimination therefore compensable damages such as all loss in wages from employment contracts to make the complainant whole are available for wrong actions, and lastly section 47 from York Case that the Code binds the Crown and every agency of the Crown.
    4) United Nation Treaty the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and its Optional Protocol 2000 Article 2 (b to f) prohibiting all discrimination against women, effective protection of women against any act of discrimination, to refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation, eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization, or enterprise, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitutes discrimination against women.***This includes to stop discrimination of Canadians by its governments that includes the Commission Body, its investigators, Judicial Review and Appeal Court Judges, and the Minister of Attorney General in charge of Human Rights Law in Ontario plus the Queen Her Majesty
    5)1990 Legislative Acts of The Proceeding Against the Crown Act and the Crown Agency Act and the Code plus the United Nations Treaty included in the Code’s preamble combine establishes legal capacity to be sued plus legal arguments found in York case (above) and Starline Case with proper analysis of the law (pages 7 to 16) for the Commission Body as Crown Agent acting in administrative capacity can be sued for intentional wrong doing resulting in compensable damages of loss in wages to make the complainant whole, and control test met for Minister is control of commission and Human Rights Act
    Starline pg 7to 16:
    Crown Agency is defined in s. 1 as:
    …a board, commission, railway, public utility, university, manufactory, company or agency, owned, controlled or operated by Her Majesty in right of Ontario, or by the Government of Ontario, or under the authority of the Legislature or the Lieutenant Governor in Council

    The consequence of an entity being a Crown Agency is that it is “for all purposes an agent of Her Majesty and its powers may be exercised only as an agent of Her Majesty”: see s. 2, Crown Agency Act.

    The Ontario Gaming Control Commission appears to be a Crown agency. It is obviously a “commission”, and is under the auspices of the Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations. Its decision are appealable to the Commercial Registration Appeal Tribunal, which in turn is governed by the Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations Act. The Ontario Gaming Control Commission also meets the “control” test for a Crown agency set out by P.W. Hogg in Liability of the Crown, 2nd ed. (Scarborough: Carswell, 1992), at pp. 249-50:

    The courts no longer classify the functions of a public body that claims a Crown immunity. Instead, the courts examine the relationship between that body and the Crown, as represented by the ministers of the Crown. If that relationship is one of control by a minister, then the controlled body is an agent of the Crown.

    “endowing it with powers to enter into contracts”
    requirements in SCC case of Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse
    pg 16 para 40: “In the defendant officers’ submission, the essence of the plaintiffs’ claim is that they were deprived of a thorough, competent and credible investigation. And owing to the fact that no individual has a private right to a thorough, competent and credible criminal investigation the plaintiffs have suffered no compensable damages

    Code includes compensable damages of making complainant’s whole including all loss in wages from employment contracts which complainant cannot sue for in wrongful dismissal suits against Employers

    “(c) Liability of the Crown and its Officials under the Public Authorities Protection Act
    Section 5 of the Public Authorities Protection Act makes it clear that the Crown can be liable in tort if its servants or agents have committed a tort. It is clear that Crown agencies are included under the Act. This was stated in obiter in the Berardinelli v. Ontario Housing Corp., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 275, 90 D.L.R. (3d) 481, case, which is dealt with below. Both the Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations and the Ontario Gaming Control Commission are thus covered by the statute as long as the requirements are met.”
    ***This case also nullifies SCC decision in Westlake set in 1973 ignored by all of the Crown and Justice Lofchik’s legal authorities for immunity

    Requirements:
    If appears that if bona fides exists, neither the Crown nor its servants will be liable. Negligence is not enough for a finding of liability: See Moffatt v. Dufferin (County) Board of Education, [1973] 1 O.R. 351 at p. 354, 31 D.L.R. (3d) 143 (C.A.).

    To require the application of the Public Authorities Protection Act the acts must be acts not authorized by any statute or legal justification, but acts intended to be done in pursuance or execution of some statute or legal power. It would appear, therefore, if illegal acts are really done from some motive other than an honest desire to execute the statutory or other legal duty and an honest belief that they are justified by statutory or other legal authority; if they are done from a desire to injure a person or to assist some person or cause, without any honest belief that they are covered by statutory authority, or are necessary in the execution of statutory authority, the Public Authorities Protection Act is no defence, for the acts complained of are not done in intended execution of a statute, but only in pretended execution thereor.
    ***pretended execution thereor like my pleading of imaging a process because it does not matter about the truth it only matters that we provide a process such as Justice Lofchik applying s. 34 discretion to claims for 4 s. 36 prima facie complaints being dismissed without fair investigation and/or any investigation
    ***My allegations are that the investigation and case analysis, the judicial review and appeals in 2006/07 and Justice Lofchik’s management of rule 21 8 day motion hearing are all “pretend execution of a statute” the Code, Charter and the United Nation Treaty and my conclusions are not baldly stated but are based on all the facts in 4 prima facie complaints including collaborative prima facie evidences from respondenced left out of reports, and judicial endorsement records plus all my legal authorities that the Commission, Judicial Review Courts and Justice Lofchik are bound by being breached

    The plaintiffs have alleged that the “investigation conducted by the Ministry which resulted in the unwarranted freezing of the bank accounts of the Aurora Stallions Jr. Lacrosse Club Inc. and the Starline Roller Hockey Club was motivated by malice”. They also allege that the actions of Mr. Major and the Ministry were throughout an abuse of government power, and that the freezing of the bank accounts constituted an abuse of investigatory powers.”

    Para 78: The plaintiff alleges that this investigation was motivated by malice, either because of friction between Starline and the Ministry arising out of the negotiations over removing the license, or on the part of the other defendants, whom the plaintiff suspects of having made accusations concerning them to the Ministry.”
    Para 71: of the amended statement of claim, the plaintiff’s allege that the Ministry’s representations to Starline regarding the rules of bingo licences were incorrect and negligent.
    ***and negligent not same as my claim with “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation”

    Abuse of Power: “Everything which is contrary to good order established by usage. Departure from reasonable use; immoderate or improper use”. Also under the heading of “abuse”, “abuse of power” is found to be the “use of one who possesses it in a manner contrary to law. Improper use of power, distinguished from usurpation of power which presupposes exercise of power not vested in the offender.”

    The principle that public bodies must not use their powers for purposes incompatible with the purposes envisaged by the statutes under which they derive such powers cannot be in doubt in Canada since the landmark case of Roncarelli v. Duplessis (1959), 16 D.L.R. (2d) 689, [1959] S.C.R. 121. Since that case, it is clear that a citizen who suffers damages as a result of flagrant abuse of public power aimed at him has the right to an award of damages in a civil action in tort.”

    “Bad faith is different from negligence because the former involves intent”

    “Malice has been described as “improper purpose….includes any other improper purpose, such as to gain a private collateral advantage.”
    ***Crown’s motion record documents is example of the private collateral advantage which Justice Lofchik is using the Judicial Review and Appeal dismissals as main reason to dismiss my claim proving my allegations pleaded in my claim against the Crown

    “If there is no malice, as long as the public officer knows there is no power to do the act, and that it will likely hurt the plaintiff, the officer is liable.”
    *Crown ignoring purpose and intent of code per preamble, s. 5 to 10 and s. 29, plus applying legal argument for s. 34 to refuse investigation to 4 prima facie complaints after investigation dismissed under s. 36 shows they had no power to do the act – and Judicial Review also improper for these 4 complaints per standards of Judicial Review by Federal Court Judicial Reviews cases of Ruckpaul and Cashin, and Crown’s BC Judicial Review case of Lewis v. Standen which shows what a thorough and neutral investigation and Judicial Review appeals of all the prima facie human rights facts looks like in writing of the endorsement record and case analysis reports

    Region Plaza Inc. v. Corporation of the Regional Municipality of Hamilton-Wentworth et al. (Municipal law – Action against councilors)
    Pg 751
    “If the plaintiff does not at the outset have knowledge of facts that give rise to the conclusions of malice, breach of duty, conspiracy to injure, or abuse of power, then it is improper to make such bald allegations in the statement of claim. It was not sufficient to simply say that the supporting facts were within the knowledge of the defendants.”
    ***not same as my claim per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement “they acted deliberately with the quality of investigation” and “apart from the facts of employment events there are no other facts”

    Ontario Society for Prevention of Cruelty of Animals v. Ontario Veterinary Assn. (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 183 (H.C.J.), in which Callaghan J. (as he then was) commented: “In this case the question of the motive which prompted the council to act as it did is a question of fact and is one which should be decided at trial.”
    “if it sustains damages as a result of such an abuse, to come to a common law court for its remedy and not necessarily rely on the remedies afforded through judicial review of such action.”
    ***I argued this case with Justice Lofchik in this 8 day Rule 21 Motion hearing and he is breaching it per his endorsement record and gives no reason why he is ignoring this law that he is bound by!

    “The principles above relate to ordinary actions and Crown immunity. There are special rules for intentional torts committed in bad faith. Crown officials are no longer allowed to avail themselves of the protection of the Public Authorities Protection Act.

    Nelles was cited by both parties. There has always been a sharp distinction drawn between public officials exercising judicial and administrative functions under the functional test. In this case, Major would probably be acting in an administrative capacity, and thus his actions deserve additional scrutiny.

    It would appear on the basis of the authorities cited that, in general terms public officers are entitled to no special immunities or privileges when they act beyond the powers which are accorded to them by law in their official capacities. It would follow, then, that where a public officer, a servant of the Crown, exceeds the powers of his office or acts improperly in fraud of his duties and powers, or acts with malice in the discharge of his duties, he does not have immunity from civil suit and where, by reason of such excess of power or improper motive, he causes damage he may be civilly liable in damages. This indeed, seems clear as far at least as it may concern public servants who act in administrative capacities.

    Continuing cause of action:
    “a cause of action which arises from the repetition of acts or omissions of the same kind as that for which the action was brought”
    ***The analysis in Starline is a proper Rule 21 analysis of the facts and law not Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record per Justice Millenitti’s 2005 improper analysis or the Crown’s authorities White, Smith, Oren, York, Mohammed. Therefore there is no imunity for a Crown Agency per the 1990 statutes per SCC 1979 case of Berdanelli v. Ontario Housing Corp for a Commission body under control of the Minister of Attorney General and authority of the Legislature or the Lieutenant Governor in Council acting in administrative capacity of a commission investigation under section 36 before tribunal referral where it changes to quasi-judicial function when it abuses its office by acting in bad faith or malice with reckless disregard of prima facie facts in 4 prima facie human rights cases and both ignoring the intent and purpose of the Code’s preamble, s. 5 to 10 and s. 29 to intentionally injure plaintiff and causes damages

    5) Control Test states if Minister is responsible for the statutory body then it becomes an agent of the Crown
    6) OHRC clearly establishes directly that the Commission has the legal status to be sued per s. 27 (2) because the Commission is responsible to the Minister for the administration of this Act, and s. 29 that they are to eliminate all forms of discrimination and preamble that “everyone is equal”, and section 47 per York case that the Code binds the Crown and every agency
    7) The Proceedings Against the Crown Act establishes legal capacity to be sued per sections 5 liability, 8 as if the Crown were a corporation, and 23 this act governs over all other acts in conflict with it include the 1966 Securities Act in Westlake, and the Code
    8) United Nation Treaty the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and its Optional Protocol 2000 Article 2 (b to f) establishes legal capacity to be sued for Charter violations prohibiting all discrimination against women, effective protection of women against any act of discrimination, to refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation, eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization, or enterprise, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitutes discrimination against women
    9) if a statute confers powers of this type upon a non-corporate entity which it brings into existence, the as Taylor, J., pointed out in Bank of Montreal v. Bole, [1931] 1 W.W.R. 203, it flows as a necessary intendment from the enactment that the statutory body is to be amenable to the ordinary processes of Court,
    10) Starline Entertainment Centre Inc. v. Ciccarelli 1995 case Ontario Court Epstein J. arguments for no immunity: distinction drawn between public officials exercising judicial and administrative capacity, administrative capacity deserves additional scrutiny, issue of immunity a trial was required to be considered within a factual basis, no special immunities or privileges when they act beyond the powers which are accorded to them by law, acts in fraud of his duties and powers, or acts with malice, excess of power or improper motive he cause damages
    11) new argument found in Wilson v. Toronto (Metropolitan) Police Service para 18, 19 and 20 – floodgate of litigation excuse used by Crown does not justify absolute immunity for Commission or its staff or Minsiter per Westlake, Smith, White and all other Crown authorities based on these 3 cases

    Wilson case Pg 4 Para 18 from SCC 1989 Nelles case: “Lamer J., as he then was, speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court in Nelles concluded that these policy considerations, while possessing some merit, did not justify absolute immunity. They had to give way to the right of a private citizen to seek a remedy when a prosecutor acts “maliciously in fraud of his duties”.
    Pg 5 para 20 “First, absolute immunity for prosecutors cannot be permitted. The existence of absolute immunity would be a threat to the individual rights of citizens who have been wrongly and maliciously prosecuted by agents of the Attorney General. It would be alarming if such wrongdoers, despite being persons from whom we expect the highest standard of conduct in exercising an important public trust, could not be held accountable to their victims.
    ***Same argument applies to my case that policy considerations did not justify absolute immunity threat to individual rights of citizens who have been discriminated and reprised against by agents of the Attorney General at the Commission

    • To add to the challenge of no immunity I would like to add the following legal argument.

      Justice Lofchik quotes as part of his analysis of negligence law based on para in ORen case at para #14:
      The plaintiffs claim for negligence on the part of the individual defendants. The Commission does not dispute that, for purpose of liability in negligence, a relationship of proximity exists, but it disputes that a duty of care is owed to the plaintiffs. The Commission and the individual defendants are engaged in a quasi-judicial process. To subject them to liability in negligence would be inimical to the proper exercise of their responsibilities without fear of lawsuits from disappointed complainants; Edwards v. Law Society of Upper Canada (No. 2) (2000), 48 O.R. (3d) 329 at para 40 (C.A.). It would be anomalous if the individual defendants could be sued in negligence when the Commission itself cannot. The work of the Commission is and remains subject to the discipline of judicial review. These reasons negativing a duty of care are compelling.”

      1. Code says under section 36 that the Commission does have a duty to fairness owed to the complainant to make thorough and neutral investigations of all prima facie facts in complaints.

      2. This case only speaks of negligence – they made an innocent mistake – one cannot sue but there is no mention that complainants cant sue for deliberate malfeasances against the Commission Body and the staff.

  40. 27.Go to Canlii(google) website to read Justice Lofchik’s bias endorsement record where there is no references to any of my pleadings made to substantiate his analyses as in other Rule 21 cases such as SCC case of Hunt v. Carey and Crown’s case of Deep. He does not write or refer specifically to any paras in my pleadings to show where I am deficient like Hunt and Deep and all other Rule 21 motions presented by the Crown because my pleadings are sufficient and he did not want to draw attention to that fact! Nor did the Crown defendants in their factum for the Rule 21 Motion and this here Appeal as compared to the Factum found in case of KRP against the same Minister. This is called imaging the truth.
    Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21
    Superior Court of Justice — Ontario
    allegations — suable — pleading — complaints — judicial review

    Cooking the Judicial Books

    Evidence of Bias at Rule 21 Motion Hearing and reasoning why Ontario Court of Appeal is refusing to allow the Court Transcript to be part of this appeal:

    1. During the 8 day motion hearing Justice Lofchik’s comments was evidence of
    Discriminatory attitude, bias and intervening in the hearing process in a way that persistly favours the Crown and acting as trier of fact which also includes his argument in his endorsement record that I pleaded no facts. In Court Justice Lofchik admits I pleaded facts. Justice Lofchik’s arguments presented to me for refusing to be bound by the United Nations Treaty per SCC Slaight case, joint tortfeasors defamation legal doctrine, Crown Agency Act, and others are not based on law. For some of his arguments he refuses my right to provide me with the law so that I had an opportunity to defend my claims and is a breach of natural justice. These comments are found in the Court Transcripts per the following:

    a) Pg 89 breach of natural justice by JL: “Well, I’m still not sure that the Human Rights Commission fits the description of a Crown Commission, or a Crown agent or Grown agency. The authority is there; whether the authority applies to the Human Rights Commission is the thing that I’m not…” “So how do we figure that out to make sure that we are sure?” “I’ll tell you what I decide.” “Bu I need to have an opportunity to argue whatever…” “Well, I thought you had.” “No, because you’re saying…” “I’ve heard your argument. I’m going to take what you said, I’m going to look at this, and I am going to make a decision. I don’t intend to debate this for the next two days.” “Yeah, but the Crown Agency applies.” “Well, that’s what I’m saying, as I’m not sure it does on the interpretation of the Act.” “What part of the interpretation? A Crown Agency is in all purpose of an agent fo Her Majesty and its powers may be exercised…”

    b) Pg 90 JL not applying Code s. 27 which clearly says Lieutenant Governor and Minister: “I’m not sure that the Human Rights Commission is a commission operated by Her Majesty or the government of Ontario or under the authority of the legislature or the lieutenant governor in council.” “It is owned by the Ontario government.” “Well, I’m not sure it is.” “Then who owns it?” “I don’t think it’s owned by anybody. It’s an independent board.” “It’s owned by somebody.” “I’m not sure it is, just as this court isn’t owned by anybody.”

    c) Pg 94 “But you are also bound by section 23 of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.” “Well, I’ve heard your argument on that. Let’s carry on. You’ve got your – I’m at paragraph 43 of your factum now. I can tell you that the United Nations as far as I’m concerned, a great organization, they do good work, but they have no binding affect on me so I am not going to pay any attention to that argument.”

    d) Pg 123: “Well, I take it your point is tha t your claim against the employees of the Commission is not just in negligence. You are claiming misfeasance. “I’m not – I’m not claiming any negligence.” “All right. Then you are claiming misfeasance.”

    e) Pg 142 “I accept the proposition that if a government employee exceeds the bounds of their office or acts with malice to cause, deliberately cause somebody harm, contrary to their duties under that public office then that’s not negligence, it’s a separate tort. So I don’t know what else you’re getting at here.” “My argument was that my friend here was stating that that was negligence…” “Well, all right, I…” “ …which is the material issue in dispute and that’s to be decided at trial and not in a motion hearing.” “All right.”

    f) Pg 155 “All right. So your point here is that there was in affect information withheld in the Commission’s report, or information didn’t go in there that you feel should have gone in there.” “That were intentionally omitted.” “All right, intentionally omitted, and that that causes – that gives rise to the tort of deceit.” “Deceit, and misfeasance of public office, conspiracy, injurious falsehoods, and defamation of character, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The case analysis does state I got the dollar raise. If I got the dollar raise there was no incompetency per common law on employment law.”

    g) Pg 160-161 “Any omission, and I wouldn’t be here today if it was just one omission, but we’re taking – we’re talking about a lof of omission, serious ommissions. Not just serious omissions but an act of pretend execution of the Ontario Human Rights Code which I discussed earlier as both Mackay and the case analysis admit I was exposed to a sex picture on March 8th, I believe, the 2nd day of work. It was a pornographic faxed image of a couple copulating from behind. They admit that. That is sufficient evidence, a violation of code five and seven. I don’t need any more evidence other than that.” JL “Ah, that’s not quite the same thing. The tribunal doesn’t hear every case. They have a discretion as to which cases to hear. That doesn’t mean there wasn’t a violation, it just means that given the amount of time and resources they have, they have to chose which cases they feel are serious enough to deal with.” “They have to apply the code per the code. The code says a pornographic image, which I already referred to Your Honour…” “Well, that – but, and there is not question about that, but they still have to make a qualitative decision. They don’t prosecute every case. I think there is case law that says that they are not obliged to prosecute every case. They can pick the cases that they in effect feel are serious, enough to prosecute. Otherwise, every time a mechanic puts up a Playboy calender up on his back wall there is a case before the Human Rights Commission and that just – the system will crumble under the weight of what they have to do.” “Well that’s not eliminating discrimination against women and according to the United Treaty.” “No, it’s not, and it may very well not be, but the question is does not prosecuting every case amount to a tort of misfeasance in public office? That’s the real issue that we have here.”

    h) Pg 192 JL acting as trier of fact: “All right. So the issue is how does the pleading of those facts prove collussion as opposed to mere negligence?” “Well, we’re not here to prove.” “Well, you say it proves.” “We are here to say that those facts, the wording, is collusion, obstruction of justice, slanting this analysis, that’s not a pleading in negligence. That is a pleading in misfeasance for improper purpose, and the improper purpose is…”

    i) Pg 194-95 “The difficulty of having a statement of claim that reads more like a novel then a statement of claim is that it’s hard to pick out the important stuff from narrative…” “Yes. If you look at the back part, Your Honour, there are from 122 to about 142 I go through the case analysis point by point and show the error made, which is fabrication or incorrectly stating the facts. An additional proof of that, Your Honour, if I may, is that if you go to my tab four…” “If you look at number one; “The defendant pleading denies the allegations contained in paragraphs two throug 134 of the statement of claim.” “So they are denying even the rebuttal to the Commission. They are denying even the validated sexual harassment, two complaints that I made internally. Those are facts they are to admit per the rule 25.07(3) I believe, and because they are not admitting them there are costs consequences at another rule, 57.” “Again, that’s another – that’s for another time and place.” “Okay, but this validates my claim that they are not being truthful, that I have a valid claim against all parties. We went through bad faith, okay. Yesterday my friend said that negligence refers to anything I say. Regardless of anything that Ms. Losiers calls, it is all negligence…” “…which is an error in law, as we’ve already gone through, that an omission is not the tort of negligence, it is the tort of misfeasance of public office.” “Well, that’s not quite true either, but you can have negligence through omission or commission.”

    j) Pg 196-97 JL acting as trier of fact based on Crown’s defence that all is negligence when I clearly pleaded deliberate to injure: “No, but failure to record a complaint properly or accurately may or may not be negligence. It could be negligence just she wrote it down wrong, or she developed the wrong attitude toward it, she misunderstood, and number of things. It can be negligence…” “…or it can be deliberate act of misfeasance, and we’re gone around this mulberry bush a lot of times now and it seems to me the law says, subject to what counsel has to say, that an act of negligence is in effect not suable but an act of deliberate misfeasance with intent to injure is. We don’t – we’ve gone around that mulberry bush…” “…so that the issue is, and I understand your argument, that you are characterizing these actions as deliberate acts of misfeasance with effectively a deliberate attempt to cause you injury.”

    k) Pg 220 discretion duty per preamble and s. 29(d) with Crown Defendants duty to eliminate discrimination, and Crown’s discretion is to be narrowly interpreted not broadly per Code Book pg 3 which contradicts JL comment: “The difficulty is that there is a considerable body of case law that supports that proposition, that is that they are not obliged to forward every case to the tribunal, that they have a discretion. In fact, there are cases that say that the Commission is in effect a gatekeeper to the Tribunal and they have a broad discretion as to –the difference being this. The police have a duty to prevent crime. They have a duty to act. They must; I mean, that’s part of their raison d’etre. That’s why they’re there. That’s not the function of the board. It doesn’t have a duty, statutory duty, to forward every case to the tribunal. In fact, it’s statutory duty is otherwise. The statute gives it, under section 34 and 36, the right to say it stops here, so factually the proposition that Justice Crane rejects doesn’t have an awful lot do do with the statute that the board operates under.”

    l) Pg 221 evidence JL is making up the law when UN treaty part of Code preamble and SCC case “Okay, but the board also operates under the United Treaty, which says that they do have a duty to eleminate discrimination against women.” “I am not going to go there. The United Nations Treaty just become operative on courts and boards when they become law passed by the legislature. The government can trot around and sign all the treaties it wants but until they are enacted into law they don’t affect you and I as citizens necessarily.”

    m) Pg 223 favouring the Crown per JL’s comment: “My last argument, I think, is almost my last argument, per KRP, courts can review discretion of police staff and the Minister of Attorney General, so therefore they can also review a discretion, abuse of discretion, by staff at the Commission.” “That’s what we call judicial review.” “That’s what we call misfeasance of public office that the courts can review.” “But Justice Crane said that they also could be reviewed by a court in a civil matter, and this is a civil matter, KRP, not a judicial review matter.” “oh, I see what you are saying.”

    n) Pg 224 JL trying to deny me right to argue other torts: “ Well, I thought that you were making those allegations with respect to those torts. I think we’ve – you mentioned conspiracy.” “I haven’t mentioned my case law for conspiracy and all the other elements.” “You mean what constitutes Conspiracy?” “Yeah.” “I don’t think we have to go there.” “But the employers are going there and my friend here has offered a case on that matter, so those are the improper purpose for the misfeasance of public office. That’s what I’m referring to.” “Okay”

    o) Pg 249-50 “All I’m saying is, as I indicated at the outset, I think your statement of claim will ultimately have to be redrafted for these reasons.”

    p) Pg 267-276 “Now what facts are there any facts pleaded with respect to the conclusion that the defendants have no honest belief in their statement of gross incompetence?”

    q) Pg 275-76 JL acting as trier of fact again (sufficient for pleadings per Ruckpaul case of distorting the truth and flawed investigations) : “Well, it’s not so much distorting facts as coming to an improper conclusion on the facts or ignoring the facts, perhaps.” “For distorting the facts, because they leave out the other three incidents afterwards.” “Well, distorting the facts to me means the facts are one thing and then they say another; nothing to do with the conclusion drawn from the facts.” “Did the report indicate that the people at Mackay admitted that they did whatever you say they did?” “Yes.” “The report says that.” “Yes” “So then it’s not distorting that fact.” “No, but the distortion is saying that those facts are insufficient evidence.” “Well, my – and you can correct me if I’m wrong, but my understanding of distorting the facts is, in effect, saying that the facts are something other than what they are, not from the point of view of a legal conclusion but just from the point of view of statement of fact.”

    r) Pg 285 “Well, that’s right, and my question to you is, other than saying, look at there’s other evidence that they didn’t accept my version of the facts, apart from that, are there facts pleaded that show conspiracy or collussion or are you saying because they only accepted the employer’s version of the facts and ignored mine, there must be collussion and there must be a conspiracy. Does your pleading to beyond that?”

    s) Pg 296 “Yeah, I repeat those facts when I say the facts listed between – my material facts are listed between 36 to 142.” “That doesn’t count for very much, does it?” “Well, it’s dated, it’s logical, it’s by date order. And I also pleaded in paragraph 23, the first statement of claim 45.

    t) Pg 323 “Same thing. That’s a complaint against the process. What I’m asking, what I’m looking for is facts pleaded wherein these employees, facts that support an allegation of misfeasance in public office” “Well, 32, Your Honour, I do list the material facts listed at 36 to 142. If you’d like we can go through those facts.” “Well, yeah, but…” They include the two sexual harassment complaints, they include my termination…” “All right. No, no, 32 I have and I think it’s all in a nutshell. Really your complaint is the last sentence, I think, on that first paragraph, I have that, that they violate your Charter rights because of misfeasance by providing sham investigation, et cetera.” “Yeah” “I have that.”

    u) Pg 564 “So there may be a statute for the Minister of the Attorney General.” “Well, the onus is on you to find it.”

    v) Pg 571 “All right. So maybe the way we’ll have to deal with this is I’ll render my decision in this case. And I am going to order that the statement of claim be amended to comply with the rules. But I am – I still don’t see any harm in doing it twice. One step at a time. Let’s get this part right.”

    w) Pg 578-579 JL ignored the Constitutional tort inhis endorsement: “Well, the legislation, I agree, but the constitutional torts against the staff is not just because of the legislation; it’s because of the conduct of those staff.” “That I am being discriminated against.” “Well, and that’s part of your claim for damages here.” “I understand that.” “And the other road is a claim for damages for people acting for the Commission under the statute as it exists. It’s got nothing to do with the wording of the statute or anything. Your complaint is their actions…” “…are discriminatory, no matter how the statute is written.”

    x) Pg 581 “Same set of facts.” “Well, same facts but maybe different liabilities and different responsibilities.” “Yeah, so then there are facts.”

    y) Pg 586-90 JL acting as trier of fact again “The fabrication of incompetency. The fabrication…” “Well, again, it’s – the facts are – they make a comment that you disagree with, and therefore, you say ‘because I don’t agree with what they said, that must be fabricated.’” “They’re not allowed to fabricate.” “No, they’re not allowed to fabricate…” “…to make some evaluation of the evidence.” “And my point is that other than the fact that you disagree with what they said, what facts are there to show that those are fabricated? Number one, it could be a mistake, they misapprehended the evidence.” “The allegations of incompetency is a fabrication. I’ve provided you evidence with the defendant’s Mackay’s statement of defence where they’re not using those same allegations, disarray of books…”
    ”If it was not a fabrication, it would have been in Mackay’s statement of defence, plus their affidavit of documents that I’ve already received with absolutely no documents relied upon for those disarray of books to prove allegations of incompetency. So to me, the whole…” “But could that not be something as simple as someone from the Commission going to Mackay’s and being told, ‘Look at this, this place is a mess. Her workplace was a mess. She wasn’t doing her job.’ The Commission person accepts that. It might be wrong, it might even be a lie. But does that make it a fabrication on the part of the Commission person?” “That’s the issue here. We need – and I have a right to a trial to decide that. Not through a Rule 21 motion. We’re arguing items here that I feel that are for the trial judge to decide.” “And it can be proven.” “And you heard arguments yesterday to say, well, no, you don’t accept those allegations as true. That’s something I’m going to have to analyze.” “The other argument that I have, too, is some of those after-the-fact arguments were not in Mackay’s rebuttal to the Commission, the original rebuttal. Therefore, it’s quite possibly that they didn’t interview anybody, I mean, because that’s just right now he said/she said, Mrs. Meadows-Lee saying that, “Yeah, we interviewed those people.” There’s no corroborating evidence to say that they actually did interview those people.” “…to decide what it takes for an allegation in a statement of claim to be accepted at face value. That’s really what it comes down to.

    z) Pg 604 evidence of favouring Crown per endoresment record alleging my claim is abuse of process when in court JL said: “But she’s lumping all these other torts as well, it can only be through a judicial review.” “And that’s not the correct jurisdiction for these courts. And I’ve given you factums, in my factum arguments.” “I don’t need to go there. I accept your submission that…” “…if you’re seeking damages for torts…” “..it’s in a proceeding such as this and not judicial review. You don’t have to argue that.”

    aa) Pg 615-19 JL acting as trier of fact again: “It mentions here, “It’s no longer sufficient to make bald allegations of malice in the statement of claim. The extension of this rule is consistent with its purpose.” And then it says something here that it is important to allege to the wrongdoer, to be able to understand what is to the wrongdoer, to be able to understand what is alleged of him and her with precision and be placed in a position that allows a response. Well, fabrication of insufficient evidence in the case analysis…” “…does fit that.” “…it’s still an allegation of…” “Fact. That my fact differs from their fact, that they didn’t fabricate.” “Well, I guess that’s the issue, or is it a conclusion? Because you disagree with what they find, you say it’s a fabrication.” “Then they’re facts in there is also a conclusion. Because they say that’s the truth.” “Well, no, there’s no question they draw conclusions. But all I’m saying is there’s a distinction between an erroneous conclusion made in the course of doing whatever they do and deliberately fabricating. And you use this term, what is it, fabrication of lack of evidence?” “Insufficient evidence.” “Yeah. But fabricate, when I think of fabricate in the terms of evidence, I think of somebody making up evidence.” “Exactly.” “Well, what evidence have they made up?” “They made up the incompetency allegations, the after-the-fact incompetency allegations. We went through that on the other day.” “Well, that’s not – but that’s not fabrication of insufficient evidence. That’s fabrication of – that’s, in effect…” “It’s tied into – the full case analysis, at the end of it, it says, “insufficient evidence of discrimination of reprisal of sexual harassment.” “Whatever you say is fabricated.” “The after-the-fact incompetency allegations that are in the case analysis…” “And most of them is the disarray of books…” “…that was not written in the original MMP rebuttal and is not in their defence, not in my termination statement.” “So you’re saying since they don’t raise it in their defence, she couldn’t have been told that in her investigation? That’s your position?” “So for the purpose of pleadings, it’s whether a defendant can properly defend themselves and according to those pleadings, it is quite easy for the defendant, Ms. Rue (ph) and Ms. Waik to properly defend, basically saying, ‘We didn’t fabricate.” “Well, I would – that’s going to have to be re-written anyway, even if I agree with me.” “I mean, it seems to me the reasonable way to deal with that is that Ms. Meadows – is it Meadows-lee – says in her report, stated that she was told this, this and this by the Defendants, when in fact she was not told this, this and this and that she fabricated those facts. Nowhere succintly does your pleading set that out. I suppose if we pick through it, we can ultimately find those bits and pieces and put them together, but it’s not very well put, let’s put it that way, even if it’s sustainable.” “Yeah, but my argument is that I’m deficient in writing.” “Oh well, yeah, I appreaciate that. All I’m saying is that it’s going to have to be rewritten anyway.” “yep, yep. And I have no argument.” “And you’re – you say you should have the opportunity to re-write it, as long as the bare bones are there.” (HVK allows for rambling deficiencies of bits and pieces!)

    bb) Pg 620 evidence JL did not read the statement of claim paragraphs 36 to 140 which can be read by all: “The concealment of evidence is the concealment of the material facts in the statement listed.” There’s where the material facts are, point 36 to 140 total.” “Okay, Well, I can tell you that when you re-write this pleading, you should set out those specific facts because anybody who’s reading this statement of claim isn’t going to have 36 to 42 in front of them, so they have no idea what you’re talking about.”

    cc) Pg 754 “Now, as I understand, this last argument is, well, there are relevant facts that might be made by way of amendment. I think the argument should be more focused on the issue of facts supporting the allegation of breach of statutory duty, because it seems to me that becomes the crux of the claim against the Human Rights Commissioner.” (HVK and Deep allows for amendments)

    dd) Pg 754 JL’s arguments on discretion not based on law but him making it up (I query) and refusal to provide me with his case law breaching natural justice again as I have a right to defend/argue against his law authority (as a given), and lack of resources argument not sufficient per SCC: “Obviously they have a discretion…” “…in the way they carry out their duties.” “The fact that there are – how shall I put this – I guess I can’t put it any other way – the fact that there are facts supporting your claim that may or may not have been investigated as thoroughly as you wish might very well have much to do with the claim against the other employers, and whether there are sufficient facts pleaded to maintain the claims against them.” “Now, there’s a duty ot investigate. However, there’s a great deal of discretion on how an investigation is carried out. And I query whether there’s a statutory duty to investigate every lead, every fact, every aspect of every complaint.” I request these authorities and JL responds “Well, I can tell you, I’m taking that as a given, based on all kinds of case law that says that there’s a great discretion on the way they carry out their investigation; and indeed whether they recommend that any particular case go the Tribunal.” “They also have a discretion as to, ‘We only have so many resources and we can only pursue so many complaints, and therefore, we pick and choose the ones that we’re going to recommend and send to the Commission.”

    ee) Pg 757 accepting uncorroborated he said she said evidence is breach of statutory duty JL’s response “Okay; that can be said in one sentence. Let’s carry on.” “All right; but here’s the point: rather than going through all of the facts that you say weren’t properly investigated, et cetera, if your point is the breach of statutory duty here is failing to follow up every fact and accepting some evidence as uncorroborated, that can be said in, as I say, a sentence or two, rather than going through your whole statement of claim pointing out instances where that happened.”

    ff) Pg 758 “Well, you’ve pleaded lots of facts.” “But the issue is, a lot of those facts relate to your alleged complaints against the former employers and their employees. And the issue then becomes, how does that relate to the claim against the Human Rights Commission? And you’ve in one sentence really, it seems to me, dealt with that, unless there are other issues. And that is, failure to follow up all of these facts, or to merely accept the evidence of statement of people by – and without further investigation, is what you say is the breach of statutory duty.” “I mean, I know you’ve pleaded lots of facts here. And if the basis of your complaint against the Commission is merely accepting people’s statements as to the truth or untruth of your allegations with respect to those facts, if that’s what you say is breach of statutory duty, that seems to me is dealt with in that part of the argument.”

    gg) Pg 759 “…haven’t said in your statement of claim is – you say, ‘Well they didn’t talk to everybody.’ What you don’t say is, ‘If they’d talked to Sam he would’ve said something else.” “The suggestion is that there’s somebody out there who might have given evidence or information contrary to what was told to the investigator.” “I said it right here on paragraph – page 77-61” “If they had spoken to Les directly…”

    hh) Pg 760 Tony Millington’s address to Claude JL response “But he may not have said that” ***is favouring the Crown and JL acting as trier of fact

    ii) Pg 761-4 “What I said was, that there have been facts pleaded with respect to the alleged harassment and incidents involving former employers and their employees.” “And what I tried to suggest is, point me at the pleadings of facts that support, you say support your allegation of breach of statutory duty.” “And now you’ve said to me in your argument that failure to carry a balanced, out a balanced investigation by not interviewing witnesses who you think maybe would’ve been favourable to you is part of the breach of the statutory duty. That’s what I take from what we’ve just been talking about.” “Yes, not one witness.” “They only interviewed me. Okay; so that was paragraph 21. Then my friend went to paragraph 24 – oh, I should maybe just go back to 21.” “…image perception because Shannon Meadows-Lee worked on the next two employers case analysis showing I started…” “And then I state clearly where the breach of statutory duty is. Shannon Meadows-Lee on behalf of the OHR – in her own words demonstrates image perception of perceived impairment at 30. It appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position.” “That is a fact, a statement made; that is the what. And the where is that the Commission, in the case analysis, that is a breach of statutory duty – ‘cause this here is defamation. That’s not it in complete detail, but we’d have to actually look at the copy of the case analysis. But I’ve written it in several paragraphs that particular phrase that was in the case analysis.” “The Commission and any members of the justice system do not have the right per discretion to libel people. And then I go on to say that this is imaging behaviour, because Shannon Meadows-Lee worked on the next two employers case analysis showing that Xentel and Lyman – showing I started part-time position on January 10th, 2003 – incompetiency issues to do with sales not accounting – or alleged incompetency – and a full-time position on February 10, 2003, no incompetency issues.” “I worked at two places of employment, full-time and a part-time job, showing I was fully capable of handling the position had I gone back to MMP. And I had previously stated that this particular argument is what my friend here calls speculation and conclusion, which Ms. Meadows-Lee cannot prove because I never returned back to MMP.” “But I can prove, as a basis for breach of statutory duty, collusion, defamation, libel, tort of deceit and misfeasance of public office, abuse of discretion. They did not have the right to fabricate facts or make libel statements.” “And I also noted at the bottom half here of this paragraph 21, also the statement at 30 alone represents discrimination by the Ontairo Human Rights Commission of a perceived disability which leads ot refusal of doing their statutory duty – there’s the breach – of proper investigating the facts and evidence that led to the decision to refuse referring my prima facie complaint to the tribunal.”

    jj) Pg 771-777 the following represents JL overstepping his boundary and acting as trier of fact: “Might I suggest, that rather than go through all that – in a nutshell, your position is, I have pleaded facts that justifies my claim against the employers. These were facts that I made known to the investigators for the Commission. They didn’t properly investigate them. That’s really where you’re at, isn’t it?” “Not just that they did not properly investigate them, Your Honour, they fabricated.” “Well, I suppose that’s arguable, in the sense that they told by some of your former employers that you weren’t doing the job, and they accepted that at face value without investigating it further.” “No, Your Honour” “You mean, they just made it up out of the blue?” “Yes, Your Honour.” “The facts in my statement of claim says that the employer allegedly told the Commission.” “But the facts also show in my statement of claim that the employer gave me three defence statements for this suit with absolutely no same allegations…
    ”…that the Commission is stating is in the case analysis.” “…doesn’t that still come down to what I just said, that there were allegations by the employers that they took at face value and they didn’t investigate them further. And that’s really an improper investigation.” “Improper purpose” “So, all I’m saying is, I don’t know whether we need to go through every paragraph of your statement of claim where you’re pointing to me where there are allegations against your former employers, and then setting out why you think that there was an improper investigation, or fabrication, whatever you want to call it.” “Your position is set out in the nutshell that I put to you, I think. The facts that you plead with respect to the improper investigation are really the fact that there’s another side to the story which you plead in your statement of claim, which they didn’t investigate. Is that fair?” “No” “Well, you say “fabricating”, but they’re not – “fabricating” to me means there’s absolutely no evidence from anybody that they can either choose to accept or not accept, but that they’ve been making something up out of the blue.” “I don’t see that as what comes out of your statement of claim. What I see comes out of the statement of claim is, there are statements being made which you say are untrue by the employer. So, maybe the employers are fabricating, and the investigators are accepting these things at face value without going behind them or testing the truth of those statements.” “Now, that to me doesn’t mean that the investigator is fabricating, it just means that he’s maybe – or she – are accepting what you say is a fabrication by the employers.” “And the fabrication on the part of the employers is part of your claim against them, which we’re not really dealing with here. We’re dealing with breach of statutory duty of the investigators. Whether it’s fabrication or not by the employers, misleading the investigators is for another day.” “Not according to this argument that I presented Your Honour earlier by Dixon on page 55 of my factum. Their assessment requires the consideration by the jury of the entire conduct of the defendant prior to the publication…” “Well, yeah, but that’s the test of what goes on at a jury trial, not the test of what an investigator is supposed to do.” “My claim of breach of statutory duty, and to do with the facts of the incompetency, are also the tort of libel and defamation, therefore…” “And I picked up on that” “…therefore, it is the entire conduct continuing through to trial. Which includes my – the Crown defendants receiving statement of defence – three of them – from MacKay, MacKay, and Peters, with absolutely no allegations of these so-called incompetency facts that are written up in the case analysis…” “All right; no, I picked up on that. Part of your claim is, again, there’s these allegations made which they’ve picked up on, haven’t properly investigated and then repeated in their report, which you say are libelous. That hasn’t escaped me.” “No, no, you didn’t understand my point. My point is that, information has come to light to them of defence statements from MMP saying there was no allegations of incompetency.” Ms. K. “MMP’s legal positioning with respect to a statement of defence is not relevant in this matter.” JL “And that’s an unproven allegation, at best.” (same applies to Crown defendants alleged investigation that is unproven) “I mean, that can be a situation where there was an allegation of incompetency,, it was repeated by the investigator; and now the people at MMP realize they’re out on a limb and decide to deny it in a statement of defence. That’s not proven that it wasn’t made.” “But my argument is, Your Honour…” “Well, your argument…” “…that’s part…” “…it was repeated…” “…no, no, no, no, my argument is that for my statement of claim to continue on, that not only do I get to include that fact, but I also get to include the fact that that has become – made to light for the Crown defendants.” “And according to laws and rules, that once new evidence has come into light, that some true statement was made false, then they are to do what is right, not just to continue the fabrication of the incompetency in this motion trial and in the appeal process.” “And two of these defence statements were given to the Crown after the case analysis; and that includes all the way up to the Supreme Court.” “But their statement’s in a statement of defence. That doesn’t…” “That there was no incompetency…” “…but that doesn’t mean they’re true, which I think is counsel’s point.” “Yes, and that’s right. And it’s a matter of the trial judge, not a motion judge, to decide what is true.”

    kk) Pg 777-792 same as Botiuk case and therefore I have proper pleaded facts and cause of action against the Crown per JL’s comments of “Because your point is that, as I say, that they were accepted by investigators and repeated by investigators without properly being investigated and considered. Fine; I have that point.” “Frankly, that could all be dealt with, in so far as the Commission is concerned, in a relatively short paragraph or two in the statement of claim. What you’re doing here is pleading evidence. And, as I indicated way back at the beginning, that’s not what a statement of claim is all about.” “I’m pleading facts…” “Well, you’re…” “…the evidence are of physical documents.” “But the facts you rely on so far as the Commission is concerned, is that they took statements from the employers at face value without properly investigating them; repeated them in their report; and some of those statements are libeloous. As I say, that – in a statement of claim, that’s all that’s required. What you’re pleading, all this other stuff here is what you do at trial to prove those claims. And that’s why, as I indicated to you at the outset, this statement of claim has to go.” “The only issue is whether the Commissioner stays in as a defendant or not, because it’s not a proper statement of claim.” “Because the Commissioner obviously is vicariously liable for the staff.” “Well, it’s the facts, it’s the facts with respect to the Commission, not the facts with respect to your other employers and the other defendants that are relevant to me here.” “And I think that argument still is that, so far as the Commission is concerned, you haven’t pleaded – as I understand the argument, you haven’t pleaded facts to support the claim of collusion and breach of statutory duty.” “You’ve pleaded lots of facts so far as what you say the other employers did and said, there’s no question about that.” “Well, I have, according to my authorities in the law. Again, I’ll go – repeat Chahal and also Dixon; it’s the publication of libel continuing through to the conclusion of trial. “Libel includes those libelous statements by the defendant employers.” “And the Crown.” JL “Yes.” “If they’re repeated in the report.” “Or if they make statements that you say are libelous. The issue then becomes, though, if they’re made in good faith, as opposed to – of an intent to, in effect, harm you…” “…then they’re probably protected by their statutory duty. So, it really then comes back to, again, what are the facts that take them out of the realm of the …” “Of good fiath.” “…protection of the statutory protection.” “And I have provided Your Honour with those arguments as well.” “Well, you have; but I don’t know that you’ve done that this morning.” “Okay. According to Deep, paragraph 64 in the defendant’s authority book: Bad Faith is a legal conclusion. It has been held to involve an allegation of an intent to deceive or to make someone believe what is false.” “So, this point at number 30 in the case analysis, this fact that the case – number 30 by Shannon Meadows-Lee…” “It appears that even if the complainant returns with a decision after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position” “This is a fact of behaviour of manipulating the case analysis to discredit the complainant. It has nothing to do with the defendants at MMP giving her any facts that she investigated, this is Shannon Meadows-Lee making a libelous, opinionated statement.” “And that is sufficient evidence of bad faith.” “All right. Well, we’ve already looked at that and you’ve made the argument.” “Okay, I’m just – bad faith, it has been held to involve an allegation of intent to deceive to make someone believe what is false. This is Ms. Meadows-Lee – if she wrote tha tone statement, then I have the right to prove that all the other statements were an intent to deceive and were not investigated, were just her writing up comments. My pleadings of fabrication of insufficient evidence, incompetency and sham investigation to image the truth is that allegation of an intent to deceive or make someone believe what is false by the Crown defendants that led to the following believe what is false solely by – as being Crown staff – and nothing else.” “Mr. Norton and judges in the appeal courts have now attempted to make Justice Lofchik believe what is false by dismissing my claims against them. Where a plaintiff claims – includes an allegation of bad faith, the pleading must support sufficient particulars that support a legal conclusion of bad faith.” “That particular statement, plus the incompetency allegation, is an example of bad faith. My pleadings of bad faith – and I’m getting to it – termination letter by MMP – okay, my pleadings of bad faith temination by MMP defendants warning the Wallace damage – and I won’t go through that case ‘cause Your Honour said that you’re very familiar with Wallace damages.” “Is sufficient per the Supreme Court case of Wallace v. United Grain Growers that the Crown defendants by association ignoring the legal doctrine of bad faith for the employer in Wallace case, where an employer must be honest at the time of termination as to the reason for termination to the employee and by changing their reason for cause have demonstrated beyond bad faith, particularly when their defence statement after the – their defence statement after the date of the fabricated Human Rights case analysis dated December 2004 does not use the defence of incompetence that they have – and they’re co-conspirators with the Crown defendants – are using in the Human Rights jurisdiction. These facts are sufficiently pleaded.” “Page 88 – these are relevant facts against the Crown as well as MMP.” “it is my paragraph 107. On or about January 29th, 2003, I received a courier at my home – a termination letter signed by Mrs. Page stating cause to be: We have received and reviewed the report from Workplace Safety and Insurance Board that does not substantiate your allegation. The employment standard claim for overime hours was in process and not decided upon as of January 20th, 2003 termination letter. I went on sick leave August 14th; I was terminated on January 20th, sufficient time for the defendants to put in their statement of claim all the allegations of incompetency that are in the case analysis – this is relevant (s/b termination letter not stmt of claim). This is relevant also to the tort – or the bad faith intent to deceive or make someone believe what is false. According to Wallace, at the time of termination, the employer is to be honest – reason of termination to the employee, and changing the reason for cause have demonstrated beyond doubt particularly when their defense statement – after the date of the fabricated case analysis dated summer 2004 does not have the defence of incompetency that they and their conspiractors – the Crown defendants – are using in the Human Rights jurisdiction. These two facs are sufficiently pleaded. These two facts are relevant to all of the torts against the Crown as the defendants; as well as the principle of bad faith. The Crown accepting MMP’s bad faith termination reason, ignoring the Supreme Court case, are demonstrating their bad faith, and these facts have been pleaded numerous times in a sufficient particularity. Other examples of bad faith are: the particulars need to be added, as the Crown defendants accepting Mrs. Page’s uncorroborated he said-she said witness statement, when she has demonstred bad faith per termination reasons in the Wallace case legal doctrine.” Ms. K “Your Honour, again we’re getting into an area where Ms. Losier claims to want to add facts, as opposed to describing what is contained in the existing pleading which we’re dealing with today” (KRP & Deep has rebuttal allowed to add facts if supports cause of action) “Yes; and they’re relevant to the bad faith argument. And if I have a cause of action with these other particulars, then I have the right to amend my statement of claim. And the reason why I didn’t add them, because I had no legal knowledge or training. Had I had that legal knowledge and training – how to write a proper statement of claim – they would’ve been included.” “Well, that argument only gets you so far. Ultimately, I still look at the statement of claim to see whether it discloses a cause of action. Now, I hear what you’re saying and I’ll take that into consideration. Let’s just get on with it.” “Another example of bad faith, only interviewing respondent’s witnesses, two persons who did not work with me at the time of employment, and no witness for the plaintiff.” “I thought from our earlier discussions I made it clear to you that I understand that’s part of your claim.” “But I didn’t make that in reference to bad faith.” “That’s why I’m, I’m dealing with right now bad faith.” “And it’s relevant to that. “As well as not interviewing any of my witnesses, because that demonstrates bias, unbalanced investigation and part of the fabrication of insufficient evidence by controlling the – or the plaintiff’s witnesses which also form a – there’s also a form of concealing evidence by not interviewing anybody; which to me are all a part of my allegations of bad faith conduct. Again, that definition is, an attempt to deceive or make someone else believe what is false.” “In the ’05 matter, it’s fabricating insufficient evidence of sexual harassment when the Commission staff did not interview any of the sexual harassers; plus, left out of the case analysis validated and corroborated sexual harassment and internal complaints validated by Xentel and Lyman in their rebuttals to the Commission. All of my allegations that they validated; and with Lyman there were several. This too represents bad faith, an attempt to deceive or make someone believer what is false.”

    ll) Pg 792-3 “And according to this case of Chahal, it’s a meeting; so therefore, if there really was an investigation, that is where the collusion between MMP and the Crown comes in: to orchestrate those facts of incompetency during the Human Rights process; to orchestrate injurious falsehoods of gross incompetency – because it wasn’t – it wasn’t before the Human Rights process that they came out and not after are they coming out – by fabricating facts during the employment and after employment, refusing to provide the plaintiff with the specific evidence of these allegations – such as the disarray of books – both in the Human Rights process and in MMP’s affidavit of documents and the Crown’s affidavit of documents; ignoring the dollar raise, a fact that’s in my statement of claim; termination letter for cause of WSIB denying non-incompetency to avoid referral to the tribunal.” “I think you should move on…” “But I’m just responding to the Crown’s allegations that there is bald allegation and no facts.” “Well, yeah, but you’ve done that before too.” “There are facts. And I want to make sure that Your Honour is aware of them, and how they’re meant to be read per the allegations.” “Yes, all right; I have your point.”

    mm) pg 817 tort of conspiracy “Well, I don’t doubt that you pleaded facts with
    respect to that issue; so just carry on.”

    mn) Pg 823 JL’s argument re: tort of libel is not based on any law as he refuse to
    give me his authorities and is a breach of natural justice not allowing me to
    review his authorities to defend my claim: “If the investigator is under a duty to
    report – a legal duty to report, then query whether that doesn’t raise an issue of
    qualified privilege on the part of the investigator” and “But if the report is solely
    internal within the Commission under a duty to report, then query that’s
    considered to be a publication of the libel.”

    mm) Pg 824 JL’s argument re: tort of libel is not based on any law as he refuse
    to give me his authorities and is a breach of natural justice not allowing me to
    review his authorities to defend my claim: “Well, I suppose what I’m saying is,
    I’m not sure that this is a totally accurate statement of the law” and I request a
    copy of what is he responds with “I’m sure I do somewhere, but not here today,
    Carry on.” (never provided me with his copy of law)

    nn) Pg 828 tort of libel on joint tortfeasors “All right; that’s trite law, we don’t need to get into that. I mean you’re just repeating what you said before.” “Well, no, this is back to the reading of that other one whether – it it’s reproduced, who is responsible for it. So, here it’s saying each time defamatory material is communicated to a new person, it is a fresh and actionable defamation.” JL “There’s no quarrel with that.”

    oo) Pg 846 “All right; so your point is what? That departure from the standards is an infliction of …” “Emotional Distress” “All right I have your point.”

    pp) Pg 856 JL making up the rules again re: SCC’s decision HR as high as UN treaty: “I understand your position to be, he wasn’t doing it in compliance with the Human Rights Code – or they weren’t doing it in compliance with the Code, they were deviating from the duties under the Code, and that’s what caused the mental suffering.” “If that’s the case, then I don’t think we need to get into all this Human Rights – United Nations stuff, because I’m presuming that the Code is valid legislation for the purposesm of this lawsuit.” “My reference to this is the overt statement which I argued yesterday, which is at number 30 in the MMP case…” “…is not allowed, per discretion, to make a libelous and discriminatory statement that I was unfit to work opinion by…” “Well, all right…” “…the investigation statement.” “…I understand – all right, I take that point.” “I still don’t know where the United Nations Treaties on Human Rights and all that comes into play with respect to that. But…” “…per the United Nations Treaty, it says to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practice which constitute discrimination against women. That includes these discriminatory comments by a Commission staff. And…” “All right; I have that point.” “…there’s also – the United Nations also refers to that it is against – that I can have a Human Rights complaint or suit against any person, any organization, any enterprise. That includes the Crown, there is no immunity. That’s how it relates…” “Well, all right, I don’t think United Nations Charters overrule Canadian law; so, let’s get on with it.”
    ”Well, the Supreme Court says that it does.” “Well, that’s not how I read it.”

    qq) Pg 862 “And so, as far as the statement of claim in respect of your claim for damages – that is, your claim you were harmed by these actions – as far as that’s concerned, I’m satisfied that there’s pleading in there to that effect.” “Because I’m content that you’ve pleaded in your statement of claim that the actions of the defendant caused you emotional harm. And that’s all this is dealing with.”

    rr) Pg 888 “And also my friend here, the Crown made submissions that – earlier that it was her versions of facts – or her version of events was the actual words she used – which events are facts – and therefore admitting I have pleaded facts. And that her version of events are the material issue in dispute.” “Right” “Your Honour’s discretion in this Rule 21 is to – not to decide the question of fact motive which prompted the Commission staff to act – being to write deceitful facts in case analysis based on uncorroborated he said-she said evidence…” “No, my job is to decide wheter the statement of claim…” “…pleads sufficient material facts to establish the basis of a cause of action in a claim. That’s my job.” “And in my factum I had also pleaded at page 43, paragraph 59, that ommissions were done in bad faith.” “Yes” “or by unlawful means.” “Unlawful means also includes accepting uncorroborated he said-she said evidence by respondents. Which is collusion, a one-sided investigation, per my facts, stated facts.”

  41. Go to Canlii(google) website to read Justice Lofchik’s bias endorsement record where there is no references to any of my pleadings made to substantiate his analyses as in other Rule 21 cases such as SCC case of Hunt v. Carey and Crown’s case of Deep. He does not write or refer specifically to any paras in my pleadings to show where I am deficient like Hunt and Deep and all other Rule 21 motions presented by the Crown because my pleadings are sufficient and he did not want to draw attention to that fact! Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21
    Superior Court of Justice — Ontario
    allegations — suable — pleading — complaints — judicial review

    Court file No. 04-13797 Amended
    ONTARIO
    SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
    BETWEEN:
    CLAUDETTE LOSIER
    Plaintiff
    and

    MACKAY, MACKAY, & PETERS LIMITED, DASHA PAGE,
    ROSS CLARKE, AND WATTS INDUSTRIES (CANADA) INC.,
    MINISTER OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS
    COMMISSION, DINA WAIK, AND SHANNON MEADOWS-LEE
    Defendants

    STATEMENT OF CLAIM
    TO THE DEFENDANT
    A LEGAL PROCEEDING HAS BEEN COMMENCED AGAINST YOU by the plaintiff. The claim made against you is set out in the following pages.
    IF YOU WISH TO DEFEND THIS PROCEEDING, you or an Ontario lawyer acting for you must prepare a statement of defence in Form 18A prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, serve it on the plaintiff’s lawyer or, where the plaintiff does not have a lawyer, serve it on the plaintiff, and file it, with proof of service in this court office, WITHIN TWENTY DAYS after this statement of claim is served on you, if you are served in Ontario.
    If you are served in another province or territory of Canada or in the United States of America, the period for serving and filing your statement of defence is forty days. If you are served outside Canada and the United States of America, the period is sixty days.
    Instead of serving and filing a statement of defence, you may serve and file a notice of intent to defend in Form 18B prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. This will entitle you to ten more days within which to serve and file your statement of defence.
    IF YOU FAIL TO DEFEND THIS PROCEEDING, JUDGMENT MAY BE GIVEN AGAINST YOU IN YOUR ABSENCE AND WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE TO YOU. IF YOU WISH TO DEFEND THIS PROCEEDING BUT ARE UNABLE TO PAY LEGAL FEES, LEGAL AID MAY BE AVAILABLE TO YOU BY CONTACTING A LOCAL LEGAL AID OFFICE.
    (Where the claim made is for money only, include the following:)
    IF YOU PAY THE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM, and $157.00 for costs, within the time for serving and filing your statement of defence you may move to have this proceeding dismissed by the court. If you believe the amount claimed for costs is excessive, you may pay the plaintiff’s claim and $400 for costs and have the costs assessed by the court.
    Date August 26, 2004
    Issued by
    Local registrar
    Address of
    court office
    TO: 1) Mackay, Mackay, & Peters Limited.
    3380 South Service Rd., Burlington, Ontario, L7N 3J5,
    905-639-1375
    C/O James D. Higginson (Barrister)
    700-4 Hughson Street South, Hamilton, Ontario, L8N 3Z1
    905-525-4545 fax 905-523-4144
    2) Mrs. Dasha Page C/O Mackay, Mackay, & Peters Limited
    C/O James D. Higginson (Barrister)
    700-4 Hughson Street South, Hamilton, Ontario, L8N 3Z1
    905-525-4545 fax 905-523-4144
    3) Mr. Clarke C/O Mackay, Mackay, & Peters Limited
    3380 South Service Road, Burlington, Ontario, L7N 3J5
    905-639-1375
    4) Watts Industries (Canada) Inc.
    5435 North Service Road, Burlington, Ontario, L7L 5H7
    905-332-4090 fax 905-332-7068
    5) Dina Waik C/O Ontario Human Rights Commission
    180 Dundas Street West 7th Floor, Investigation Department
    Toronto, ON, M7A 2R9
    416-212-2045 fax 416-314-3571
    6) Shannon Meadows-Lee C/O Ontario Human Rights Commission
    180 Dundas Street West 7th Floor, Investigation Department
    Toronto, ON, M7A 2R9
    416-212-2045 fax 416-314-3571
    7) Ontario Human Rights Commission
    180 Dundas Street West 7th Floor
    Toronto, ON, M7A 2R9
    8) Minister of Attorney General, Crown Law Office, Civil Law
    720 Bay Street, 8th Floor
    Toronto, ON, M5G 2K1

    CLAIM
    1. THE PLAINTIFF CLAIMS AGAINST THE DEFENDANT:

    (a) Damages for MMP Limited for wrongful dismissal, bad faith termination, and retaliatory discharge and violation to the Occupational Health and Safety Act Section 50 in the sum of notice period of $940.65 and increase in the notice period per Wallace Damages plus 4% vacation pay on the notice and increase as per the amount that this Honourable Court may deem just;

    (b) Special damages for MMP Limited in the sum of 5 sick days $470.33 per company policy implemented May 2002, loss in wages during injury to health leave of absence of $9,040.00 (August 2002 to January 20th 2003 summary dismissal date) plus 4% vacation pay on loss in wages of $380.41;

    (c) Special damages shared by both MMP Limited and Watts Industries for medical expenses
    of Psychological Assessment and Therapy by Dr. Pomeroy of $3861.73 and such other
    special damages that shall be proven at the trial of this Action;

    (d) Special damages for MMP Limited of Ambulance charge of $45.00, payment of portion
    owed by MMP Limited for drug receipts submitted with November 29th letter total of
    $23.33 (20 % of total $116.64), plus medication for injury to health of $351.73 up to date
    of benefits activation at new employer in May 2003;

    (e) Special damages of MMP’s contribution for medical, dental and health coverage for each
    month from December 2002 to May 10th 2003;

    (f) Aggravated damages for contributing to employee’s deficiency, inducement of procuring the breach of contract, wrongful interference with employment relationships, and other tortious actions with malice and reckless disregard for my employee rights for Mackay (vicarious liability), Mrs. Page and Mr. Clarke in the sum of $15,000 each; and for Watts Industries in the sum of $100,000 or amount that this Honourable Court may deem just;

    (g) Punitive damages for defamation of character and loss of reputation causing tortious actions and obstruction of justice by commission for Mackay (vicarious liability), Mrs. Page and Mr. Clarke in the amount of $15,000 each; and for Watts Industries in the sum of $100,000 or amount that this Honourable Court may deem just;

    (h) Special damages to MMP Limited and Watts Industries for injury to health inducing depression causing decline of future benefits from future employers’ insurance benefits for Life, AD&D and Long Term Disability in the amount that this Honourable Court may deem just;

    (i) Punitive and aggravated damages for additional injurious falsehoods, deceit, emotional distress and defamation by MMP Limited, Dasha Page, Ross Clark as expressed in the December 2004 Ontario Human Rights case analysis in the amount that this Honourable Court my deem just;

    (j) Aggravated damages against Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, Ontario Human Rights Commission, and Minister of Attorney General, for the MMP and Watts December 2004 fabrication of case analysis to obstruct/refuse referral to Tribunal of prima facie complaints causing additional emotional distress, a total award of $50,000 split among the defendants or amount that this Honourable Court may deem just;

    (k) Punitive damages against Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, Ontario Human Rights Commission, and Minister of Attorney General, for the MMP and Watts December 2004 fabrication of case analysis and sham investigation to obstruct/refuse referral to Tribunal of prima facie complaint of $100,000 split among the defendants or amount that this Honourable Court may deem just;

    (l) Exemplary damages against all defendants as this Honourable Court may deem just.

    (m) Prejudgment and post judgment interest pursuant to the Courts of Justice Act R.S.O. 1990;

    (n) Costs of this Action; and

    (o) Such further and other relief as Counsel may advise and that this Honourable Court may deem just.

    1. The Plaintiff, Ms. Claudette Losier, is an individual who resides in Hamilton, Ontario.

    2. The Defendant is a body corporate, incorporated pursuant to the laws of the Province of Ontario and carrying on business in and around Burlington, Ontario; two of the managers who are the “directing minds”; third party also a body corporate, incorporated pursuant to the laws of the Province of Ontario and carrying on business in and around Burlington, Ontario; third parties in a quasi-judicial process pursuant to the laws of the Province of Ontario, two employees of the quasi-judicial organization, and the Ministry overall responsible for their agents.

    3. I plead that I commenced employment with the Defendants at Watts Industries in 1998 and in 2001 I was constructively dismissed through a Human Rights process including settlement of 4 months. I faithfully and diligently performed my duties on behalf of the Defendant while the Defendant and staff diligent harass me via work group mobbing throughout this period which resulted in two visits to lawyers office with no resolution, a Human Rights discrimination complaint settled in 2001, separation from my husband and injury to my health leading to reactive depression, suicide thoughts and attempt and finally hospitalization and misdiagnosis of a delusional disorder of persecution type. The harassment at Watts included the President of the Company, Mr., Fifer, following me around on my lunch hours off work premises and following me home to Stoney Creek to intimidate me and promote paranoid thoughts to discredit me with a mental illness when I go to the authorities.

    During my employment at Watts, I started to notice same contemptuous mocking treatment happening in my personal life most noticeably in an Alanon meeting fellow member Mary gesturing around her breast as if she was a striper wearing tassels and looking at me as she performs this vulgar gesture at an Alanon meeting. I infer that Watts defame my character per se unchaste woman in my personal life as well because the mobbing tactics within the workplace was not wearing me down emotionally fast enough and I showed no sign of quitting and they knew I was documenting their abuse and had excellent documentation. One example of this invasion of my personal life is that at Watts I was meant to overhear conversation between Greg Sampson and Joan, where Joan asked Greg if he went to see my art show in Simcoe and he responded not yet but that his brother lives in Simcoe. I did not tell anyone at Watts about my art show in Simcoe, so they received that information from my personal life hence my belief of super surveillance. Also, David Lord a sales manager for the Drain department ran into me at art opening in Hamilton and he knows the same art members from the Hamilton Artist Inc. group that I know and I infer he spread some rumors about what was going on at Watts and caused that group to also treat me with contempt including mocking sexual harassment nonsense. One intimidation tactic employed was inviting Barry Koeplin, the District Manager at Rentway where I use to work, to Dan Bowes office for private meeting with my supervisor Troy Nantais. Then later follow me to lunch where I would again see my current supervisor talking to my ex Disctrict Manager to provoke fear and shame that they were discussing my sexual harassment complaint at Rentway. There was also one incident where I went to my supervisor’s, Lili Murphy’s office and overheard her retrieve her messages and the voice I heard was my ex supervisor Aileen Howden from Rentway. This incident happened after I talked to ex Rentway employee, Jane Harris, who advised me that she too went to management regarding harassment by same male coworker.

    This conspiracy campaign to injure me with a mental illness started at Watts during 1998 to 2001 to for the sole purpose to discredit my complaints to the authorities and my OHIP record is evidence of this injury while employed at Watts. My injury to health is very well documented by my OHIP medical billing records from 1997 to 2004 to show that the first time I went to see a medical profession for any mental injury was in March 1999 for billing of anxiety. That this assessment changed to billing of “paranoid states” by January 2001 as a result of the continuous mobbing at Watts which includes deceit and at the time of my attempts to resolve my work issues with the Ontario Human Rights Commission, and from June 2001 to August 2002 with additional billings of various disorders including Schizophrenia. I state that the assessment at this time is the result of the psychiatrist not looking at all the facts in making their assessment only behaviours and is violation of my mental health rights under section 15 (2) of the Mental Health Act since at this time I already had two internal memos of sexual harassment. It is also a reflection of the effects of intentional infliction of emotional distress in that when I saw this psychiatrist I was highly inflamed with overwhelming anger and irritability to the point of not being able to properly express myself. If they saw me when my emotions were at normal level they would not have made the assessment that they did. This is apparent in September 2002 as the psychiatrist in Stoney Creek were seeking advice from the lawyers after I sent out my complaints of their assessment to the Ontario College of Surgeons and Physicians which resulted in the psychiatrist closing my file on September 19th 2002. I argued that my behaviour in 2001 and 2002 that resulted in a misdiagnosis also exemplifies behaviour of someone suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder as a result of work abuse and I reference article from the National Center for PTSD in the US of “A Conceptual Framework For The Impact of Traumatic Experiences”. Also, the facts in 2001 contradict an assessment of persecution as I had 2 written memos from management at two different places of employment clearly stating I was the target of sexual harassment plus one Human Rights in process settlement of discrimination complaint, which is evidence that I was being persecuted.

    4. I plead that while I was employed at Watts, Mr. Fifer the president of the Burlington location set out to publicly humiliate me with label a “Troublemaker” because Rentway passed distorted information regarding my 1995 internal sexual harassment complaint to teach me a lesson. This included addresses by Linn Shea of “hi trouble” and later moving this address through the work group with selected individuals, and also comments in my presence of “can’t do that that’s sexual harassment.” For their Human Rights rebuttal, Watts creates another incident where Steve Wilhem addresses me as “hi trouble” after I submitted my Human Rights complaint in the fall 2000 to induce me to complain again and when I do he drafts up an apology letter and submits it to HR manager and management then submits this apology letter for their rebuttal to my Human Rights Complaint. Watts’ management made no internal investigation with the other incidents of “hi trouble” as per their rebuttal and only note this manufactured incident in their rebuttal with apology letter to image to authorities innocence of wrongdoing. By doing so they demonstrate that there was no confidentiality with regards to my complaint, they manufacture the truth that they did no internal investigation of my complaints, and they committed the tort of deceit.

    The most humiliating harassment that I received occurred in December 1998 with a room full of managers involved in what I would call entrapment tactic and this incident is a reflection of the condoning of sex in the workplace as corporate culture at Watts Industries. I was requested to go to the IS manager’s office under pretext of work related problem, and when I arrive the IS Manager exposes me to sexual animated cartoon of Bill Clinton and Monica in the Oval Office in the act. In this room laughing was: VP of Finance (Dan Bowes), Accounts Payable manager (Linn Shea), Accounting manager (Lili Murphy), and across the hall watching in the doorway was the Payroll manager (Glen Griffith), and HR manager “Malcolm). This incident was obviously willfully planned and intentional with malice and reckless disregard for my employee rights, and feelings. This incident represents what I call the “entrapment” tactic to provoke me in condoning sex in the workplace and to discredit me that sex in the workplace does not bother me which gets repeated later at MMP Limited, and 3 additional employers after MMP Limited. Furthermore, when we return to work in January the HR manager Malcolm did not return, and I was the first one given the sexual harassment policy written up by Mr. Fifer, the president, to sign. This too shows how this corporation condones breaking the rules by management for sport and later when fear of being challenged or exposed they image themselves as promoters of the rules and hide behind their sexual harassment policy to basically harass selected employee.

    The coworker in the receivable department thought it would be fun to subjugate me with another sexual picture on the anniversary of the first, and she did this in December 1999 with managements backing. The entrapment tactic was used again to request my attention under false pretext to her desk and then she subjugates me with email close up picture of a penis and her desk is directly across from the HR manager’s office with open door and the HR manager Michelle sitting in her office. Furthermore, Dan Bowes (VP of Finance) walks by and sees the penis image and all he does is say “what was that”. This behaviour did not give me the confidence that Dan Bowes or HR manager took the sexual harassment policy serious nor the corporation as a whole but rather hide behind their policies to harass employees for sport. I filed sexual harassment complaint against this employee, and afterwards the mobbing increased and I filed Human Rights complaint in fall of 2000 as they would not stop the mobbing. They continued to sexualize my work environment which also included my male supervisor promoting me to look at papers in his lap with question how I would handle that credit problem, VP of Finance and VP of Drain Sales standing by my desk grabbing their groin in my presence, followed by Thomas Ho continuously coming to my desk to fiddle with his belt even after I complain to him, female employees gesturing around their breast to encourage leering at the gestures around their breast and one female staff walking by me sticking out her chest. In their 2001 rebuttal to the commission they fabricate that Dan Bowes did not see the pornographic image of a penis and said “what was that” which is the tort of deceit and breach of fiduciary duty, and also breach of internal due process as management failed to advise me of this deceit at the time of the internal due process for this sexual harassment incident. Some of these anti-social behaviours were repeated at MMP and 3 additional employers in a row. There is precedent of a corporate culture that disregards sexual harassment complaints found in case of Clark v. Canada.

    5. I plead that I received the following additional hostile mobbing anti-social behaviour of derogatory comments in my presence directly and indirectly to isolate me, to induce me to quit or injury to my health to breach the contract at Watts Industries of: sucks to be you, hi trouble, you couldn’t leave us alone, there’s Claudette we don’t need her, are you going to job interview well you should, your still here boy you must be one tough lady (VP of Sales), I enjoy irritating people (by Sherry), whatever (by Sherry), I want to say something sexual (by Sherry), I would like to take a course on selecting porn sites (by Sherry), I saw it (by Sherry), Oh God Oh God Help me (by Sherry), I’m a shit disturber (by Sherry), we would not want to make any mistakes and get away with it, loser loser (supervisor Lili Murphy and Beth), there won’t be a next time, I should check this to make sure you’re not ripping the company off (supervisor Lili Murphy), oops can’t do that that would be sexual harassment, I was told you no longer work there, I’ll be charged with harassment, Claudette leave I’m tired of looking at you (by supervisor Diane Horten), here comes the evil woman, are you having fun yet (after misapplication tactic), this has your name on it can’t deny its yours, I’m in denial, in case you want to work today, I’m up here to harass your employees, a pile of money would be nice (HR manager), it may get worst before it gets better (HR manager), Sherry told me to do it, fuck, tattoo on male friend’s penis, I’m receiving preferential treatment (by Sherry gloating about herself), I should pick on someone else (by Sherry feigning victim hood), it is hard to get respect around here (by Sherry to mock comment I made), I have to be good (by Sherry after my harassment complaint against her), etc. These were persistent disparaging remarks disguised as jokes in my presence to mock and harass me and my convictions that sex does not belong in the work place by several members of the work group including managers demonstrating a corporate culture of condoning mobbing behaviour and sexual harassment, and also reckless disregard for the Human Rights Code.

    The above derogatory comments fits the definition of defaming one’s character per se unchaste woman due to filing an internal sexual harassment complaint causing others to treat that person with contempt and ridicule for that complaint and conviction. Also, I had sent two emails to my supervisor, Troy Nantais, that he was providing me with differential treatment within the Accounts Receivable Department, and shortly after sending him the second email HR manager dismissed him from Watts. During this time I was also documenting sabotaging of my work by Troy and Sherry intentionally applying cash for my clients to 30 day invoices instead of applying cash to 90 invoices per the client’s cheques. This was to affect my 90 days results and another tactic to provoke annoyance. This behaviour by the work group is a breach of the implied terms of contract that the employer is to treat the employee with an environment of respect, civility and dignity. Some of these disparaging remarks disguised as jokes that I found to be hostile or mocking/ridiculing and treating me with contempt was repeated at MMP as per the material facts listed from #36 through #114.

    6. I plead that I signed the 2000 settlement agreement and indemnification release form under duress with threat by Watts’ Human Resource manager’s comment in February 2001 of “it may get worst before it gets better’ and bribe “a pile of money would be nice”. I also received the additional threat in May 2001 in the form of a fabricated warning notice by my supervisor, Lili Murphy, that I did not sign and sent challenge to commission showing this notice to be an example of differential treatment with an email of badgering and use of double speak communication from Sherry Khan with copies to Lili Murphy just prior to receiving this warning notice for my allege abuse of use of email. Also, Watts requested the commission dismissed my 2000 complaint under section 34 of the Code for being frivolous, vexatious, and in bad faith showing to be a breach of fiduciary duty and attempting to again label me a “troublemaker.” Watts again requested that my 2004 reprisal complaint be dismissed because I signed this indemnification release under section 34 and the commission did not dismiss my complaint because of my arguments that Watts signed in bad faith and are hiding behind this release form to further harass me like it’s a license for additional character assassination, and because I signed under duress.

    The duress includes a separation from my husband in 2001. My husband requested that we separated because the abuse at Watts caused me to isolate and I refused to socialize as an anger management tool not because of fear and this bothered my husband plus my overwhelming anger at that time. I started with the suicide ideation perhaps by end of 2000 and vocalizing these thoughts to my husband. The separation on top of the work abuse at Watts pushed me over the edge to attempt suicide in May 2001. My husband than had me committed to psych ward to protect me from myself. I was released in July and I signed the 2000 settlement in October 2001. I was not healthy enough to refuse the settlement nor to request the commission to move to the investigation stage as I was still separated from my husband with no support system living in an apartment by myself on Watts’ benefit program should I proceed further plus now had the added disadvantage of a misdiagnosis of a delusional disorder of persecution type. I had no lawyer to assist me with my damages or properly advise me of this indemnification release. I agreed under duress to mitigate my damages to my injury to health to prevent additional injury. Unfortunately, Watts signed in bad faith and continued their harassment at Mackay in 2002 and it only took 5 months of repeating the same mobbing anti-social behaviour to get me back into that helpless reactive depression state with suicide ideation and attempt in August 2002 proving that I was not completely recovered the injury to my health by Watts.

    Watts signed this settlement agreement in Bad Faith and is behaving unlawful, and has a corporate culture of breaking rules and condoning sexual harassment, discrimination, scapegoat, mobbing and bullying, and complete disregard for employment law and human rights code and imaging to authorities that they abide by these laws when exposed. There is evidence of bad faith and unlawful actions by the defendants Watts and therefore the settlement agreement of final release of the 2000 complaint does not apply. The settlement by Watts also included a letter of assurance: provided assurance that they have and will continue to provide training to staff in an effort to insure compliance with the letter and spirit of the Code. The spirit of the Code also includes reprisal action which this letter of insurance is only another example of corporate imaging by Watts that they will abide by the Code similar to providing me a sexual harassment policy after a room full of managers subjugate me with sexual picture. I have abided by the release of claims up to that date and arising out of my work abuse experience at Watts from 1998 to 2001 by not filing common law remedies of a constructive dismissal suit and tortious actions against staff at Watts for the abuses that I received while employed from 1998 to 2001. My agreement to this release does not include additional harassment in 2002 to 2004 in the form of defamation of character, interference with employment relations, inducing breach of contract at next employers, conspiracy to injure, intentional emotional distress, injurious falsehoods, wrongful interference with employment relations, and Human Rights reprisal complaint and collusion with the commission. There is precedent for interference in employment relations and conspiracy in law in the following cases: Ahmad v. Ontario Hydro (interference), and Chahal v. Khalsa Community School (interference and inducing breach of contract, and conspiracy to injure).

    7. I plead that what I experience at Watts from 1998 to 2001, and Mackay in 2002, and later in 2003 and 2004 by 3 additional employers requiring the need for additional law suits is work group harassment called mobbing and blackguarding/scapegoat between employers. I commenced the following suits against the other conspirators in Small Claims Court that now needs to be moved up to the Superior Court: wrongful/constructive dismissal complaints against 3rd and 4th employers including tortious actions against 5 managers plus tortious actions including Misfeasance of Public office claim against intake staff at the commission and the commission. I will be also filing suit against 5th employer and Watts who dismissed me without cause after 2 months of repeating Watts’ modus operanti of sexualizing my work environment and repeating items in all of my human rights complaints particularly “sucks to be you” again and after 3.5 hours of receiving my second complaint letter alleging sexual harassment, discrimination and mobbing harassment, and management’s refusal to provide me with internal due process and terminated my employment alleging change in business. There is precedent in law of this form of harassment in Human Rights cases calling it “poisoned work environment” and now the new psychological harassment law in Quebec to update their labour act. Employment law still lacks a remedy for this form of harassment specifically and needs to advance further beyond the tort of intimidation, conspiracy to injure, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and sexual harassment to include the tort of work group mobbing to penalize the work group for condoning this anti-social behaviour to deter further abuses in the future. Today mobbing is a sport our in work system because it gets rewarded by silence as most targets are ignorant of the law that can protect them and because the legal system is too expensive. I would like to see a tort on mobbing created from my cases as there is a desperate need to deter this form of workplace harassment by the work group system and I have 5 suits to prove that fact with 4 employers in a row after my Watts “2000” complaint mobbing me, treating me with additional contempt and ridicule, and defrauding me of employment when previously I was highly praised by managers and staff.

    The current employment law system needs to advance in this area to stop this trend of corporate culture abuses and abuse of authority as severe mobbing/bullying can lead to more violence that of suicide and homicide (Ottawa OC Transport) resulting in deaths. Mobbing and bullying is a course of conduct to inflict emotional unnecessary stress as in the case of Boothman v. R. I refer to Kenneth Westhues’s (University of Waterloo) definition of mobbing that describes what I am experiencing and complaining about in my statement of claims and Human Rights complaints of: mobbing can be understood as the stressor to beat all stressors; it is an impassioned, collective campaign by co-workers to exclude, punish, and humiliate a targeted worker; initiated most often by a person in a position of power of influence, mobbing is a desperate urge to crush and eliminate the target; the urge travels through the workplace like a virus, infecting one person after another; the target comes to be viewed as absolutely abhorrent, with no redeeming qualities, outside the circle of acceptance and respectability, deserving only of contempt; as the campaign proceeds, a steadily larger range of hostile ploys and communications comes to be seen as legitimate; workplace mobbing is normally carried out politely, without any violence, and with ample written documentation; yet even without the blood, the bloodlust is essentially the same contagion and mimicking of unfriendly, hostile acts toward the target; relentless undermining of the target’s self-confidence; group solidarity against one whom all agree does not belong; and the euphoria of collective attack; humiliation of daily loathing from one’s peers. Kenneth also states the vulnerable position the target is put in is like “the worker has grabbed a hot wire and cannot let go, despite the pain and injury it inflicts” and he mentions in this article that targets “in the past been misdiagnosed as having paranoid delusions.” Mobbing is an abuse of power contest of abnormal stress endurance and the law needs to advance to deter and to protect the weak from being ganged up via mobbing to helpless position in the work place and outside of the workplace (i.e. schools, churches, any social group). I infer, that Mr. Fifer, the president was the person in position of power who influenced this mobbing and he received condoning by corporate office showing this problem to be a corporate culture and system problem of abuses of authority at Watts. Coincidently, Mr. Fifer left Watts on or around the date in December 2002 when I filed my reprisal complaint.

    Watts passed on this mobbing/scapegoat campaign via tort of interference and conspiracy with the management team of Mrs. Page and Mr. Clarke to continue same and/or similar mobbing behaviour with coworkers at MMP to injure me further with permanent persecution disorder as per the material facts listed from #36 to #114, and post mobbing #115 to #142. The post mobbing also represents material fact that supports tort of deceit, breach of fiduciary duty and duty to care, and inducing breach of contract by MMP Limited, Mrs. Page, and Ross Clarke, and includes the OHRC. My evidence will show that the spreading of this mobbing virus includes the commission resulting in fabrication of insufficient evidence of prima facie complaints in December 2004 to protect Watts’ campaign.

    8. I plead that the Watts Industries deliberately and knowingly set out to destroy my reputation, with defamation per se unchaste woman and unfit to work, and interfere with my employment relations to publicly humiliate me for blowing the whistle on them and to cause injury of a permanent delusional disorder of persecution type as a result of my 2000 Ontario Human Rights Complaint with the staff at Mackay, and later through 3 additional employers. The material facts demonstrate this loss of reputation and public humiliation at MMP listed from #36 to #142 and starts with the exposure to sexual picture again. There is also precedent in law of this form of scapegoat and blackguarding by employers contacting next employers to ruin the employee’s career and I refer to Mackenzie v. Cuddeford (1986). There is also precedent in law of this corporate culture of scapegoat employee for dismissal with fabricated cause who make sexual harassment complaint and I refer to Campbell v. Wellfund Audio-Visual Ltd. (1995). I believe this because the medical assessment in 2001 was a working assessment not a permanent assessment, which I infer that had Watts Industries not interfered and Mackay not acted upon the information supplied to them I would not have received a misdiagnosis in 2002 of a delusional disorder because I told psychiatrist I was being bullied and scapegoat at MMP Limited and would not need today to medication on Paxil in order to work. This medical assessment is a license to harass me further to silence a whistleblower with a mental illness which Watts took full advantage of my disclosure to them in 2001 of this assessment.

    My claim of a scapegoat campaign to induce a mental illness of persecution type is further substantiate by the fact that Mrs. Page breaches her fiduciary duty and sets out to deceive the WSIB in August 20th letter with false fact that I made no complaints, and later that I said to her “people were out to get me”, acts in bad faith by providing me one reason for termination in letter dated January 20th, 2003, which is different from termination reason provided to Ontario Human Rights commission and later to Small Claims Court in Burlington, and no reason for dismissal with cause in her defense for Superior Court claim, and finally new reason of disarray of books in the commission case analysis that I only received in December 2004. Mrs. Page’s last reason for Small Claims Court was for termination was due to long absence; an absence caused by the work environment where Mrs. Page abdicated her responsibility with malice and breach of duty to care, and later failed to provide me with any form of communication of accommodation for my depressed state of being cause by hers and her staffs’ behaviour. The fact that Mrs. Page never contacted me to see when I might return is also an example of differential treatment as when I was employed she advised me to call Kenny who was off on WSIB for injury to his leg and asked him when he might return to work. This is how we defraud one of employment and health.

    9. I plead that the misdiagnosis of a delusional disorder is behind conspiracy campaign resulting in the additional harassment at Mackay and 3 more employers, and the commission obstructing natural justice of not referring 4 prima facie complaints to the Tribunal. Watts Industries received letter from St. Joseph’s hospital in 2001 that I was under their care for this disorder in order to receive benefits from them. Watts Industries has reason to continue this scapegoat campaign to do permanent damage and defraud me out of employment and out of perfect health status due to this misdiagnosis and my signing an indemnification release form in 2001in retaliation for exposing their poison work environment and discriminatory behaviour with the Ontario Human Rights Commission in 2000/2001. There is precedent in law demonstrating that Employers do retaliate. I refer to the EEOC Cases by Complaint Type found in the CareerJournal.com article “What to Do When Employers Retaliate” by Loring N. Spolter: “This chart clearly shows that retaliation by Employers is a growing problem and concern: 1990 7,579 cases to 1997 18,113 cases.” Retaliation by Employers is a known fact and behaviour for those of us to stand up and challenge employers’ unlawful behaviours and the law needs to advance to curb this escalating authoritarian work abuse system before it gets too uncontrollable and more lives/careers are destroyed by Corporations and corporate culture of retaliation.

    Prior to working for Watts Industries, I had perfect health with no mental disorder or depression. My OHIP records from 1997 to 2004 show that I seeked attention for anxiety the first time on March 18th, 1999, while employed at Watts. This conspiracy to injure campaign at Mackay did in fact prove effective as it did cause injury both health wise with another misdiagnosis of delusional disorder and financially. I was hospitalized in August 2002 and the psychiatrist misdiagnosed with a delusional disorder of persecution type again because I told him I was being bullied at Mackay. This psychiatrist violated my rights under the mental health act section 15 (2) in that he did not make an independent assessment and therefore did not look at all the facts in making his assessment. The mental health diagnostic (DSM-IV) for delusional disorder of persecution type as it reads is a mental health trap to silence those who challenge the system/authority as follows: This subtype applies when the central theme of the delusion involves the person’s belief that he or she is being conspired against, cheated, spied on, followed, poisoned or drugged, maliciously maligned, harassed, or obstructed in the pursuit of long-term goals. Small slights may be exaggerated and become the focus of a delusional system. The focus of the delusion is often on some injustice that must be remedied by legal action (“querulous paranoia”), and the affected person may engage in repeated attempts to obtain satisfaction by appeal to the courts and other government agencies. Individuals with persecutory delusions are often resentful and angry and may resort to violence against those they believe are hurting them. It is easy to harass one into exhibiting these alleged delusional behaviour traits particularly through 4 employers in a row. It’s as easy as calling up next employer and passing information about the selected target.

    My evidence will show that two managers after Watts were bantering of this disorder and actually put in writing after I filed suit/complaint to the authorities that I said “people out to get me” and/or they felt I had fears of “people out to get me” inferring connection with this misdiagnosis and Watts. I refer to article “Perceived-Disability Discrimination An Often Overlooked But Potentially Problematic Area of the ADA” by Gary Costales: perceived-disability discrimination becomes an issue when an employer treats an employee who may or may not have some sort of physical or mental impairment less favorably than others based on a perception that the employee is disabled; quite often, the best evidence of perceived-disability discrimination comes from the comments an employer makes to an employee who may or may not have impairment. I infer that in my case because it is the perceived-disability of delusions that it is not only the comments but the behaviour of continuously harassing me treating me less favorably than others and complete refusal to treat me respectfully instead of contempt and ridicule as evidence.

    Dasha Page treated me less favorably by alleging incompetence and reduction of work and she made one indirect comment of “delusion” in my presence in March and she made the comment that I said “people were out to get me” to both WSIB and the Ontario Human Rights commission, and finally Dasha Page abdicated her duty to care and never contacted me once about my health nor to provide accommodation for my injury to health, nor pay me 5 sick days per policy or respond to my November/December letters to her. Plus Mrs Page sends to my home on January 20th 2003 a termination letter in direct violation of the Occupational Health and Safety Act section 50 and the criminal code 425.1 demonstrates Retaliatory Discharge. Based on this pattern alone by Dasha, which demonstrates discrimination and reprisal, I can only infer the case analysis by the commission to not refer to the Tribunal is collusion with MMP and a form of accessory after the fact someone who helps a person who has committed a crime to escape detention or capture as outlined in section 23 of the Criminal Code. That crime is not just discrimination but a conspiracy to injure me with a mental illness of the type of “people out to get me”.

    10. I plead in the alternative that this Watts Industries defamation and conspiracy campaign is also to image me a “vexatious litigant” because I make complaints that I am allowed to do by law, and by Charter. Watts knowing my character knew that I would complaint again if the same items as in my 2000 complaint were repeated. My material facts listed at #36 to #142, and evidence with 3rd, 4th, and 5th employer will demonstrate this pattern of labeling my complaints vexatious. Watts Industries attempted to dismiss my 2000 complaint under section 34 and label my 2000 complaint as being vexatious, frivolous, and made in bad faith. They did not succeed and have retaliated ever since with each new employer repeating items out of that complaint and attempting as well to dismiss my Human Rights Complaint under section 34 for being vexatious, frivolous and made in bad faith, with all refusing to tell the truth and all failing at a section 34 dismissal request. This is an attempt to relitigate a vexatious claim against me by Watts through other employers by passing the items that I stated was harassment in my 2000 complaint to next employer for them to relitigate vexatious complaint. My Human Rights Complaints against MMP, Xentel, Lyman were also not dismissed under section 34 of the code for being frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith in 2003/2004. In 2004, MMP Limited attempted to dismiss my civil suit against them for being abuse of process and was denied that motion. Also, Lyman Custom Brokers attempted a similar motion in May 2004 for no cause of action, frivolous, vexatious, abuse of process, and attempted to label me a “vexatious litigant”. Judge R. Nairn dismissed their motion in September 2004.

    Since the Human Rights section 34 arguments for these employers failed to dismiss my complaints, Watts then enlist the aid of the commission investigation staff to provide me with a sham investigation and to fabricate insufficient evidence to not refer my prima facie complaints to the Tribunal under section 36 (2). My reconsideration application arguing this fact that I received a sham investigation to image to authorities that I received a proper investigation and that I do not have sufficient evidence of discrimination resulted in the Chief Commissioner’s decision to reconsider under section 37 (2) of the code around February 24th 2005 for the complaints against the following employers: Watts, MMP Limited, Xentel and Lyman. The Respondents should have responded back by March 11th 2005 and as of May 6th I have not received a response which leads me to believe a breach of duty of fairness again from the commission that the respondents are receiving more than the 15 day limit to respond to a section 37 (2). I have sent several faxes to the reconsideration department without response back to my inquiries.

    Furthermore, In 2005 I filed complaint against the 5th employer Kinros owned by Laurentide Manufacturing and sister company Laurentide Custom Woodworking, and reprisals against Watts, MMP Limited, Xentel, and Lyman. This time the commissioner attempted to not deal with five of these complaints except the Kinros complaint under section 34 for alleging being vexatious where previously the commission staff never attempted a section 34. I again submitted arguments that the commission has no grounds for a section 34 for being vexatious and the Chief Commissioner quickly sent me back his decision to forward all of these complaints to the respondents under section 37 (2) around the first week in April 2005 instead of maintaining the commission had grounds for vexatious and section 34 dismissal. A reconsideration means no complaints have been dismissed at this point, that is a total of 10 complaints and a 12th complaint against Laurentide Custom Woodworking that the commission refuses to respond to my inquiry for decision and first complaint settled in 2001. If they had been dismissed I would be submitting my application at the Appeal Courts. These applications will be part of my evidence.

    What the above material facts and evidence demonstrates is that I am extremely credible and I do not make vexatious complaints nor do I image the truth. That there is an Authoritarian Work Abuse System through these employers and the commission to image the truth with generalized denials that I am not credible or lacking sufficient evidence via tort of deceit, conspiracy to injure, defamation of my character, and Misfeasance of Public Office. As a result of this defamation that there is a campaign to harass me to get me to complain again of items in my Human Rights Complaints to image that I am delusional with a persecution disorder and if that does not work than to label me and my complaints vexatious or fabricate insufficient evidence.

    11. I plead that my employment at MMP was wrongfully terminated with summary dismissal with cause in retaliation for exposing MacKay’s poison work and sexualized work environment and interference by Watts with a WSIB claim of negative stressors in the workplace causing injury to health by way of tortious actions of deceit, fraudulent misrepresentation, conspiracy, and inducing breach of contract and in bad faith. Mrs. Page and Mr. Clarke, made false statements regarding the status of my employment complaints and situation in an effort to misled and pervert the processing of my WSIB claim and to prevent me from obtaining benefits under the Workers Compensation Act, and later difficulties in obtaining benefits from their private Insurance Company RWAM (Ambulance expense), drug reimbursement, and sick days, with the Employment Standards Office, with the OHRC, and now with the Superior Court of Justice. There is precedent in law for this behaviour to mislead such authorities as the WSIB in: Antonacci v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada (1998).

    My termination letter states because my WSIB claim was denied and my allegations not substantiated. Just prior to receiving the January 20th, 2003, termination letter I was in the process of settling an Employment Standards claim of withholding overtime pay due to me which also could be a contributing factor in my dismissal. In the US at-will state terminating employee’s employment after filing both WSIB claim and Employment Standards claim is considered Retaliatory Discharge and illegal in US law. Since the defendants at MMP Limited did not yet receive my Ontario Human Rights Complaint in January 2003, my discrimination complaint against them could not have been a contributing factor in their decision to terminate my employment, only my complaints of sexual and poisoned work environment in my WSIB claim and Employment Standards claims, and my complaint of Watts passing on slanderous information for which I was receiving the same tactics.

    Also my termination letter is a violation of the Whistleblower legislation as part of the Occupational Health and Safety Act (Section 50) and new legislation passed by Parliament that make reprisals against Whistleblowers a general criminal indictable or summary offence per section 425.1 of the Criminal Code. It clearly states no employer or person acting on behalf of an employer or in a position of authority in respect of an employee of the employer shall take a disciplinary measure against, demote, terminate, or threaten to do so, adversely affect the employment of such an employee, or threaten to do so (b) with the intent to retaliate against the employee because the employee has provided information referred to in paragraph (a) to a person whose duties include the enforcement of federal or provincial law; (2) Any one who contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of (a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years; or (b) an offence punishable on summary conviction. My termination clearly states that my employment was terminated because my WSIB claim was denied and my allegation not substantiated, that is a discipline measure of termination because I provided information to a person whose duties include the enforcement of provincial law. The injurious falsehoods of gross incompetence of disarray of books only being used by the Human Rights commission only in December 2004 is additional retaliation and now violation of section 425.1 of the criminal code. Also, MMP’s behaviour of continuously changing the reason they dismissed me after I out argue the original reasons demonstrates bad faith termination and creates Wallace damages.

    12. I plead that I was hired at MMP in Bad Faith conspiring with Watts to continue the mobbing and psychological tactics per my Watts 2000 Human Rights Complaint to induce permanent delusional disorder. This passing on items that annoys me is in the form of practical joker passing around slanderous information for the purpose of malice to wear me down emotionally and is the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. I refer to Wilkinson v. Downtown where one joke induced a state of nervous shock and prolonged mental and physical suffering. Why not it worked from 1998 to 2001 and landed me in the psych ward with suicide attempt in June 2001 and a misdiagnosis of delusional disorder so lets do it again. Anger is a symptom of depression and so by daily repeating items in my 2000 complaint and creating new tactics to annoy me and to provoke my anger or an emotional knee jerk reaction the MMP defendants demonstrates premeditation to injure me. At Mackay it worked and only took 5 months as per the material facts listed from #36 to #114 to reopen this injurious psychiatric wound to reach reactive depression levels again with overwhelming anger and anxiety, loss of appetite and weight, suicide ideation and attempt and hospitalization in August 2002.

    In fact, the final incident at Mackay that pushed me into the reactive depression on August 14th took place on August 9th when Ross Clarke came to my desk to intimidate me asking for his signed copy of the Sexual Harassment policy which he intentionally withheld from me. Ross Clarke’s behaviour was intentional to provoke fear and insinuate that someone was going to charge me with sexual harassment hence his intimidating request for the signed copy only from me on this date. The material fact is listed at #84: “Also this morning around 10:30, Mr. Clarke came to my desk and in an intimidating tone asked me if I had signed the Sexual Harassment Policy Form causing distress and making it look like I was at fault for doing something wrong. I advised that I did not sign this form because management had not provided me with this document to sign. I stated that we had spoken about this policy in March and that no one at Mackay could supply me with a copy of this policy as noted in my day timer. Mr. Clarke was angry by this comment and yelled that he did not care what I noted down and that I should not get so defensive. I asserted myself again and said to Mr. Clarke, you asked if I signed this sexual harassment form and I told you that I did not because you did not supply me with one in March per your discussion with me in March. Mr. Clarke then called up Carol in Windsor to fax me over a copy of the sexual harassment policy. At 10:54 Mr. Clarke gave the fax copy of the policy to me to type in the Conditions of Employment computer file. Later Mr. Clarke made a display of himself in the boardroom in front of my desk discussing with a customer his sexual harassment policy and that he had a problem with an employee once who was looking at pornography on the internet while on company time that he had to be reprimanded. After I typed it I sent Ross Clarke email that the Sexual Harassment Policy was typed and he did not ask me for my signed copy again.” By August 14th I had difficulty concentrating and knew that I was now experiencing reactive depression not just overwhelming anger and anxiety.

    The anti-social behaviour directed at me starting on second day of employment with sexual picture exposure, followed by the repeating of phrase of “sucks to be” and addressing me as “claude” at MMP Limited which I infer that I was hired because of Watts’ interference and my vulnerability of being misdiagnosed with a delusional disorder of persecution type. I infer that this vulnerability was exploited from the onset first to control and embarrass me than later to induce me to break down mentally and quit, and to discredit me with injurious falsehoods that I said “people were out to get me” and later summary dismissal of gross incompetence. The material facts of this pattern of anti-social behaviour are list at #36 to #142. This abuse of authority in employment has precedent in law particularly in Boothman v. R., where an employee was severely harassed by a superior who had knowledge of her fragile mental state. The August 9th incident with the sexual harassment policy by Ross Clarke demonstrates a superior abusing his authority to intimidate his staff. I also refer to the new law in Quebec to update their labour act (section 81.18, and 81.19) implemented in June 2004 to prohibit psychological harassment, particularly mocking one’s convictions regarding sexual harassment, of the kind that I experience at Watts and later at Mackay.

    This action represents a loss in reputation due to defamation of my character that I am mentally ill and/or that I make false harassment complaints and that I am a troublemaker and therefore deserving of additional ridicule and contempt. I was induced into removing myself from employment at Mackay in August 2002 due to negative stressors in the work place causing injury to my health in the form of increasing unnecessarily my anxiety and anger to overwhelming levels into reactive depression that very quickly lead to suicidal thoughts and attempt. I was hospitalized and misdiagnosed with a delusional disorder as a result of conspiracy to injure within work group at Mackay due to Watts interference through behaviour of the following: repeating items in my Watts’ 2000 complaint, bullying, mobbing, psychological and sexual harassment, discrimination based on sex and perceived disability of a delusional disorder, intimidation, sabotaging my work via setting me up to fail, false criticism that does not reflect reality, withholding internal sexual harassment policy till August 9th after I requested it in March and April, public humiliation, dishonest and unethical treatment by management and abuse of authority. This misdiagnosis is evidence of my emotional distress as a result of harassment at MMP per the material facts listed from #36 to #114.

    13. I plead that the defendants Mrs. Page and Mr. Clarke and Watts Industries, deliberately and knowingly made false and erroneous allegations which were/are defamatory and were made to cause me economic harm and damage that adversely affected my relationship with co-workers, WSIB, Ontario Human Rights Commission, the Employment Standards Office, and Small Claims Court (precedent case: Duke v. Puts, 2004). This defamation of my character by defendants Watts and MMP with the commission resulted in the December 2004 case analysis from Shannon Meadows-Lee of the investigation department of the OHRC with many injurious falsehoods that are easily disputed to obstruct natural justice of referring my prima facie complaints against MMP and Watts to the Tribunal, and later refusal to refer decision by Chief Commissioner Keith Norton. These case analysis also represents the commission’s misfeasance of public office and other tortious actions such as deceit, defamation, conspiracy to injure, intentional emotional distress (acting on their knowledge of my injury to health vulnerability), injurious falsehoods; and criminal action of obstruction of justice, accessory after the fact, adding and abetting, concealing my evidence, and controlling witnesses to avoid adverse outcome.

    I also infer that the commission is colluding with both Watts and Mackay as they were late in submitting their defense statement causing noting in default, and motions to set aside default to file defence till closer to date of the OHRC’s submission of their case analyses, and both deny the material facts from #2 to #134 with general denials and are asking for stay of proceedings till the commission has made their decision in their original defence. I believe this due to the fact that MMP’s statement of defence only give general denials with no material fact to back up the denials particularly why they summary dismissed me with cause and no notice per rule 25.07 (3). I believe that both MMP and Watts would have submitted a motion to dismiss my claim based on the case analyses fabricating insufficient evidence provide to them by the OHRC as per their original defence statement. A stay of these proceedings should not be granted per the following reasons: it’s been already 2 years since my dismissal, collusion and obstruction by the OHRC, and I am currently unemployed again as a direct result of additional interference and repeating of items in my Human Rights Complaints, and I am having more difficulty finding replace work than I did in 2002. Plus the arguments found in Kurlyk v. Toronto (City) Board of Education of: ample precedent for allowing parallel proceedings which may result in different findings, deletion of exclusive jurisdiction clause permitting judicial incursion into areas formerly occupied by the commission, and assessment of damages is not beyond the ken of this court and the commission. The case of Skoptiz v. Intercorp Foods allowed an extension of the common law notice, consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Wallace, based on a finding that the employer had violated the Human Rights Code by not accommodating the plaintiff’s medical disability. It is feasible that a plaintiff may use both the civil claim and the human rights process in tandem.

    14. I plead that my claim in common law are for the remedies available for human rights abuses for MMP defendants are of: wrongful/constructive dismissal, and acting in Bad Faith (hire/termination); vicarious liability; torts of deceit, conspiracy to injure, intentional infliction of emotional distress, sexual harassment, intimidation and psychological harassment/mobbing; breach of company’s policies on harassment, inducing breach of contract; defamation (loss of reputation causing differential treatment, subjugation of anti-social behaviour, malice and reckless disregard for my rights), breach of duty of care, breach of fiduciary duty, wrongful interference with contractual rights or relations, injurious falsehoods, and absence of a duty to negotiate in good faith. There are common law remedies for discrimination and harassment that of wrongful/constructive dismissal and tortious acts as per the incidents of material fact listed from #36 to #114, and post mobbing of #115 to #142.

    My claim also includes common law remedies against Watts Industries for acting in bad faith by passing on to Mackay defamatory information from my 2000 Human Rights complain and breaching their agreement in that settlement to abide by the spirit of the Code, tort of intimidation, interference with employment relations, indirect interference with contractual relations, unlawful conspiracy, inducing breach of contract, injurious falsehoods, vicarious liability, and defamation via loss of reputation causing additional contemptible/ridiculing treatment and another poison work environment repeating items I complain in my 2000 Human Rights Complaint against them. Watts influenced the discriminating/contemptuous conduct that I received by the defendants at MMP per the material facts listed at #36 to #142, which offends the code of Human Rights and supports my claims in common law including punitive damages particularly when this behaviour by both these employers is also violation of criminal code 425.1. Plus, there is the need for the legal system to advance and to implement Retaliatory Discharge tort as in the United States and create the tort of mobbing and hiring in Bad Faith. I refer to the US retaliatory discharge tort and the two cases in Canada that have been allowed to proceed of: Ruggeiro v. Emco Ltd. (1993), 6 C.C.E.L. (2d) 57 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.); Duplessis v. Walwyn Stodgell, Cochran Murray Ltd. (1988), 20 C.C.E.L., 245 (B.C.S.C.). My statement of claim for the above common law causes of actions is in the right jurisdiction and is not for the violation of the statute, as in Bhadauria, as I already have formal complaints at the OHRC against both corporate defendants.

    15. I plead that the extent of Watts’ defamation of my character extends beyond Watts Industries interference at Mackay and includes defaming my character with the Ontario Human Rights commission to cause an obstruction of natural justice and injurious falsehoods by the commission staff of insufficient evidence of prima facie complaints. The defamation of my character can easily be demonstrated based on my pass memos of performance by others prior to working at Mackay and MacKay’s description of my work ethics during my employment that they submitted to the Ontario Human Rights commission in their rebuttal to my complaint, in the December 2004 case analysis, and Mr. Clarke’s comments in his letter to the Employment Standards Office. I can show that in 1992 I was promoted to branch administrator; in 1993 I was recognized by my manager for my attention to Quality; in 1996 that same manager stated that my solid and reliable performance is appreciated; in 1999 from Watts manager being noted that I was a strong performer in accomplishing tasks and 2001 rating of 4 exceeding expectations in receivable duties; in 2002 reference letter from employer before Mackay that I was a conscientious, punctual employee who took her responsibilities very seriously; and then from Mackay claiming pe

    • 15. I plead that the extent of Watts’ defamation of my character extends beyond Watts Industries interference at Mackay and includes defaming my character with the Ontario Human Rights commission to cause an obstruction of natural justice and injurious falsehoods by the commission staff of insufficient evidence of prima facie complaints. The defamation of my character can easily be demonstrated based on my pass memos of performance by others prior to working at Mackay and MacKay’s description of my work ethics during my employment that they submitted to the Ontario Human Rights commission in their rebuttal to my complaint, in the December 2004 case analysis, and Mr. Clarke’s comments in his letter to the Employment Standards Office. I can show that in 1992 I was promoted to branch administrator; in 1993 I was recognized by my manager for my attention to Quality; in 1996 that same manager stated that my solid and reliable performance is appreciated; in 1999 from Watts manager being noted that I was a strong performer in accomplishing tasks and 2001 rating of 4 exceeding expectations in receivable duties; in 2002 reference letter from employer before Mackay that I was a conscientious, punctual employee who took her responsibilities very seriously; and then from Mackay claiming performance issues without progressive discipline process for wrongful dismissal excuse after they received my Human Rights complaint against them when original reason for termination is reprisal action under the Code and violation of criminal code 425.1. I can also show fabrication of warning letter at Watts Industries to paint me a trouble-maker and lacking in team spirit which was successfully challenged in fax to commission in May 2001.

      MacKay’s defamatory reference for me in their response to Human Rights commission was the following: the respondents state that the employment was terminated following a significant absence and due to performance issues (proving discrimination based on real disability); Dasha Page was upset by the conversation given the nature of the conversation and the bizarre accusations that were being made, the Respondents considered terminating the employment immediately during the probationary period; it became clear that the Complainant could not handle the full responsibilities of the position and was really just not competent enough to perform to work in a busy office; Dasha Page denies that there was any conversation regarding quitting; the Respondents could have let her go during the probationary period but elected to try and preserve her position as she made it apparent that she needed the job; the Complainant was unable to operate the accounting duties and the Respondents were required to bring in additional help in order to do the accounting; there was significant damage done to the Respondents by virtue of the administration system implemented by the Complainant; and the Complainant maintained that extensive overtime was necessary in order for her to do the job, while the job had previously been done without the necessity of overtime. I submitted an excellent rebuttal to this fabrication causing additional fabrication by the defendants in the commission case analysis of disarray of books that were not mentioned in their rebuttal to my complaint that I received and was allowed to cross examine.

      My reputation as a good worker has been defamed by Watts Industries, and now Mackay to the point of not being able to receive fair employment without this continuation of Watts’ mobbing campaign at next employer nor good references for future job opportunities due to their actions, plus not being giving the appropriate work environment to grow and improve my skills, and is career stoppage. I also have the added problem of now having my Charter Rights obstructed by the OHRC. My excellent health record destroyed by the actions by these two employers causing intentionally injury to my health which resulted in loss of insurance benefits in 2003 at fourth employer in this campaign due to the fact now I have to reveal that I have suffered from depression when previously I did not.

      16. I plead that when I left Watts Industries in 2001 and after the time off for disability leave it took me one month of a job search before I was hired by Marshalls Transport who laid me off in January 2002 with no repeating items in my Human Rights complaint of exposure to sexual picture or sucks to be you comments. Again it only took me approximately one month of looking for work before I was hired by MMP Limited in March 2002 only for them to repeat items, particularly sexual picture and sucks to be comment, in my Watts Industries’ 2000 Human Rights Complaint and wrongfully breaching of contract in January 2003. Again it only took me one month from starting my job search in December 2002 to be hired by Xentel DM Incorporated for part time telemarketing position in January 2003 only to repeat items in my Watts Industries and MMP Limited Human Rights complaints followed by breach of that contract on September 15th 2003. While employed at Xentel for part time telemarketing position it only took me one month to find replacement full time accounting position at Lyman starting on February 2003 and only again to repeat items in my Watts and MMP Limited Human Rights Complaints with the OHRC colluding and passing additional information to Lyman and Xentel. Again my contract was breached wrongfully by Lyman on March 19th 2004. This pattern alone demonstrates a persecution order otherwise known as scapegoat campaign by Watts Industries after my 2000 Human Rights complaint against them to ruin my career and health for blowing the whistle on their illegal labour practices. In 2004 it took 6 months before I was rehired by Kinros/Laurentide in September 2004 only to repeat items in all of my Human Right Complaints and terminate my employment only 3.5 hours after I handed my second complaint letter. It’s now going on six months where I have submitted 90 resumes to various job openings with approximately 20 call backs for interviews and no job offer. This pattern of difficulty finding work is the result of Watts defaming my character per se of unchaste woman and/or unfit to work and their conspiracy scapegoat campaign through four employers in a row giving my resume the appearance I can’t hold down a job.

      17. I plead that I am experiencing significant loss of gross income because of Watts’s interference with my employment relations and career since 2001 and they are responsible along with their co-conspirators for this financial damage. My income tax return from 2001 to 2004 demonstrates this financial loss of gross income as a result of Watts Industries’ scapegoat campaign to ruin my career: 2001 $43,004 (includes 4 month settlement from Watts), 2002 $20,748, 2003 $38,887 (combine income from Xentel and Lyman), and 2004 $24,654.02. Currently my net income from 2005 is $3,640.00 from E.I. which I am no longer receiving. By the end of 2005 if this Watts induced blacklisting and defamation continues my damage from loss in gross income will be approximately an additional $35,000. I went to an interview in 2005 where the interviewee advised me that she has had other candidates for bookkeeping positions looking for remuneration of $50,000 a year. My potential to reach that level of remuneration is being sabotage by Watts and the employers that they influence to repeat items in my Human Rights Complaints. This lost and difficulty holding or getting a job is a result of defamation of my character by Watts, followed by MMP Limited, Xentel, Lyman, and the Ontario Human Rights Commission supporting discrimination, reprisal and violation of criminal code 425.1 by these employers. Soon I will be forced to use my RRSP fund which will increase the damages.

      18. I plead that I mitigated my loss of employment at Mackay by starting a part time telemarketing job on January 10th, 2003, and a full time accounting job on February 10th, 2003, and working at both jobs till September 15th 2003. The full time position rate of pay of $35,000/year exceeded the rate of pay at MMP and I was also wrongfully terminated in March 2004. I continue to mitigate my damages but finding difficult to find work with 3 additional employers participating in this campaign and not receiving proper reference letters from these participants too. This difficulty in finding replacement work is demonstrated by the following: in 2003 it took only 1 month to be rehired, in 2004 it took 6 months, only to be wrongfully dismissed after only 2 months and complaining again of sexual environment, and now currently unemployed since November 15th 2004. Also I mitigated my damages to my health by first challenging the misdiagnosis with the Ontario College of Surgeons and Physicians and closing of that file in September 2002. Then by seeking another assessment for my injury to health via trained psychologist who listens to their patients, which I received on October 2002 of anxiety with depressed moods that is acute, and changing my medication to match the correct assessment. I changed my medication from Anti-Psychotic Perphenzine to Paxil around December 5th 2002 and continue to medicate on Paxil. I am currently still taking this medication to continue to mitigate my health damages as a result of additional mobbing stress at 3 more employers plus obstruction of natural justice by the OHRC that causes abnormal levels of anxiety and anger to avoid another episode of reactive depression and suicide ideation that leads to attempts.

      19. I plead that the wife abuse that I am referring to is directly related to work abuse as my husband has been affected by the effects of the work abuse on my emotions and angry behaviour which I infer is part of my claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The wife abuse that I refer to is only psychological not physical and is related to the fact that I was misdiagnosed with a delusional disorder and my husband believed I had this assessment and was psychologically attempting to create doubt in my thinking during my employment at MMP when we discuss the additional harassment I was receiving which elevated my anger. I expected my husband to trust his wife not create doubts in her thinking and push psychiatrist with misdiagnosis and pills that I don’t believe in with the possible threat hanging over my head that if I don’t go to these doctors and take these pills that my husband believes in we might separate like in 2001 during my employment with Watts. The effects on my husband from my work abuse are like the effects of second hand smoke to someone who does not smoke. My husband became hyper vigilance over my behaviour and health being overly concern, with good reason particularly concern that I might attempt suicide again, where in the past he trusted his wife to know what she needs health wise. One of the behavioural change in my husband that I call spousal abuse is discounting my feelings and beliefs of work abuse. Discounting is abusive and a bully trait. Previously to Watts, my husband did not discount my feelings or beliefs particularly with the 1995 Rentway sexual harassment complaint against one employee yet he does so with my issues with Watts and Mackay, Employers providing me with work group mobbing harassment and sets out to irritate me with countering excuses that its just a habit.

      The Defendants are highlighting this one email and conversation on the topic of spousal abuse to Dasha Page on August 14th, 2002, after 5 months of work harassment relates to typical and predictable bully behaviour of art of deflection and countering excuses per Tim Field’s book “Bully in Sight”. This is counter-accusations with a grain of truth i.e. “my August 14th email about wife abuse” to magnify this one comment to portray it as the norm, rather than the exception, whereas the mistakes that the bully makes (usually plenty #2 to #90 original statement of claim) are somehow forgotten, overlooked, or “not relevant” or completely denied #2 to #90. The bully’s objective is to keep the spotlight on the victim and what he/she has/hasn’t done. Here the defendants at MMP want the court to believe that they did not behave or are responsible for the facts in #2 to #90, except they pick out the facts at #56 (original statement) of my one wife abuse email message to deflect responsibility and accountability of my injury to health on my husband and that they are faultless to injuring my health by the facts in #2 to #90 which I regularly complained about.

      20. I plead that the facts as stated in Shannon Meadows-Lee from the investigation office at the commission in her December 2004 MMP case analysis are injurious falsehoods and the tort of deceit from the commission colluding with now MMP Limited to protect Watts Reprisal campaign from being exposed by concealing evidence and controlling witnesses who would provide adverse outcome to the facts presented in these case analyses. The concealment of evidence is the concealment of the material facts in this statement listed from #36 to #142. This concealment of evidence and material facts demonstrates a breach of fairness by the OHRC. I had already commenced a civil suit for misfeasance of public office against the commission for colluding with the third and fourth employers in this campaign in 2004 prior to receiving these case analyses. I infer the commission has a need to avoid the truth from being exposed at the Tribunal because of their participation with this campaign in 2003/2004 and this is the criminal action of accessory after the fact. The most obvious injurious falsehoods is the allegation of gross incompetence and the concealing of my termination letter in direct violation of the criminal code 425.1 by both MMP Limited and Shannon Meadows-Lee and Dina Waik (investigating officer) to obstruct natural justice of referring my prima facie complaint to the Tribunal were the evidence will contradict the commission’s finding of fact.

      The facts that the defendants from MMP Limited do not supply the Superior Court of Justice in their defense statement the same reason for summary dismissing me with cause of gross incompetence, plus do not in their original defense statement to Small Claims Court in Burlington, yet only in the jurisdiction of the Human Rights is the tort of injurious falsehoods as per Sproats’ Wrongful Dismissal Handbook of: malice has been described as the absence of bona fides proven or reasonably inferred from the facts; malice in the law of injurious falsehoods is sometimes equated with dishonest or improper motive; honest belief in an unfounded claim is not malice but the nature of the unfounded claim may be evidence that there was not an honest belief in it. In my case the purpose of false claims in one jurisdiction and not the other for the sole purpose of avoiding a referral to Tribunal where the evidence will be exposed is malice and absence of bona fides.

      I claim that the defendants have no honest belief in their statement of gross incompetence because they do not use this defense in common law because there is no defense for cause of gross incompetence without a progressive discipline process and a couple of signed warning letters from me but apparently the commission feels there is such a defense in the Human Rights jurisdiction. I like to argue that this is abuse of statutory duty and authority by the commission as per the following in Pritchard v. OHRC: “while administrative boards have the delegated authority to determine their own procedure, the exercise of that authority must be in accordance with natural justice and the common law.” Also, the defendants allege reduction of work which would be considered to be a demotion which is a breach of contract and supports a constructive dismissal suit. My evidence of fact to the commission shows increase in work load not reduction. By fabricating falsehoods of reduction of work, the defendants at MMP and the OHRC demonstrate they intended to breach contract not to mention wrongful interference with contract. The MMP defendants and the commission are attempting to rely on the common law defense of after-acquired cause with the alleged disarray of books which I feel are facts that should have been readily available to me from the outset between March to August 2002 for the defendants to provide me with a progressive discipline process while employed and/or at least include this alleged fact in their January 20th 2003 dismissal letter that I received after my 5 month absence due to injury to health.

      Furthermore, there are cases showing precedent that if the Employer contributes to the incompetence, or the employee’s performance deteriorate because of illness, especially a stress-related one caused by the employer, or the employer fails to give opportunity to respond to allegations of cause the court will consider this factor in determining whether cause for summary dismissal exists. I refer to Casey V. General Inc. (1988), 24 C.C.E.L. 142, 73 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 103 (Nfld. S.C.). This fact in law is also represented in the Human Rights decision in Morrison v. Motsewetsho which the investigation staff is intentionally ignoring: “Sexual harassment may justify an employee’s poor work performance.” This alleged fact of gross incompetence alone is evidence of Bad Faith and unfairness of an employer’s dismissal investigation and the commission’s statutory duty, breach of fairness, aggravated an injury to the plaintiff and therefore magnified the award of damages for mental distress, warrants punitive and now exemplary damages.

      21. I plead that by not including in the December 2004 case analysis the material fact that Dasha Page in her witness statement to WSIB and her rebuttal to my complaint made comments that I said to her “people were out to get me” after my March 18th meeting regarding Watts passing on slanderous information was bantering of a disability of delusions shows Shannon Meadows-Lee is colluding to protect the conspiracy to injure with permanent delusional disorder Watts campaign. Also, Dasha Page claims she reduced my work and was considering terminating my employment for performance issues in March yet in June’s appraisal meeting she refused to provide me with a list of performance issues where I can improve showing she was not interested in me improving or giving me that opportunity. I infer that these facts were not investigated because they provide adverse outcome to the December 2004 case analysis. This behaviour by the defendant shows she was treating me based on perceived disability less favorably than others and Shannon Meadows-Lee is concealing the evidence and controlling the witnesses to slant this case analysis to protect MMP and ultimately Watts.

      Furthermore, the perceived disability of delusions has to do with the belief of harassment and being persecuted and the fact remains that I was harassed and persecuted to promote these thoughts to give the appearance to authorities that I have this disorder. I provided a copy of the DSM-IV description of this disorder to Dina Waik and therefore the commission should have interviewed all the staff involved in the harassment incidents in my complaint that I requested per material facts listed from #36 to #114: Mrs. Page, Ross Clarke, Karen Tarpos, John Kuzmichuk, Alice Reid, Vincent Julian, Tony Millington, Les Rozahagi, Bill at commercial photo, Kin Lau, Kevin Diamond, Ron Cherubin, Reinhold Schuele, Marguerite of Marchildon Zimmerman Associates, Norma Lawson, and Dave Mancini. The commission only interviewed Dasha Page, Ross Clarke and two other witnesses who may or may not have worked with me during my employment because these individuals would be less than truthful. This exemplifies controlling the witnesses who may provide adverse outcome. Moreover, based on article “Perceived-Disability Discrimination An Often Overlooked But Potentially Problematic Area Of The ADA” the author states: it is important to remember that the focus of any perceived-disability case is on the employer’s perception of an individual’s actual or perceived impairment. I infer that the defendants at MMP’s plus the commission’s perception or imaged perceptions are a perceived impairment. Shannon Meadows-Lee, on behalf of the OHRC, in her own words demonstrates this imaged perception of perceived impairment at #30 “it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position.” I say imaged perception because Shannon Meadows-Lee worked on the next two employers case analysis showing I started part time position on January 10th 2003 (incompetence issue to do with sales not accounting) and full time position on February 10th 2003 (no incompetence issues). I say imaged perception because of comment by Mr. Wharton in Payne v. OHRC of “apparent tendency of Commissioners to follow unquestioningly any staff recommendations.” I received from Mr. Keith Norton, Chief Commissioner his decision in 2005 with standard commission form alleging again insufficient evidence and ignoring evidence I provided him with of no claim of incompetence civilly. Keith Norton’s decision represents abuse of natural justice and common law. Also, this statement at #30 alone represents discrimination by the Ontario Human Rights Commission for perceived disability which leads to refusal of service of doing their statutory duty of proper investigation of the facts and evidence that led to decision to refuse referring my prima facie complaint to the Tribunal.

      22. I plead the tort of defamation was committed by the investigation staff particularly with the case analysis statement at #30: “it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position.” This statement is defamation per se unfit to work had I returned in January 2003 to MMP Limited I would be unfit to work. This defamatory statement is an opinion not fact and does not reflect reality and is for the sole purpose of influencing the reader of this statement and therefore constitutes libel. Ms. Waik and Ms. Meadows-Lee worked on the next two employers case analysis showing I started part time position on January 10th 2003 till September 15th 2003 (incompetence issue to do with sales not accounting), and full time position on February 10th 2003 till March 19th 2004 (no incompetence issues rather fabrication of shortage of work). This shows not only was I fit to return to work in January 2003 but that I was fit to work at two employers at the same time from February to September 2003. This is with the aid of Paxil as I have learned my lesson that I need medication in order to work in an abusive work environments otherwise the same injury on the abusive work environment inducing me into reactive depression that hit me in June 2001 and August 2002 would have been repeated in 2003/2004.

      23. I plead that I am complying with the provisions of the Public Authorities Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.P.38, and, in particularly, subsection 7(1) thereof. In that regard, the action herein was commenced within the six months of the execution of public and/or statutory duties on the part of these Defendants, with the fabricated case analysis fabricating insufficient evidence that I only received on December 3rd 2004, giving rise to the action herein. As such, the action herein is not statute-barred. In fact, the actions against the commission and the Minister of Attorney General responsible for their agents are still on going as my prima facie complaints have not been submitted to the Tribunal and are now 4 months obstructed. In fact, I received from Chief Commissioner on February 24th 2005 a memo that my reconsideration application was sent to respondents for review for reasons that there is an integrity issue with the commission process. The respondents would have been given 15 day time limits to submit their response, and its now May 5th and my faxes for status are being ignored by commission.

      24. I plead that the staff in the investigation office of the OHRC has committed the act of Misfeasance of Public Office in the targeted malice line of cases where the public officer recklessly disregards the means of ascertaining the extent of his or her power. Particularly, the statement at #30 in MMP’s case analysis represents this recklessness and targeted malice. I refer to Uni-Jet Industrial Pipe v. Canada (A.G.) on the test for abuses of public office of: 1. an intentional illegal act, which is either: i) an intentional use of statutory authority for an improper purpose; or ii) actual knowledge that the act (or omission) is beyond statutory authority; or iii) reckless indifference, or willful blindness to the lack of statutory authority for the act; 2) intent to harm an individual or a class of individuals, which is satisfied by either: i) an actual intent to harm; or ii) actual knowledge that harm will result; or iii) reckless indifference or willful blindness to the harm that can be foreseen to result. I infer that I received a sham investigation process that is use of statutory authority for an improper purpose. What I received as an investigation is the following: because it doesn’t matter about the truth it only matters that they have provided an accepted process so that when you say they disadvantaged you they can say they followed an established process.

      Shannon Meadows-Lee from the commission claims there is evidence to support gross incompetence to refuse referral to the Tribunal and without this excuse for my termination she would have no choice but to refer my prima facie complaint to the Tribunal. Ms. Meadows-Lee conceals the material fact of my termination letter as she makes no mention of it in the case analysis for MMP and my termination letter is in direct violation of criminal code 425.1 which is strong evidence of reprisal. By doing so, Ms. Meadows-Lee is going against natural justice and common law. In addition, Shannon Meadows-Lee slanted the case analysis at #30 to discredit me with mental illness being the cause for my alleged incompetence with her comment of “it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position.” By making this statement Shannon Meadows-Lee over stepped the boundaries of her duties and willfully misrepresented the facts to do harm to discredit the complainant with the commissioner reading her decision, with the judge in my civil suit reading her case analyses, and this demonstrates improper purpose. She is well aware that I commenced part time position on January 10th 2003 and full time position on February 10th 2003, and that I worked both till September 15th 2003. There was no allegation at fourth employer of gross incompetence in accounting duties and I worked there for 13 months. She wrote up the case analysis for these two employers as well.

      These case analyses by the commission staff causes remedies that I am now seeking with regards to MMP Limited, additional defamation by Watts. I seek remedies against the commission investigation staff, the commission and the Ministry of Attorney General for: misfeasance of public office, injurious falsehoods, deceit, conspiracy to injure, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and inducement of breach of contract with false allegations of gross incompetence. The criminal behaviour that supports my civil claims are obstruction of natural justice, accessory after the fact by concealing evidence and controlling the witnesses supports my claims civilly particularly intentional use of statutory authority for improper purpose. I refer to section 8 (2) of the Ministry of Citizenship and Culture Act regarding Crown Liability: Subsection (1) does not, by reason of subsections 5 (2) and (4) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act, relieve the Crown of Liability in respect of a tort committed by a person mentioned in subsection (1) to which it would otherwise be subject, and the Crown is liable under the Act for any such tort as if subsection (1) had not been enacted (R.S.O. 1990, c. M. 18, s. 8 (2).

      25. I plead that the Commissioner’s reconsideration on February 24th 2005 under section 37 (2) is further evidence of wrong doing by the investigation staff of fabricating insufficient evidence for my complaints against all four employers, particularly MMP Limited and Watts. My reconsideration application alleged sham investigation to image the commission providing me with a process per the following description of a sham investigation from other targets: because it doesn’t matter about the truth it only matters that they have provided an accepted process so that when you say they disadvantaged you they can say they followed an established process e.g. ‘full’ investigation and mediation. I refer to The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code book and case of Commercial Union Assurance v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission): “The authority to reconsider arises when there is an issue as to the integrity of the Commission’s process, where factual circumstances have changed from the time of the original Commission decision, or where new facts have arisen which were not previously available and are subsequently brought forward.” The commissioner sent me letter dated February 24th, 2005, that the commissioner has decided to reconsider under section 37 (2) for the Watts reprisal, the MMP and Xentel and Lyman complaints, and that my reconsideration application was sent to these defendants. I did not provide any factual circumstances that have changed from time of original commission decision or any new facts that have arisen. My reconsideration application was that the investigation staff provided me with sham investigation to image to authorities that they provided me with a process and that the case analysis of insufficient evidence is fabricated to benefit the discriminating employers. Therefore, the commissioner is in agreement that there is an issue as to the integrity of the Commission’s investigation process done by Ms. Meadows-Lee and Ms. Waik with this section 37 (2) reconsideration decision. I infer that the December 2004 case analyses was for the sole purpose to frustrate the complainant in both jurisdiction, Human Rights and civilly, to obstruct justice and intentionally inflict unnecessarily emotional distress with additional tort of deceit. The deceit by the commission of fabricating reasons for not referring my prima facie complaints affects my contract due to the commission failure to make the complainant whole as if the discrimination never taken place which includes remedies of total loss in wages not just notice period.

      I refer to The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code book and case Gismondi v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission): “The Commission has a well-recognized expertise in fact-finding and processing complaints in the human rights context. Its screening function is more administrative than quasi-judicial in nature. Because of this, the standard of review under sections 34 and 37 is patent unreasonableness. The court may look at the material before the Commission to see if there is a rational basis for the result.” The Commissioner made the decision for a section 37 (2) because the investigation staff’s case analysis is not only lacking in integrity but also demonstrates patent unreasonableness particularly with natural justice and common law, and criminal law (425.1). My evidence and material facts supplied to the commission will show that the case analysis lacks integrity and is patent unreasonableness. Ms. Waik is supposed to be an expertise in fact-finding and she leaves out of her report submitted to Ms. Meadows-Lee the following material facts for MMP as listed from #36 to #114: my termination letter in direct violation of criminal code 425.1, that exposure to sex picture is automatic breach of code 5 and 7 and proves poisoned work environment under the code, Mrs. Page’s obvious bantering of persecution disorder of “delusion” and fabricating that I said “people are out to get me” proving discrimination of a perceived disability of persecution disorder, at my 3-mth probation I received $1.00 raise because I was working out and Mrs. Page refusal to provide me a written list of items where I can improve, emails supplied to the commission that I was receiving additional training on new duties of closing of the books in August just prior to leaving, that Mrs. Page supplied August 20th 2002 letter to WSIB that I made no complaints showing deceit, that there was not progressive discipline process, Mrs. Page’s email that my overtime was “no problem” and that I filed a successful Employment Standards Claim for those overtime hours, that Mrs. Page fabricates and contradicts herself in WSIB witness statement that she gave me an internal due process meeting regarding my complaint of hung penis joke but advises WSIB that she did not know this joke was sexual, concealing of solicitation of sex comment by Les of “so you don’t want any sex” in June 2002, absolutely no comments or investigation of the incidents to sabotage my work to give appearance of incompetence nor the lap games by Kin Lau and John, nor Ross Clarke intimidating me with the sexual harassment policy on August 9th, etc.

      I refer to The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code book and case Gismondi v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission): “In addition, all the complainant’s arguments must be placed before the Commission when it makes its decision and the complainant must be informed of the matters the Commission will consider. I was advised by the investigation staff that they were not submitting my original rebuttal to the respondent’s rebuttal to the Commissioner when he made his decision to refer to Tribunal or not, which is part of all the complainant’s arguments and cross examination. This is with good reason by the investigation staff to conceal my valid arguments. I refer to The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code book and case Pieters v. University of Toronto: “The same standard of review, patent unreasonableness, should apply to the judicial review of decisions made under section 34, 36, and 37. The court reviews the material before the Commission to see if it supports the result reached. Based on my evidence and material facts in this claim listed from #36 to #114 that was not included in the case analysis the court will conclude that the evidence does not support the result reached in the case analyses by the investigation staff. Based on these arguments from the Code I will succeed in the tort of Misfeasance of Public Office.

      26. I plead that by imaging a sham investigation fabricating insufficient evidence and controlling the witnesses at the employers that Watts interfered with such as MMP the commission demonstrates biase towards Watts and discriminating employers, breach of fairness, and has violated my Charter Rights section 15 (1) of: Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination. Thus fabricating insufficient evidence at MMP will naturally result in fabrication of insufficient evidence at Watts, particularly when the commission only interviewed the managers at MMP who are the other defendants in this suit.

      I used the following arguments in Human Rights in my reconsideration application to convince the Chief Commission to reconsider one of my reprisal complaints against Watts. I did not have anyone make hostile comment of “sucks to be you” to me in my work places till Watts Industries, and than repeating this hostile remark and variations of it in mocking manner at four employers in a row. That in its self is enough of a link to require the commission to do its statutory duty and process the reprisal complaint against Watts. The repeating of ‘sucks to be you” particularly links interference by Watts as this disparaging remark disguised as joke was repeated and variations of it at all of these places of employment after filing a successful Human Rights Complaint against Watts Industries in 2000 where one of the incident involves this specific phrase by Lynn Shea. I refer to the argument in case of Moffatt v. Kinark Child & Family Services (1998), 35 C.H.R.R. D/205 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry): “Section 8 requires an actual or threatened retaliatory act linked to the making of a complaint under the Code. The link can be established in two ways: proof the respondent intended to retaliate or the perception of the complaint, on a “reasonableness” standard.” At MMP the repeating of a variation of the hostile remark “sucks to be you” on top of exposing me to sexual picture, addressing me as “Claude”, Ross Clarke fiddling with his pants in my presence and withholding the sexual harassment policy till August 9th when he uses that policy to intimidate me, Ross Clarke bantering in my presence about another staff caught looking at pornography on his computer, use of double speak to create errors in my work, and lastly Mrs. Page’s bantering the word “delusional” and later alleging I said to her that “people were out to get me” is enough of a retaliatory act linked to the making of the Watts’ complaint under the Code. Not only are these incidents right out of my 2000 complaint proof the respondent retaliated it is the perception of the complainant on a “reasonable” standard.

      I also refer to the case of deSousa v. Gauthier (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 5053, 43 C.H.R.R. D/128, [2002] O.H.R.B.I.D. No. 9 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry); Bryan v. Premark Canada Inc. (November 6, 1998), Doc. 98-18 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry); Elkas v. Blush Stop Inc. (1994), 25 C.H.R.R. D/158 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry): “When the respondent’s treatment of the complainant is partly reprisal for contacting the Commission, there is a breach of section 8.” Therefore Watts’ treatment of the complainant by interfering with her employment relations for filing her 2000 complaint with the phrase “sucks to be you”, address of Claude, and additional exposures to sexual pictures is a breach of section 8. I refer to the case on reprisal of Donaldson v. 463963 Ontario Ltd. (Jan. 14, 1994), No. 83 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry): “The issues under section 8, following a complaint of sexual harassment, are whether the complainant feels threatened by the respondent’s acts and whether she believes the acts constitute an act of retaliation. In this case, the respondent kept contacting the complainant at home after she left her employment with him; a breach of section 8 was found.” In my case, Watts and the other employers interfere with my employment relations by contacting next employer to pass on information in my complaints to get this new employer to repeat the same items that I complain about like the hostile disparaging remark of “sucks to be you.”

      I refer to case of Jones v. Amway of Canada Ltd. (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 1191, 159 O.A.C. 331, 2002 C.L.L.C. 230-030 [2002] O.J. No. 1504 (Ont. Div. Ct.); see also Moffatt v. Kinark Child & Family Services (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 5891, 35 C.H.R.R. D/205 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry) and Bryan v. Premark Canada Inc. (November 6, 1998), Doc. 98-18 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry): “An internal complaint pursuant to the employer’s harassment policy is sufficient to trigger protection under section 8. Moreover, the employee’s right to this protection is not affected by the employer’s rejection of the internal complaint.” Therefore, an external Human Rights Complaint pursuant to the Code is sufficient to trigger protection under section 8. I refer to case of Aboucher v. Toronto (Metro) School Board (No. 3) (1998), 31 C.H.R.R. D/411 (Ont. Bd. Of Inquiry): “Where the employer discriminates against a job candidate because the candidate has made a human rights complaint against another employer, this constitutes reprisal under section 8.” By repeating items that I complained in my previous complaints is because the candidate has made a human rights complaint against another employer particularly exposure to sexual picture on second day of hire at MMP. Lastly I refer to the following argument from case of Broadfield v. De Havilland/Boeing of Canada Ltd. at #139: “the line of reasoning that underlies this principle begins with the notion of indirect action by an employee which puts the employer in breach of the Code by way of s. 8. The point was made in Fu v. Ontario Government Protection Service (1985), 6 C.H.R.R. D/2797 at D/2800, para. 22922: Where the individual employer himself takes no direct action or discrimination but authorizes, condones, adopts or rectifies an employee’s discrimination, then the employer is himself personally liable for contravening the Code…as it is the employer himself who has infringed or done, directly or indirectly, an act “that infringes a right under this Part” (section 8). Section 8 of the Code says “No person shall infringe or do…anything that infringes a right…” The employer is infringing or doing something by its mere passive inaction of allowing an infringement of a right in the workplace when the employer could rectify the situation. To do nothing can be, in the circumstances, to “do” something that “infringe a right” within the meaning of section 8.” The Commissioner did reconsider based on these and other arguments that I put in my reconsideration application.

      Thus based on the above reprisal cases and material facts that link back to Watts’ 2000 complaint I will also succeed on the civil tort of interference with employment relations. I refer to Ontario Court of Appeal’s guidance on the tort of interference found in case of Reach M.D. Inc. v. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Assn. Of Canada (2003), 17 C.C.L.T. (3d) 149: “To establish the tort of interference with economic relations, the plaintiff must prove: 1) that the defendant intended to injure the plaintiff; 2) that the defendant interfered with the plaintiff’s business by illegal or unlawful means; and 3) as a result, the plaintiff suffered loss. With respect to the first part of the test, the Court held that it was not necessary that the defendant was predominantly motivated in its actions to injure the plaintiff; mere targeting of the plaintiff was sufficient to ground liability.” Mere targeting such as passing information that sexual pictures and the phrase “sucks to be you” annoys me to promote others to harass me with this same phrase again plus sexualizing my work environment is unlawful means and result in financial loss of wrongful termination on January 20th 2003, another loss of proper reference letter, and loss in gross income in 2002.

      27. I plead that there is evidence of defamation in 2001 by the commission that Ms. Meadows-Lee is concealing regarding my 2000 Watts Complaint. At #17 in Watts’ case analysis Ms. Meadows-Lee alleges insufficient evidence obtained during investigation to indicate that Watts defamed the complainant’s character during the mediation process which is additional imaging of the truth. The 2000 complaint was submitted in the fall and the deadline for Watts’ rebuttal was in January. In February my intake officer left a message with my husband to advised me that this complaint was being sent to the investigation department, and then the commission allowed Watts to send me their rebuttal in April demonstrating breach of fairness by the commission. What the commission did by allowing Watts 3 additional months to respond was for Watts to perform additional tactics to wear me down and to manufacture the truth to portray them innocent of wrong doing. To top this off I received contemptuous communication from Mr. Rick Della Vella, mediator from the commission, calling me a disgruntled employer and telling me in one phone conversation “you won’t win the lotteries by a human rights complaint.” These words are laced with contempt for me and are a symptom of defamation. Also, after I faxed my rebuttal to Watts’ warning letter in May 2001 I called Mr. Della Vella to make sure he had received it and his tone on the phone was disappointment as he stated “I saw it”. Behaviours don’t lie people do.

      Also Ms. Meadows-Lee states at #14: Ms. Losier also believes that the president of Watts followed her in his car to intimidate her and might have used “super surveillance” such as bugging her telephone and speaking to her private associates and family in order to have them harass her further. Ms. Meadows-Lee leaves out important material facts submitted that supports my belief of super surveillance such as: Mary in an Alanon meeting all of a sudden provoked me with shame tactic of imitating a stripper gesturing around her breasts with tassles, George at a Tai Chi session with Alanon members made unusual statement of “don’t worry about the president of the company”, I saw Mr. Fifer driving his white rental car behind me on Fruitland Road a couple of blocks away from my home on one occasion and on one occasion followed me to lunch and just stood outside his car to intimidate me as I walked to my car to go back to work, I bumped into David Lord at an artist opening in Hamilton and he knows some of the same people at the Hamilton Artist Inc., that Greg Sampson had discussion with Joan Coles regarding my art show in Simcoe without me providing anyone at Watts this information, one discussion by Dale about “you know she is going to church”, one discussion with Troy Nantais advising me how employers use internet spy software to find information on their employees, etc. These incidents were included in my 2000 Watts complaint and they promote super surveillance thinking, and my 2000 complaint was settled for 4 months pay for 3 years of employment.

      Ms. Meadows-Lee’s slanted her comments here again to put the complainant in the worst possible light to pursued the reader of her case analysis. Since MMP alleges they did not contact Watts for a reference and Watts alleges they never received a call from MMP for a reference yet MMP repeats several items in my 2000 complaint leaves the logical conclusion of super surveillance such as bugging my telephone to know when and where I go on an interview or who hires me. For my rebuttal to this case analysis statement I showed that there is precedent of this type of super surveillance behaviour by Employers as per the Globe and Mail article by Wallace Immen “Workplace privacy gets day in Court”. I particularly listed the snoop tools in this article such as: Stealth cameras, Webcams, Phone Registers, Global positioning system tracking, and Infrared sensors. I particularly mentioned that Phone Registers are “automated monitors that record several days’ worth of messages and keep logs of time, date and length can be purchased for a few hundred dollars.

      The statement at #15 in the case analysis is also imaging innocence of wrong doing: “All Watts employee interviewed attested to the fact that the president of Watts Industries, who resided in the United States at the time Ms. Losier was employed, only spent minimal time in Canada and when he did so, he communicated mainly with the officers of the company and would not have had occasion to converse with Ms. Losier directly apart from greating her in the corridor or meeting her with other employees at the company Christmas gathering.” These employees that were interviewed were not present at the stalking incidents documented therefore their comments are irrelevant to the incidents by Mr. Fifer that I refer to as stalking to intimidate me with paranoid thougths to discredit me. The material facts regarding Mr. Fifer’s behaviour towards me differs from Ms. Meadows-Lee’s statement at #15 in the Watts case analysis. While I was employed this president did great me with hello several times in 1998. He came to the Accounts Receivable department once when the supervisor, Diane, was on vacation to ask me about an account on hold and than he ran off to the VP of Finance to ask him to ask me same question. He also left voice message on my phone in 1998 with his US phone number to call him in his office in Andover regarding his letter to Allan D. Strauss from Delta Faucet Canada dated June 3, 1998, which he writes: Claudette Losier has received data from you to process invoice corrections, and needs to complete that processing or contact you for any further information. I did call him back to advice him that I was waiting for information from Alan at Watts in the warehouse. The fact of the Delta Faucet letter shows that these employees that the commission interviewed where not completely aware of what their President who resides in the United States was doing where I am concerned while I was employed. I did spot him where I lunched at Wendy’s on two occasions, one being with him and his boss from corporate office just sitting in his car while I go get my lunch. The other occasion was when he stood by his car as I walk back to my car with my lunch and he said nothing therefore his intentions was to intimidate me, and there were no other Watts employees witness to this incident. He did try to follow me on the QEW on another occasion and I quickly changed lanes and lost him and next day showed his anger by glaring at me when he walked by the accounts receivable department. There was one incident where I spotted him right behind me on Fruitland Road in Stoney Creek right after I got off the highway in his white rental car just a couple of blocks away from my home. There was one incident with him and sales VP standing on top of staircase as I came up to the stairs to intimidate me, and he made no attempt again to converse with me and barely moved out of the way. I refer to case of Lynch v. Theodorakakos (1992), 16 C.H.R.R. D/319 (B.C.C.H.R.): Council Member found that the restaurant owner’s lack of knowledge about the incidents did not protect him from liability as he was nevertheless responsible for offering a non-discriminatory workplace environment. Thusly, the witnesses interviewed by the commission in 2004 have no knowledge of the behaviour of this president in 1998 to 2001, and therefore Watts is not protected from liability as they are responsible to provide me with a non-discriminatory workplace environment and to not retaliate after I leave their place of employment by passing on information to interfere with my employment relations at Company C, D, and E.

      This president, Mr. Fifer, left Watts coincidently on approximately the same date I filed my reprisal complaint against Watts Industries in December 2002. I saw what I saw and none of these Watts’ witnesses where there at the time of these incidents and cannot say that this president was not behaving in this manner to intimidate me to promote paranoid thinking to discredit me and my complaints as the commission is alleging in their case analysis. I never attended any Christmas gathering so therefore I agree there would be no opportunity for this president to converse with me during a Christmas gathering as Watts is alleging in this analysis. Most of these incidents where
      listed in my 2000/2001 complaint against Watts and there was no evidence at that time brought forward by these witnesses at that time only in 2004 after the fact. The commission staff is only now in 2004 interviewing and have not disclosed who these witnesses are to me as they are supposed to under section 36 demonstrating a controlling of the witnesses. The fact remains that the complaint in 2000/2001 listing those incidents was not dismissed in 2001 under section 34 for being frivolous, vexatious, and in bad faith, and that complaint was settled validating my documentation of all incidents.

      • 28. I plead that the commission being a quasi-judicial process relies and hides behind their immunity status to abuse their authority and statutory duties. I feel that this is a case where the commission acted outside its limit (collusion). I infer that the commission improperly exercises its judicial powers with criminal behaviour of obstruction of natural justice, concealing evidence and controlling witnesses who would provide adverse outcome are types of misconduct that amount to sufficient excesses of jurisdiction and are thus not protected by an absolute immunity. By alleging facts and evidence in her case analysis of gross incompetence as cause for my dismissal, refusing to review and note January 20th 2003 termination letter with retaliatory discharge reason for dismissal plus the lack of credibility by the defendants at MMP, refusing to question witness on bantering of disability of persecution with “people out to get me”, and statement made that had I return I would not be mentally capable of handling my duties when facts show I moved on very quickly to part time and full time employment, Shannon Meadows-Lee and Dina Waik demonstrate sufficient excesses of abuse of jurisdiction and targeted malice. I refer to page 289 of Klar’s Tort Law #146: Judicial immunity is defended on the ground that it is not for judges’ protection but for the public’s protection; Judges should be able to act independently and fearlessly without threat of lawsuit by disappointed litigants; this rational is understandable; it does not, however, justify extending the immunity to judges who act maliciously in order to harm claimants.

        Also, the OHRC has a history of unwillingness and failure to properly exercise their statutory mandate as per article by S. Peiters listing various reports to guide the commission to improve its performance that are ignored, including 1993 Ombudsman report by Roberta Jamieson. Other examples of failure to properly exercise their statutory mandate are: in March 2000 the Ontario Superior Court squashed two section 34 decisions by the Ontario Human Rights Commission. In Payne v. Ontario Human Rights Commission, a retired commissioner, Mr. Wharton, in his affidavit believed the commission colluded with Payne’s employer. I infer that this commissioner has inside knowledge that the commission in fact at times does collude with discriminating employers. The commission will use the defense that I am just a disappointed litigant/complainant to avoid exposure. I am requesting this judgment seat as per my rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms section 15 (1) against the commission to review the evidence that Shannon Meadows-Lee is relying upon to willfully refuse to do her statutory duty of referral of a prima facie complaint to Tribunal to prove excess of jurisdiction and therefore tortious behaviour.

        29. I plead that this immunity status for the commission is based common law prior to the Charter in 1982, therefore should be lifted. I refer to section 32 from my paralegal course booklet: the Charter protects the rights of the individual with respect to the state by regulating the actions of the federal Parliament, the provincial legislatures, and all organizations that come under government authority, such as boards and agencies. The Charter regulates only the relationship between the individuals and the state—it does not apply to private matters. In most cases, the rights of individuals in private matters are protected by other human rights legislature or by common law.” My suit is a public matter against the commission, a government agency, and its staff for Misfeasance of Public office violating my Charter Rights section 15 and 24, and therefore section 32 applies to protect the rights of the individual with respect to state and includes boards, agencies and therefore the commission. Furthermore, I would argue that section 33 the notwithstanding clause could not apply to allow for the Commission’s common law immunity to being sued to stand above my Charter Rights in matters of tortious actions that include criminal behaviour that supports my civil claim of Misfeasance of public office.

        30. I plead that this continuous attack on my character by MMP Limited, Watts Industries, and now the collusion by the OHRC with the fabricated December 2004 case analysis warrants punitive damages and now exemplary damages. The reasons for awarding punitive damages was well stated in Uni-Jet Industrial Pipe v. Canada (A.G.) #91 In Hill, Cory J. stated (at para. 199): Punitive damages can and do serve a useful purpose. But for them, it would be all too easy for the large, wealthy and powerful to persist in libeling vulnerable victims. Awards of general and aggravated damages alone might simply be regarded as a license fee for continuing a character assassination. The protection of a person’s reputation arising from the publication of false and injurious statements must be effective. The most effective means of protection will be supplied by the knowledge that fines in the form of punitive damages may be awarded in cases where the defendant’s conduct is truly outrageous. The 2000 settlement offer from Watts plus my misdiagnosis of a delusional disorder is that licence fee for continuing a character assassination.

        I feel that this case is truly outrageous even more so since receiving Shannon Meadows-Lee’s case analysis with injurious falsehoods of gross incompetence of disarray of books that MMP alleges took till December 2004 to correct. I barely completed one month’s set of books that of June in August 2002 prior to my absence which should not take MMP till 2004 to correct, 2 years after the fact, as they and the commission are alleging. Furthermore, after receiving the commission’s case analysis I now infer that Watts, MPP Limited and 3 additional employers were encouraged after the 2000 Human Rights complaint to treat me with additional anti-social mobbing behaviour of repeating items in my complaints with malice and reckless disregard for my rights and the Human Rights Code without stop because the commission condoned and colluded with Watts’ campaign. This is an authoritarian work abuse system or machine that needs the law to severely penalize it to deter it from continuing this character assassination, and condoning of anti-social behaviour. I can prove this with 4 employers in a row after Watts repeating items I complain in my 2000 Watts complaint and later adding items in the other complaints at next employer increasing the anti-social behaviour which infers collusion with Commission’s protection of avoidance of accountability and refusal to refer to Tribunal 4 prima facie complaints.

        31. I plead that by continuing the deceit of denial of wrongdoing and bringing forward additional deceit in form of allegations of gross incompetence of disarray of books that was not disclose to me till December 2004, 2 years after the fact, and only in jurisdiction of the Human Rights with the commission to obstruct justice demonstrates personalities and collective authoritarian work abuse system without conscience. Our society appears to be evolving at a faster pace developing more personalities and organizations without conscience as referred to in Robert D. Hare’s book “Without Conscience” and law professor Joel Bakan’s book “The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit Of Profit And Power”.

        The behaviours that I complain about in my statement of claim of the material facts listed from #36 to #142 and the general denials without any material facts in the defendants’ statement of defenses and the commission’s case analysis is congruent with some of the behavioural characteristics in the DSM-IV for anti-social personality disorder/psychopath of the following: callous unconcern for the feelings of others, reckless disregard for the safety of others, deceitfulness with repeated lying and conning others, incapacity to experience guilt, failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviours. Furthermore, I infer that my cases demonstrates “serial bullying/mobbing” at work in the sense of serial to repeat offending behaviour because it offends me. Serial mobbing is similar to serial rapist and serial murder, in that the displayed behaviour is repeating of modus operanti and leaving calling cards to psychologically intimidate the target which is the tort of intimidation. The calling card from Watts to Mackay and 3 additional employers in a row is repeating items that I complain about in my Human Rights complaints like subjugation of sexual picture and hostile disparaging remark disguised as joke of “sucks to be you”, and addresses of “Claude” to mock my convictions/complaints. The repeating of vexatious behaviour that I complain about fits the definition of serial, mobbing, section 10 (1) of the Human Rights Code, and section 81.18 of the Quebec labour code to prohibit “psychological harassment”. Therefore the employment contract law needs to advance to deter this trend of these characteristics evolving even more in our work systems with greater penalties, such as exemplary damages being awarded, given out to these white collar perpetrators and rule breakers. I am asking for development of greater penalties to the defendants in this case to deter future occurrences of repeating this anti-social behaviour particularly with my next employer (6th employer) or some other vulnerable target in their workplaces who might not know their rights as well as I do now, or some other complainant to the commission.

        32. I plead that my Charter Rights, equal access and benefit of the law, have been violated by the OHRC by their tortious actions with my complaints against the defendants Watts and MMP Limited as per the material facts listed at #36 to #142. The commission process in it self is inconsistent with the Charter. My situation is worsening since filing my first complaint in 2000 and by the addition of tortious actions by commission staff from 2003 onwards. Section 7 states: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Section 15 (1) states: Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. For the past 6 years my right to job security has been violated due to being a woman whistleblower of sexual harassment in the work place and therefore sex discrimination by five employers, four of them in a row. The OHRC’s statutory duty affects the employment contract as they are to make the complainant whole as if the discrimination never occurred. This includes all loss in wages. Therefore, the violation to the charter applies to the commission due to their misfeasance of public office by providing me a sham investigation and fabricating insufficient evidence to not refer my prima facie complaints to the Tribunal where I can recover full loss in wages as if the discrimination had never taken place.

        The process as it is currently set up is a bureaucratic stalling process that needs to be seriously remedied as this process does not fulfill the purpose of the Human Rights Commission to be remedial for eliminating discrimination and prejudices the complainant’s complaint. The Human Rights process takes the average life span of 5 to 6 years when a civil case that supports human rights violation can be settled within 6 months per Barrister David Harris. The process should follow same procedure as in Civil Law moving quickly to Trial where the evidences is exposed in the open and the facts are argued with both sides present and a trained judge of law decides on the outcome to be consistent with the Charter. Other issues with the commission process that is inconsistent with the Charter are: only accept a 2 page complaint from the complainants which does not represent the full set of facts, the investigation process is secretive government controlled process where the complainant does not receive copies of the witnesses statement to cross examine them, the information given to the commissioner after the investigation does not include all the evidence nor the complainant’s rebuttal (cross examination of the respondent’s rebuttal), section 34 and 36 (2), and the common law rules for employment termination and precedent cases should also apply in the jurisdiction of Human Rights. Furthermore, I am being denied the following right per Section 24 (1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances. A section 36 (2) decision to not refer to Tribunal after the investigation process goes through a conciliation and request payment to settle by the respondents violates my Charter Rights. I refer to the argument in Kulyk v. Toronto (City) Board of Education: “It should be troubling to the administration of justice, and we should be cautious where employment situations coupled with human rights violations are used as tools to prevent victims and aggrieved parties, in the correct circumstances, from having access to our courts. “

        33. I plead that the current Human Rights Process is a shield against the person seeking redress for the discrimination sought to be remedied by the legislation and therefore needs to be changed. I refer to Belleghem J.’s argument found in Kulyk v. Toronto (City) Board of Education: “The Human Rights Code is remedial legislation. It addresses the need to facilitate the airing of human rights complaints. Though these broader powers attract more complaints, they could not thereby have been intended to curtail the complainant’s right to sue for those same grievances. If the legislation was intended to limit the right to sue, it would have clearly so stated. Workmen’s compensation legislation and auto insurance legislation are obvious examples of a legislative limit on the right to sue. On the other hand, the very removal of the privative provisions from the earlier human rights legislation supports an interpretation that whatever powers the board has, they are in addition to, rather than alternative to, the complainant’s civil rights, including the right to sue. It is inconsistent with the object of the remedial legislation to use it as a shield against the person seeking redress for the very mischief sought to be remedied by the legislation.” Therefore the Charter of Rights under section 15 (1) and 24 do not prevent a plaintiff to bring forth their claims of discrimination to court of competent jurisdiction. LaForme J. in Kulyk agreed with Belleghem J. in Lehman that: “given the deletion of the exclusive jurisdiction clause from the Human Rights Code, it may be intended to permit judicial incursion into areas formerly occupied by the board in a “proper case”.

        34. I plead that I am not your typical target of bullying/mobbing as I do stand up against it to the detriment of my health, my personal relationships, and career stoppage. I expose it every time and I do not reward it with my silence, which is why I am being expulse from the work environment at Watts in 2001, and at Mackay, and 3 additional employers after Mackay in a row, plus receiving obstruction of justice by the commission. I am being seen by these employers and the OHRC as expendable and if I won’t move on of my own volition these employers just invoke their rights as employer to breach the contract for whatever reason they choose to have on that date of expulsion because common law based on law of early Century society says either party can breach the contract at any time. I have been expulse with the following wrongful reasons: constructive dismissal through Human Rights process 2001, Wrongful Dismissal in 2002 with various reasons including gross incompetence with after the fact acquired reason, Wrongful Dismissal in 2003 of incompetence with notice offer after condoning my low sales prior to my request to the commission for complaint forms 2003, Wrongful Dismissal in 2004 for lay off claim of closing division and later shortage of work and later hiring two ex female employees to do work I could be doing, and finally Wrongful dismissal again in 2004 claiming change in business after 3.5 hours of handing my second written complaint to management when offer at interview was promised of full time permanent position. My experience alones shows that the current legal system, in both jurisdiction of the human rights and civil law, is not working to deter these kinds of employment abuses. My experience shows that sexually oriented practices endanger a woman’s job, undermines her job performance and threatens her economic livelihood” still. These employers show that the support, acceptance and collusion surrounding Workplace Bullying is as much a crime against the dignity of working people such as myself as the abuse itself.

        The law needs to advance to view Bullying in the same light as Domestic Violence. I refer to article “Mediation is not the way to deal with cases of Workplace Bullying” by Hadyn Olsen, Employment Relations Advisor/Facilitator. In this article he states: Domestic violence and Workplace Bullying actually share many of the same dynamics; they both involve an addiction to power and they are both centered on controlling others in a detrimental way. Domestic violence is now seen as a perpetrator problem; not a victim problem. It is something only the perpetrator can fix. It is not the victim’s responsibility at all. Regardless of the failings and weaknesses of the victim, there is no excuse or reason that justifies the use of violence. The person who uses violence must take full responsibility for their actions. The perpetrator alone must change. Yet in the employment arena this is not so. We continue to perpetuate the belief that if a business/organization is successful then the employer must be all right. The complaining employee is often suspected—after all what is one individual up against many well-qualified and experienced managers? The employee is seen a troublemaker who is rocking the boat. Or even worse, senior management claim that it is not Workplace Bullying that is the problem, but only personality differences. The complaining employee is seen as expendable, is ignored and consequently moves on or out. The Employment Relations Service and the Human Rights Commission currently are bully-friendly. The practice of demanding mediation as the first response to any workplace grievance (including Workplace Bullying) places our society back in the same position it was in the 60’s and 70’s in regard to domestic violence. It is an entirely inappropriate response to this problem. Workplace Bullying and domestic violence are almost identical twins. Why then do we have different ways of dealing with them? There should be no tolerance for the practice of abusing others, regardless if it is domestic violence or workplace violence.

        35. I plead that what I experienced at Watts and repeated at Mackay was the premeditative passing around to various members in the work group what pushes my buttons and causes me to complain, particularly sexual items, sucks to be you hostile comment and addressing me with “Claude”. I infer that this is a work system problem where employers hide beyond the wordings in their company policies to harass by imaging an internal due process such as with the picture incident at Mackay, then passing info to harass me with another member causing the cycle to perpetuate so I have to complain again and we go through another imaging of internal due process this time with the sexual joke of hung penis at Mackay where Dasha Page does not know from her imaged investigation that this joke was sexual in nature, and this second complaint does not stop the sexualizing of the work environment as Mackay management withhold the sexual harassment policy for 5 months and moved this tactic to others such as Dasha Page, Les, Kin Lau, John and Ross Clarke. An employee should only have to make one sexual harassment complaint not more than 1 in any work place if the system and law were working correctly as more than one complaint infers “poison work environment” and “work group mobbing”, defamation of one’s character, and therefore discrimination practices and illegal labour practices.

        I refer to the comments made in Robichaud v. Her Majesty the Queen, as represented by the Treasuary Board [at D/2709, para. 22321]: “The broad remedies provided by section 41, the general necessity for effective follow-up, including the cessation of the discriminatory practice, imply a similar responsibility on the part of the employer. That is most clearly the case with respect to the requirement in paragraph 41 (2)(a) that the person against whom an order is made “take measures, including the adoption of a special program, plan or arrangement…to prevent the same or a similar practice occurring in the future”. Only an employer could fulfill such a mandate.” I like to infer as well that the employer can also influence the work group to continue the same or a similar practice occurring in the future by moving the practice to another employee or next employer. Watts encouraged their employees to continue the harassment by moving the tactics around to various individuals in a systematic campaigned of conspired harassment and I got told by Watts’ HR manager “it may get worst before it gets better” in February 2001. Watts passed this technique to Mackay, and 3 additional employers. Only the employer can take measures, including the adoption of a special program, plan or arrangement…to prevent or continue the same or a similar practice occurring in the future. Mackay and Watts fail this test showing they did not take measures or adopt special programs but rather hide behind their harassment policies to continue the conspired harassment within the work group and without the work group by Watts and later MMP. I infer that had I complained at Watts and at Mackay after every single sexual comment/gesture/picture it would not stop this tactic as these employers did not want to provide me with respectful work environment per the implied terms of my contract just like Mackay did not want to provide me with a progressive discipline process to improve my alleged gross incompetence as they were only interested in inducing breach of contract.

        Also I infer that the commission too fails this test to put measures in place to stop this anti-social behaviour of discrimination and reprisal from being repeated against the same complainant and by the same respondent being Watts. I also infer and responded to Chief Commissioner, Mr. Keith Norton, my belief that the investigation was a sham to image a process per the following: because it doesn’t matter about the truth it only matters that they have provided an accepted process so that when you say they disadvantaged you they can say they followed an established process e.g. ‘full’ investigation and mediation. The commission offered me an imaged sham investigation to protect all parties in this campaign from exposing the truth. Therefore, OHRC is condoning the sexualizing of my work environments with sexual pictures, gestures and vexatious comments.

        36. I commenced employment with the Defendants at MMP Limited in March 7th, 2002, as Accounting Clerk. I was continuously employed with the Defendant from March 7th, 2002, to January 20th, 2003, with a leave of absence starting August 15th, 2002, due to injury to health inducing anxiety with depressed moods causing reactive depression, overwhelming anger leading to suicide ideation and attempt of overdosing on medication on August 21st. I faithfully and diligently performed my duties on behalf of the Defendant and throughout my employment with the Defendant, I proved myself to be a valuable and reliable employee and received a $1.00 raise at my 3-mth probation in June as per interview promise by Dasha Page to match what I was previously making at another employer because I was working out. No list in writing from management was given to me where I needed to improve per my June letter.

        37. During my employment at Mackay from March to August 14th, 2002, I was subjugated again to items that I complained about at Watts Industries in my 2001 Human Rights Complaint. The tactics started in first week of employment which I infer is hiring in Bad Faith for the sole purpose to humiliate me further for my sexual harassment complaints and convictions and to shame me into quitting. On March 8th, Alice in office after a day of vacation comes up to me by the photocopier between Tony’s and Dasha’s offices to show me two faxes. One of these faxes was a sexual picture joke showing a couple copulating, and the other was a joke fax about the Alanon/AA serenity prayer and being an asshole. I was stunned by this and went agh and walked away from Alice.

  42. 37. During my employment at Mackay from March to August 14th, 2002, I was subjugated again to items that I complained about at Watts Industries in my 2001 Human Rights Complaint. The tactics started in first week of employment which I infer is hiring in Bad Faith for the sole purpose to humiliate me further for my sexual harassment complaints and convictions and to shame me into quitting. On March 8th, Alice in office after a day of vacation comes up to me by the photocopier between Tony’s and Dasha’s offices to show me two faxes. One of these faxes was a sexual picture joke showing a couple copulating, and the other was a joke fax about the Alanon/AA serenity prayer and being an asshole. I was stunned by this and went agh and walked away from Alice.

    38. On the Saturday after this incident, March 9th, 2002, I advised Karen Tarpus of my objection for being exposed to sexual joke. I was in on Saturday with Karen for training. Near the end of the training session after 2:00 pm out of the blue Karen makes the comment “It Sucks To Be Me” which has no relation to the topic on accounting that we were discussing. This is an item in my 2001 Watts Industries Human Rights complaint. It references a comment made by employee Lynn Shea to humiliate me of “It Sucks To Be You” and is an example of double speak.

    39. On March 18th, 2002, at 9:00, I went to Dasha’s office and closed the door to discuss the negative stressors that of my belief that Watts Industries has passed on some information to slander me to Mackay as I was experiencing some of the same tactics by some employees. Mrs. Page’s manner towards me was patronizing and not taking my negative stressor seriously. She jokingly put on a show asked questions like who and what and when, and denied having receiving any information from Watts.

    40.On March 22nd, 2002, I had a meeting with Mr. Ross Clarke in the afternoon in the boardroom he mentioned that I should locate and read the company’s condition of employment and sexual harassment policy. I advised Mr. Clarke that I saw a file with information on Sexual Harassment in the filing cabinet and that I would check there. When I went back to my desk to look for this file I could not find it. I asked both Mrs. Page and John where can I locate the sexual harassment policy and neither one of them could find me a copy. I sent an e-mail to Karen to find out if she knew where the policies where kept and she could not find me a copy.

    41. On March 28th, 2002, at 10:10, I request again from Mr. Clarke a copy of the conditions of employment and sexual harassment policy. Again, Mr. Clarke did not provide me with copies.

    42.Also in March there was one incident where Mrs. Page and Mr. Clark are standing at the end of my work station to have a conversation that I am made to hear regarding their hiring agent for Diana Hall. In this conversation they discuss the possibility of all new staff taking a psychological test and Mrs. Page mentions the word delusional out of the blue. At the same time they also discussed that they were not happy with this service from this vendor that they know through the Business Commerce group that they belong to.

    43. On April 2nd, 2002, I went into Mrs. Page’s office with a personal request to use the fax machine for my husband. Out of the blue Mrs. Page makes the inappropriate comment “I thought you were going to quit…” In April, 2002, I requested that the DacEasy accounting duties be transferred to me from Karen. Mrs. Page advised me should discuss this with Mr. Clarke. We also talked about waiting till their slow season in the fall to change accounting package from DacEasy to Simply Accounting or other accounting packages. Mrs. Page never got back to me with a response to my request.

    44. On April 23rd, 2002, at 9:00 I walk by Mrs. Page and John who are standing by the middle filling cabinet discussing a job. As I walk by, Mrs. Page jokingly makes the comment about a penis joke that a crewmember wrote in a field notebook.

    45. On April 26th, 2002, Vince Julian came by my workstation and told me a male bashing joke, which I did not get the joke. He proceeded into another joke, which I asked if it was sexual and received no response. Vince started on a third joke and I asked twice if it was a sexual joke. Vince ignored my questions in an aggressive bully manner and proceeded with his joke about a hung man (large penis) joke who stuttered and wanted to have his stuttering problem removed by having his penis cut in size. I stood there and was subjugated to his joke knowingly seeing my discomfort. Later that day, I made a verbal complaint of this harassment incident with Mrs. Page that I do not appreciate being subjugated to sexual jokes and having my work time wasted by Vince. I asked that she speak to Vince about this incident. Mrs. Page did not provide me with any written report of her disciplinary action with Vince for his harassment behaviour towards me.

    46. A few days later, Vince came by my workstation and addressed me as “Claude” repeating another item out of my 2000 Human Rights Watts Industries’ complaint. I advised him my name is “Claudette” and I continued to do my work ignoring him. A couple of days later, Reinhold walks by my workstation and addresses me as “Claude” and comes up with the excuse that he knew a woman called that name. Again a few days later, Mr. Tony Millington (tenant renting office space) comes to my workstation with his associate Ron Nathan addressing me as “Claude”. I advised Tony that my name is “Claudette” and walked back to my desk. Tony played innocent and asked what did he call me? His coworker Ron concurred that Tony did intentionally call me “Claude”. A few days later, I was working away at my workstation when Tony Millington walks up to Mrs. Page who is behind the counter by my desk. Mr. Millington proceeds to have a conversation with Mrs. Page about someone being overly sensitive. I interrupt this conversation and said, “I am sensitive just because I asked you to not call me “Claude”? Mr. Millington made the comment of “Ah hah” which shows that he is intentionally trying to push my buttons with the name-calling and this conversation about being sensitive. I was provoked and continued on commenting that there is nothing wrong with having a sensitive nature, that I’m not a heard follower that people in the office were behaving like puppets: first Vince, then Reinhold, and then Mr. Millington. Mrs. Page was present and she was made aware by my comment that I perceived these incidents to be negative stressors.

    47. In May, 2002, I asked Mrs. Page again for the accounting duties of DacEasy to be transferred to me from Karen. She again advised me she would speak to Mr. Clarke. I did not receive a response back.

    48. On June 3rd, 2002, I made day timer entry that Mrs. Page advised me that she will discuss my 3-mth review and increase to $16.00/hour with Ross. She advised me of additional work required and taking over accounting duties from Karen. On June 4th, 2002, I drafted my 3-mth-appraisal letter out of fear and to push my qualifications in accounting. The management team left me out of the organization to move to the new location in May, the accounting duties were being withheld, and there were exclusion bully tactics that indicated strongly to me that management did not intend to keep me on at the new location. Also, I was hired while the person whom I was to replace, Ms. Diane Hall, was still working there. When I called about the interview in March of this year, I was told not to call the office and say I was calling about the interview. The ad in the paper was to a P.O. Box at the Spectator Paper. This is an employer who is secretive not direct and honest with their employees about dismissal issues. Ms. Diane Hall only started working there in November and was let go around her 3-mth probation period. I was advised in my interview that Ms. Hall was being let go due to incompetence and bad attitude. I was afraid that they were planning to do the same with me so I drafted my letter to push my qualifications.

    49. On June 5th, 2002, after the move to new location the Scotia Bank interact modem would not work. John set up my computer, desk and modem. I worked till 8:00 p.m. on payroll and was advised by Mrs. Page who also worked late to write manual cheques for payroll. From June onwards I started having a lot of problems with computer equipment that I did not have prior to June.

    50. On June 10th, 2002, Mrs. Page was shouting at me at my desk in the morning about the alarm going off on Friday and that it was my fault for forgetting to give her back the Accuguard Card with the security codes on it. She said she was very angry over this. On Wednesday, I had used Mrs. Page’s card to add codes in the alarm system. I worked late till 8:00 pm on the payroll because of the problems with the modem. Mrs. Page did not come up to me to request her card back. I was off on Thursday and Friday.

    51. I was advised by Mrs. Page on June 11th, 2002, that she was working on a written list of duties/performance items and that she will do my appraisal with me in the morning. On June 12th, I asked Mrs. Page in the morning if we were going to meet for my 3-mth appraisal that was due June 7th. Mrs. Page advised me that she needed time to type up her list of my performance appraisal.

    52. On June 13th, 2002, I came in and the first thing I did was to go to Mrs. Page’s office and press for my 3-mth appraisal. Mrs. Page appeared nervous and unorganized for my appraisal. She had nothing written down or prepared per her statement that she needed time to type up her list on June 12th. I had requested from Mrs. Page in my 3-mth-appraisal letter a list of items where I needed to improve. Then Mr. Clarke came in the office. Mrs. Page immediately requested Mr. Clarke to come into her office, as she needed his help with the appraisal. Mr. Clarke made one criticism that I needed to improve my handwriting. He mentioned that he thought my letter was well written and thoughtful. I just receive a verbal response from Mrs. Page that I need to improve my handwriting and memory. Mrs. Page stated that I had improve in that I don’t ask her to repeat her instructions 4 times but that we are now down to 2 times. She requested that I listen to her instructions first without searching for pen and paper. That I should try to write it down from her first instructions. Mrs. Page advised that I need to work on memory but gave me no examples where memory was a problem. She advised me that my benefits were to start as of June 7th and that I would receive the pay increase to $16.00 as of that date. She also mentioned that the duties to be added to my job would be that of training for record searching, and making copies of plans. She noted that Carol in Windsor was working on payroll changes to Windows System. This hesitation of any real acknowledgement of performance and value by management gives the appearance that my request in my formal letter of taking over the accounting function from Karen in Daceasy was not going to be met for no work performance related issue. Mr. Clarke in this meeting did not offer me the accounting duties per my request in my letter. He said something about waiting till we figure out what accounting package to change from, that I should create a file per customer and put their invoices in it and document my accounts receivable notes. I asserted myself by advising Mr. Clarke that I already created a call document and Mrs. Page is aware of it and that all invoices are kept in order in a binder already, and that I still need to work with a live accounting package now to perform my work duties. I advised that I need to work with a live accounting software for both accounts receivable and accounts payable and not excel spreadsheets. Mrs. Page stepped in to advise Mr. Clarke that Karen is tired of doing these duties and would like to be relieved of them. Mrs. Page also said to Mr. Clarke that he should give me the opportunity to see if I can do the duties and make a decision later something about “if I don’t work out…” Mr. Clarke left the room without consenting to my request. I asserted myself again and pressed Mrs. Page for me to start in June entering transactions into DacEasy. She said she would speak to Mr. Clarke again.

    53. On June 13th, 2002, after this meeting Mr. Millington came in the office in the front door passing my receptionist desk addressing me again as “Claude” in front of Mr. Clarke sitting in the boardroom in front of my desk. Also on June 13th, 2002, I sent Mr. Clarke an e-mail about EHT tax that was due on the 15th of the month. I was at my desk working away and could see Mr. Clarke in the boardroom in front of my desk. Upon receiving my e-mail Mr. Clarke made the patronizing and mocking remark loud enough for me to hear of “I have another e-mail from Claudette”.

    54. On June 18th, 2002, I advised Mr. Clarke that the account of Battery Plus was uncollectible due to the client going into receivership. I than receive a request to create work by Mr. Clarke to find out why this happened. I feel that this request by Mr. Clarke was a make work project to take time away from more urgent duties. Prior to this date Mr. Clarke made no inquiries with me about receivables and was content as long as the money was coming in to meet his cash flow situations. This account was over 60 days past due on November 28th, 2001, when I was not their employee. Mr. Clarke, being the owner, should have been aware of the problems with collection of this account prior to my conversation with him on June 18th, 2002. I proceeded to pull the file and note in my call document the series of collection attempts on this account. I sent Mr. Clarke an e-mail response at 11:15 starting with notation on October 5th of Mrs. Page’s letter to client for payment, to my notation on June 18th of call response from Deloitte & Touche for an update on the receivership. In my e-mail I ask Mr. Clarke “do you want to write this account off? Please advise.” I receive Mr. Clarke’s response at 12:35 of “no sense spending any more time on this, we still have the info, keep the file separate incase somebody wants to survey info.” Mr. Clarke ignored my inquiry to write this account off.

    55. On June 19th, 2002, Mr. Clarke hands me a fax dated March 26th that he sent to Mrs. Page of a copy of the Conditions of Employment and there was no copy of the Sexual Harassment Policy attached. I requested this policy back in March. Later on June 19th, Mr. Millington walks in and passes my reception area and addresses me with “Hi Claude” while Mr. Clarke is sitting in the boardroom.

    56. In the morning of June 20th, 2002, I notice Mrs. Page coming to my desk frequently with unnecessary interruptions and found it difficult to focus on my work with these unnecessary interruptions. Later in the afternoon, while I was at my desk working Mrs. Page came out to the front and sat down on a chair set out for the clients in front of my desk. She started looking through a woman’s magazine. All of a sudden Mrs. Page starts up a conversation with me about women’s breast. She showed me a picture of a woman that she liked the way she looked in a swimsuit. Mrs. Page started talking about her pregnancy and how her breast increased in size. Also on this day, Mrs. Page stopped by my desk to ask me if I had a complaint for her, and this was the third time Mrs. Page ask me this question which made me feel that she was provoking me into making complaints intentionally.

    57. On June 21st at 10:00, 2002, I was at my desk working in Microsoft Access in the cost sheets for jobs entering the crews’ time sheets. I entered a quantity for wooden markers and notice that the dollar value was set to zero. I also notice that when I entered time for Reinhold Shuele in Access his charge out rate was also set to zero. I immediately advised Mrs. Page of this negative stressor by telling her what was going on with my computer without accusing her of wrongdoing. I let her know that I am all of sudden having problems with my computer not functioning in the manner that it did in the past. I asked Mrs. Page what was the charge for the wooden markers and was advised to set it at $2.00. I went into the access table and reset the dollar amount for the wooden markers and the charge out rate for Reinhold Shuele. The way in which this database works is if you set the value in the table to zero it will come up in the cost sheets with that value. I felt that this database had been tampered with to create errors in my work. I did not have this problem prior to this date and after mentioning it to Mrs. Page the problem went away. Also on June 21st, 2002, I advised Mrs. Page of another negative stressor regarding my computer in that I was having problems with my keyboard with the enter key being stuck or jammed all of a sudden impeding my work. I advised that I have to hit it really hard to make it work. I had been working with this problem for several days. Mrs. Page agreed I could purchase a new one. John later jokingly made the comment that one of the crews must have switched my keyboard with theirs that they were having this problem. At 1:00 p.m. Mrs. Page requested I come to her office to discuss the use of the gas card. Alice was in the office and wanted to use it. I did not understand why Mrs. Page would need to interrupt me for this. I had no need for the card. This was a pretext to bring me into the room for a premeditated conversation where I as the butt of the joke. Prior to this incident Alice or myself would just go to Mrs. Page’s office separately and ask for the card. Mrs. Page made some comment about saving her butt but started to say the word ass. Alice made the comment “can’t use the word ass.” I asked who started that rule? Mrs. Page advised me it is because she told her staff not to swear around me. I advised Mrs. Page that she misinterpreted my comment when I said that “I don’t like to swear I meant use the Fuck word.” I said in this meeting that I never complained to anyone at Mackay about that word that I only complained to Mrs. Page about sexual jokes. Alice made the comment that after working here for some time I would use this swear word like everybody else. I stated that I am not a herd follower just because others use that word does not mean that I have to join the crowd.

    58. On June 24th, 2002, at 8:35 I come into the office from the front door. Mr. Millington is by the client’s seats in front of my desk with Mrs. Page at his side. Mr. Millington addresses me as “Hi Claudia”. I ignored this intentional provocation to promote an emotional reaction out of me and dropped off my things at my desk and left the office to go to the washroom.

    59. On June 25th, 2002, at 9:00 a.m. I notice problem with Pitney Bowes Stamp machine in that I still had $60.00 left in the machine and the machine was telling me to refill as it was zero. I again immediately advised Mrs. Page of this negative stressor that I was all of sudden having problem with this machine. I had no such problem prior to June and my 3-mth appraisal. This problem with Pitney Bowes disappeared after I talked to Mrs. Page. Later at 10:30, Mr. Millington asks me if I want a coffee and I advised that I did not. Mr. Millington sent his associate Les to go do the Tim Horton coffee run. Les went by my desk to go out the front door. He stopped with the door open and suddenly asked me out of the blue “So you don’t want any Sex?” This incident coincidently happened after my conversation with Mrs. Page on June 21st (only complained about sex jokes), and after subjugated by Mr. Millington with Mrs. Page present to “Hi Claudia.” This situation was for the purpose of intentional infliction of emotional distress to annoy and cause an emotional reaction out of me. On June 25th, 2002, I advised Mrs. Page that Vincent Julian’s 3-mth probation was due on the 25th. Mrs. Page did not hesitate to talk to Vincent immediately and she did not need Mr. Clarke’s help as she did during my interview. This is an example of differential treatment.

    60. On June 26th, 2002, I proceeded to make a collection call to client Mr. Dave Mancini. The number I dialed was an old number and I got the answering machine of a Dairy Company. I did not leave a message and hung up, as I did not know if Mr. Mancini was affiliated with the Dairy Company. I called up John in the office to mention my difficulty in contacting Mr. Mancini. John set out to deceive me and create conflict by advising me to call #905-304-3952 and that I could contact Mr. Mancini at Gates of Ancaster. I then called and left a message for Mr. Mancini to call me regarding his account. I later received a call from Mr. Mancini advising me that he got a message from the Dairy Company telling him that I left a message there for him. I advised him that I did call the Dairy Company and got their answering machine and hung up without leaving any message for Mr. Mancini.

  43. 61. On June 27th, 2002, at 4:30 I was in the DacEasy accounting software when I received error message advising me that can’t go in only one user. I again immediately advised Mrs. Page of this negative stressor of computer problem now in DacEasy. This problem went away as soon as I spoke to Mrs. Page about it. Also on this date I was given the task to enter items on the Condition of Employment by Mrs. Page. She had no problem showing me where I can find this computer file like she did in March and now it is available to me. Also on June 27th Kevin came up to my desk in the afternoon while Mrs. Page was standing by my desk to complain that plans for project 00H-050-36 where not sent out according to his instructions. Kevin said he left them on my desk. I assertively stated that there were no instructions from Kevin to send the package out and that I was waiting for client information to send the plans to the correct location. Kevin then changed his comment to saying that he thought he left me the instructions when I asserted myself with him in Mrs. Page’s presence. This was an attempt to make me look and feel incompetent by Mrs. Page and her staff Kevin. Also on June 27th I received a call from John in the office advising me that he has Mr. Mancini on his line. John proceeds with angry tone to ask me why I called Gates of Ancaster at #905-304-3952 for Mr. Mancini? I tried to explain the reason calmly that John instructed me to call at Gates of Ancaster and that he advised me I would find Mr. Mancini there as he was employed at Gates of Ancaster. John put on a show of getting very angry and upset with me, and I felt this to be a bully tactic so I assertively stopped his game playing with the comment “what’s was his point?” He then said he had Dave on the line and he hung up the phone on me. Mr. Mancini advised me that he did not receive the invoice and plans sent because we sent it to the old address. I requested he fax me his letterhead with his new address. I immediately went to Mrs. Page’s office to ask if I can go and make copies of the plan for this customer. Later I called the customer to tell him I was mailing 4 copies of his plan and invoice today and apologize to the client for the delay.

    80. In July, 2002, I contacted vendor Norma Lawson to advise her of problem with her account on our system and that I needed to reconcile her account. I requested she send me a list of all invoices for the year showing which ones were paid and which ones were still outstanding. Since March, I had been following Karen’s instructions of adding to the excel spreadsheet lists for incoming vendor invoices and paid vendor invoices Norma’s invoices and paid invoices. I found out in June after I was trained on how to use DacEasy that there was a discrepancy on this vendor’s account. I notice that for the cheques that I wrote out prior to June paying specific invoices that Karen did not apply these cheques in DacEasy according to my request on the excel list. I checked further and found this problem goes back to January. Karen, the ex bookkeeper, should have advised me that she was not applying these cheques according to my excel list in March and why she was doing so, so that we could have looked at this account sooner to correct the application problem. Karen should have communicated with me that there was an application problem with this vendor. The list that I received from the vendor showed invoices not paid that were paid and cleared off the vendor payable account by Karen. I had copies of original invoice to be paid that were not open on the account in DacEasy. This account needed to be reconciled.

    81. On July 2nd, 2002, Karen stopped by at 4:30 to train me. At 5:00, Kin Lau (contractor assisting Mrs. Page while she is on vacation) came to my desk and brought me 5 plans for project 02H-135 that he stated needed to be urgently courier out immediately. My working hours is 8:30 to 4:30. I was on overtime for the specific purpose of being trained by Karen. Kin Lau intentional waited till 5:00 with this urgent courier request taking away my training time with Karen. We had to stop my training to prepare plans to be courier out and call the Courier Company.

    82. On July 5th, 2002, John advises me that Sil at Chamberlain called him to request copies of plans for project 02h-045-4 for Springfield Hotels (Airport) as he claims he never received copies of the plan. I advised John I would look into this matter and made a day timer entry to look for plans for this project. I remembered on June 25th that Mrs. Page had requested that I have this plan ready for Sil at Chamberlain and the Sil would stop by to pick up the plans. I pulled the file and find my copy of invoice #11159 for the plans with my hand written notation that the plans were picked up by client (he sent a woman to pick up the plans). I went to John’s desk to show him my copy of this invoice with my notation of pick up. John then spoke to the client and does not say anything further to me about the missing plans. John intentionally created conflict to make it look like I am inefficient at my duties and create unnecessary work.

    83. On July 8th, 2002, I notice more computer/machine problems. At 3:20 the Pitney Bowes machine showed error town/province absent and refill. Also, my printer default was changed so that items would not go to my printer connected with my computer (PC Anywhere – Control Software can change files and delete files from another source while I am working on my computer). I did not have any computer problems prior to June and now I am having a lot. Also on July 8th at 1:35 I was trying to key in an invoice for the vendor Sokkia of #12023248 for $175.26 in DacEasy. I needed to delete the entry by hitting F6 when the system freeze on me so I controlled-alt-delete and received an error message that “this version of DacEasy accounting is for single user use only accessing of the program files by more than one user at a time is prohibited.” I called the accountant James to see why this is happening and he gave me the excuse the computer just thinks it is attached to another user. I had to shut down my computer and reboot which impeded my work.

    84. On July 10th, 2002, I requested Mr. Clarke to signed two cheques for the Receiver General and GST cheques. Mr. Clarke only signed the Receiver General cheques. I also made out one cheque to the Association of Ontario Land Surveyors with the abbreviation of Association as Ass. I gave this cheque to Mr. Clarke in the boardroom to sign. Later, he comes to my desk with this cheque and asked me what I thought? I said I don’t understand what he was referring to? He pointed to the abbreviation and said that the vendor might read that abbreviation as asshole.

    85. On July 12th, 2002, at 9:38 a.m. I sent Mr. Clarke an e-mail to advise him of the quarter GST payment due on July 31st will be $11,113.98 and asked him how much funds he would like me to transfer to the GST account as there was only $3700.02 in this account. I received e-mail reply of “the reason we have the GST account is to prevent this type of cash requirement from occurring.” I responded back with an e-mail to advise Mr. Clarke that the reasons why there is a cash shortage in the GST account is that I was instructed to make deposits of $500.00 to the GST account not $1000.00. I had continued to write cheques of $500.00 and Mr. Clarke continued to sign them without questioning me at the time. I also advised Mr. Clarke that I did not have accounting data to know how much funds would be required since I had not been trained on the DacEasy accounting software. When I challenge Mr. Clarke I then receive a derogatory note “don’t be so defensive.” Mr. Clarke did not make it clear to me that the $500.00 transfer of funds was only one time.

    86. On July 15th, 2002, at 10:59 a.m. I sent Mr. Clarke e-mail request for him to review my collection letter to A. Wesley Paving for disputed invoice #10706. There were four parties involved. After meeting with the clients on May 28th and submitting my request for payment letter of May 29th and resubmitting request for payment to other party at fault, I received response from all parties that no one is responsible for payment of this invoice. I ask Mr. Clarke to review my next letter and provide his opinion on how to pursue collection on this disputed item. At 12:40 I received e-mail response back from Mr. Clarke and he does not respond to my accounts receivable inquiry. On July 16th at 1:19 I send another e-mail requesting a response to my accounts receivable letter. At 3:19, Mr. Clarke advises that he will pay the Halton Catholic Separate School Board a visit to see if he can resolve this disputed invoice and see who should pay for the services rendered. He stated he would be in on Friday and that I should have the file of correspondence ready for him. At 3:21 Mr. Clarke sends me second e-mail requesting to change the words in my letter. I thought that this was good that I was finally getting some feedback. July 19th I gave Mr. Clarke the information he requested. Later, Mr. Clarke contacted the School Board and he later advised me that I would need to pursue small claims court against A. Wesley Paving. Around the first week in August, all of a sudden Mr. Clarke passes on the collection of this disputed invoice to Mrs. Page. I could see the two in the boardroom having this conversation. I was excluded from this discussion intentionally and Mr. Clarke made no attempt to advise me that I do not need to pursue the small claims yet. Mrs. Page had just return from a three-week vacation and had other more urgent surveying items to pursue than this disputed invoice administration issue.

    87. On July 16th, 2002, I received an e-mail response from Mr. Clarke of “I see no reason to call an uncollected account a bad debt, we never had the money in the first place”. This was management’s response to my request for instructions on how Mackay handles bad debt items. My original e-mail was on June 26th, my second request e-mail was on June 27th, and finally on June 28th Mr. Clarke advises me that he will discuss this matter with me when he is in the office (see attached). No discussion took place. On July 16th I sent third request for instructions and received the response that I should not call an uncollected account a bad debt? On July 17th I sent Mr. Clarke an e-mail response as to why I call an uncollected item a bad debt and not a reversal of revenue: based on my 13 years of experience, information from my accounting book (copies given to Mr. Clarke to read and discuss with me), and my husband who has his CMA certificate. In this e-mail I stated that I would do the entry per his instructions for Gerry Williamson and outstanding invoice #9800, but needed his instructions for the other item that was over $1000.00. I never received a response from Mr. Clarke as to how to handle this second item. I also felt I was being set up for another criticism down the road on the item for Gerry Williamson so I did not do this entry as per my e-mail. I also did not do this entry as I felt it was not good accounting to reverse revenue that should be a bad debt expense. Later on August 9th I received from the accountant Lisa Osborne an accounting list of year-end entries with an entry to clear the Gerry Williamson uncollectible to bad debts expense and not reversing revenue as Mr. Clarke instructed me. At 3:00 p.m. on July 16th, I looked on my desk for the GST forms that I needed to fill out to pay the second quarter payment of GST. I could not find this form on my desk where I left it. I double-checked the vendor files for Minister of Finance and the Receiver General. The form was no where to be found. No one else in the office would need this form. This tactic was used by Watts Industries of taking customer fax off my desk that I was working on as noted in my 2000 complaint. On July 17th at 1:00 p.m. I looked again for the GST form on my desk and in the files for the Minister of Finance and the Receiver General. The form was still missing. I knew this to be a bully tactic so I placed a yellow sticker on my computer as a reminder to myself to look for this form. The notes were visible for everyone in the office to see. On July 19th I looked again in the Minister of Finance file and at the back of it was placed the missing GST form.

    88. On July 17th, 2002, I was working on doing the payroll which ended on Wednesday. Alice came up to my desk to intentionally deceive me by advising me that she was only going to work 4 hours as she had to take her daughter to the doctors. I repeated what she said only going to work 4 hours? She said ok. On July 18th Alice came up to my desk to ask why she was short on her pay that she was short some time on her pay stub. We reviewed the hours on the excel spreadsheet with her pay. She now tells me that she told me on July 17th that she would be working till 4:00 p.m. not 4 hours only on Wednesday. I knew this was a bully tactic and did not fall for this conflict created situation to argue with her. I simply made a negative assertion statement of apologizing for this misunderstanding. I was not interested in arguing with Alice and continued to document this incident. I stated to her that he adjustment would be for 3.5 hours and she agreed. I repeated this amount again to make sure no misunderstanding as to what Alice is telling me. I advised he that it would be adjusted on her next pay stub. Alice was smiling and made a speech in a patronizing manner that “its ok to make a mistake.” Later I received her time card for the Wednesday, which shows she worked a full shift of 8 hours, which clearly indicates premeditation to create errors in my work and make me look incompetent. On July 22nd, 2002, the Pitney Bowes stamp machine did not function properly again it showed error message to refill when I knew there was still $40.00 left for stamps.

    89. On July 24th, 2002, I was looking around my desk for the original invoice for vendor RJM for the Bell system setup for $4304.45. This invoice was not entered in the accounts payable payment system of DacEasy for the June’s month end. I could not close June’s month without entering this item. I had written out a cheque to pay this vendor and needed to enter this payment in the payable system of DacEasy. I had an open file for vendor invoices to be entered in accounts payable, which is the last place where I put this invoice. I placed it in this file waiting to speak to Karen about the accounts she would use for this entry. I asked Mrs. Page and John if they had this invoice. They both denied they had it. Mrs. Page then made a negative critical comment that the vendor Ron wrote out a written copy and that he would not have a duplicate copy for me if I contact him. I called Dasha’s bluff and advised her that it would be unlikely for a vendor not to have his own copy of this invoice for reason of audit. I left two messages with this vendor and he faxed over a copy of the invoice. Later on August 7th John stopped by my desk with a folder and the original invoice for $4304.45 without saying anything to me.

    90. Also, at 4:00, on July 24th, I went back to Mrs. Page’s office to review billing issues that we had been discussing. When I went back to her office Mr. Kin Lau was behind her desk by the window standing in front of a plan for Coreslab. I went to sit down looking up at Mrs. Page waiting to carry on with our discussion about the billing. She proceeds to point at the Coreslab plan at a section where there is an easement problem that missed by her and has caused problems for the customer. Due to this negligent, Coreslab is suing Mackay for the problem it has caused for their client. Kin Lau’s body/lap was very close to the plan where Mrs. Page was pointing her finger. This seemed abnormal because Mrs. Page repeated herself 3 times about this easement section and pointing her fingers in that area close to Mr. Kin’s body/lap and looking back at me. There was no reason for her to review this matter three times or at all with me. I felt this was entrapment attempt to set me up to be charged with sexual harassment by Mr. Lau for leering with Mrs. Page as a witness.

    91. On July 25th, 2002, at 2:25, I turned at my desk to write into my day timer that was son the small grey table behind me. I am bent over writing away when Mr. Lau comes towards me not politely asking me to move or pass him the plan that was in the Commercial Photo bag to my left. He leans over my writing and gets his body in my face almost to pick up the plan. He was too close, almost touching or brushing up against me. Had I looked up my eyes would be right in Mr. Lau’s lap and I feel he is doing this to accuse me of sexual harassment. I closed my eyes and tried to move my body away and Mr. Lau would move his body closer to mine. He picked up the bag with the plan. I asserted myself with him immediately and demanded that he place his request for plans at the front counter of my desk rather than do it behind and around me so we don’t do this dancing at the back. I advised Mr. Lau that I could do my job you stand over there and make your request. At 4:20 John comes around my desk looking for plans for Budd Development so I start looking around my desk and I notice John staying close to where ever my eyes were looking similar to Kin’s earlier behaviour. I feel that John was staging his body close to me so I would make a mistake and look at his body inappropriately.

  44. 92. On July 26th, 2002, I page John and advised him that Mark Pillinini was on the line for him. He had me on loud speaker and said that Mark Pillinini was calling to speak to Alice and so from my desk on the phone I repeated that Mark Pillinini was on the line. Alice changed the name and said Markay. I said no, Mark Pillinini. Alice was expecting this call from Mark Pillinini not Markay as per John’s comment.

    93. On July 30th, 2002, at 11:20 Ron Querubin stopped by my desk to request that I give him my password to my computer. I advised him that only management should have access to my password. He questioned why I had a password and would not give him that information. I advised Ron that all of the other companies that I worked for had employees’ password protect their computers and that this is not a new practice. I advised that my computer had confidential accounting information. At 11:30 I went to shut off my computer and received this error message “computer attached to another user.” So I shut my computer off and who ever was attached to my computer. In July 2002, I notice some of my other confirmation letters printing out differently missing information that was typed. I caught this problem before sending the letters out to the client. On July 30th I gave John a confirmation letter to review and approved for Banyon Community Service for project 02H-235 with the sales quote number #pp02076 beside the reference spot and in the description of project in brackets the following “as per proposal pp02076.” John gave me back a different copy of the confirmation letter, one missing this important information. I noticed it right away and reprinted the copy that was saved with this information on it.

    94. On August 1st, 2002, I notice that my computer today is working extremely slowly again. I advised Mrs. Page of this problem again, and requested that my computer be fixed of this problem of slowness and error messages all of a sudden. There appears to be an increase of computer problems along with an increase in conflict creating situations since my 3-mth appraisal.

    95. On August 2nd, 2002, at 10:40 I advised Mrs. Page while she was standing at my desk of the computer problems I was having of items typed on screen comes out printing differently creating errors. I told her I did not notice this problem till now and that this problem causes me to work slower as I have to double check all my work for accuracy. I advised Mrs. Page that there has to be a problem with my computer regarding the following: missing things I type, changes in information, lots of errors messages, and all of sudden slowness. I advised Mrs. Page that month end billing might take longer due to these problems. Mrs. Page suggested I talked to Haige Seferian (tenant) for the phone number of a computer service repair person. At 1:30 Mrs. Page requests that I see her in her office. With urgency in her voice, Mrs. Page sets out to deceive me when she advises me that for the past two weeks Norma Lawson was not responding to their fax request. I proceeded to mention to Mrs. Page the problem on this vendor’s account created by the misapplication of the payment entries by Karen. I said that I needed time to reconcile this account to pay invoices that match our records with Norma’s outstanding records. Mrs. Page made the critical comment that I should not withhold paying this vendor because now Norma is upset and not responding to our request. I showed Mrs. Page the fax report I received from Norma in July and compared it with DacEasy AP statement to show her how our records do not match and I requested time with no interruptions to reconcile this account. I assertively called Mrs. Page’s bluff by stating to her that I did not believe her that Norma was reacting in the manner that Mrs. Page was describing. I advised that Norma had no problem in the past to call and speak to me directly about her account and that she was made aware of the problem with her account in July. She made no call to me about past due invoices and any urgency or no service. I also told Mrs. Page that Norma called the office on July 30th at 3:50 to speak to John who was out. She had me write a message note for John that yes she can respond to his request for records search. Later I find an invoice #112944 from Norma Lawson for record search on 62R-1625 dated July 29th. Later Mr. Kin Lau also gets involved in this conflict show when he came up to my desk and mockingly repeated Mrs. Page’s urgency and problem that Norma Lawson was not responding to his request for record searches and that she was upset with us. I wrote up a cheque that day for invoices outstanding in my pending file that were no longer in the accounts payable system for DacEasy.

    96. On August 7th, 2002, at 9:00 I was trying to save the confirmation letter for project 02H-244 and received another error message that of: file is read only\\Dasha Page\…\confirmation 02h-244.Doc. Mrs. Page was out of the office this morning so I asked Ron Querubin if he had this file open and he said he did not. I asked John if he had this file open and he said he did not. At 9:15 John tried to find out why can’t save this letter and could not find a solution and he suggested I reboot. After rebooting the letter saved fine and no more problems with this confirmation. At 11:15 I was on the phone with Mr. Clarke discussing the visa with my eyes down when Mr. Lau comes through the front door and aggressively starts to carry on a conversation very loudly while I am on the phone with my head down talking to Mr. Clarke. At first I ignored him, but he would not stop so I said excuse me to Mr. Clarke and put the phone on hold. I told Mr. Lau that I am on the phone and I documented the incident in front of Mr. Lau. Mr. Lau later came back to my desk with his fabricated excuse that he thought I was talking to him still about Bay City. I refused to argue with him. Later during my conversation with Mr. Clarke, he asked if Karen had finished the month of June’s financial statements. Mr. Clarke new I would be doing the statements for June not Karen. I advised that the statements were not completed at this date. On the phone he was getting angry with me that they should be done and needed to be completed ASAP causing distress. At 11:25 I sent e-mail to Karen advising her of Mr. Clarke’s urgency, that these statements should have been completed in July and that he just brought it to my attention today. Karen advised that there is no urgency that “considering the bank statement doesn’t even arrive to MMP until mid month that would have been difficult.”

    97. On August 7th, 2002, I received email from Karen Tarpos regarding June’s Month End duties and training on Thursday night. I also received email from Dasha Page re: A. Wesley Paving A/R problem and Dasha Page’s attempts to collect. She advised me that is was still on her desk.

    98. On August 8th, 2002, I received email from Karen Tarpos on new duties Bank Rec with procedures for Month End Entries and Bank Rec.

    99. On August 8th, 2002, I sent email to Ross Clarke advising him that today’s deposit was $1712.00 that the overdraft position was $112,782.09 and I asked if I can release some A/P cheques and if so how much?

    100. On August 8th, 2002, at 8:00 I stopped by Commercial Photocopy on Barton St. in Stoney Creek to make copies of plans as I had done previously. Mrs. Page requested I go to make copies at this vendor. I have not had any problems with this vendor on any other visits and I was always addressed by my name “Claudette”. After my copies were done I started to head out when the Sales Representative, Bill, standing in the hallway in front of the copying area addressed me as “Hi Claudine” to which I did not respond and ignored. He than repeated this address and the short male coworker with a mustache (don’t know his name) attempted to draw my attention to Bill and his address. I responded the second time to the coworker with a mustache with the following “no documentation required” and left. They laughed at this comment and knew what I meant i.e. Bully reversing tactic. This made me angry hence my outburst of “no documentation required”. It is premeditated and indicative that my movement for work is being super surveillance by management with use of third parties. When I returned to the office Mr. Clarke was in the boardroom in front of my desk. I attempted to be somewhat direct with Mrs. Page about that bully tactic. As soon as I saw Mrs. Page at my desk I advised her that “we had fun at Commercial Photo today”. She proceeded automatically like she was expecting a complaint from me with comments like what happen and is there a problem. I than stated to her that I made the comment to the Commercial Photocopy staff of “no documentation required on reversing entries”. Mrs. Page laughed and made no further comments to acquire information about the negative incident, and left me desk area. She did not ask me what I meant by my comments of documentation or reversing tactics.

    101. At 9:15 Mrs. Page requested that I make 8 copies of plans for a client at the office who needed them urgently. She requested that I make the copies using Haig’s machine in the office which is a slow machine. John had been timing copy jobs done on this machine. I proceeded to make copies and had problems. The first copy did not come out completely finished and my complete job had to be cancelled and reprinted. Haig disrespectfully bumped his job ahead of my second attempt to print my job, delaying my printing some more. I had not received the same formal training of this new machine as other employees. In fact on the day that Mr. Seferin was training everyone else in the office I was left out of the training session and no one came up to me for a proper training session on this machine afterwards. At 9:45 I advised Mrs. Page of the problems I was having with this machine and she advised me to go to rapid to make copies. I returned at 10:20. This requested task took one hour to complete and irritated the client. Later in the morning, Mr. Clarke came by my desk off to the side and stood in front of me. He just stood there fiddling with his pants/belt and stared at me. At 4:30 on August 8th, 2002, I was in the boardroom with Karen for training on the bank reconciliation statements for the month of June. Mr. Clarke came in the boardroom talking to Karen. I notice that he was doing a lot of fiddling/gesturing with his belt and lap area again while in our presence.

    102. On August 9th, I received a deceitful response to set me up to error from Mrs. Page about my inquiry to Mr. Dave Edward’s comment in the parking lot on August 8th about his vacation request date. Mrs. Page states in her e-mail response “he mentioned to me December about a week ago. I told him to write it up. I will remind him.” I later received from Dave his time card for the Friday vacation of August 2nd not December as per Mrs. Page’s e-mail. Also this morning around 10:30, Mr. Clarke came to my desk and in an intimidating tone asked me if I had signed the Sexual Harassment Policy Form causing distress and making it look like I was at fault for doing something wrong. I advised that I did not sign this form because management had not provided me with this document to sign. I stated that we had spoken about this policy in March and that no one at Mackay could supply me with a copy of this policy as noted in my day timer. Mr. Clarke was angry by this comment and yelled that he did not care what I noted down and that I should not get so defensive. When I challenge Mr. Clarke, he puts me down with stating “I should not get so defensive.” The first time Mr. Clarke used this put down was on July 12th. I asserted myself again and said to Mr. Clarke, you asked if I signed this sexual harassment form and I told you that I did not because you did not supply me with one in March per your discussion with me in March. Mr. Clarke then called up Carol in Windsor to fax me over a copy of the sexual harassment policy. At 10:54 Mr. Clarke gave the fax copy of the policy to me to type in the Conditions of Employment computer file. Later Mr. Clarke made a display of himself in the boardroom in front of my desk discussing with a customer his sexual harassment policy and that he had a problem with an employee once who was looking at pornography on the internet while on company time that he had to be reprimanded. This is an example of indirect communication to intimidate me by Mr. Clarke with reference to an employee who was looking at pornography at work which is a reference item in my 2000 Watts Complaint.

    103. Also on August 9th, 2002, I request Mr. Clarke to sign two more cheques for payments of GST to the Receiver General posted dated for August 15th and 31st. I could not mail these cheques with the July 31st as Mr. Clarke did not sign them for me to mail at the same time. On August 9th, I sent Karen an e-mail advising her that in my training to close the month of June, that we missed including the depreciation expense for the month of June’s statements. I asked the question “do I do the entry in July for the month of June?” Karen responds with “I could have sworn I seen it on your entries but it should have been entered just like the example in July.” We did not review any example in July as we were in the month of June still. Karen was using double-speak in this e-mail to confuse me by switching July for June or May. So I had to send another e-mail asking “what example in July?” I was told the example in May. On August 12th I went to Haig’s scanner machine to make a copy of plans. I requested Alice’s assistance with the scanner. Alice made the following comment “Its Claudette’s fault”. At about 10:40 Ron Querubin comes by my desk dropping off information in my in tray clicking his pen excessively when he comes to my desk intentionally creating noise disturbance. I have notice him doing this on other occasions this time I decide to document as I feel it is intentional to distract, to induce irritability and annoy me.

    104. On August 14th, 2002, at 8:42 I sent Mrs. Page e-mail of overtime hours and for time off on Thursday and Friday. At 9:02 I advised Mrs. Page of my overtime hours and that I sent her an e-mail to request time off. I notice Mrs. Page being on her cell phone for awhile both in her office and outside my door. At 9:50 I asked Mrs. Page if she had time to look at my e-mail per my request at 9:02. She advised that she had not as she had to deal with a client first. Mrs. Page gave me no details as to who this client was or what the problem was as she had in the past. At 10:01 I send an another e-mail requesting a response to me e-mails and verbal request. I felt I was being ignored. There did not seem to be an urgent client matter. In fact, I received an e-mail response from Mrs. Page at 10:13 that just said “No problem. I imagine that you will use your overtime hours to cover these two days?” There was no mentioned that her response was delayed due to urgent client issues. Her response came 1 hour and 31 minutes after my first e-mail, than a second e-mail request and 2 verbal request. On August 14th at 10:45 Mrs. Page walks by my desk to interrupt my work with a conversation about a newspaper. I advised her not now, as I don’t have time. I feel that Mrs. Page was subjugating me with an unnecessary interruption to draw my attention away from my payroll duties. On this same day while I was trying to complete the payroll, I notice that Ron Querubin kept coming up to my desk in a mocking way checking my in-tray to see if I completed the task that he had just placed in there creating a sense of urgency. The payroll task took priority to any task in my in-tray on payday. Prior to today, I never had any other employee at Mackay come to my desk to pester me about work in my in-tray in the manner in which Ron was displaying. Later, I went to Mrs. Page’s office to give her a phone message. She was on the phone. I placed the phone message on her desk and pointed at it and went back to my desk. A few minutes later, Ron Querubin stopped by my desk and made a mocking behaviour and unnecessary interruptions going on at my desk I started to lose my concentration completely today and I was feeling depressed and could not eat my lunch. I completed the task of payroll and asked Mrs. Page if I can go home early and left about 3:00. I went immediately to the unemployment’s office to see what options I had as I felt the bully environment becoming intolerable. I later went to the library to research information on workplace violence on the topic of bullying. I came up with resources, and made copies and went home. I went home in a very angry and agitated state to advise my husband that I was quitting and submitting a complaint with the labour board. My husband immediately jumped to the conclusions as to the condition of my injury to health and calls the psychiatrist at St. Joseph’s who misdiagnosed me with delusion disorder without my consent or request and started to push pills on me or we will separate threat. After reading some of the information on bullying I agreed to take the medication to calm my nerves and visit my family doctor.

    105. On August 19th, 2002, at 8:35 I sent Mrs. Page an e-mail after calling her to advise her that I was not well and will be taking the day off and that I had a doctor’s appointment at 2:15 to discuss the cause of my injury to health as I felt it was work related. After my doctor’s appointment I sent Mrs. Page a note advising her that the doctor has requested leave of absence this week and that my condition would be reassess weekly. I stated that the reason for my request was owing to health injury due to negative stressors in the workplace.

    106. On August 20th at about 1:40 I received a message to call Ron Querubin at Mackay. I called and the temp passed me on to Ron of Millington & Associates. This temp works for Mackay and the Ron that works for Mackay is Ron Querubin. I get transferred to the correct Ron and he asked me again for my password. I became very agitated by this call because of the play on the two Rons and because I had this same conversation with Ron on July 30th regarding not giving him my password. I advised Ron that I had given this information to Mrs. Page and that only management should have that information and that it was Mrs. Page’s responsibility to have my computer ready for Ron to invoice clients not me. I advised him the same thing that I did on July 30th and requested to speak to Mrs. Page. I later sent Mrs. Page an e-mail to advise her that it is her responsibility to have this computer working for her staff not her employee who is off on injury to health. I notified Mrs. Page of my password again and made the request that only she communicates with me at this time. At 4:15 I faxed to Mrs. Page a copy of my Doctor’s note and again request she forward to my attention a copy of the WSIB report. At 4:30 I called work to ensure that Mrs. Page had received my e-mails and fax copy of Doctor’s note. There was no supportive response being offered by Mrs. Page for my injury to health and she did not inquire how I was doing. She responded to my questions with just yes and no answers. She had received my faxes and e-mails. Dasha Page never sent me copies of the WSIB report and I did not get her copies showing she was breaching her fiduciary duty and misleading the WSIB till January 7th, 2003, decision was made.

    107. Mrs. Page set out to deceive the WSIB in her answers on Form 7 fabricating that the items that caused the injury/disease was unknown to her. Also, Mrs. Page wrote up a letter dated August 20th that she included with the Employer’s report of Injury/Disease Form 7 whereby she set out to deceive the WSIB as to the real status of my work environment and my injury to health, and my complaints during employment. The letter states: further to the attached WSIB claim, we were not able to fully complete the form as we are not aware of the exact cause of Ms. Losier’s injury; we have included with our submission all correspondence with Ms. Losier to assist you with the evaluation of the claim; Ms. Losier indicated at her 3 months evaluation (see attached letter dated June 4, 2002) that she likes her job and our team of employees and feels confident to perform also reconciliation for Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited; she was happy and never complained of any problems until August 14, 2002 when she sent Dasha Page, the company manager, an e-mail (attached) regarding wife abuse and requested time off to do some legal investigation; she never mentioned that she had work related problems; however, on August 19, 2002, we were surprised to receive another e-mail (attached) advising us of work related illness; on August 20, 2002, Ms. Losier sent yet another e-mail (attached) requesting Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited to report her health injury caused by negative stressors in the work place; later that day she faxed to Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited doctor’s report (attached); it is because there is a great deal of unknown at this time we were not able to fill out all the fields of the claim application.

    108. During this time off, I drove to a Brantford hotel and took 57 of my sleeping pills as a suicide attempt on my life. I was admitted to the Brantford General Hospital on August 23rd, 2002. While hospitalized, I was again misdiagnosed with a delusional disorder this time because I said I was being bullied at Mackay. This doctor only looked at my symptoms and my previous assessment in making his assessment. There was no discussion of the incidents at Mackay that caused the thinking that I was being bullied by this doctor.

    109. While hospitalized, I received call from Michelle Spaate from the WSIB on August 28th, 2002, to be advised of MacKay’s denial of wrongdoing. She said my employer advised the WSIB that there were no negative stressors in the work place due to the following: my request for leave of two days absence to investigate legal information on wife abuse, my 3-mth appraisal letter, and no prior written complaints to my employer. Mrs. Page did not advise me at the time that I made my verbal complaints of sexual vexatious exposure to sex picture or joke that I had to put my complaint in writing which demonstrates breach of trust and duty of care.

    110. On September 19, 2002, Dr. Ennis, psychiatrist at St. Joseph’s in Stoney Creek, closed my file due to my belief of misdiagnosis of delusional disorder.

    111. On September 24th, 2002, I sent Mrs. Page letter with copy of doctor’s note for indefinite leave from work pending response to treatment, and that I had another appointment on October 10th, 2002.

    112. October 28th, 2002, I received second assessment report from Dr. Ed Pomeroy, PhD, a qualified psychologist, of anxiety with depressed moods that is acute as a result of work abuse.

    113. On November 19th, 2002, Mrs. Page and Karen Tarpus were interviewed by Paul Dardarian, Claims Investigator for the WSIB. Both Mrs. Page and Karen Tarpus made deceitful statements during this investigation to mislead the investigator. Mrs. Page states regarding incident March 8th with Alice: Dasha did not document anything; she does vaguely recall that the worker recall that the worker told her about Alice showing her the joke; Dasha said that she had not had an opportunity to speak to everyone at the workplace but did speak to Alice about not showing the worker any jokes in the future. By Mrs. Page not documenting my complaint keeping a record of incident implies that she did not take my concerns or the Human Rights Code that sexual harassment is prohibited seriously. Mrs. Page distorts the truth in her statement: She also recalls that about two weeks or so after the worker began working she had a conversation with her; the worker said that she is aware that someone is after her and was also certain that they have contacted the accident employer. Mrs. Page distorts truth in her statement: Dasha also became aware that the worker had a difficult time in speaking to male employees; if she was in the parking lot and they asked her a work-related question she would tell the male employee not to talk to her unless she was at work. Regarding the second sexual joke, Mrs. Page states: Dasha recalled this, but did not think that it was sexual in nature; the worker asked if she could reaffirm with all employees that no jokes should be shown to her and Dasha abided to this. This statement shows complete disregard for me when I complain of sexual joke and that management did not follow their own company policy of: complaints and accusations of sexual harassment from any employee will be taken seriously and will be investigated by the President. I did not make the statement that Mrs. Page says I made of: the worker asked if she could reaffirm with all employees that no jokes should be shown to her and Dasha abided to this. My complaint was with Vincent not other employees, and my complaint to Mrs. Page was I do not appreciate being subjugated to sexual jokes. Mrs. Page did no investigation of my complaint per their company policy which demonstrates that she condones this behaviour. Mrs. Page distorts the truth again when questioned about the sexual harassment policy as she states: they were updating the policy in Windsor and they asked the worker if she could update the harassment policy at this office in Burlington; the worker had some documents at her home and she updated it and this was given to all employees to read and sign. I brought in a policy on Substance Abuse not the sexual harassment. Mrs. Page makes false statement of: she was not aware that some individuals were calling the worker “Claude.” Mrs. Page attempts to image innocents of wrongdoing by her false statement of: she was surprised that the worker had put this claim in; she had thought that the worker was happy at the workplace and enjoyed her work; the worker is still considered an employee and her employment has not been terminated. Also, Karen Tarpus makes deceitful statements when questioned by the investigator of: during the last month to month and one-half of the worker’s employment, she does not think that she went into the workplace at all and if there was any communication it was by phone; she recalls that during the first meeting, a co-worker had shown the worker some type of joke, which she believes had to do with a firemen calendar; it had been Karen that had initiated that joke and it had gone on to the other co-workers and one of them showed the worker.

    114. On November 22nd, 2002, I courier to the Ontario Human Rights Commission my self draft complaint for discrimination for sex, perceived disability of a delusional disorder of persecution type, and real disability of anxiety, and reprisal action against MacKay. Shortly after I submitted my reprisal complaint against Watts Industries to the Ontario Human Rights commission.

    115. On November 29th, 2002, I mailed letter to Mrs. Page requesting overtime pay for overtime hours worked from July 1st to August 14th for a total logged hours of 27.22, accumulated drug receipts for the amount of $116.64 for payment of the portion owed by Mackay, and for sick days pay allowed to employees per year under the company’s new sick benefit policy (implemented May 2002). I received no phone call from my employer or manager.

    116. On December 5th I went to my family doctor who wrote up change in my medication from perphenizine to paxil 10 mg. I was advised to reduce the remaining perphenizine to start the paxil.

    117. I called Mrs. Page on December 12th 12:10 for a response and was advised that Mr. Clarke was handling my request. I asked at this time that Mrs. Page forward to me the letter I drafted in May for the sick day benefits none was forth coming. I called Mr. Clark up at the Windsor location and was transferred to his cell phone. He was rude to me on the phone and said “Claudette who” after I stated who I was. Mr. Clarke advised me that he was withholding processing my request for payment of items in my letter dated November 29th till a decision has been made on my WSIB claim. This means withholding overtime pay till a WSIB claim is resolved which is illegal. This indecent behaviour aggravated my condition. I was advised by Mills and Mills to file an Employment Standard Claim against Mackay for withholding overtime pay due to me.

    118. On December 16th, 2002, I went to my family doctor for assessment of health and discussion of fit to return to work. Based on the attitude by management at MMP towards my November 29th 2002 letter we felt it best not to return to MMP due to “hostile work environment”. I immediately started looking in the papers for another job leaving the door open for MMP to change their attitude and show their employee at home some respect, and waiting for my manager to inquire about my return to work or accommodations. I was waiting for response from them to my November 29th letter for the sick days and drugs reimbursements, plus waiting for the WSIB decision, plus the result of my Employment Standard’s claim for overtime hours pay being withheld illegally.

    119. I filed a claim (file #52008023) on December 18th, 2002, for contraventions of the Employment Standards Act, 2000. I was later advised over the phone by Claire Hickey at the Employment Standards Office that my employer sent letter dated January 6th advising them that overtime was not due to me and that they had standard policy regarding overtime and there was no mention of overtime pay being withheld till WSIB claim was resolved. Mr. Clarke set out to deceive the Employment Standards and he demonstrates a breach of trust towards me his staff. I sent fax of email dated August 14th, 2002, to my supervisor Mrs. Page that contradicting Mr. Clarke’s argument that they had standard policy. I advised Mrs. Page in this email that I had more overtime hours to submit to her for July and August with her notation of “no problem” for June’s overtime hours submitted for the 2 days off.

    120. On December 30th, 2002, I sent Mrs. Page another letter requesting from the company the sick benefits and received no response demonstrating again negligence of duty of care.

    121. On or about January 7th, 2003, I received the WSIB report with their decision that my claim was denied under our Traumatic Mental Stress Policy because the harassment that I complained about does not fit their definition of trauma per their policy. Ms. Mitoma, claims adjudicator, states that: I have concluded that your condition is not attributable to an unexpected traumatic event as set out by our policy. Our policy describes sudden and unexpected traumatic events to include such things as witnessing a fatality or a horrific accident, being the object of an armed robbery or hostage-taking, being the object of physical violence, and so forth. The Defendants, Mrs. Page and Mr. Clarke, not once contacted me by phone or mail to advise me that they have received this report or made any inquiries to my expected return date nor made any compromise of accommodation to get me back to work which again demonstrates negligence of duty of care and that their intention was to breach the contract.

    122. On January 10th I started part time work with another employer while I was waiting to receive a response to my November 29th and December 30th letter to MMP. I notice a difference in how I was feeling with a reduction of my anger and irritability since switching to paxil in December.

    123. On or about January 20th, 2003, I received courier at my home a termination letter signed by Mrs. Page stating cause to be: we have received and reviewed the report from Workplace, Safety & Insurance board that does not substantiate your alleged claim. The Employment Standards claim for overtime hours was in process and not decided upon as of January 20th 2003 termination letter date.

    124. Sometime in 2002 or 2003 the Defendant hires Pat Bennett. I believe Pat Bennett to be the staff of tenant next door to MacKay’s new location (moved in June). Pat advised me during my employment that her boss was reducing her hours and getting ready for retirement. After the move in June, Pat stopped by our office frequently and was very friendly with Mr. Clarke. Also, Pat did work during this time for Mr. Clarke’s new partner and tenant, Haig Seferin (landscape architect). I believe another reason for my termination other than conspiring with Watts to injure me was to pass on my job to Pat Bennett.

    125. On January 23rd, 2003, I received letter from the Employment Standards Officer, Claire Hickey, that her investigation had been completed. A cheque for my overtime of $372.72 was enclosed with this letter covering my entitlement under the Employment Standards Act 2000, Section 22.

    126. On February 7th, 2003, I sent to Chris Berzins, manager at the Freedom of Information and Privacy Office requesting copy of Mr. Clarke’s letter dated January 3rd submitted to the Employment Standards Office denying overtime pay due to me. Mr. Clarke makes deceitful statements in his letter to Ms. Hickey which borders on persecution of female staff, additional contemptuous behaviour, and went like this: we have a standard policy around the office that all overtime must be authorized by the manager or by an employee’s supervisor (did not provide the Employment standards copy of policy); we never, at anytime, requested Ms. Losier to spend time past her regular working hours, to carry out her duties; neither was any overtime authorized nor asked for; it is interesting to note that the first three weeks of July, Dasha Page OLS, Manager, was out of the office on vacation in Europe; further, I would point out to you, that both Ms. Losier’s predecessor in her position, and her successor, have not had to work overtime to carry out the assigned duties; we did pay Ms. Losier for her training period which involved a Saturday overtime; Ms. Losier was only with us 20 weeks; had she stayed for sometime and contributed to the smooth functioning of the office, we would have accommodated her extra time; having said the above, I believe in practical solutions; if you and the Ministry deem that Ms. Losier should be paid, at regular rates up to 44 hours, time and a half, after that, we will pay; however we will only do this at your request, not out of any obligation that we feel, is owed to Ms. Losier.

    127. I started another full time position on February 10, 2003, at a higher rate of pays that of $35,000/year than at MMP.

    128. On or around July 30, 2003, I received MacKay’s rebuttal to my Human Rights Complaint. In their Rebuttal to my Human Rights complaint, Mrs. Page and Mr. Clarke again make deceitful statements to misrepresent and deceive the commission as to the cause for my termination to now not be due to the WSIB denial of my claim per their January 20th termination later, but rather due to long absence and performance issues: the termination occurred during the WSIB claim denial and was not a reprisal for making any allegations under the WSIB, as the company waited until the claim had been adjudicated upon; there was no reprisal, no poisoned work environment and the Respondents were unaware as to any previous complaint regarding Watts Industries; the employment was terminated and had nothing to do with WSIB claim as there was no finding of a hostile work environment. The report I received from WSIB made no mentioned that there was no finding of a hostile work environment, rather their finding was: I have concluded that your condition is not attributable to an unexpected traumatic event as set out by our policy; our policy describes sudden and unexpected traumatic events to include such things as witnessed a fatality or a horrific accident, being the object of an armed robbery or hostage-taking, being the object of physical violence, and so forth.

    The defendants made deceitful and defamatory statements regarding my performances while working there of: the complainant was unable to operate the accounting duties and the Respondents were required to bring in additional help in order to do the accounting. Also, the defendants are claiming to the Ontario Human Rights Commission that I damaged their systems. In this rebuttal they make numerous false statements: the work environment of the Respondents is not a poisoned environment; prior to her hiring, the references that were attached to her resume were not contacted and no previous employers were consulted prior to hiring; the Respondents deny that they received any information from the employers that are listed in paragraph 2(a) of the Complaint and further deny that the staff at the Respondents have harassed the Complainant; the employee that had showed the joke apologized to her and the Complainant accepted the apology; following the issue with respect to sexual comments, the Complainant came into the office of Dasha Page and advised her regarding people that were “after her” and that she believed Dasha Page was “collaborating with these people to get her”; Dasha Page was upset by the conversation given the nature of the conversation and the bizarre accusations that were being made, the Respondents considered terminating the employment immediately during the probationary period; it became clear that the Complainant could not handle the full responsibilities of the position and was really just not competent enough to perform the work in a busy office; Dasha Page denies that there was any conversation regarding quitting; the respondents completely deny the allegations in this paragraph and state that it is a complete fabrication (Mrs. Page’s delusional comment); the employee prior the Complainant was hired by an agency/there was never any discussion or statements regarding that woman (Diane Hall); Delusional is not a word that is used by Dasha Page; on the contrary, the Complainant kept advising Dasha Page that “someone is out to get me”; the respondents are completely unable to respond to the phrase double-speak as they have no idea what this refers to; the Respondents have no knowledge on the issue of the Complainant being identified as “Claude”; (e) this is a complete fabrication and is denied completely (Dasha’s comment penis joke in crew’s book); (f) the Respondents have no idea what the Complainant is referring to and have no idea as to the false pretense for gas card question; Millington and Associates employee, Les, has no information on the allegations (“You don’t want sex”); the Complainant received her raise and did not make any comment about the environment or make any complaint about working for the company; the Complainant was unable to operate the accounting duties and the Respondents were required to bring in additional help in order to do the accounting; there was significant damage done to the Respondents by virtue of the administration system implemented by the Complainant; the Respondents were unaware of any negative stressors in the workplace; in fact, on August 14th, 2002, the Complainant emailed the Respondents and advised that she would be taking Thursday and Friday off as she was “experiencing some wife abuse at home and would like to do some legal investigation”/ only after did the Complainant make mention of negative stressors in the workplace; there was no withholding of information from the Complainant; the Complainant demonstrated a total lack of ability to exercise any patience and emailing several times a day; Dasha Page did believe that the Complainant was a happy employee; She did not express any concerns prior to her complaints to the WSIB and, therefore, the Respondents had no belief that she was anything but a happy employee; the termination occurred during the WSIB claim denial and was not a reprisal for making any allegations under the WSIB, as the company waited until the claim had been adjudicated upon; there was no reprisal, no poisoned work environment and the Respondents were unaware as to any previous complaint regarding Watts Industries; and the employment was terminated and had nothing to do with the WSIB claim as there was no finding of a hostile work environment.

    129. On August 1st, 2003, I courier my rebuttal to MacKay’s response to my Human Rights complaint which was received by the commission on August 7th, 2003. My complaint was moved to the investigation department in September 2003 as per commission staff.

    130. On April 27th 2004, Mackay submitted their Defense to my Small Claims #326/04 and again change the reason for my termination for cause for the third time to: ultimately, the WSIB determined that the Plaintiff did not qualify for benefits, but the Plaintiff did not return to work and the Defendant had no alternative but to terminate the employment of the Plaintiff. The defendants did have an alternative that required a duty of care of contacting their employee to request a return to work date and possibility of accommodations. During my employment, Kenny was off on WSIB benefits and Mrs. Page request I call him regarding his return to work date. Mrs. Page made no effort to contact me during my absence for return to work date and this is an example of differential treatment due to loss of reputation and malice by Mrs. Page. There are deceitful statements made in this defense: the defendant pleading denies in its entirety the schedule attached to the Plaintiff’s Claim; the Defendant pleading denies that the Plaintiff was wrongfully dismissed, or in any way treated unfairly, while an employee of the Defendant pleading; the Defendant states and the fact is that the Plaintiff did not attend for work on August 14th, 2002, and e-mailed the Defendant advising that she would not be returning to work for the balance of that week as she was “experiencing some wife abuse at home and would like to do some legal investigation”; and there was no reprisal and the work environment was not poisoned. In there defense, Mackay request that the Plaintiff’s action be stayed pending the determination of the Ontario Human Rights complaint. That the Defendant states that the allegations in this action and the complaints to the Ontario Human Rights Commission are substantially similar and that a stay of this case should be granted.

    131. On May 7th, 2004, Mrs. Page’s lawyer filed her defense for Small Claim action #358/04 with again another deceitful statement of: the defendant denies each and every allegation as set forth in the letter attached as the basis of the Plaintiff’s Claim. This denial includes Mrs. Page’s letter dated August 20th, 2002, to WSIB that I made no complaints prior to August 2002.

    132. I was receiving a monthly salary of $1881.30 approximately as at the date of his/her dismissal and I had the expectation of earning similar or greater amounts per month in the future. I was at the date of dismissal receiving certain benefits, including: drugs, dental, etc. I was refused benefits per company policy of: ambulance fees, and 5 sick days per year and reimbursement of company’s portion of drug receipts submitted with November 29th 2002 letter proving differential treatment.

    133. On August 25th, 2004, I received email from Dina Waik of the investigation office of the Ontario Human Rights Commission of the following: I suggest you also articulate a separate settlement for what might have been a disability-factored dismissal from Mackay; of course, I have not concluded my investigation, but I would like that separate from the discrimination on the basis of sex and reprisal.

    134. On or about December 3rd 2004 I received from the Mackay Defendants their statement of defense denying #2 to #90 which is everything in my statement of claim except #56 original claim which has to do with the email on wife abuse. They also ask for a stay of these proceedings till the Human Rights process has been completed.

    135. On or about December 3rd, 2004, I received the case analysis from the Ontario Human Rights Commission. Upon reading these reports my body went into nervous shock with elevated levels of anxiety, immediate loss of appetite, and I started to have problems sleeping throughout the night. I went to my family doctor to request increasing my Paxil dose again from 10 to 20 mgs. I was in the process of reducing dosage and was only taking 5 mgs up to December 3rd 2004.

    136. I plead that the commission’s case analysis at #8 states that the defendants alleged facts for reason for summary dismissal with cause to be: Losier’s employment was terminated following a significant absence and due to performance issues. The significant absence is due to suffering from depression which if that is the cause for my dismissal proves discrimination of a real disability.

    137. I plead that the commission’s case analysis at #10 state facts of the investigation process to be: the commission staff interviewed the complainant, the personal respondent, the owner of the corporate respondent and two additional witnesses. My original complaint form gave a list of witnesses to be interviewed that the commission did not interview and I infer is controlling the witnesses who would give adverse outcome.

    138. I plead that the commission’s case analysis at #13 states: the evidence indicates that in or around March 2002, a work colleague showed Ms. Losier a faxed picture of a nude couple apparently in a sexual embrace. The commission omits Karen’s statement to WSIB that it was a firemen calendar picture that I was exposed to and now stating it was a sexual embrace, when it was pornographic image of sex from the rear not exactly a nice sexual embrace.

    139. I plead that the commission’s case analysis alleges that facts at #14 as: the evidence indicates that Ms. Page immediately spoke to the work colleague in question, a woman and that it was understood that the woman gave an apology to Ms. Losier, which she accepted; the evidence indicates that the respondents had a workplace sexual harassment policy, however, Ms. Page did not invoke it because the matter appeared to have been resolved. The commission omits to include the other facts regarding the sexual harassment policy based on my evidences that I infer is concealing evidence of: that it was withheld from me till August 9th, that Dasha Page misled Michelle Spraate from the WSIB in August claiming I made no complaints because I made none in writing; plus the August 20th letter to WSIB claiming I made no complaints and was a happy employee.

    140. I plead that the commission’s case analysis alleges that the facts at #15 are: the evidence indicates that a similar scenario was played out on April 26, when a male co-worker told a joke about a man with a “hung penis”; Ms. Losier complained to Ms. Page; The evidence indicates that the male co-worker was new to this work area and was not present to be spoken to after the previous incident; after Ms. Page spoke to him, he gave an apology to Ms. Losier, which she accepted; Ms. Page individually counseled the man about appropriate behaviour in the workplace. The commission again omits the facts of the following: this male coworker is not new to this work area but a returnee who was previously employed by this employer and who told sexual jokes to Karen Tarpos; this male coworker’s telling of this joke was intentional as I asked him several times is this a sexual joke and he refused to acknowledge my discomfort and continued with the joke; that Dasha Page falsely advises the commission she did an investigation of this second joke yet in her witness statement for WSIB she contradicts herself by stating she did not no this joke was sexual in nature showing she breached the sexual harassment policy and did no investigation of my complaint.

    141. I plead that the commission’s case analysis alleges the facts based solely on Dasha Page’s word at #16 as: there was no evidence to confirm Ms. Losier’s contention that she was subsequently subjected to sexual innuendo by Ms. Page and a co-worker; based on Ms. Losier’s description of these events that Ms. Page used the words, ass, as part of the idiom “saving her ass” the present investigation did not find any sexual connotation. The facts omitted intentionally by controlling witnesses by not interviewing staff other than Dasha Page and Ross Clarke was that I was subjugated with additional sexual innuendo by Dasha Page and others after I complained about 2 sexual jokes.

    142. I plead that the commission’s case analysis at #17 alleges: the evidence does not indicate that the respondents had any knowledge of the complainant’s disability at that time. The commission omits the facts as presented by Dasha Page in the employer’s rebuttal shows which shows a different story that she twisted my words to bantering of a delusional disorder with “people out to get me” and that she considered terminating my employment after the March 18th meeting when I confronted her of my allegations that Watts was passing slanderous information that she was acting upon. The only evidence that Shannon Meadows-Lee is relying on is Dasha Page and Ross Clarke’s word that they did not have a conversation at my desk in March that I was made to hear regarding delusional and psychological testing of new employees. The facts and evidence shows that these two witnesses change their story regularly, contradict their own stories and have no conscious in fabricating falsehoods.

    143. I plead that the commission’s case analysis at #18 alleges: the evidence indicates that the complainant’s co-workers were unaware of her disability; Ms. Losier’s description of their comments, for example, calling her Claude and not Claudette or mispronouncing Mark as Markay did not indicate that the co-workers were using “double speak” or word games to confuse her or portray her as delusional. Shannon Meadows-Lee omits my version of the facts that: the co-workers were addressing me as Claude not as a form of double speak but rather because I listed that address in my Watts 2000 complaint as an annoyance because of one entry were I was all of a sudden addressed with this name by my sister in law while employed at Watts that references address by perpetrator in my Rentway 1995 sexual harassment complaint; that only after I was subjugated with sex picture and joke, the staff at MMP then moved on to another item in my Watts 2000 complaint with 3 male co-workers at MMP Limited repeating that address of “Claude” in a row, and that Dasha Page was involved in one conversation regarding Tony Millington painting me sensitive because he called me “Claude”; that this address is a gender/sex bender not double speak to confuse me as Claudette is a female name and Claude is a male name. Shannon Meadows-Lee again misrepresents the facts calling my representation of the fact to be a “mispronouncing” Mark as Markay when the facts I presented are that John advised me that Alice was waiting for a call from Mark Pallidini not Markay, and when I advised John that Mark Pallidini was on the phone I hear Alice smirking in the background Markay. Shannon intentionally omits in her case analysis my documented evidence of additional obvious usage of double speak to confuse and annoy me of: sucks to be me by Karen, 4 hours vs. 4:00 by Alice, July vs. May of depreciation entry by Karen, and December vs. August for vacation date by Dasha Page.

    144. I plead that the commission’s case analysis at #19 fabricates that the evidence indicates that: the respondents believed that the position occupied by the complainant was very challenging and that she was initially assigned only half the workload of her predecessor; despite this, her work performance was poor; she had difficulty completing the tasks and had to work a great deal of overtime. Shannon omits the facts supplied to her supported by evidence that in June I provided Dasha Page a letter requesting a list of areas where I needed to improve and known was forthcoming in writing and that I did receive $1.00 raise to match the rate of pay by Marshall Transport of $16.00/hour, that I was never notified by Dasha Page in writing of warning that my employment was in jeopardy of termination due to poor performance. Shannon omits my facts and evidence that while I was employed with the issues of poor performance that did come up I openly challenged these accusations from Dasha Page and Ross Clark sometimes in email form and others verbally, and that there are no facts in writing during my employment by these two defendants that they brought to my attention in writing any issues of poor performances nor reduction of my work load nor that they felt I could not handle the duties. Shannon omits my evidence that Dasha Page had no problem with my overtime hours per the August 14th email which contradicts Shannon’s case analysis that Dasha alleges of “she had difficulty completing the tasks and had to work a great deal of overtime.” Shannon omits my evidence that some of the overtime hours were due to additional training of new duties by Karen Tarpos. Shannon omits the facts that MMP Limited is the first and only employer to summary dismiss me alleging cause of gross incompetence and fabricate disarray of books 2 years after the fact

    145. I plead that the commission’s case analysis at #20 state the facts of: upon completion of the three-month probationary period, the evidence indicates that the respondents considered employment termination, but instead decided to continue Ms. Losier on reduced duties to give her a further opportunity to prove herself and to further assess her abilities; there was no issue raised related to disability raised when Ms. Losier was advised of this decision by respondent Clarke; the evidence indicates the respondents provided her with further training and assistance; at the time of the probationary extension, the respondents assert they had no knowledge of a disability; their concerns with the complainant were entirely related to performance issues. Shannon’s analysis omits the following evidence: 3-mth probation letter requesting list of areas where I needed to improve and no list was supplied, no warning letter given to me at this probation meeting to advise me that my employment was in jeopardy of being terminated due to poor performance and that I was being placed on additional probation, I received a $1.00 raise, emails from me with Karen showing increase in work and training on new duties of the accounting software and month end closing of June’s books including bank reconciliation. Shannon is being selective in ignoring the obvious following facts: that Dasha Page was considering terminating my employment after my March 18th meeting due to my allegations of Watts passing slanderous information and that I am receiving the same tactics; that Dasha claims my behaviour was bizarre enough to terminate my employment and she twist my words to “people out to get me” and that I advised her of that “people were out to get me” more than once.

    117. I plead that the commission’s case analysis fabricate the facts and evidence at #21 with: the evidence indicates that the complainant continued to struggle to perform the tasks assigned and was never able to take on the additional duties performed by her predecessor; and respondent Clarke says Ms. Losier indicated to him that she needed a leave to deal with spousal abuse. Shannon omits facts and evidence that I supplied the commission that the defendants were intentional setting me up to fail of: double speak to confuse me and causing errors in my work, impeding my work with computer/machine problems (edi payroll not working in June), that Ross Clarke was to sign cheques and does not to later complain that I did not do my job, that Ross Clarke misled me as to how much I was supposed to deposit in GST bank account for remittance and continued to sign the cheques for lower amount without advising me to increase the amount to give the appearance of incompetence, that I did in fact take on additional duties performed by predecessor such as month end closing of books for June and bank statement and journal entries.

    146. I plead that the commission’s case analysis fabricate the facts and evidence at #22 by the following: the evidence indicates that further information about the complainant’s performance became apparent after she left the workplace; the books were in disarray, invoices were not paid, collections were not made or were not logged, and GST and source payments were not completed; a witness indicates that the respondent company is still dealing with problems associated with these errors; according to the respondents, this determination was made by witnesses who were unaware of the reason of the complainant’s absence. Shannon omits the following facts that: predecessor Karen who did the books left in November 2001, the books were done by Diane Hall entering accounting data on excel spreadsheet and re-entered into the books/accounting software by Karen from November to March 2002, after I was hired I entered accounting data for cash receipts and disbursements on the same excel spreadsheets and this information was still being entered in the books/accounting software by Karen, last month of entering into accounting software/closing of month end books by Karen was May 2002, the first month of entering data into Daceasy and first closing of month end books by me was June 2002 and I was still working on it per my email in August just before I request injury to health leave of absence, August 7th email from Dasha of collection of A. Wesley Paving still on her desk and no collection effort made and this collection was passed to her by Ross when he asked me to place small claims court claim on this client, collections not made or logged by predecessor Karen/Diane when I started and I had to find collection effort information by predecessor from surveying crew Dave Edwards, that I implemented the call document as the company did not have one in place, GST was completed, Source Deduction for last payroll could not have been completed for the August 25th deadline as I was off on injury to health and all other payment for Source was made otherwise they would receive penalty. Shannon omits facts that this alleged incompetence would have been known to the respondents from August 15th to January 20th 2003 yet nothing is mentioned in the termination letter that I received from the defendants of this alleged gross incompetence, nor in their rebuttal in 2003 only the case analysis in 2004.

    147. I plead that the commission’s case analysis is again fabricated at #23 with: based on this performance, the respondents determined that Ms. Losier was not able to perform the job and decided to terminate her employment; however, because she was on sick leave, they did not immediately communicate this decision to her. Shannon omits the facts as per my evidence to the commission that the defendants did communicate their decision to terminate my employment on January 20th 2003 with reason for cause for summary dismissal that the WSIB denied my claim and my allegations were not substantiated with no mention of the allegation of gross incompetence.

    148. I plead that the commission’s case analysis is fabricating evidence of the following facts at #24 of: the evidence indicates that Ms. Losier made repeated inquiries, sometimes sending several emails in a day, regarding her benefits while she was off work; while there were sometimes delays, the evidence indicates that Ms. Losier received all sick benefits, drug benefits and overtime pay to which she was entitled during her time off work. Shannon omits my evidence that I supplied the commission on November 29th a letter not emails to the defendants for benefits reimbursement, sick days and overtime pay that the defendants ignored and I had to call them on December 12th for their response, that I spoke to Dasha Page and later spoke to Ross Clarke who advised me that he was withholding responding to my letter till a decision was made by WSIB which is a violation of the employment standards act with regards to the overtime pay due. Shannon omits my evidence and fact that the overtime pay was remitted via an Employment Standards claim that required resolution by the Labour Board, nor my second letter not emails to Dasha Page on December 30th requesting the memo for sick pay per Ross Clarke’s email of this benefit on May 28th 2002.

    149. I plead that the commission’s case analysis at #27 fabricate the facts as: there is insufficient evidence to indicate that the complainant was treated unequally or subjected to harassment because of sex; the respondents had a policy against sexual harassment and counseled persons in the work area regarding appropriate behaviour; there was no corroboration of any other comments or conduct of a sexual nature; some of the allegedly offensive comments did not appear to have a sexual meaning. Shannon omits the fact of Les coming to my desk in June after these two sex jokes with soliciting sexual vexatious comment of “so you don’t want any sex”. This comment could only have a sexual meaning and was not investigated by the commission.

    150. I plead that the commission’s case analysis distort the facts at #28 of: facts that I provided to the commission were not investigated and would fail six elements of the reasonableness test suggested in the Canadian Human Rights decision per case Budge V. Thorvaldson Care Homes Ltd. Cited: (2002), 42 C.H.R.R. D/232 (Man. Bd. Adj.): 1) it is aware that sexual harassment is prohibited conduct (yet Mrs. Page did not know that a joke about a hung penis was sexual in nature showing no investigation of this copulation joke about a hung penis, and the sexual harassment policy was withheld after requesting it in March), 2) a complaint mechanism is in place (yet when I complained to Mrs. Page she did not follow through on this mechanism per their own internal policy, did not document or make notes of the meetings, and the policy was withheld from me after requesting it, and she lies to the WSIB saying I made no complaints, and says to Michelle Spaate at WSIB that I made no complaints because I made none in writing), 3) it acted with alacrity in handling the complaint (no follow up with me after the complaint by Mrs. Page, I received no counseling on their policy, and the harassment policy was withheld from me after requesting it till August 9th after Ross Clarke attempted to intimidate me about not handing him signed copy of sexual harassment policy), 4) it dealt with the matter seriously (Mrs. Page later makes a comment about penis in a crew workbook, plus later a conversation about her breast, plus no writing documentation of my complaint, plus lying to Workers Compensation that I made no complaints and than later admitting I made a complaint but she did not know that a joke about a hung penis was sexual in nature, plus withholding the harassment policy after I requested it), 5) it has met its obligation to provide a healthy work environment (if the environment was healthy I would still be working there and I would have received a copy of the harassment policy as requested, and Mrs. Page would have provided me with memo to inform the complainant and would not need to lie in her August 20th letter to WSIB), and 6) it met its obligation to inform the complainant of its response (absolutely no written notice by Mrs. Page after I made my complaint to avoid any evidence I made complaints except for receiving my supervisor’s statement from the workers’ compensation investigation and copy of her August 20th letter, and my employment is terminated after I blow the whistle on their illegal behaviour with the WSIB and Employment Standards). Mackay fails this test. Shannon omits the fact that I presented the above argument of this failed test to the commission in my rebuttal to MMP’s rebuttal in her case analysis along with my argument from Workplaceca on a progressive discipline process. Shannon was not going to provide copy of my rebuttal along with my evidence to be presented to the commissioner for the commissioner to make an inform decision of my complaint.

    151. I plead that the facts that were not investigated by the commission plus the facts that were investigated clearly shows discrimination based on sexual harassment and sex per Janzen et al v. Platy Enterprises Ltd.: Sexual hara

  45. 134. I plead that the facts that were not investigated by the commission plus the facts that were investigated clearly shows discrimination based on sexual harassment and sex per Janzen et al v. Platy Enterprises Ltd.: Sexual harassment in the workplace may be broadly defined as unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that detrimentally affects the work environment or leads to adverse job-related consequences for the victims; it is an abuse of both economic and sexual power; sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination within s. 6(1) of the Human Rights Act. The fact not investigated by the commission are: that Kin Lau came very close to having his lap in my face which is sexual to me, and that Dasha and Kin Lau attempted to entrap me into a leering of Kin Lau’s lap to charge me with leering. The commission did not investigate per the case analysis a very important material fact that Ross Clarke’s used the sexual harassment policy to intimidate me on August 9th, 2002, and he came to my desk angry because I did not give him signed copy of the policy when management refused to provide me with a copy, and after this conversation he gives me a copy to type in the computer but does not bother to ask for his signed copy again. The facts are that comments of “penis joke in crew book”, “breast enlarge due to pregnancy”, “so you don’t want any sex”, “can’t say ass” on top of Ross Clarke’s behaviour on August 9th do have a sexual meaning and/or is evidence of poison work environment because it annoys me and therefore discrimination. The commission omitted these items to protect MMP and Watts from exposure of wrongdoing which is obstruction of justice.

    135. I plead that the commission’s case analysis distort the facts at #29 of: there is insufficient evidence to indicate that the complainant was treated unequally or subjected to harassment in the workplace because of her disability; it does not appear that the respondents exaggerated the complainant’s performance issues because she had or was perceived to have a disability; there is insufficient evidence regarding the allegation that the respondents knew about her disability, conspired with staff from Company B or treated her in a discriminatory fashion when she was off on sick leave. Shannon omits the following facts in her case analysis for obvious reasons of: March 18th I made complaint that Watts passed on slanderous information and I am receiving the same tactics; Dasha distorts my words to a delusional bantering of “people out to get me”; that she advises the commission that my behaviour was bizarre and they had performance issues to warrant dismissal before my 3-mth performance review; I requested in June letter for list of areas where I can improve to protect my performance of allegations of gross incompetence and none was supplied in writing contradicting that there was performance issues prior to 3-mth probation; I received $1.00 raise at my 3-mth probation to match Marshall’s hourly rate; my August 7th email from Karen Tarpos of June’s Month End duties and training on Thursday night; January 20th 2003 termination letter for cause to be WSIB claim denied and my allegations of poisoned work environment not substantiated and no mentioned of any incompetence issue; and the defendants allege gross incompetence for summary dismissal with cause only in the jurisdiction of the Ontario Human Rights but do not use this defense in their statement of defenses civilly. Shannon intentionally omits my cross examination remarks in my rebuttal of: I refer to the article at Workplace.Ca on Criteria for an employer to prove an employee Incompetence: the adjudicator noted the requisites for an employer to build a case for innocent incompetence as follows: the employer must define the level of job performance required; the employer must establish that the standard expected was communicated to the employees; the employer must show it gave reasonable supervision and instruction to the employee and that it afforded the employee a reasonable opportunity to meet the standard; the employee must establish inability on the part of the employee to meet the requisites standards to an extent that renders him incapable of performing the job and that reasonable efforts were made to find alternative employment within the competence of the employee; the employer must prove that reasonable warnings were given to the employee that a failure to meet the standard could result in dismissal; that Mackay fails this requisite for an employer to build a case for incompetence.

    136. I plead that the commission’s case analysis is distorted again at #30 of: the evidence does not indicate that the complainant requested any form of accommodation, or indicate to the respondent that her performance issues were related to disability; the evidence indicates that the respondents provided the complainant with further training after extending her probation period, but her performance did not improve; it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position. Shannon omits facts supplied of: that I notified the defendants in August 2002 of my injury to health with my doctor’s note requesting leave of absence due to negative stressors in the work place causing my inability to function at work at my job; that the respondents made no effort to offer of accommodation prior to sending the January 20th termination letter; that I was waiting for a response to my November and December letter for sick pay; that the training was on new duties not old duties; and no written warning notice signed by me of “her performance did not improve”. The facts show that while I was employed Dasha Page requested I contact male coworker, Kenny, who was off on WSIB to request when he might return to work and I expected the same treatment when I was off and there was no such phone call from my employer. The facts and evident that I have contradict Shannon Meadows-Lee’s allegation here that “her performance did not improve” and proves my point of collusion with MMP Limited with injurious falsehoods of gross incompetence to obstruct natural justice of referring my prima facie complaint to the Tribunal and a form of inducing breach of contract and wrongful interference with contractual relationships.

    137. I plead that the last statement of fact presented in at #30 by Shannon Meadows-Lee of “it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position” proves my point of collusion and slanting this analysis by Shannon to obstruct natural justice and not a true presentation of the facts. Shannon Meadows-Lee is very much aware that I started a part time job on January 10th 2003 and a full time job on February 10th 2003, that I kept working the part time job till September 15th 2003 after receiving same harassment mobbing behaviour at both places of employment, and kept working at the full time position till March 2004 with no issues of gross incompetence at this full time accounting position. Shannon Meadows-Lee is aware of these facts because she wrote up additional fabricated case analysis in favour of these two employers. Shannon Meadows-Lee is putting in her case analysis “it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position” to influence the commissioner so he won’t change the decision to refer this complaint to the Tribunal.

    138. I plead that the commission’s case analysis is distorted at #31 of: there is insufficient evidence to indicate that reprisal was a factor in the termination of the complainant’s employment; the evidence indicates that the complainant was unable to perform the duties of her position. There is an abundance of facts and evidence being concealed by Shannon Meadows-Lee and Dina Waik of: January 20th 2003 termination letter for cause of WSIB claim being denied and my poisoned work environment allegation not being substantiated and no mentioned in this letter of gross incompetence after 5 months absence; the allegations of gross incompetence offered by MMP changed from their original rebuttal in 2003 to the commission and this here analysis in 2004; I received two statement of defense civilly by MMP and no use of this defense in common law for summary dismissing me with cause; not to mentioned my allegations of setting me up to fail while I was employed not after the fact that were not investigated at all nor reflected here in this analysis; my numerous email communications between Karen and myself to show the kind of training I actually did receive which was lacking.

    139. I plead that the commission’s case analysis for the prima facie reprisal complaint against Watts Industries also contain errors, omission of facts and evidence, plus Shannon Meadows-Lee does a wonderful job slanting that analysis towards painting me with a diagnosis of delusional disorder. Shannon’s obstruction of justice with the MMP complaint leads to obstruction of justice with the Watts’ reprisal complaint.

    140. I plead that the concealing of facts in the MMP case analysis affects my reprisal complaint against Watts Industries. The facts as stated by retired commissioner Mr. Wharton in Payne v. Ontario Human Rights Commission are: the apparent tendency of Commissioners to follow unquestioningly any staff recommendations. Shannon Meadows-Lee and Dina Waik, staff of the investigation office at the commission, by writing these fabricated case analysis, concealing evidence and controlling witnesses, have set in motion unnecessary delays of natural justice and abuse of process.

    141. I received at my home Chief Commissioner, Keith Norton’s, decision dated February 1st 2005 again refusing to refer my prima facie complaints to the Tribunal with the allegation insufficient evidence. This decision by Keith Norton is based on my 20 page rebuttal and copy of MMP’s defence statement in Burlington’s Small Claims Court with no allegation for cause of summary dismissal of gross incompetence nor disarray of books. Keith Norton is a lawyer and I infer his decision does not reflect natural justice nor common law.

    142. As a result of the Defendants’ lack of conscience, continuous deceit to cover up their wrongdoing, and ruthless conduct, I lost my jobs; my once perfect health record destroyed causing stigmatism and further similar abuses, and refusal of future insurance benefits due to injury to health (depression); lost of skill utilization for future advancements; lost of job references; required to take medication in order to work to reduce condition caused by additional mobbing behaviour to mitigate further injury into reactive depression and suicide ideation; a good standard of living and loss of reputation of my good name.

    Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress:
    I plead that the acts and omissions of the Defendants noted above were calculated to cause me serious anguish and to suffer in the form of distress, anxiety, depression, hypervigilence and insomnia to induce permanent delusional disorder as a direct consequences of the Defendants conduct noted above and therefore I am entitled to damages. I plead that the Defendants’ conduct was cold, calculated, arrogant, malicious, reckless, vindictive, ruthless, dishonest, without conscious, premeditated, systematic and reprehensible and deserving of the Court’s censure. I plead that I have made reasonable attempts to mitigate my damages and that in the course of mitigating damages I have incurred expenses, the full particulars of which I will undertake to provide to the Defendants prior to trial.

    The Plaintiff proposes that the trial of this action be held in the Hamilton Superior Court of Justice.
    R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Form 14A; O. Reg. 533/95, s. 7; O. Reg. 652/00, s. 3; O. Reg. 653/00, s. 12.

    Form 4C
    Courts of Justice Act
    backsheet
    Losier v. MMP Limited, Dasha Page, Ross Clarke, Watts Industries, Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, Ontario Human Rights Commission, & Minister of Attorney General
    File No. 04-13797
     
    Ontario
    Superior Court of Justice
    PROCEEDING COMMENCED AT Hamilton
    45 Main Street East
    Hamilton, Ontario, L8N 2B7
    Statement of Claim
    Claudette Losier, 80 West 33rd St., Hamilton,Ontario,L9C 5J1, 905-388-7794
    Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited and Dasha Page & Ross Clarke C/O James D. Higginson (Barrister) fax 905-523-4144
    Watts Industries (Canada) Inc. fax 905-332-6068
    Minister of Attorney General, Ontario Human Rights Commission, Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee fax 416-314-3571(OHRC)

    O. Reg. 333/96, s. 5; O. Reg. 457/01, s. 15.

  46. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited and Dasha Page & Ross Clarke C/O James D. Higginson (Barrister) fax 905-523-4144
    Watts Industries (Canada) Inc. fax 905-332-6068
    Minister of Attorney General, Ontario Human Rights Commission, Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee fax 416-314-3571 416-314-3571 (OHRC)

    137. I plead that the last statement of fact presented in at #30 by Shannon Meadows-Lee of “it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position” proves my point of collusion and slanting this analysis by Shannon to obstruct natural justice and not a true presentation of the facts. Shannon Meadows-Lee is very much aware that I started a part time job on January 10th 2003 and a full time job on February 10th 2003, that I kept working the part time job till September 15th 2003 after receiving same harassment mobbing behaviour at both places of employment, and kept working at the full time position till March 2004 with no issues of gross incompetence at this full time accounting position. Shannon Meadows-Lee is aware of these facts because she wrote up additional fabricated case analysis in favour of these two employers. Shannon Meadows-Lee is putting in her case analysis “it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position” to influence the commissioner so he won’t change the decision to refer this complaint to the Tribunal.

    ****This pleading shows that every conclusion I make I back it up with facts from my 4 prima facie complaints ignored and left out of the case analysis not allowed per duty of fairness to complainant and standard for investigation per Federal Court Judicial Review cases of Cashin and Ruckpaul not the Ontario Minister of Attorney General’s erroneous standards which are discriminatory.

  47. Go to Canlii(google) website to read Justice Lofchik’s bias endorsement record where there is no references to any of my pleadings made to substantiate his analyses as in other Rule 21 cases such as SCC case of Hunt v. Carey and Crown’s case of Deep. He does not write or refer specifically to any paras in my pleadings to show where I am deficient like Hunt and Deep and all other Rule 21 motions presented by the Crown because my pleadings are sufficient and he did not want to draw attention to that fact! Nor did the Crown defendants in their factum for the Rule 21 Motion and this here Appeal as compared to the Factum found in case of KRP against the same Minister. This is called imaging the truth.
    Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21
    Superior Court of Justice — Ontario
    allegations — suable — pleading — complaints — judicial review

    Justice Lofchik dismissed my case based on my Judicial Reviews being dismissed and this too is an error in law per the following:

    2006 Ontario Judicial Review Error in Law:

    Para #60 The plaintiff has failed to plead facts which support a claim of bad faith, abuse of power or malice toward her. Referring to the passages of a Case Analysis Report with which she disagrees just does not do it. This is so particularly when the Divisional Court in her judicial review application found that “there was an abundance of evidence to support the findings upon which the discretion of the Commission was exercised”. And that, “the Applicant has failed to establish that the decisions are arbitrary, capacious or made in bad faith”.
    ***My allegations in the Rule 21 8 day motion hearing was that the Minister of Attorney General continued the cause of action with the Judicial Review Courts and I have a Charter Rights to amend my claim which includes improper judicial review by refusing to weigh all the evidence per standard in Ruckpaul case. What I received is per Crown’s factum pg 8 para #23 another imaged process because it does not matter about the truth only that we provide her with a process so when she says we disadvantage her we say we gave her the process:
    We do not inent to analyze all the evidence, not the specific details of each complaint and each Case Analysis Report. However, certain general observations are necessary. Ms. Losier correctly contends that it was not necessary for her to establish an entire pattern of facts, because even one “incident” can sometimes justify a finding of workplace harassment or reprisal. She points to numerous particulars that she says the Commission did not try to verify, a belief stemming from the fact there is no reference to them in the Case Analysis Reports or the reasons for the decisions. She asserts that the Commission did not address conflicting evidence or explain why her evidence was rejected or ignored, or why other evidence was preferred. Ms. Losier also contends that the Commission resorted to second hand information (hearsay evidence) rather than first hand evidence, when first hand evidence was available. It is worth repeating that the Commission is not sitting as a tribunal; it is acting in an investigative and administrative screening capacity.
    ***Ruckpaul Judicial Review contradicts the analysis of the law for judicial review in this paragraph.

    We are not prepared to assume that the failure to mention every allegation, or the detailed particulars of Ms. Losier’s evidence, leads to the conclusion the Commission failed to consider those allegations or that evidence. It is very clear that the Commission assessed the credibility of Ms. Losier’s allegations and evidence, and found it wanting. The court cannot second guess the Commission’s assessment of credibility or wade into the evidence and reach opposite conclusions without first determining that the Commission’s findings were irrational.
    ***If they did not analyze all the evidence or specific details of each complaint that they cant say that my credibility is wanting and this here is also defamation of my character.

    In our view, the decisions are not irrational. There is an abundance of evidence to support the findings upon which the discretion of the Commission was exercised. The applicant has failed to establish that the decisions are arbitrary, capricious or made in bad faith. Each application is therefore dismissed”
    ***If they refused to analyze all the evidence than they have provided a one sided bias Judicial Review solely based on case analysis and no analysis done per Ruckpaul’s Judicial Review which is also differential treatment and prove of discrimination by Minister of Attorney General and Queenspark.

    Ruckpaul v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 149 (CanLII),
    analysis pgs 7 to 11 particularly paras 42, 45-50, 52-58, 62-71 and 75, is a proper judicial
    review not what I received in Ontario to protect the abuse from the Minister of Attorney
    General, Commission and investigation staff:

    “its duty is to decide if, under the provisions of the Act, an inquiry is warranted having regard to all the facts.”

    “an investigation had to be at least thorough and neutral for the Commission to have a fair basis on which to evaluate”

    “that where the completeness of the investigation or report is challenged, the
    underlying investigation documents are relevant and subject to production”

    “If the investigation is flawed to the point where a court can reasonably conclude
    the evidence reported by the investigator is incomplete or inadequate, the court
    must intervene.”

    “She failed to interview the applicant nor any of her witnesses. The Commission
    realized this was a flaw and asked the investigator to interview the applicant’s
    witnesses.”
    ***Same as my complaints – no witnesses.

    “Furthermore, two supplemental witness statements, dated February 15 and 16,
    2001, from CIC’s main witnesses in response to questions put by the investigator to
    CIC were not disclosed.”
    ***Same as my complaint Mrs. Page, Mr. Clark and 2 witnesses statements were not disclosed.

    “Ms. Huneault made a clear statement concerning one of the grounds upon which
    the applicant based her discrimination and harassment claims. However, the
    investigator failed to address this issue any further in his report. This omission
    might constitute a “fundamental” omission.”
    ***Same as my complaints such as per my Judicial Review argument that “even one incident can justify” violation such as MMP’s 3 prima facie incidents not one of “exposure to porn joke” and “long absence” for disability discrimination and termination letter with cause because my WSIB was denied and your poison work environment allegations were not substantiated we are terminating your employment with no allegations of incompetence per case analysis nor in Judicial Review endorsement record plus others items.

    Kollar v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2002 FCT 848 (CanLII) also validates my claims of improper investigation and judicial review:
    Standard:
    Pg 7 para 34: “breach of the principles of natural justice or other procedural unfairness or unless the decision is not supportable on the evidence before the Commission”

    Pg 9 para 38: Did the Commission commit a reviewable error of fact and law by ignoring witness evidence indicating that the sexual harassment had occurred?
    ***This paragraph then states the incident and who was interviewed whereas my Judicial Review analysis does no such analysis to each and every allegation of same reviewable error of fact and law!!!

    Pg 9 para 39: The investigation report in this case seems to have focused not on the above information, but on the applicant’s work record when she was employed initially with CIBC then CIBC Securities Inc. and then again with CIBC. It is appropriate to discuss the applicant’s work record but the investigation report should also deal with the evidence of alleged sexual harassment. The investigation report does not deal with this evidence. Was the evidence not accepted? I cannot tell from the report or the record. In my opinion, the investigation report did not deal with this evidence and consequently, the investigation report did not deal with the apllicant’s first part of her complaint which was that the respondent failed to supply her with an harassment free work place. This aspect of the complaint should have been dealt with in the investigation report. In my opinion, the investigation was, in this respect, deficient as it lacked thoroughness.
    ***My complaints and case against the Crown in a nutshell that the investigating officer had to put what they investigated in the report and per what they did put in their report is not thorough nor neutral and also proves abuse by the Judicial Review Courts in Ontario and Justice Lofchik’s agreement with my Judicial Review per Crown’s para#23! This case clearly shows that the abuse in only in Ontario and its coming from the Minister of Attorney General providing complainants with improper investigations and Judicial Reviews and is an act of discrimination!

    Para #40: The Commission need not accept the recommendations of the investigator but if it does and the investigation is found to be deficient because of lack of thoroughness, then the decision of the Commission is also deficient and cannot stand. I am of the opinion that the decision of the Commission is in error as it does not deal with the applicant’s first ground of complaint, that is that the employer did not provide her with an harassment free work place. For the above reason, I would quash the decision of the Commission and order that a new investigation be completed.

    Para #42: I might add, however, that it appears from the record that only the respondent’s response to the complaint dated October 5, 1999 was cross-disclosed to the applicant. The response of November 10, 1999 does not appear to have been disclosed to the applicant. I am of the view that since it was accepted by the Commission, it should have been cross-disclosed to the applicant.

    Suits are allowed after a judicial review for bad faith conduct resulting in damages per SCC Longley and Roncarelli cases based on civil court rules of evidence not Judicial Review rules of evidence based of due deference and not weighing evidence per HVK pg 2 held: The plaintiff’s claim was not a re-litigation of the previous prodeedings, as they did not involve any claim for damages. It was possible that the court could find that the decisions of the directors and employees was motivated by bad faith and not protected by any limitation of liability.
    ***Justice Lofchik acting as trier of fact again and his argument not based on law per Crown’s case of Wilson references to Reports and also what was left out of reports is sufficient for abuse of power, bad faith, and malice at pg 15 para 59 “malice would be made out if they were to find that: …the respondents continued the prosecution either for an improper purpose, or in reckless disregard of evidence which would have disclosed the unreliability of the information provided by the [complainant], or or out of ill will, spite or for selfish purposes, or because [the complainant] wanted them to do so. (in my claim the complainant is the respondent wanted them to do so )
    ***reckless disregard of facts and evidence proving unreliability from employment events: 1) of MMP and Xentel’s evidence of incompetency is a termination letter from MMP 5 month after off on sick leave for depression with no allegations of incompetency plus $1.00 raise at 3 month probation and no sign warning letter at probation or during MMP employment, and for Xentel a termination letter with severance/notice and release form for notice and Xentel settled claim in 2007, and 2) no witnesses of the complainant’s interviewed at all and no sexual harassers interviewed at all for Lyman and Xentel complaints and only Ms. Page for her breast comment incident interviewed, and 3) no witnesses at all interviewed to prove or disprove Watts retaliation/delusional profiling campaign of contacting next employer and passing info in complaints
    ***There was no interview of my witness Karen Tarpos who was the one not Mrs. Page to train me on new duties and not retrain on the alleged old duties that I was incompetent on and is fundamental omission proving conspiracy to injure me with damages of refusal to refer to tribunal, injure me with personal injury of delusional disorder and to discredit me

    OHRC Code book 2005 s. 36
    Pg 185 Layzell v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) 2003 – The Commission owes to the Complainant a duty of fairness in its procedures…
    Pg 187 Valair v. Canada (Attorney General) 2004 (FC) – Uneven disclosure can constitute a breach of procedural fairness. The Commission must provide to the complainant all the submissions by the respondent, unless the submission adds nothing new. (like the disarray of books only in report dec 2004 and only alleged interviewing MMP’s witnesses 2 undisclosed workers who did not work with plaintiff)
    Pg 188/9 – Kollar v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2002 (FCT) – The investigation must be thorough and this will be assessed on the basis of the investigation report. If the Commission makes its decision on the basis of an investigation report which fails to deal with evidence relating to all the alleged breaches of human rights law, the decision of the Commission cannot stand. (MMP’s termination letter prima facie reprisal because my allegations of poison work environment were not substantiated per WSIB report, MMP’s rebuttal disability discrimination “long absence” and “people out to get me”, leaving out all sexual harassment items and internal complaints validated at Xentel and Lyman, Lyman’s prima facie disability discrimination of Ins. Co. denying benefits due to past history of depression)
    Pg 189 – Lee v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2002 (FCT) – The record before the Commission must not be flawed. Commission staff must treat the parties in an evenhanded fashion, particularly where one party is unrepresented) (uneven only allegedly interviewed MMP’s witnesses Mrs. Page, Mr. Clark, and 2 undisclosed witnesses who did not work with plaintiff)
    Roncarrelli pg 166/67
    “On a consideration of these I am unable to find that the Legislature has, either expressly or by necessary implication, laid down any rules to guide the commission as to the circumstances under which it may refuse to grant a permit or may cancel a permit already granted sections and of the remainder of the Act.”
    “In my opinion the intention of the legislature, to be gathered from the whole Act, was to enumerate (i) certain cases in which the granting of a permit is forbidden, and (ii) certain case in which the cancellation of a permit is mandatory, and, in all other cases to commit the decision as to whether a permit should be granted, refused or cancelled to the unfettered discretion of the commission. I conclude that the function of the commission in making that decision is administrative and not judicial or quasi-judicial.”
    ***This validates my factum argument paras 6 to 8 that legislation of Code expressly laid down rules to guide the commission being ignored as to circumstances under which it may refuse to grant a complaint and the intention of the Code to be gathered from the whole Act that includes the preamble with its purpose/intent, section 5 to 10 as to what constitutes prima facie complaints per grounds, and not just Way/Gismondi recital of section 34 with no case examples of prima facie complaints made out dismissed per section 36 as per Crown’s factum argument and Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record.
    Pg 169 “He must give notice when he will proceed with the matter, and he must act honestly and impartially and not under the dictation of some other person or persons to whom the authority is not given by law. There must be no malversation of any kind.” (including defamation, conspiracy, accepting unreliable and hearsay evidence and ignoring collaborated prima facie facts and evidence)
    ***Impartially proven when they only interview 2 witness for MMP respondents and none for the complainant and leave out prima facie facts and evidence collaborated from Respondents.
    “fraud, collusion or malice…” (list items that are improper purpose for Misfeasance of Public office so defamation is also acceptable)

  48. Claim Against Minister of Attorney General – Michael Bryant

    Go to Canlii(google) website to read Justice Lofchik’s bias endorsement record where there is no references to any of my pleadings made to substantiate his analyses as in other Rule 21 cases such as SCC case of Hunt v. Carey and Crown’s case of Deep.
    Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21
    Superior Court of Justice — Ontario
    allegations — suable — pleading — complaints — judicial

    Crown’s factum pg 17 para 53: “Furthermore, the Appellant raised no factual allegations of any wrongdoing as against the Minister of the Attorney General in either pleading” claims?

    04 Matter paras: 1 j & k,
    para #23
    I plead that I am complying with the provisions of the Public Authorities Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.P.38, and, in particularly, subsection 7(1) thereof. In that regard, the action herein was commenced within the six months of the execution of public and/or statutory duties on the part of these Defendants, with the fabricated case analysis fabricating insufficient evidence that I only received on December 3rd 2004, giving rise to the action herein. As such, the action herein is not statute-barred. In fact, the actions against the commission and the Minister of Attorney General responsible for their agents are still on going as my prima facie complaints have not been submitted to the Tribunal and are now 4 months obstructed. In fact, I received from Chief Commissioner on February 24th 2005 a memo that my reconsideration application was sent to respondents for review for reasons that there is an integrity issue with the commission process. The respondents would have been given 15 day time limits to submit their response, and its now May 5th and my faxes for status are being ignored by commission.
    ***Includes continuing case of action and that the Minister is responsible for his agents at the Commission which is true per the Code section 27 that the Commission is responsible to the Minister for this Act. Therefore the Minister is suable personally for promoting, condoning and utilizing improper investigation tactics and Judicial Review/Appeal Courts that are discriminatory and different then the standards for investigation and judicial review set out in the federal human rights jurisdiction before the date of my investigation in 2004 per case law of Cashin, Ruckpaul and others which are case law found in Ontario Human Rights Code Book 2005. The actions against the Minister includes continuing the same wrong doing into 2010 now with Justice Lofchik and refusing to do his duty to eliminate discrimination in Ontario for everyone per preamble, section 5 to 10, and section 29 of the Code.

    Para 24:
    I plead that the staff in the investigation office of the OHRC has committed the act of Misfeasance of Public Office in the targeted malice line of cases where the public officer recklessly disregards the means of ascertaining the extent of his or her power. Particularly, the statement at #30 in MMP’s case analysis represents this recklessness and targeted malice. I refer to Uni-Jet Industrial Pipe v. Canada (A.G.) on the test for abuses of public office of: 1. an intentional illegal act, which is either: i) an intentional use of statutory authority for an improper purpose; or ii) actual knowledge that the act (or omission) is beyond statutory authority; or iii) reckless indifference, or willful blindness to the lack of statutory authority for the act; 2) intent to harm an individual or a class of individuals, which is satisfied by either: i) an actual intent to harm; or ii) actual knowledge that harm will result; or iii) reckless indifference or willful blindness to the harm that can be foreseen to result. I infer that I received a sham investigation process that is use of statutory authority for an improper purpose. What I received as an investigation is the following: because it doesn’t matter about the truth it only matters that they have provided an accepted process so that when you say they disadvantaged you they can say they followed an established process.

    Shannon Meadows-Lee from the commission claims there is evidence to support gross incompetence to refuse referral to the Tribunal and without this excuse for my termination she would have no choice but to refer my prima facie complaint to the Tribunal. Ms. Meadows-Lee conceals the material fact of my termination letter as she makes no mention of it in the case analysis for MMP and my termination letter is in direct violation of criminal code 425.1 which is strong evidence of reprisal. By doing so, Ms. Meadows-Lee is going against natural justice and common law. In addition, Shannon Meadows-Lee slanted the case analysis at #30 to discredit me with mental illness being the cause for my alleged incompetence with her comment of “it appears that even if the complainant had returned to the position after her leave, she would not have been able to perform the duties of the position.” By making this statement Shannon Meadows-Lee over stepped the boundaries of her duties and willfully misrepresented the facts to do harm to discredit the complainant with the commissioner reading her decision, with the judge in my civil suit reading her case analyses, and this demonstrates improper purpose. She is well aware that I commenced part time position on January 10th 2003 and full time position on February 10th 2003, and that I worked both till September 15th 2003. There was no allegation at fourth employer of gross incompetence in accounting duties and I worked there for 13 months. She wrote up the case analysis for these two employers as well.

    These case analyses by the commission staff causes remedies that I am now seeking with regards to MMP Limited, additional defamation by Watts. I seek remedies against the commission investigation staff, the commission and the Ministry of Attorney General for: misfeasance of public office, injurious falsehoods, deceit, conspiracy to injure, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and inducement of breach of contract with false allegations of gross incompetence. The criminal behaviour that supports my civil claims are obstruction of natural justice, accessory after the fact by concealing evidence and controlling the witnesses supports my claims civilly particularly intentional use of statutory authority for improper purpose. I refer to section 8 (2) of the Ministry of Citizenship and Culture Act regarding Crown Liability: Subsection (1) does not, by reason of subsections 5 (2) and (4) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act, relieve the Crown of Liability in respect of a tort committed by a person mentioned in subsection (1) to which it would otherwise be subject, and the Crown is liable under the Act for any such tort as if subsection (1) had not been enacted (R.S.O. 1990, c. M. 18, s. 8 (2).
    ***Ministry is typo (writing defiency) since 4 other references to the Minister in claim all say Minister not Ministry including heading on first page and back page, and para 1 and #23 of claim. Per Crown’s authority of Dawson I am allowed to amend all “oversights” and per SCC case of Hunt all deficiencies in writing. Going against Natural justice is pleaded here as fact of conduct not a cause of action and allowed per Odhavji for improper or unlawful conduct for intentional torts. Bad Faith and Malice sufficient pleaded here per allegation of injurious falsehoods to discredit the complaint per law Bad Faith means dishonest purpose and not carrying out the statute according to its intent and purpose (factum #12).

    Minister can be sued in his own name per:
    1) Proceedings Against the Crown
    2) Deep pg 17 para 83: a claim against a Minister of the Crown is a claim against the Minister personally”. Michael Bryant was aware of wrong doing by Commission and staff in spring of 2004 , notice and small claims court suit 1178/04, prior to the improper investigation in Fall 2004 and improper case analysis reports in December 2004 sufficient facts for conclusion of reprisal motive.
    ***Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record says I pleaded “they acted deliberately with the quality of investigation” and this includes the Minister of Attorney General being behind the creation of improper investigation tactics and Judicial Reviews/Appeals “acting deliberate with the quality of the investigation” and he is responsible for the Code and the Commission per section 27 of the code to eliminate discrimination for everyone here in Ontario; and per MAG Act section 5(b) shall see that the administration of public affairs is in accordance with the law per the Code preamble, section 5 to 10, section 36 not 34 with duty to fairness of investigation of all prima facie facts, section 27 and 29 to eliminate discrimination including within his own department both at the Commission/Tribunal and the Judicial Review/Appeal Courts, and with judges like Justice Lofchik making discriminatory comments in court.
    3) no vicarious liability for staff in any pleadings against the Minister of Attorney General
    4) KRP suit allows for suit against Minister of Attorney General personally for: a) the plaintiffs pleaded that this acquiescence was a violation of s. 5(b) of the MAG Act. Section 5(b) of the MAG Act states that the Attorney General shall see that the administration of public affairs is in accordance with the law” and b) alleged OPP failure to enforce the Henco injunction depriving them the benefits of their contracts
    ***Minister of Attorney General’s job is to set proper investigation and judicial review standards in Ontario that conforms to the standards in the Federal Court’s Human
    Rights Jurisdiction as there is only one human rights throughout Canada per Ontario’s Human Rights Code book 2005
    *Ms. Meadows-Lee was not my investigating officer, and was brought in to write improper case analyses (other Judicial Review say reports written by investigating officers). I had no dealings with Ms. Meadows-Lee other than the case analysis.
    *Minister of Attorney General, Michael Bryant, was put on notice of intentional unlawful conduct by intake staff in spring of 2004 and with receipt of small claims court suit #1178-04 against intake staff, prior to the investigation of 4 prima facie complaints and the four questionable case analyses dated December 2004, and these two claims sufficient for reprisal motive against the Minister of Attorney General using Meadows-Lee to write up sham case analysis and continuing cause of action with Judicial Review and Appeal Courts with improper Judicial Review/Appeals per other provinces proper Judicial Reviews in cases Cashin, Ruckpaul and Crown’s case of Lewis of all the prima facie facts.

    Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse
    Pg 3: “The officers’ alleged failure to cooperate with the SIU investigation and the Chief’s alleged failure to ensure that they did cooperate both constitute unlawful breaches of statutory duties under the Police Services Act. The allegation that the officers’ acts and omissions “represented intentional breaches of their legal duties as police officers” satisfies the requirement that the officers were aware that their conduct was unlawful and that it was intentional and deliberate. The allegation that the Chief deliberately failed to segregate the officers satisfies the requirement that he intentionally breached his legal obligation to ensure compliance with the Police Services Act.
    ***This argument from SCC is similar to the KRP case which clearly shows that the person who is ultimately responsible to ensure the Commission cooperates with the CODE ACT that includes duty of fairness to complainant during investigation and Judicial Reviews constitutes unlawful breaches under the Code and the MAG Act. My case is that MAG knew of my allegations against the Commission in spring 2004 per notice and then received suit against intake staff, refused to do an investigation, did nothing, influenced, authorized and condoned the reprisal of improper investigation tactics employed that includes not interviewing any sexual harassers for Xentel and Lyman complaints, and only interviewing Mrs. Page with proven bad faith, and by having Ms. Meadows-Lee not my investigator Dina Waik write up the case analysis. This is so because the Minister of Attorney General, Michael Bryant and the current one, are continuing the wrong by the Commission through Judicial Review Courts and now Justice Lofchik into 2010 protecting this shame investigation part of continuing the cause of action is sufficient to continue with suit against the MAG for refusing to ensure compliance with the Code preamble, section 5 to 10, section 36 and duty to fairness to the complainant, and section 29 to eliminate discrimination for everyone in his departments at the Commission and the Courts. The Minister of Attorney General has a public legal duty to act to eliminate discrimination in Ontario. This is a deliberate willfully disregard of duty to eliminate discrimination for women in Ontario and that everyone is equal and deserving of an equal human rights process through the commission and courts similar to other successful complainants with similar facts such as exposure to pornography is prima facie complaint made out.

    Odhavji
    pg 12 para 23: “In each instance, the tort involves deliberate disregard of official duty coupled with knowledge that the misconduct is likely to injure the plaintiff”
    para 24: “that a failure to act can amount to misfeasance in a public office, but only in those circumstances in which the public office is under a legal obligation to act”
    “If there is a legal duty to act and the decision not to act amounts to an unlawful breach of that legal duty, the omission can amount to misfeasance [in a public office].”
    “a public officer who could have discharged his or her public obligations, yet willfully chose to do otherwise”

    SCC Botiuk and Hill per my factum arguments para #13:
    “The so-called “single publication rule” does not apply to concurrent tortfeasors, who can be defined as persons whose torts concur, or run together, to produce the same damage.”
    “three instances: agency, vicarious liability, and concerted action.”
    “As set out in Hill, supra, “if one person writes a libel, another repeats it, and a third approves what is written, they all have made the defamatory libel.”
    “The Declaration and Report are by their terms inextricably interrelated. By their actions, the appellants become joint tortfeasors. Further, they, as lawyers, signed the Declaration without undertaking any investigation. For Lawyers to act in this way constituted reckless behaviour.”
    ***Any investigation includes proper investigation which includes plaintiff’s witnesses and including collaborated prima facie facts in reports, and a $1,00 raise at MMP and offering of sufferance pay with notice at Xentel means no incompetency per employment law ignored by Minister of Attorney General through Commission and Judicial Review jurisdictions.
    ***The dismissed complaints per the case analyses and the Judicial Review/Appeal court documents is concerted action and third person approving what is written that is libel by continuing this wrong to continue without correcting the wrong by the Minister of Attorney General to violate my charter rights and all other intentional torts pleaded. For the Minister of Attorney General, who is a lawyer not just politician, to act this way is reckless knowing that a $1 raise at 3 month probation at MMP and termination with incompetence with offer of sufferance and release form at Xentel means no incompetence, and that the Respondents validated my complaints and discriminatory facts that are at issue in this claim left out of case analyses, Judicial Review/Appeal endorsement records and Justice Lofchik’s rule 21 endorsement record for improper purpose to obstruct 4 prima facie complaints from reaching the Tribunal or Court Trial in 2004 through to 2010, resulting in obstructing to make the complainant whole resulting in compensable damages and other damages

    Wilson case on arguments for Malice and Reckless against MAG same as my suit:
    pg 15 para 59 “malice would be made out if they were to find that: …the respondents continued the prosecution either for an improper purpose, or in reckless disregard of evidence which would have disclosed the unreliability of the information provided by the [complainant], or out of ill will, spite or for selfish purposes, or because [the complainant] wanted them to do so. (the complainant in this case refers to the witness against Wilson who made the allegations to the Attorney General that Wilson was the accused)
    ***My allegations are the same as this paragraph reckless disregard of evidence disclosing the unreliability and bad faith information provided by MMP and no evidence for Xentel/Lyman/Watts as no interviews of respondents, witnesses or sexual harassers was made and leaving out of reports all collaborated and validated sexual harassment internal complaints made per case analysis and these facts pleaded sufficiently I infer/conclude is “improper investigation” tactics.
    para 60 “Lamer J. Stated , at p. 640 of Nelles, that to succeed in an action for malicious prosecution against the Attorney General or Crown counsel, the plaintiff would have to prove malice “in the form of a deliberate and improper use of the office of the Attorney-General or Crown Attorney, a use inconsistent with the Statute of “minister of justice”. He went on to say that in his view, this amounts to a requirement that the prosecutor “perpetrated a fraud on the process of criminal justice and in doing so has perverted or abused his office and the process of criminal justice.”
    pg 16 para 62 “Borins J.A. noted, at paragraph 49, “that the core meaning of malice is the use of the criminal justice system for an improper purpose, the proper use of it being to bring before the Court a person whom the prosecutor has reasonable and probably cause to believe has committed a criminal offence.” He went on to say that: “although the prosecutor may have reasonable and probable cause to commence a prosecution, if the prosecutor obtains information which suggests that the person probably did not commit the offence, or recklessly disregards advice that such information could be obtained through routine investigative steps, the prosecutor lacks reasonable and probable cause to continue the prosecution, and malice may be inferred.
    ***Like the use of human rights justice system through Commission/tribunals and Judicial Review and Appeal Courts for improper purpose to reward discriminators and punish complainants with obstruction of justice of prima facie complaints made out with improper investigation tactics and Judicial Review and Appeals when the proper use of Human Rights Statutes is to bring to the Commission discriminators who have violated the Code to change them so they eliminate their discriminatory behaviour, attitude, custom, policy, law, etc. This includes the Crown refusing to abide by routine investigation steps and Judicial Reviews per the proper standards in Federal Court Judicial Review cases such as Cashin and Ruckpaul, Lewis and Koller that I found after this sham Rule 21 motion per Court Reports that the Ontario Court of Appeal is refusing to review. Neither the Crown nor Justice Lofchik provided the Court with any authority of case law of a section 36 dismissal and judicial review in Ontario that says the Crown is allowed to provide the sham investigation tactics and Judicial Review that I was given in 2004 and 2006. Gismondi and Way are case authorities for section 34 prior to investigation and don’t cant per Justice Lofchik’s error in law.
    para 63 Could recklessness of this sort give rise to an inference that Crown counsel deliberately and improperly used the office of the Crown Attorney, that such use is inconsistent with the statuts of “minister of justice”, and that it amounts to the prosecutor perpetrating a fraud on the process of criminal justice and in doing so, perverting or abusing his or her office and the process of criminal justice? For the purpose of this motion, I will assume it could

    ** Dawson v. Rexcraft Storage and Warehouse Inc. (1998), 164 D.L.R. (4th) 257 (C.A.) at para. 10 and contour argument para 11
    Crown’s factum pg 11 para #28 “absence of a necessary element of the cause of action will constitute a defect” and refers to case of Dawson pg 10 para 10:
    “In other cases, however, the statement of claim may be defective because it has failed to allege the necessary elements of a claim that, if properly pleaded, would constitute a reasonable cause of action”
    ***Properly pleaded means the plaintiff does not have that element verses writing deficiency forgot to include it due to oversight or no law training did not know.
    Para #11 contours this argument and aligns with “plain and obvious” test that includes reading generously with allowances for inadequacies due to drafting deficiencies such as the plaintiff had no lawyer or law school training to plead like a lawyer and any missing element of a tort is an oversight and she is allowed to amend per Charter values of access to justice that includes amending all oversights and writing errors: “To illustrate the second situation, suppose, for example, that P sues D for damages for malicious prosecution. To recover for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must establish these elements: institution of criminal proceedings by the defendant without reasonable and probable cause; an improper purpose in instituting the proceedings such as malice, or a primary purpose other than that of carrying the law into effect; termination of the criminal proceedings in favour of the plaintiff; and damages: J. Fleming, The Law of Torts (8th ed., 1992, The Law Book Co. Ltd.) at 610. If P fails to plead favourable termination of the criminal proceedings, D may move to strike out the statement of claim on the ground that P failed to allege a necessary element of the tort. P’s failure to plead favourable termination may simply be an oversight. If so, the court should allow P to amend the statement of claim to add this allegation, and the lawsuit will proceed. See AGF Canadian Equity Fund v. Transamerica Commercial Finance Corp. Canada (193), 14 O.R. (3d) 161 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 172-74 (Gen. Div.)
    ***If this plaintiff did not have favourable outcome and did not include one in his claims then the element would be missing.

    I also have a case against current Minister of Attorney General based on Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record and continuing cause of action to protect wrong doing by Micheal Bryant when he was in office in this position and Commission and staff.

  49. Bald Assertion, Conclusion, Speculation Arguments

    Go to Canlii(google) website to read Justice Lofchik’s bias endorsement record where there is no references to any of my pleadings made to substantiate his analyses as in other Rule 21 cases such as SCC case of Hunt v. Carey and Crown’s case of Deep.
    Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21
    Superior Court of Justice — Ontario
    allegations — suable — pleading — complaints — judicial

    Bald Allegations, Legal Conclusions, Speculative and Inferences (Crown’s factum pg 2 para #2 h, i, and j, pg 10 para 25, 26 Senechal and 27 Wilson and Oren, pg 12 para 34, pg 18 para 56)
    Crown’s factum pg 11 para 31: Appellant based the allegations in her claim various alleged tortious conduct purely on her “own perceptions of events”, when events are facts per HVK of who, what when and where and allowed, and Justice Lofchik’s validates that my suits are the same as my Judicial Review employment events facts per complaints and case analyses but is acting as trier of fact that they are insufficient for 6 intentional torts I pleaded and he validated with “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigations”

    The only analysis Justice Lofchik did of facts and is not sufficient per all Rule 21 Striking cases are found in Para #8 and #52 which prove I did plead facts to reach conclusions of 6 intentional torts:
    Para #8: The Plaintiff’s allegations are, essentially, that she was sexually harassed and discriminated against on the basis of disability while employed by her former employers and that the Commission and its employees did not properly investigate her complaints and colluded with the other defendants to stifle her complaints. The Plaintiff further alleges the Defendants acted in a coordinated manner to share information about her.”
    ***Justice Lofchik validates here that I pleaded only intentional conduct as there is no reference to negligence in this paragraph such as found in law cases of Oren, Lacasse, Wilson, Deep, Starline, etc
    Para #52: The basis of the claims set out above comes back to the Case Analysis Reports. Because she does not agree with the contents of the Reports and some of the statements in them, the Plaintiff concludes that the investigation conducted on behalf of the Commission were flawed or a sham, and that the investigators colluded with the other Defendants to deny her a hearing before the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal.
    Para #53: Apart from the references to the Reports and the contents with which she disagrees, the Plaintiff has failed to plead any material facts….P
    Para #8 “that the Commission and its employees did not properly investigate her complaints and colluded with the other Defendants to stifle her complaints”
    ***The facts are more then the “references to the Reports and the contents” and include comparing these facts with all the facts in 4 prima facie human rights complaints left out of the case analysis sufficient for conclusion of all deliberate conduct and torts.
    HVK pg 10 para 32: “a Society and a social worker preparing a Society case are obvious instruments of Government within the meaning of subsection 32(1)”
    Events are facts and that I pleaded them “apart from the facts of the employment events”. Therefore I pleaded sufficient facts that differs from the Crown’s perception of these events from “facts of employment events” which are the material issues in dispute to be decided at Trial not a Rule 21 motion and allowed per Estey in SCC Hunt when the defendants deny they acted with such intent per their defence statement they were able to plead in defence and these defendants never asked for particulars per their case of Senechal para #65 and Rule 25.10. My factum #6 pg 7 “question of motive which promted the council to act as it did is a question of fact and is one which should be decided in trial and not Judicial Review Courts deciding on Bad Faith per Intentional Torts law and rules of evidence.”

    Also, my own perceptions of events are facts per HVK Para 33 pg 10: “a minimum level of material fact despite the rambling and repetitive nature of the pleadings. What is alleged to have been said, when, where, by whom and to whom it was made is buried in the voluminous lines of the claim.”

    Exception to Rule 21 Facts are to be taken as true: that facts not to be accepted as true are only those facts that are speculative on future damages per the following 3 cases that are not similar to my claim per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement “apart from the facts of employment events” (Crown Factum pg 11 para #29):
    a) Operations Dismantle of Future cruise missiles no damages till event happens
    b) York Advertising v. OHRC case was for injunctions for potential damage in future from disclosing tribunal results against York and judge dismissed per Operations York Pg 9 para 23 (a) There is no evidence of real damage before the court – the damages are purely speculative.
    c) Region Plaza Inc. v. Corporation of the Regional Municipality of Hamilton-Wentworth et al. (Municipal law – Action against councilors) Pg 751: “If the plaintiff does not at the outset have knowledge of facts that give rise to the conclusions of malice, breach of duty, conspiracy to injure, or abuse of power, then it is improper to make such bald allegations in the statement of claim. It was not sufficient to simply say that the supporting facts were within the knowledge of the defendants.”
    d) Dyce Case para 16 (fishing expedition): “The plaintiff frankly concedes that he has no other information because as he alleges he has been to unable to obtain it”
    ***Justice Lofchik and the Crown do not provide any case law that pass event facts from employment human right and commission investigation pass events are speculative, and they do not provide in their endorsement record or factum paras in claim of the facts that they alleged are speculative per Operations/York/Region/Dyce therefore their analysis/argument is bald conclusion additional imaging like the Commission’s case analyses.

    Deep 2004
    para 37: Rule 25.06: (2) “A party may raise any point of law in a pleading, but conclusions of law may be pleaded only if the material facts supporting them are pleaded.” And (8) Where fraud, misrepresentation, breach of trust, malice or intent is alleged, the pleading shall contain full particulars, but knowledge may be alleged as a fact without pleading the circumstances from which it is to be inferred”
    para 38: the particulars pleaded must enable a trier of fact to properly infer intentional or malicious conduct
    para 46: “A typical instance of this kind of deficiency is the pleading or affidavit that states as a fact what is really a conclusion without a stated factual basis. For example, a party might state simply that the party was defamed by the other party without stating what the other party said that was defamatory. Such a statement fails to assert a fact and accordingly does not enable the other party to identify the factual basis of the case which it is required to meet.”
    para #66: “All of these allegations state legal conclusions unsupported by any particulars of the conduct that constitutes bad faith.” (refers to para 65), and para 65: “The plaintiff’s allegations of bad faith are found in paragraph 17 of the statement of Claim (allegation that the College has a long history of dealing unfairly with him), paragraph 30 of the Statement of Claim (allegations that the defendants improperly proceeded with mala fide and reckless disregard of the consequences of its decisions, their conduct was reprehensible and aggravated damages are warranted), paragraph 31 of the Statement of Claim (allegation that the defendants acted in a high handed vindictive manner with callous disregard to the plaintiff and his rights) and paragraph 32 of the Statement of Claim (allegation that the action of the defendants was intentionally directed against the plaintiff and his property warranting punitive damages). Nor is there any affidavit evidence to support a claim of bad faith.

    Senechal v. Muskoka (District Municipality) 2003
    Pg 9 para 50: A pleading must, at a minimum, disclose sufficient material facts, but not evidence, to enable the opposite party and the Court to ascertain precisely the issues in dispute and to enable the other party to respond to the allegations in its pleadings. It is improper to baldly plead conclusions without any supporting facts.
    Pg 10 Para #52 borrows and repeats para 20 from George v. Harris [2000] O.J. No. 1762 (S.C.J.): A pleading that demonstrates a complete absence of material facts will be declared to be frivolous and vexatious.
    Para 63 I do note that the Municipality was able to plead to the allegations of the plaintiffs without the need to ask for particulars under Rule 25.10.
    ***Case Analysis Reports and Human Rights complaints are allowed as facts per the Crown’s Rule 21 motion hearing authority of HVK a case against case worker writing up its case analysis reports and plaintiff was allowed to amend claim and sue per case reports.

    Oren Para 11: The plaintiffs claim for abuse of office and malicious conduct. Paragraph 33 of the Statement of Claim alleges, in respect of the defendants Pocock and McKinnon, malice or ulterior or improper motive as set out in that paragraph, i.e. (a) on the part of Pocock, as “payback” against Katz (b) on the part of McKinnon, to support Pocock and cover up her “wrongdoing and (c) on the part of both of them, to divert criticism away from themselves. The problem with this pleading as to motive is that it pleads inferences without pleading any facts that would support the inferences.

    George v. Harris para 20:
    document that demonstrates a complete absence of material facts will be declared to be frivolous and vexatious
    portions of a pleading that are irrelevant, argumentative or inserted for colour, or that constitute bare allegations should be struck out as scandalous
    The same applies to a document that contains only argument and includes unfounded and inflammatory attacks on the integrity of a party, and speculative, unsupported allegations of defamation. In such a case the offending statements will be struck out as being scandalous and vexatious
    In addition, documents that are replete with conclusions, expressions of opinions, provided no indication whether information is based on personal knowledge or information and belief, and contain many irrelevant matters, will be rejected in their entirety.
    Pg 6 Para 26 Crown’s factum:
    The words “deliberately avoids disclosing the status of documents the status of documents that were formerly in the Premier’s Office” are objectionable. They contain inflammatory and unsupported attacks on the integrity of Mr. Harris and as such are scandalous. Mr. Klippenstein argues that there are facts before the Court that support this assertion. I disagree. What the plaintiffs have done here is they have examined Mr. Harris’s Affidavit of Documents, interpreted it and then used that interpretation as evidence. The distinction is between stating what the facts are on the one hand and putting in evidence and argument as to inferences on the other hand. The former is permissible and the latter is not. The words quoted will be stuck.
    Pg 7 para 33:
    Re Paragraph 12: This entire paragraph is inflammatory. It speaks of “evasions and deliberate gaps” as though the Court had already determined such. Not only is this not the case but the so called “facts” that Mr. Klippenstein points to as being supporting of such assertions are not facts at all but are conclusions drawn by the plaintiffs themselves based on their perceptions of the situation. While the plaintiffs may have strongly held beliefs that Mr. Harris has been evasive and has deliberately held back documents such assertions have no place in the grounds section of a Notice of Motion, a location that protects them from cross-examination. These words are struck.
    ***A Notice of Motion is not the same my claim and there is no protection from cross-examination of the fact of conduct of “deliberately held back documents” by Commission when the Commission has a duty to show me this investigation evidence of “disarray of books” per Cashin and Ruckpaul cases, and refusal is a deliberate breach of natural justice to refuse my right to receive the specifics of the generalized allegation of “disarray of books” for me to make a proper defence and that are defamatory to me

    Pg 10 Para #52 borrows and repeats para 20 from George v. Harris [2000] O.J. No. 1762 (S.C.J.)
    ***Not same as my claim or Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record per Senechal para 53:
    “The impugned pleadings against the Municipality are as follows: list pleadings a to l “
    Para 54: “The statement of claim contains only the following material facts specific to the Municipality: a and b
    Plus paras 53 to 66 with additional analysis of specific paragraphs in plaintiff’s claims with analysis why they are deficient not same as my claim per Justice Lofchik’

    Para 63 I do note that the Municipality was able to plead to the allegations of the plaintiffs without the need to ask for particulars under Rule 25.10.
    ***Crown in my case also was able to plead to the allegations per their motions records book that includes their defence statements and never once request for particulars per rule 25.10 a fact and law ignored by Justice Lofchik to favour the Crown Defendants and additional Institutional bias

    Facts also include fact of conduct:
    Starline:
    Ontario Society for Prevention of Cruelty of Animals v. Ontario Veterinary Assn. (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 183 (H.C.J.), in which Callaghan J. (as he then was) commented: “In this case the question of the motive which prompted the council to act as it did is a question of fact and is one which should be decided at trial.” And “not necessarily rely on the remedies afforded through judicial review of such action”

    Wilson:
    Held: It was not enough to plead that Barry negligently failed to learn facts that could have fixed him with the knowledge that reasonable and probable grounds did not exist. The claim against the Attorney General failed since it was based on vicarious liability for Barry’s actions.
    pg 15 para 59 “malice would be made out if they were to find that: …the respondents continued the prosecution either for an improper purpose, or in reckless disregard of evidence which would have disclosed the unreliability of the information provided by the [complainant], or out of ill will, spite or for selfish purposes, or because [the complainant] wanted them to do so. (Here complainant is the witness who alleged Wilson did the crime)
    ***Therefore my alleges of “not properly investigate the file” includes facts in case analysis reports and prima facie facts left out of case analysis reports for improper purpose to obstruct human rights justice to reach the conclusion of a sham investigation of recklessly disregarding evidence which discloses the unreliability of the information provided to Commission by all respondents sufficient for all torts pleaded.

  50. Discretion Arguments on top of my appeal factum paras #6 to 8.

    Go to Canlii(google) website to read Justice Lofchik’s bias endorsement record where there is no references to any of my pleadings made to substantiate his analyses as in other Rule 21 cases such as SCC case of Hunt v. Carey and Crown’s case of Deep.
    Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21
    Superior Court of Justice — Ontario
    allegations — suable — pleading — complaints — judicial

    Discretion – can sue for abuse of Discretion or applying discretion without authority of statute per
    Justice Lofchik’s argument pg 17 para #50 from Oren case “anomalous if the individual defendants could be sued in negligence when the Commission itself cannot” and “duty of care” does not exist
    which does not say the Commission Body cannot be sued for breach of duty of fairness to provide thorough and neutral investigation to all the prima facie facts per Misfeasance of Public Office and other intentional torts– Longley, Roncarrelli, Uni-Jet, HVK, Odhavji, Wilson, Nelles, Starline, KRP, Botiuk, Hill, Chahal, Clark, Derry, (Crown’s factum argument #2 b, c, d, and k, pg 7 para 20 for only section 34 (Way and Gismondi) and no case law for s. 36, and para 21 “not under duty to proceed with every complaint placed before it, para 22 and 23 JR (Lacasse, York and Oren), pg 8 para 23 Losier’s JR are all bare recital of discretion)
    ***Crown/Justice Lofchik did not provide any Judicial Review case law of section 36 dismissed prima facie complaints after investigation with discretion of “not under a public duty to proceed with every prima facie complaints after an investigation” to compare to Losier’s case where the case analysis or the court’s endorsement records includes statement by Crown that the complainant had merit per the Code giving Commission discretion to refuse referral of 4 prima facie complaints to Tribunal due to money management of the commission department and this is justified under section 1 of the Charter per Oaks test and demonstrate that the Commission had reasonable basis for concluding that total denial of benefits of making complainant whole is a minimum impairment of her rights and that it has accommodated the appellant’s needs to the point of “undue hardship”. None of my case analyses or Judicial Review endorsement say that but rather fabricates I have insufficient evidence when I have prima facie facts and evidence not investigated or Judicial Reviewed in Ontario per standard in Federal Court’s Judicial Reviews which is evidence that this wrong doing is being directed intentionally by the Minister of Attorney General to save money and/or in my case reprisal for filing small claims court suit 1178/04 against intake staff in spring 2004 before the investigation in fall 2004 and December 2004 case analysis reports.

    *Justice Lofchik’s pg 18 para #52 not proper analysis of facts or issues “The basis of the claims set out above comes back to the Case Analysis Reports. Because she does not agree with the contents of the Reports and some of the Statements in them, the Plaintiff concludes that the investigations conducted on behalf of the Commission were flawed or a sham, and that the investigators colluded with the other Defendants to deny her a hearing before the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal.” The facts also includes what was left out of these Case Analysis that the Respondents collaborated and are prima facie made out per the Code grounds particularly MMP’s “long absence/people out to get me/termination because allegations of poison work environment not substantiated”, Lyman’s “refusal of health benefits due to depression/sexual harassment complaints validated left out of case analyses”, and Xentel “sexual harassment complaints validated left out of complaint/retaliatory discharge when gave severance with release letter”. The case analysis reports and human rights complaints are sufficient per Crown’s authority of HVK which was based on a Society case analysis report and the plaintiffs were allowed to sue base on case analysis reports!!!!

    Way
    Para 6 and 7 s. 34(1) discretion – Commission pursuant s. 34(1)(b) and (d) – Section 34 of the Code permits the Commission to sift through complaints and remove a number of them from the time consuming process of investigation – The Commission is not under a duty to investigate every complaint
    ***Therefore only allowed to not proceed with complaint for those complaints that are refused to refer to investigation under s. 36 with measures to codify (1) (a to d) so cannot dismissed complaints because of lack of resources but has to be legitimate reasons such as no grounds

    Crown’s case of Gismondi paras 23, 24, and 44 agrees with my definition of discretion in my factum paras #6 to #8 that discretion is based on measures to manoevre such as s. 34(1) (a to d) for no grounds, and s. 5 to 10 to prove grounds and prima facie complaints made out, plus that everyone is equal and has a right to no discrimination per Code, Charter and UN Treaty. Gismondi also refers to cases of Slaight (my factum #6 arguments) and Payne, and that breach of fairness is made out when crown’s considerations are undisclosed to complainant (disarray of books and respondents witnesses statements validated per cases of Ruckpaul and Cashin “no opportunity to controvert specific evidence against her”)

    Para 23: “However, discretion must still be exercised in a manner that is within a reasonable interpretation of the margin of manoeuvre contemplated by the legislature, in accordance with the principles of the rule of law (Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [959] S.C.R. 121), in line with general principles of administrative law governing the exercise of discretion, and consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Slaight Communications Inc. V. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038).”
    ***This para in Gismondi case agrees with my authorities in Appeal Factum para #6-8 that there are margins to manoeuvre and my claim is that the Commission intentionally overstep those margins and acted without the authority of the Code and are accountable in civil suit for damages.

    Para 24 The fundamental purpose of the Code is to establish a legislative framework “to ensure that all members of our society enjoy the essential right to be free from discrimination on racial and other grounds” : Payne v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (2000), 192 D.L.R.
    Para 44 If the Commission were to proceed on a different recommendation or to base its decision on factors or considerations undisclosed to the complainant and the others there would be no opportunity to respond and the right to fairness would be infringed.

    Crown’s factum pg 9 para #24 not part of Rule 21 motion hearing or in Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record refers to Dudnik case and code: subsection 30(1) of the Code further provided that no person who is a member of the Commission was required to give testimony in a civil suit or any proceeding as to information obtained in the course of an investigation under this Act. Dudnik v. York Condominium Corp. No. 216, (1990), 12 CHRR D/325 at para. 75, reversed on other grounds (1991), 14 CHRR D/406 (Decision June 20th 1990)
    Dudnik v. York Condominium para 75:
    In our view, s. 29(1) prohibits the Chief Commissioner and any other Commissioner from being required to give testimony in an inquiry or to produce documents. However, s. 29(2) allows a Commission employee, other than a Commissioner, to be compelled to give testimony or produce documents in any inquiry. Documents produced in response to a subpoena issued to a human rights officer or other employee would be admissible so long as relevance was established by the respondent, and there was no sustainable ground of privilege claimed by the Commission.
    ***Neither the Code nor this Case state that the Commission and staff being sued per Proceedings Against the Crown Act are not required to give testimony as Defendant, and per Dudnik there are allowances, and privilege is not sustainable if they did their job in Bad faith.

    Stare decisis legal doctrine says this 1990 ruling no longer applies because binding authority of new statute created in 1990 the Proceedings Against the Crown Act dated in 1990 s. gives litigants right to sue for intentional wrongdoing per sections 5, 8 and 23 which invalidates the Crown’s authority

    Proceedings Against the Crown Act – Liability in tort:
    5. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, and despite section 71 of Part VI (Interpretation) of the Legislation Act, 2006, the Crown is subject to all liabilities in tort to which, if it were a person of full age and capacity, it would be subject,
    (a) in respect of a tort committed by any of its servants or agents;
    (d) under any statute, or under any regulation or by-law made or passed under the authority of any statute, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 5 (1); 2006, c. 21, Sched. F, s. 124.
    Where proceedings in tort lie
    (2) No proceeding shall be brought against the Crown under clause (1) (a) in respect of an act or omission of a servant or agent of the Crown unless a proceeding in tort in respect of such act or omission may be brought against that servant or agent or the personal representative of the servant or agent. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 5(2).
    Discover section 8: In a proceeding against the Crown, the rules of court as to discovery and inspection of documents and examination for discovery apply in the same manner as if the Crown were a corporation,
    Conflict: section 23: Where this Act conflicts with any other Act, this Act governs. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 23.

    Other argument is that section 30(1) is unconstitutional and violates my rights and counters Justice Lofchik’s argument for absolute immunity at para #61 “If the law were otherwise, it would render immunity meaningless due to the threat of personal liability by a simple plea of malicious intent” per Pispidikis v. Scroggie and Morier v. Rivard SCC 1985 (see arguments in Wilson re: SCC Nelles 1989):
    Crown’s case of Wilson includes SCC decision in Nelles 1989 which nullifies per stare decisis Justice Lofchik’s argument here based on SCC 1985 decision in Morier v. Rivard on immunity Pg 4 Para 18 that: “Lamer J., as he then was, speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court in Nelles concluded that these policy considerations, while possessing some merit, did not justify absolute immunity. They had to give way to the right of a private citizen to seek a remedy when a prosecutor acts “maliciously in fraud of his duties”.
    Pg 5 para 20 that: “First, absolute immunity for prosecutors cannot be permitted. The existence of absolute immunity would be a threat to the individual rights of citizens who have been wrongly and maliciously prosecuted by agents of the Attorney General. It would be alarming if such wrongdoers, despite being persons from whom we expect the highest standard of conduct in exercising an important public trust, could not be held accountable to their victims.

    Unconstitutional and Differential Treatment:
    Federal Court Human Rights Jurisdictions does not have same rule 30(1) in their Human Rights Statute and overrules this Ontario Code rule per Human Rights cases of Cashin 1984 and Ruckpaul 2004 which both cases allows for complainants to received Crown’s investigation evidence because it is a human and constitutional right to review documents Commission relies upon to refuse one’s Charter Rights particularly when Crown breaches natural justice and duty to fairness, and the Code book says there is only one provincial and federal human rights legislation which is relevant to the interpretation of one human rights statute. Nowhere is a rule 30(1) mentioned in these 1984 or 2004 cases which are Judicial Review cases requesting investigation documents from the Commission given to the complainant. Therefore the Charter section 52 applies to null and void Ontario’s Code 30(1) and per SCC argument in Nelles’ policy such as OHRC section 30(1) did not justify refusal of investigation documents because they had to give way to the right of a private citizen to seek a remedy when the Commission and staff acts “maliciously in fraud of his duties”.

  51. Abuse of Process to have a civil suit if had judicial review calling it a relitigation argument

    Go to Canlii(google) website to read Justice Lofchik’s bias endorsement record where there is no references to any of my pleadings made to substantiate his analyses as in other Rule 21 cases such as SCC case of Hunt v. Carey and Crown’s case of Deep.
    Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21
    Superior Court of Justice — Ontario
    allegations — suable — pleading — complaints — judicial

    Justice Lofchik’s errored in his para #45 analysis of Judicial Review based on Lacasse, Oren and York argument as none of these 3 cases say can’t challenge decision in civil suit for damages from intentional torts which agrees with my authorities breached by him of Kulyk, Starline/ Ontario Society for Prevention of Cruelty of Animals) :
    York’s injunctions case not a statement of claim case pg 14 para 42 and para 33: the Moving Parties are compelled to challenged them through the process of judicial review, assuming that they are granted status. Para 33: “Section 5 of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act provides that, except as otherwise provided, the Crown is subject to all liabilities in tort to which, if it were a person of full age and capacity, it would be subject in respect of a number of matters. The listed matters do not encompass the type of claim with which we are here concerned.
    Lacasse at para # 5: (l) Proceedings to attack the conduct of, or the decisions of the Commission, must be made by way of an Application for Judicial Review (Judicial Review Procedure Act, Courts of Justice Act and the Rules). In any event, the complaints are still pending and no decision has been rendered. Therefore the proceedings against it are premature.
    Oren at Para 12: “Paragraph 34 (b) alleges misfeasance and abuse of public office on the part of the defendants by neglecting to carry out their duties. This is a claim of negligence and not of intentional conduct, which is necessary for a claim of misfeasance in public office.

    Other cases per my factum para #6: HVK, Kulyk, Starline (Ontario Society for Prevention of Cruelty of Animals) validates can challenge Commission’s decision by civil suit:
    Ontario Society for Prevention of Cruelty of Animals v. Ontario Veterinary Assn. (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 183 (H.C.J.), in which Callaghan J. (as he then was) commented: “In this case the question of the motive which prompted the council to act as it did is a question of fact and is one which should be decided at trial.”
    “if it sustains damages as a result of such an abuse, to come to a common law court for its remedy and not necessarily rely on the remedies afforded through judicial review of such action.”
    HVK: application for judicial review. None of these proceedings involved claims for damages.

    Justice Lofchik errored at para #64 pg 22 and para #65 pg 23 as his authorities for abuse of process facts are not the same as mine “facts of employment events/complaints” particularly when Fabian had a trial in the Lang case found in case of Carnegie v. Rasmussen Starr Ruddy, 1994 CanLII 7283 (ON S.C.), does not say it is abuse of process to sue for civil damages after Commission’s decisions were judicial reviewed and appealed from and allowed which includes Crown’s case of Dyce for a Court Order family matter for this appeal. Justice Lofchik relies on 3 cases for abuse of process without providing me copies of each one to defend and only does bald analysis and does not show how the facts of employment events in my pleadings apply per Lang and Toronto City cases. I can only find the following paras from other cases for 2 authorities and nothing for R. v. Wilson (a criminal matter not civil suit):

    Lang Michener v. Fabian 1987 CanLII 172 (ON. S.C.), (1987), 59 O.R. (2d) 353, 16 C.P.C. (2d) 93 (H.C.J.). The facts on that case were somewhat similar to the facts in this case. Fabian, an unsuccessful plaintiff in a personal injury action, had commenced an action against the defence experts who had testified at trial. The statement of claim in the action was struck out which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Immediately thereafter Fabian commenced a second action against the same expert and the three solicitors acting for the defendants in the personal injury action. That action was dismissed as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. Fabian unsuccessfully appealed the order dismissing his order dismissing his action to the Supreme Court of Canada. Fabian, as an officer of a corporation, commenced numerous other actions with similar claims all of which have been unsuccessful. The solicitors Lang Michener Lash Johnston brought an motion pursuant to then s. 150(1) of the Courts of Justice Act to prohibit Fabian from bringing any further motions.

    McGowan v. Toronto (City), 2010 ONCA 362 (CanLII) para 3: “With respect, this conclusion evinces too narrow an interpretation of the doctrine of abuse of process. Relitigation and abuse of process are not restricted to actions in which a party is seeking to set aside his or her convictions. An action can also be an abuse of process when the party seeks to challenge the correctness of a conviction without seeking to directly set is aside: See Toronto (City) v. Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U. P.E.), Local 79, 2003 SCC 63 (CanLII), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77.

    R. v. Wilson, [1983] 2. S.C.R. 595 at 5-8 (no copy given to me and is criminal matter against the Crown not civil suit) –

    Para #65 pg 23 Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record for hallmarks of a frivolous and vexatious proceeding and abuse of process refers to Currie v. Halton (Region) Police Services Board 127 A.C.W.S. (3d) 573. (no copy given to me and is also a criminal matter not civil suit and only information I could find is that its currently under review at the SCC). Justice Lofchik at para #68 is ordering “leave to deliver a fresh statement of claim” and he does not show at para #65 how my “facts of employment events” are “complete absence of material facts” for the 6 intentional torts pleaded when injurious falsehoods of gross incompetency MMP/Xentel is sufficient for both claims per argument in Crown’s factum and authority of George v. Harris Pg 5 Para 20: The next step is to consider the meaning of “scandalous”, “frivolous” or “vexatious”. There have been a number of descriptions provided in the multitude of authorities decided under this or similar rules. It is clear that a document that demonstrates a complete absence of material facts will be declared to be frivolous and vexatious.

    Dyce Pg 6 para 24: (4) Are these claims a collateral attack on decisions made involving the plaintiff and his wife? It is quite apparent to me that both actions are indeed a collateral attack and ought to be dismissed as an abuse of process under rules 21.01(3)(d) and 25.11(c). Clearly it is an abuse of process to try to litigate issues already determined. A court order which has not been set aside or appealed from may not be attacked collaterally and that is exactly what the plaintiff is attempting to do in these cases.

  52. Negligence and no cause of action for breach of statute and/or natural justice argument.

    Go to Canlii(google) website to read Justice Lofchik’s bias endorsement record where there is no references to any of my pleadings made to substantiate his analyses as in other Rule 21 cases such as SCC case of Hunt v. Carey and Crown’s case of Deep.
    Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21
    Superior Court of Justice — Ontario
    allegations — suable — pleading — complaints — judicial

    Negligence (Crown’s factum pg 2 para #2 (f) and (g), pg 12 para 35, pg 16/17 para 50 & 51 Oren bare recital of discretionary power) (Crown’s Factum pg 3 para #2 (l), pg 15 para #45 Lewis and #46 Deep “breach may be considered within the context of the general law of negligence”, and Crown’s Factum pg 2 para #2 c and k, pg 19 paras 59 and 60, para 61 Dyce)

    Justice Lofchik’s errered in his analysis of negligence law is solely based on Crown’s argument that I pleaded negligence without showing the paragraph in my claim that is same as Oren or Lacasse or the following Crown authorities:
    Oren Para 14: “The plaintiffs claim for negligence on the part of the individual defendants. The Commission does not dispute that, for purposes of liability in negligence, a relationship of proximity exists, but it disputes that a duty of care is owed to the plaintiffs. The Commission and the individual defendants are engaged in a quasi-judicial process. To subject them to liability in negligence would be inimical to the proper exercise of their responsibilities without fear of lawsuits from disappointed complainants; Edwards v. Law Society of Uppwer Canada (No. 2) (2000), 48 O.R. (3d) 329 at para 40 (C.A.). It would be anomalous if the individual defendants could be sued in negligence when the Commission itself cannot. The work of the Commission is and remains subject to the discipline of judicial review. These reasons negativing a duty of care are compelling.”
    ***Not same as mine per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement that I pleaded “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation” and Oren was not suing employer defendants with Crown defendants and the Crown does have a duty to fairness per section 36 of the code to the complainants and a breach is unlawful and suable per Misfeasance of Public Office not Negligence:
    OHRC Code book 2005 s. 36
    Pg 185 Layzell v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) 2003 – The Commission owes to the Complainant a duty of fairness in its procedures…
    Pg 187 Valair v. Canada (Attorney General) 2004 (FC) – Uneven disclosure can constitute a breach of procedural fairness. The Commission must provide to the complainant all the submissions by the respondent, unless the submission adds nothing new. (like the disarray of books only in report dec 2004 and only alleged interviewing MMP’s witnesses 2 undisclosed workers who did not work with plaintiff)
    Pg 188/9 – Kollar v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2002 (FCT) – The investigation must be thorough and this will be assessed on the basis of the investigation report. If the Commission makes its decision on the basis of an investigation report which fails to deal with evidence relating to all the alleged breaches of human rights law, the decision of the Commission cannot stand. (MMP’s termination letter prima facie reprisal because my allegations of poison work environment were not substantiated per WSIB report, MMP’s rebuttal disability discrimination “long absence” and “people out to get me”, leaving out all sexual harassment items and internal complaints validated at Xentel and Lyman, Lyman’s prima facie disability discrimination of Ins. Co. denying benefits due to past history of depression)
    Pg 189 – Lee v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2002 (FCT) – The record before the Commission must not be flawed. Commission staff must treat the parties in an evenhanded fashion, particularly where one party is unrepresented) (uneven only allegedly interviewed MMP’s witnesses Mrs. Page, Mr. Clark, and 2 undisclosed witnesses who did not work with plaintiff)

    Roncarrelli pg 166/67: “In my opinion the intention of the legislature, to be gathered from the whole Act, was to enumerate (i) certain cases in which the granting of a permit is forbidden, and (ii) certain case in which the cancellation of a permit is mandatory, and, in all other cases to commit the decision as to whether a permit should be granted, refused or cancelled to the unfettered discretion of the commission. I conclude that the function of the commission in making that decision is administrative and not judicial or quasi-judicial.”
    ***This validates my factum argument paras 6 to 8 that legislation of Code expressly laid down rules to guide the commission being ignored as to circumstances under which it may refuse to grant a Tribunal referral and the intention of the Code to be gathered from the whole Act that includes the preamble with its purpose/intent that everyone is equal, section 5 to 10 as to what constitutes prima facie complaints per grounds, and not just Way/Gismondi bare recital of section 34 with no case examples of prima facie complaints made out dismissed per section 36 as per Crown’s factum argument and Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record.
    Pg 169 “He must give notice when he will proceed with the matter, and he must act honestly and impartially and not under the dictation of some other person or persons to whom the authority is not given by law. There must be no malversation of any kind.” (including defamation, conspiracy, accepting unreliable and hearsay evidence and ignoring collaborated prima facie facts and evidence)
    ***Impartially proven when they only interview 2 witness for MMP respondents and none for the complainant and leave out prima facie facts and evidence collaborated from Respondents.

    “fraud, collusion or malice…” (list items that are improper purpose for Misfeasance of Public office so defamation is also acceptable)
    ***Collusion made out per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement para #8 “colluded with the other defendants to stifle her complaints” and para #52 “investigators colluded with the other Defendants to deny her a hearing before the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal”

    Pg 191 Ruckpaul v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) 2004 (FC) – If the investigation is flawed to the point where a court can reasonably conclude the evidence reported by the investigator is incomplete or inadequate, the court must intervene.
    ***Losier’s JR and investigations was flawed because my JR judges refused to weigh evidence when per this FC case they were suppose to weigh evidence and reports, and the evidence per the employment events facts warrants an inquiry” under section 36

    Deep pg 12 para #51 “Since there is no nominate tort of statutory breach in Canada, the plaintiff’s mere allegation of a breach of statute is insufficient. Rather, any purported breach of a statute must be considered in the context of a claim of negligence: Canada v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool [1983] 1 S.C.R.
    Deep para #60: “The plaintiff at paragraph 29 pleads that the defendants were “negligent in their exercise of statutory powers and breached the duty required of them…” but has failed to plead material facts to support any allegations that the defendants owed him a private law duty of care.”
    ***I did plead Breach of fairness of an investigation and there is a duty per code section 36: 04 matter paras 10,20, 26, 27 and 05 matter 5, 15, 31, 33, 34, 36, 44, 100, and 113.

    Wilson: Held: It was not enough to plead that Barry negligently failed to learn facts that could have fixed him with the knowledge that reasonable and probable grounds did not exist.
    Senechal case (Crown Factum pg 18 para 52 not in book): Pg 2 Held: Application allowed in part. The actions were not statute-barred. Most of the allegations of negligence were struck out. The plaintiffs were given leave to amend their statements of claim through the provision of facts that would support their allegations of negligence.
    Claims intentional conduct:
    ***Even my case of Starline points to some paragraph in claim that shows pleading of negligence: Para 71: of the amended statement of claim, the plaintiff’s allege that the Ministry’s representations to Starline regarding the rules of bingo licences were incorrect and negligent.

    Odhavji 2003 SCC
    Pg 3: “The officers’ alleged failure to cooperate with the SIU investigation and the Chief’s alleged failure to ensure that they did cooperate both constitute unlawful breaches of statutory duties under the Police Services Act. The allegation that the officers’ acts and omissions “represented intentional breaches of their legal duties as police officers” satisfies the requirement that the officers were aware that their conduct was unlawful and that it was intentional and deliberate. The allegation that the Chief deliberately failed to segregate the officers satisfies the requirement that he intentionally breached his legal obligation to ensure compliance with the Police Services Act. However, the same cannot be said of his alleged failures to ensure that the officers produced timely and complete notes, attended interviews, and provided accurate and complete accounts. A mere failure to discharge obligations of an office cannot constitute misfeasance in a public office and the plaintiffs must prove the failures were deliberate.”
    Odhavji para 20 Garrett v. Attorney-General , [1997] 2 N.Z.L.R.332, the Court of Appeal for New Zealand considered an allegation that a sergeant failed to investigate properly the plaintiff’s claim that she had been sexually assaulted by a police constable. Blanchard J. concluded, at p. 344, that the tort can be committed “by an official who acts or omits to act in breach of duty knowing about the breach and also knowing harm or loss is thereby likely to be occasioned to the plaintiff.
    The failure to discharge obligation of the office in para #37 is per SCC argument on pg 16 para 40: “In the defendant officers’ submission, the essence of the plaintiffs’ claim is that they were deprived of a thorough, competent and credible investigation. And owing to the fact that no individual has a private right to a thorough, competent and credible criminal investigation the plaintiffs have suffered no compensable damages.
    ***Is not the same in Human Rights Jurisdiction where duty to fairness includes thorough and neutral investigation and there is compensable damages per

    Therefore Justice Lofchik’s analysis of negligence law applied to my claims is solely based on my pleadings of breach of statute and based on Crown’s error in law of still applying in 2010 from para #45 from Lewis 1989 case that all “breach may be considered within the context of the general law of negligence” Pg 14 para 31 Saskatchewan Wheat Pool states only that it is insufficient that the defendant has breached the statute. It does not, however, establish that the breach of a statute cannot give rise to liability if the constituent elements of tortious responsibility have been satisfied. Put a different way, the mere fact that the alleged misconduct also constitutes a breach of statute is insufficient to exempt the officer from civil liability. Just as a public officer who breaches a statute might be liable for negligence, so too might a public officer who breaches a statute be liable for misfeasance of a public office. Sasketchewan Wheat Pool would only be relevant to this motion if the appellants had pleaded no more than a failure to discharge a statutory obligation. This, however, is not the case. The principle established in Saskatchewan Wheat Pool has no bearing on the outcome on this appeal.

    The Odhavji argument of negligence for discharging office is for criminal jurisdiction not same as in Human Rights jurisdiction with different rules for investigations and what goes in reports. The Commission does have a duty to the complainant of fairness in their investigation that includes what they write in their Case Analysis reports and stare decisis to other complainants when “equality” is the issue per Ruckpaul and Cashin and other cases on what constitutes a proper human rights investigation/judicial review, and there are compensable damages unlike the criminal jurisdictions particularly loss of all wages to make the complainant whole and a breach is the Tort of Misfeasance of Public Office not negligence.

    Human Rights Code section 36 pg 185 from Layzell case: The Commission owes to the complainant a duty of fairness in its procedures.”
    Ruckpaul Federal JD: “an investigation had to be at least thorough and neutral for the Commission to have a fair basis on which to evaluate” and “its duty is to decide if, under the provisions of the Act, an inquiry is warranted having regard to all the facts.”, “Ms. Huneault made a clear statement concerning one of the grounds upon which the applicant based her discrimination and harassment claims. However, the investigator failed to address this issue any further in his report. This omission might constitute a “fundamental” omission.”and “She failed to interview the applicant nor any of her witnesses. The Commission realized this was a flaw and asked the investigator to interview the applicant’s witnesses.”, and “Furthermore, two supplemental witness statements, dated February 15 and 16, 2001, from CIC’s main witnesses in response to questions put by the investigator to CIC were not disclosed.”.

    Starline: “Bad faith is different from negligence because the former involves intent” (04 Matter para #11, 14, 20, and 05 Matter para #16, 23, 25, 33, 44 plus other paras were I plead fabricated insufficient evidence which infers bad faith dishonesty intent)
    Deep para #64: “Bad faith is a legal conclusion. It has been held to involve an allegation of an intent to deceive or to make someone believe what is false. It has been said to be equivalent to an allegation of dishonesty.
    ***Sufficiently pleaded para #20: This alleged fact of gross incompetence alone is evidence of Bad Faith and unfairness of an employer’s dismissal investigation and the commission’s statutory duty, breach of fairness, aggravated an injury to the plaintiff and therefore magnified the award of damages for mental distress, warrants punitive and now exemplary damages.

    The Odhavji argument also applies to Justice Lofchik’s para argument #66 Breach of Natural justice not a cause of action does not give rise to liability if the constituent elements of tortous responsibility have been satisfied and he did not provide case law that says breach of natural justice cannot be used as improper purpose for Misfeasance of public office or unlawful conduct for Conspiracy Tort.
    Deep para 50 “The plaintiff asserts a claim for breach of natural justice. Breach of natural justice is not a cause of action known in law. So it is plain and obvious that the statement of claim does not disclose a reasonable cause of action”

  53. My claims not same as Oren or Lacasse argument

    Go to Canlii(google) website to read Justice Lofchik’s bias endorsement record where there is no references to any of my pleadings made to substantiate his analyses as in other Rule 21 cases such as SCC case of Hunt v. Carey and Crown’s case of Deep.
    Losier v. Mackay, Mackay & Peters Limited, 2009 CanLII 43651 (ON S.C.) — 2009-08-21
    Superior Court of Justice — Ontario
    allegations — suable — pleading — complaints — judicial

    Justice Lofchik’s validates I pleaded facts per employment events and case analyses per his paras #8, #46, #52-54 and #60 and does not show per my specific pleadings like other Rule 21 cases where I am deficient therefore these facts are sufficient to reach the conclusion of 6 intentional torts not just 4 in endorsement. Justice Lofchik cannot refuse access to justice because these facts and bad faith were judicial reviewed based on due deference with no cross examination per rules of civil trial, and not weighing the evidence and all the facts per Federal Court Judicial Review cases when these Case Analyses resulted in damages. The case analysis Reports are sufficient in themselves per HVK, SCC Hill and Botiuk defamation cases and are defamatory pleaded sufficiently and are discrediting the plaintiff, and SCC of Odhavji and Longley for Misfeasance of Public Office that includes Bad Faith requirement per this tort. Judicial Review Courts cannot be trier of fact for Bad Faith for civil torts which requires a trial and different rules of evidence such as cross examination that are not part of a Judicial Review.
    Justice Lofchik’s endorsement Para #8: The Plaintiff’s allegations are, essentially, that she was sexually harassed and discriminated against on the basis of disability while employed by her former employers and that the Commission and its employees did not properly investigate her complaints and colluded with the other defendants to stifle her complaints. The Plaintiff further alleges the Defendants acted in a coordinated manner to share information about her.”
    HVK pg 9 para 30: “In light of this statutory provision, it is open to a court to find that an officer or employee of the Society, who acted in bad faith in the execution of the person’s duty, is responsible for those actions and will not be protected by the corporate veil of the Society. In the case before me, allegations are made that the members of the Board of Directors met, planned and conspired with the Society to act against the plaintiffs, did not provide an independent review of the Director’s actions at the hearing in February, 2000, colluded with each other and acted throughout the legal processes in a manner that demonstrated bad faith. While such allegations may be difficult to prove, that does not mean that the pleadings should be struck at this stage as it is possible that the plaintiffs will be able to demonstrate bad faith on the part of the directors and that they are not protected by the statutory provision as officers of the Society.”

    Para #46: The plaintiff has in fact applied for judicial review of the Commission’s decisions in respect of the Human Rights complaints that form the subject matter of these actions.
    Para #52: The basis of the claims set out above comes back to the Case Analysis Reports. Because she does not agree with the contents of the Reports and some of the statements in them, the Plaintiff concludes that the investigation conducted on behalf of the Commission were flawed or a sham, and that the investigators colluded with the other Defendants to deny her a hearing before the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal.
    ***Justice Lofchik’s leaves our of endorsement record all the prima facie facts left out of case analysis that proves all of my conclusions and intentional torts such as MMP’s termination letter with no cause of incompetency. Justice Lofchik acting as trier of fact instead of a Rule 21 motion’s judge making the decision that the Commission staff acted in good faith in the contents of the Reports, when internal government reports pleaded were allowed per HVK pg 10 para 32 and the following case: The application of the Charter to the actions of a Children’s Aid Society has been considered by our courts in the case of Children’s Aid Society of the City of London and the County of Middlesex v. T.H., [1992] O.J. No. 3050 where Vogelsang J. held that the Charter applies and that, “a Society and a social worker preparing a Society case are obvious instruments of government within the meaning of subsection 32(1)”.

    Para #53: Apart from the references to the Reports and the contents with which she disagrees, the Plaintiff has failed to plead any material facts that are not based on assumptions, suspicions, speculation, and her own conclusions regarding the conduct of the Commission or its employees. Many of the Plaintiff’s allegations are set out as her own “inferences”.
    ***Justice Lofchik fails to substantiate which paragraphs in claims are pleadings of assumptions, suspicions and speculation like all other rule 21 cases such as Operations and Regional, and this is cooking the judicial books/imaging the truth. Facts are more than the reports and the contents I disagree with are all the facts in my 4 Prima Facie complaint left out of the Reports that the Employer Defendants validated such as MMP’s “long absence” and “people out to get me”, Xentel’s offer of severance pay with release form and internal complaints, and Lyman’s many internal complaints and refusal for benefits because I disclosed past history of depression, plus not interviewing my witnesses and the sexual harassers.
    Para #54: The claims boil down to an assertion that the Defendants performed their duties in such a way as to undermine the Plaintiff’s claims of sexual harassment and discrimination on the part of the other Defendants, and that they acted deliberately for this purpose. The Plaintiff’s complaint is essentially about the quality of the investigation of her complaints and the manner in which the employees of the Commission did their jobs. This is essentially a claim in negligence for which the employees are not suable.
    ***This paragraphs states the conclusion as “assertion” and also includes the facts to based that assertion of of sexual harassment and discriminating events not investigated sufficient for all torts pleaded. Justice Lofchik imaging like the case analysis because he makes no references to specific paragraphs in claims because they were pleaded sufficient with the facts being the incidents in complaints and reports that asserts the Crown acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation.

    Para #60 The plaintiff has failed to plead facts which support a claim of bad faith, abuse of power or malice toward her. Referring to the passages of a Case Analysis Report with which she disagrees just does not do it. This is so particularly when the Divisional Court in her judicial review application found that “there was an abundance of evidence to support the findings upon which the discretion of the Commission was exercised”. And that, “the Applicant has failed to establish that the decisions are arbitrary, capacious or made in bad faith”.
    ***My allegations in the Rule 21 8 day motion hearing was that the Minister of Attorney General continued the cause of action with the Judicial Review Courts and I have a Charter Rights to amend my claim which includes improper judicial review by refusing to weigh all the evidence per standard in Ruckpaul case. What I received is per Crown’s factum pg 8 para #23 another imaged process because it does not matter about the truth only that we provide her with a process so when she says we disadvantage her we say we gave her the process:
    We do not inent to analyze all the evidence, not the specific details of each complaint and each Case Analysis Report. However, certain general observations are necessary. Ms. Losier correctly contends that it was not necessary for her to establish an entire pattern of facts, because even one “incident” can sometimes justify a finding of workplace harassment or reprisal. She points to numerous particulars that she says the Commission did not try to verify, a belief stemming from the fact there is no reference to them in the Case Analysis Reports or the reasons for the decisions. She asserts that the Commission did not address conflicting evidence or explain why her evidence was rejected or ignored, or why other evidence was preferred. Ms. Losier also contends that the Commission resorted to second hand information (hearsay evidence) rather than first hand evidence, when first hand evidence was available. It is worth repeating that the Commission is not sitting as a tribunal; it is acting in an investigative and administrative screening capacity.
    ***Ruckpaul Judicial Review contradicts the analysis of the law for judicial review in this paragraph.

    We are not prepared to assume that the failure to mention every allegation, or the detailed particulars of Ms. Losier’s evidence, leads to the conclusion the Commission failed to consider those allegations or that evidence. It is very clear that the Commission assessed the credibility of Ms. Losier’s allegations and evidence, and found it wanting. The court cannot second guess the Commission’s assessment of credibility or wade into the evidence and reach opposite conclusions without first determining that the Commission’s findings were irrational.
    ***If they did not analyze all the evidence or specific details of each complaint that they cant say that my credibility is wanting and this here is also defamation of my character.

    In our view, the decisions are not irrational. There is an abundance of evidence to support the findings upon which the discretion of the Commission was exercised. The applicant has failed to establish that the decisions are arbitrary, capricious or made in bad faith. Each application is therefore dismissed”
    ***If they refused to analyze all the evidence than they have provided a one sided bias Judicial Review solely based on case analysis and no analysis done per Ruckpaul’s Judicial Review which is also differential treatment and prove of discrimination by Minister of Attorney General and Queenspark.

    Ruckpaul v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 149 (CanLII),
    analysis pgs 7 to 11 particularly paras 42, 45-50, 52-58, 62-71 and 75, is a proper judicial
    review not what I received in Ontario to protect the abuse from the Minister of Attorney
    General, Commission and investigation staff:

    “its duty is to decide if, under the provisions of the Act, an inquiry is warranted having regard to all the facts.”

    “an investigation had to be at least thorough and neutral for the Commission to have a fair basis on which to evaluate”

    “that where the completeness of the investigation or report is challenged, the
    underlying investigation documents are relevant and subject to production”

    “If the investigation is flawed to the point where a court can reasonably conclude
    the evidence reported by the investigator is incomplete or inadequate, the court
    must intervene.”

    “She failed to interview the applicant nor any of her witnesses. The Commission
    realized this was a flaw and asked the investigator to interview the applicant’s
    witnesses.”
    ***Same as my complaints – no witnesses.

    “Furthermore, two supplemental witness statements, dated February 15 and 16,
    2001, from CIC’s main witnesses in response to questions put by the investigator to
    CIC were not disclosed.”
    ***Same as my complaint Mrs. Page, Mr. Clark and 2 witnesses statements were not disclosed.

    “Ms. Huneault made a clear statement concerning one of the grounds upon which
    the applicant based her discrimination and harassment claims. However, the
    investigator failed to address this issue any further in his report. This omission
    might constitute a “fundamental” omission.”
    ***Same as my complaints such as per my Judicial Review argument that “even one incident can justify” violation such as MMP’s 3 prima facie incidents not one of “exposure to porn joke” and “long absence” for disability discrimination and termination letter with cause because my WSIB was denied and your poison work environment allegations were not substantiated we are terminating your employment with no allegations of incompetence per case analysis nor in Judicial Review endorsement record plus others items.

    Kollar v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2002 FCT 848 (CanLII) also validates my claims of improper investigation and judicial review:
    The Standard for Judicial Review in Kollar in Federal Courts in 2002 shows I received improper investigation in 2004 and improper judicial review in 2006 in Ontario and that the Crown defendants all knew in 2004/2006 what constitutes a proper investigation and Judicial Review.

    Pg 7 para 34: “breach of the principles of natural justice or other procedural unfairness or unless the decision is not supportable on the evidence before the Commission”

    Pg 9 para 38: Did the Commission commit a reviewable error of fact and law by ignoring witness evidence indicating that the sexual harassment had occurred?
    ***This paragraph then states the incident and who was interviewed whereas my Judicial Review analysis does no such analysis to each and every allegation of same reviewable error of fact and law!!!

    Pg 9 para 39: The investigation report in this case seems to have focused not on the above information, but on the applicant’s work record when she was employed initially with CIBC then CIBC Securities Inc. and then again with CIBC. It is appropriate to discuss the applicant’s work record but the investigation report should also deal with the evidence of alleged sexual harassment. The investigation report does not deal with this evidence. Was the evidence not accepted? I cannot tell from the report or the record. In my opinion, the investigation report did not deal with this evidence and consequently, the investigation report did not deal with the apllicant’s first part of her complaint which was that the respondent failed to supply her with an harassment free work place. This aspect of the complaint should have been dealt with in the investigation report. In my opinion, the investigation was, in this respect, deficient as it lacked thoroughness.
    ***My complaints and case against the Crown in a nutshell that the investigating officer had to put what they investigated in the report and per what they did put in their report is not thorough nor neutral and also proves abuse by the Judicial Review Courts in Ontario and Justice Lofchik’s agreement with my Judicial Review per Crown’s para#23!

    Para #40: The Commission need not accept the recommendations of the investigator but if it does and the investigation is found to be deficient because of lack of thoroughness, then the decision of the Commission is also deficient and cannot stand. I am of the opinion that the decision of the Commission is in error as it does not deal with the applicant’s first ground of complaint, that is that the employer did not provide her with an harassment free work place. For the above reason, I would quash the decision of the Commission and order that a new investigation be completed.

    Para #42: I might add, however, that it appears from the record that only the respondent’s response to the complaint dated October 5, 1999 was cross-disclosed to the applicant. The response of November 10, 1999 does not appear to have been disclosed to the applicant. I am of the view that since it was accepted by the Commission, it should have been cross-disclosed to the applicant.
    ***Same as my case the investigation interview of Mrs. Page, Mr. Clarke and 2 witnesses unknown to complainant and specific evidence of incompetence such as disarray of books was not disclosed

    Suits are allowed after a judicial review for bad faith conduct resulting in damages per SCC Longley and Roncarelli cases based on civil court rules of evidence not Judicial Review rules of evidence solely on due deference and not weighing evidence providing another sham Crown process per Kollar’s Judicial Review which is continuing cause of action by Minister of Attorney General. HVK pg 2 held: The plaintiff’s claim was not a re-litigation of the previous prodeedings, as they did not involve any claim for damages. It was possible that the court could find that the decisions of the directors and employees was motivated by bad faith and not protected by any limitation of liability.
    ***Justice Lofchik acting as trier of fact again and his argument not based on law per Crown’s case of Wilson references to Reports and also what was left out of reports is sufficient for abuse of power, bad faith, and malice at pg 15 para 59 “malice would be made out if they were to find that: …the respondents continued the prosecution either for an improper purpose, or in reckless disregard of evidence which would have disclosed the unreliability of the information provided by the [complainant], or out of ill will, spite or for selfish purposes, or because [the complainant] wanted them to do so. (in my claim the complainant is the respondent wanted them to do so )
    ***reckless disregard of facts and evidence proving unreliability from employment events: 1) of MMP and Xentel’s evidence of incompetency is a termination letter from MMP 5 month after off on sick leave for depression with no allegations of incompetency plus $1.00 raise at 3 month probation and no sign warning letter at probation or during MMP employment, and for Xentel a termination letter with severance/notice and release form for notice and Xentel settled claim in 2007, and 2) no witnesses of the complainant’s interviewed at all and no sexual harassers interviewed at all for Lyman and Xentel complaints and only Ms. Page for her breast comment incident interviewed, and 3) no witnesses at all interviewed to prove or disprove Watts retaliation/delusional profiling campaign of contacting next employer and passing information in complaints
    ***There was no interview of my witness Karen Tarpos who was the one not Mrs. Page to train me on new duties and not retrain on old duties that I was alleged incompetent on and is fundamental omission proving conspiracy to injure me with damages of refusal to refer to tribunal, injure me with personal injury of delusional/depression disorder and to discredit me

    Para #4: The Plaintiff also claims damages for negligence, “misfeasance”, injurious falsehood, emotional distress and defamation against the Minister of the Attorney General, the Ontario Human Rights Commission (the “Commission”) and two it then employees, Dina Waik and Shannon Meadows-Lee.
    (only 3 intentional torts out of 6 and did not plead negligence per Crown’s and Justice Lofchik’s authorities)
    Intentional Torts pleaded sufficiently per Justice Lofchik’s endorsement record that I pleaded “they acted deliberately with quality of the investigation” with facts being employment events per his comment “apart from the facts of employment events the facts are insufficient” and that these claims are same as judicial review, and the Crown agrees per their factum pg 11 para #31 “alleged intentional conduct” and the Crown were able to plead in response when they filed their defence statement and never once request order for particulars/facts per their case of Senecchal, therefore these employment event facts in my human rights complaints are sufficient to base conclusion of all deliberate causes of actions of how the Crown abused their jobs. Justice Lofchik error at para #60 that my facts are merely “referring to the passages of a Case analysis Report with which she disagrees just does not do it” when I compare the case analyses facts with the prima facie facts in my complaints from employment events validated by Respondences, plus include adjudicated facts similar to mine from other successful human rights complaints, and facts showing not thorough investigation when Crown did not interview sexual harassers and my witnesses when they were required to per duty of fairness per standard in Federal Court cases of Judicial Review of Cashin, Ruckpaul, and Kollar in 2002. Justice Lofchik does no analyses to show in pleadings that the “employment event facts” are deficient for cause of actions pleaded per all Rule 21 cases and he cannot dismiss these facts because they were part of a judicial review when the law allows suits for damages after Judicial Reviews/Appeals exhausted for how the Crown abused their jobs “quality of investigation” so that he can wrongly claim my pleadings are bald and speculative. My two claims are not the same as all of the Crown’s cases per their arguments of hand selecting bare recitals of the law, such as Oren and Lacasse, refusing to show in writing specifics in my pleadings where I am deficient same as their authorities and other paragraphs in these cases invalidates their argument, therefore Justice Lofchik erred and did no independent review of these cases when he based his analyses strictly on Crown’s bare arguments for: Oren, Lacasse, Region, Operations Dismantle, Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, Deep, George, etc. Justice Lofchik validates that there are writing deficiencies per para #30 and order to amend claims for joint tortfeasors of employer defendants that includes oversights of torts elements due to no law training or lawyer and allowed to amend claim which is all that is required per Rule 21 to continue suit against the Crown. This includes a claim against the Minister as a claim against him personally per Justice Lofchik at para #42 per Deep para #83, KRP, Wilson/Nelles, Roncarrelli, Longley, Uni-Jet, and Odhavji for deliberately and improperly use of his office in 2004-2006 for uses inconsistent with the status of “minister of justice” per MAG Act, Code, Charter, and UN Treaty, and that this acquiescence was a violation of s. 5(b) of the MAG Act resulting in numerous damages including depriving me the benefits of my employment contracts. This includes concerted action not vicarious liability of improperly authorizing and condoning defamation of a member of the public and promoting improper investigation tactics and judicial reviews with intentional recklessness disregard of the truth and acting without the authority of the Code/Charter ignoring purpose of public policy to eliminate discrimination for everyone in Ontario is equal. The “discoverability rule” applies to the additional wrong doing after date of claim of continuing cause of action through Judicial Review/Appeal with additional improper administration of statute that is contrary to Charter values per example of proper administration of human rights statute in Federal Court 2004 case of Ruckpaul and 2002 case of Kollar, and other human rights cases similar to mine.

    Justice Lofchik does not show in my pleadings which para is per his para #49 “allegedly negligently carrying out the duties of their positions or failure to carry out the duties of their positions” like Crown’s authorities does and based his analysis solely on the Crown’s factum para #35 rephrasing Oren’s para #11 “cover-up” of wrongdoing were found to be insufficient for the purposes of establishing motive and the factual basis of a claim for abuse of office involving Commission employees – which is distorting what the judge really said of: “(a) on the part of Pocock, as “payback” against Katz (b) on the part of McKinnon, to support Pocock and cover up her “wrongdoing and (c) on the part of both of them, to divert criticism away from themselves. The problem with this pleading as to motive is that it pleads inferences without pleading any facts that would support the inferences.” This is not same as mine when Justice Lofchik includes that the “Defendants undermine the plaintiff’s sexual harassment and discrimination on the part of the other defendants” which includes the facts of discrimination unlike this para from Oren. Oren was dismissed per reasoning in para #12 of: “(b) alleges misfeasance and abuse of public office on the part of the defendants by neglecting to carry out their duties. This is a claim of negligence and not of intentional conduct, which is necessary for a claim of misfeasance in public office”. Also not same as mine per Justice Lofchik’s para #54 “the plaintiff’s complaint is essentially about the quality of the investigation of her complaints and the manner in which the employees of the Commission did their jobs” which does not show any para in my claim of pleading “neglecting to carry out their duties” when he validates I pleaded “they acted deliberately with the quality of the investigation” in his para #8 and #52 with flawed/sham investigation which is all that is required per Oren para #12 for claim of misfeasance in public office. Lacasse is not a claim or rule 21 motion case but an application and her complaints were still open at the Commission Pg 5(l) and dismissed per the following: in any event, the complaints are still pending and no decision has been rendered. Therefore the proceedings against it are premature”, Para 3 and general damages against the Commission for failing in “there (sic, their) fiduciary duty and denying me the benefit and protection of law”, and per Pg 3 to 6, Para 5, “(b) The claims pursued in this proceeding by the Applicant cannot be the subject matter of an Application. The claims made in this Application are not claims that are authorized by either a statute or by the rules of court.” The judge here did not say that a civil proceeding not allowed for “failure to review file” but that it was premature at this stage since the files were still pending.
    ***My pleadings are not for “failing in there ficuciary duty” but for breach of duty of fairness that the Commission owes to all complainants (04 matter para #20) per the Code section 36 which is not negligence but misfeasance of public office

    Neither of these two cases for allegations only of tort of negligence/misfeasance of public office “neglecting to carry out duties” or “failure to review files” are same as mine claim with 6 intentional torts including defamation with injurious falsehoods of gross incompetence with deliberate actions of fabricating
    insufficient evidence and distort/slant the facts towards the respondence, controlling witnesses by not interviewing any for complainant including all sexual harassers, and leaving out prima facie collaborated facts from Respondences proving violation of the Code per Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision “that the law is clear that the prohibitive ground of discrimination need not be the only reason for the action taken, so long as it forms one of the reasons” such as #04 claim MMP’s “long absence” and #05 claim Lyman’s refused benefits because I disclosed episode of depression. My complaints are not pending at the Commission and were dismissed resulting in damages that are ongoing therefore civil suit not premature and there are facts per “employment events” in claim 04 Matter para #13 material facts from #2 to #134 and claim 05 Matter material facts listed at paras: #8, #10, #15, #19, #20, #21, #26, #27, #28, #29, #42, and #46-105 (with other similar para pleadings) sufficient conclusion of 6 intentional torts for “they acted deliberately.

  54. Court file No. 05-18300
    ONTARIO
    SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
    BETWEEN:
    CLAUDETTE LOSIER
    Plaintiff
    and

    WATTS INDUSTRIES, MACKAY, MACKAY, & PETERS LIMITED,
    XENTEL DM INCORPORATED, 352587 ONTARIO LTD., 1290864 ONTARIO INC.,
    1573342 ONTARIO INC., 1527934 ONTARIO INC., KINDY SIHRA, MINISTER OF
    ATTORNEY GENERAL, ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, DINA
    WAIK, AND SHANNON MEADOWS-LEE
    Defendants

    STATEMENT OF CLAIM
    TO THE DEFENDANT
    A LEGAL PROCEEDING HAS BEEN COMMENCED AGAINST YOU by the plaintiff. The claim made against you is set out in the following pages.
    IF YOU WISH TO DEFEND THIS PROCEEDING, you or an Ontario lawyer acting for you must prepare a statement of defence in Form 18A prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, serve it on the plaintiff’s lawyer or, where the plaintiff does not have a lawyer, serve it on the plaintiff, and file it, with proof of service in this court office, WITHIN TWENTY DAYS after this statement of claim is served on you, if you are served in Ontario.
    If you are served in another province or territory of Canada or in the United States of America, the period for serving and filing your statement of defence is forty days. If you are served outside Canada and the United States of America, the period is sixty days.
    Instead of serving and filing a statement of defence, you may serve and file a notice of intent to defend in Form 18B prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. This will entitle you to ten more days within which to serve and file your statement of defence.
    IF YOU FAIL TO DEFEND THIS PROCEEDING, JUDGMENT MAY BE GIVEN AGAINST YOU IN YOUR ABSENCE AND WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE TO YOU. IF YOU WISH TO DEFEND THIS PROCEEDING BUT ARE UNABLE TO PAY LEGAL FEES, LEGAL AID MAY BE AVAILABLE TO YOU BY CONTACTING A LOCAL LEGAL AID OFFICE.
    (Where the claim made is for money only, include the following:)
    IF YOU PAY THE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM, and $157.00 for costs, within the time for serving and filing your statement of defence you may move to have this proceeding dismissed by the court. If you believe the amount claimed for costs is excessive, you may pay the plaintiff’s claim and $400 for costs and have the costs assessed by the court.
    Date May 17, 2005
    Issued by
    Local registrar
    Address of
    court office
    TO: 1) Watts Industries (Canada) Inc.
    5435 North Service Road, Burlington, Ontario, L7L 5H7
    905-332-4090 fax 905-332-7068
    2) Mackay, Mackay, & Peters Limited.
    3380 South Service Rd., Burlington, Ontario, L7N 3J5,
    905-639-1375
    C/O James D. Higginson (Barrister), Martin, Martin, Evans, Husband
    700-4 Hughson Street South, Hamilton, Ontario, L8N 3Z1
    905-525-4545 fax 905-523-4144
    3) Xentel DM Incorporated
    10 Kodiak Crescent, Toronto, M3J 3G5
    416-633-4646 fax 416-633-4643
    4) 352587 Ontario Ltd. o/a Lyman Custom Brokers and Freight Forwarding
    C/O Lynette A. Corbet (Barrister), McArthur Vereschagin
    195 James Street South, Hamilton, Ontario, L8P 3A8
    5) 1290864 Ontario Inc o/a Laurentide Manufacturing
    111 Brockley Drive, Hamilton, Ontario, L8E 3C4
    905-561-2022
    6) 1573342 Onatario Inc. o/a Kinros Industries C/O Laurentide Manufacturing
    111 Brockley Drive, Hamilton, Ontario, L8E 3C4
    905-561-2022
    7) 1527934 Ontario Inc. o/a Laurentide Customer Woodworking
    111 Brockley Drive, Hamilton, Ontario, L8E 3C4
    905-561-2022
    8) Kindy Sihra c/o Laurentide Manufacturing
    111 Brockley Drive, Hamilton, Ontario, L8E 3C4
    905-561-2022
    9) Minister of Attorney General, Crown Law Office, Civil Law
    720 BAY STREETBay Street, 8th Floor, Toronto, Ontario, M5G 2K1
    10) Ontario Human Rights Commission
    180 Dundas Street West 7th Floor, Toronto, Ontario, M7A 2R9
    11) Dina Waik C/O Ontario Human Rights Commission
    180 Dundas Street West 7th Floor, Investigation Department
    Toronto, ON, M7A 2R9
    416-212-2045 fax 416-314-3571
    12) Shannon Meadows-Lee C/O Ontario Human Rights Commission
    180 Dundas Street West 7th Floor, Investigation Department
    Toronto, ON, M7A 2R9
    416-212-2045 fax 416-314-3571

    CLAIM
    1. THE PLAINTIFF CLAIMS AGAINST THE DEFENDANT:

    (a) Damages for 1290864 Ontario Inc o/a Laurentide Manufacturing, 1573342 Onatario Inc.
    o/a Kinros Industries, 1527934 Ontario Inc. o/a Laurentide Customer Woodworking for
    inducing breach of contract, wrongful dismissal, bad faith termination, misrepresentation
    at time of interview, retaliatory discharge, and for increase in the notice period per
    Wallace Damages plus 4% vacation pay, as per the amount that this Honourable Court
    may deem just;
    (b) Special damages to 1290864 Ontario Inc o/a Laurentide Manufacturing, 1573342
    Onatario Inc. o/a Kinros Industries, 1527934 Ontario Inc. o/a Laurentide Customer
    Woodworking for job search expenses from November 15th 2004 to now of $95.04 up to
    May 13th 2005 per the amount that this Honourable Court may deem just;
    (c) Aggravated and/or Punitive damages to Kindy Sihra for tort of sexual harassment and
    Intimidation which includes promoting a “poison work environment” using others to
    harass me by sexualizing the work environment around me such as her friend Jen, Paul
    Underhill, and MMP Limited’s customer Mark Palladini in the sum of $5,000.00 or
    amount that this Honourable Court may deem just;
    (d) Aggravated and/or Punitive damages to Kindy Sihra as the “directing mind” behind the
    participation in Watts Industries conspiracy campaign of repeating items in all of my
    Human Rights Complaints creating the tort of conspiracy to injure both for imaging a
    persecution disorder and injury of financial job loss, wrongful interference with
    employment relations, inducing breach of contract, tort of deceit, tort of defamation of
    character, tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of duty to care,
    breach of fiduciary duty, tort of misrepresentation of offer of a full time permanent
    positon in the sum of $5,000.00 per defendant or amount that this Honourable Court may
    deem just;
    (e) Aggravated damages to 1290864 Ontario Inc o/a Laurentide Manufacturing, 1573342
    Ontario Inc. oa Kinros Industries, 1527934 Ontario Inc. o/a Laurentide Customer
    Woodworking for vicarious liability for their employees tortious actions and participating
    in Watts Industries conspiracy campaign of repeating items in all of my Human Rights
    Complaints creating the tort of conspiracy to injure both for imaging a persecution
    disorder and injury of financial job loss and loss of proper reference, wrongful
    interference with employment relations, inducing breach of contract, tort of deceit while
    employed and in their Human Rights Rebuttal, tort of defamation of character, tort of
    intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of duty to care, breach of fiduciary
    duty, tort of misrepresentation of offer of a full time permanent positon in the sum of
    $5,000.00 per defendant or amount that this Honourable Court may deem just;
    (f) Punitive damages for tortious actions of defamation of character and loss of reputation,
    deceit, conspiracy to injure, intentional infliction of emotional distress, misrepresentation,
    inducing breach of contract, breach of duty to care, breach of fiduciary duty, wrongful
    interference with employment relations and vicarious liability for 1290864 Ontario Inc
    o/a Laurentide Manufacturing, 1573342 Ontario Inc. oa Kinros Industries, 1527934
    Ontario Inc. o/a Laurentide Customer Woodworking, for sum of $5,000 per defendant or
    amount that this Honourable Court may deem just;
    (h) Punitive and aggravated damages for torts committed at Laurentide/Kinros by MMP Limited, Xentel DM Incorporated, Lyman Custom Brokers and Freight Forwarding of: conspiracy to injure, deceit, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, wrongful interference with employment relations, inducing breach of contract. For MMP Limited in the sum of $5,000, for Xentel Dm Incorporated in the sum of $5,000, for Lyman Custom Brokers and Freight Forwarding in the sum of $5,000, or in the amount that this Honourable Court my deem just;

    (i) Punitive and aggravated damages for torts committed by Watts with the OHRC regarding the Xentel, Lyman and the subsequent Watts reprisal at these two places of employment case analyses, and at Kinros/Laurentide: conspiracy to injure, deceit, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, wrongful interference with employment relations, and inducing breach of contracts, inducing Misfeasance of public office by commission staff for the sum of $400,000 (a $100,000 per interference at each organization: OHRC, Xentel, Lyman, and Kinros/Laurentide) or in the amount that this Honourable Court my deem just;

    (k) Aggravated damages against defendants Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, Ontario Human Rights Commission, and Minister of Attorney General, for the sham investigation and the December 2004 fabrication of case analyses to obstruct justice that includes concealing evidence and controlling witnesses who would provide adverse outcome to refuse referring to Tribunal 3 prima facie complaints for Xentel DM Incorporated, Lyman Custom Brokers and Freight Forwarding, and Watts Industries reprisal at these two employers. This malicious and reckless action created the torts of: Misfeasance of public office, defamation of character, intentional infliction of emotional distress, misrepresentation/deceit, conspiracy to injure, and inducement of breach of contract at Xentel and Lyman. I am requesting damages for a total award of $50,000 split among the defendants or amount that this Honourable Court may deem just;

    (l) Punitive damages against Dina Waik, Shannon Meadows-Lee, Ontario Human Rights Commission, and Minister of Attorney General, for the sham investigation and the December 2004 fabrication of case analyses to obstruct justice that includes concealing evidence and controlling witnesses who would provide adverse outcome to refuse referring to Tribunal 3 prima facie complaints against Xentel DM Incorporated, Lyman Custom Brokers and Freight Forwarding, and Watts Industries reprisal at these two employers. This malicious and reckless action created the torts of: Misfeasance of public office, defamation of character, intentional infliction of emotional distress, misrepresentation/deceit, conspiracy to injure, and inducement of breach of contract at Xentel and Lyman. I am requesting damages for a total award of $100,000 split among the defendants or amount that this Honourable Court may deem just;

    (l) Exemplary damages against all defendants as this Honourable Court may deem just.

    (m) Prejudgment and post judgment interest pursuant to the Courts of Justice Act R.S.O. 1990;

    (n) Costs of this Action; and

    (o) Such further and other relief as Counsel may advise and that this Honourable Court may deem just.

    1. The Plaintiff, Ms. Claudette Losier, is an individual who resides in Hamilton, Ontario.

    2. The Defendants are bodies corporate, incorporated pursuant to the laws of the Province of Ontario and carrying on business in and around Burlington, Hamilton, and Stoney Creek, Ontario; an employee of one of three of the corporate bodies; third party in a quasi-judicial process pursuant to the laws of the Province of Ontario, two employees of the quasi-judicial organization, and the Minister overall responsible for their agents.

    3. I plead that my employment at Watts is the background for the continuing work abuse that I am receiving at Xentel DM, Lyman Custom Brokers, the Misfeasance of public office by OHRC staff, and Laurentide group of companies. I commenced employment with the Defendants at Watts Industries in 1998 and in 2001 I was constructively dismissed through a Human Rights process including settlement of 4 months. I faithfully and diligently performed my duties on behalf of the Defendant while the Defendant and staff diligent harass me via work group mobbing throughout this period which resulted in two visits to lawyers office with no resolution, a Human Rights discrimination complaint settled in 2001, separation from my husband and injury to my health leading to reactive depression, suicide thoughts and attempt and finally hospitalization and misdiagnosis of a delusional disorder of persecution type. The harassment at Watts included the President of the Company, Mr., Fifer, following me around on my lunch hours off work premises and following me home to Stoney Creek to intimidate me and promote paranoid thoughts to discredit me with a mental illness when I go to the authorities.

    During my employment at Watts, I started to notice same contemptuous mocking treatment happening in my personal life most noticeably in an Alanon meeting fellow member Mary gesturing around her breast as if she was a striper wearing tassels and looking at me as she performs this vulgar gesture at an Alanon meeting. I infer that Watts defame my character in my personal life as well because the mobbing tactics within the workplace was not wearing me down emotionally fast enough and I showed no sign of quitting and they knew I was documenting their abuse and had excellent documentation. One example of this invasion of my personal life is that at Watts I was meant to overhear conversation between Greg Sampson and Joan, where Joan asked Greg if he went to see my art show in Simcoe and he responded not yet but that his brother lives in Simcoe. I did not tell anyone at Watts about my art show in Simcoe, so they received that information from my personal life hence my belief of super surveillance. Also, David Lord a sales manager for the Drain department ran into me at art opening in Hamilton and he knows the same art members from the Hamilton Artist Inc. group that I know and I infer he spread some rumors about what was going on at Watts and caused that group to also treat me with contempt including mocking sexual harassment nonsense. One intimidation tactic employed was inviting Barry Koeplin, the District Manager at Rentway where I use to work, to Dan Bowes office for private meeting with my supervisor Troy Nantais. Then later follow me to lunch where I would again see my current supervisor talking to my ex Disctrict Manager to provoke fear and shame that they were discussing my sexual harassment complaint at Rentway. There was also one incident where I went to my supervisor’s, Lili Murphy’s office and overheard her retrieve her messages and the voice I heard was my ex supervisor Aileen Howden from Rentway. This incident happened after I talked to ex Rentway employee, Jane Harris, who advised me that she too went to management regarding harassment by same male coworker.

    My injury to health is very well documented by my OHIP medical billing records from 1997 to 2004 to show that the first time I went to see a medical profession for any mental injury was in March 1999 for billing of anxiety. That this assessment changed to billing of “paranoid states” by January 2001 as a result of the continuous mobbing at Watts which includes deceit and at the time of my attempts to resolve my work issues with the Ontario Human Rights Commission, and from June 2001 to August 2002 with additional billings of various disorders including Schizophrenia. I state that the assessment at this time is the result of the psychiatrist not looking at all the facts in making their assessment only behaviours and is violation of my mental health rights under section 15 (2) of the Mental Health Act. It is also a reflection of the effects of intentional infliction of emotional distress in that when I saw these psychiatrist I was highly inflamed with overwhelming anger and irritability to the point of not being able to properly express myself. If they saw me when my emotions were at normal level they would not have made the assessment that they did. This is apparent in September 2002 as the psychiatrist in Stoney Creek were seeking advice from the lawyers after I sent out my complaints of their assessment to the Ontario College of Surgeons and Physicians and they closed my file on September 19th 2002. Also, the facts in 2001 contradict an assessment of persecution as I had 2 written memos from management at two different places of employment clearly stating I was the target of sexual harassment plus one Human Rights in process with settlement offer for discrimination complaint, which is evidence that I was being persecuted.

    Watts Industries has continued their Retaliatory campaign through these next three employers in a row repeating items in all of my Human Rights complaints which is a form of modus operanti to link a persecution campaign back to them. This persecution by Watts did not stop in their work environment as they have continued to retaliate via defaming my character that I am deserving of additional harassment of items out of my 2000 Human Rights Complaint and MMP complaint by interfering with my employment relations at now: Xentel, Lyman and Laurentide group of companies.

    4. I plead that while I was employed at Watts I was publicly humiliated with being labeled a “Troublemaker” because Rentway passed distorted information regarding my 1995 internal sexual harassment complaint. This public humiliation campaign by Watts is being continued at Xentel, Lyman, Laurentide group of companies and the Ontario Human Rights Commission to cause the plaintiff additional distress and humiliation and this behaviour has precedent in law. I refer to the case of Hughes v. Gemini Food Corp. (February 7, 1997), and the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision of: “upheld an award of general damages of $778,590 plus $75,000 in aggravated damages for what the trial judge called “a form of public humiliation” inflicted on the plaintiff. The court ruled that this was an appropriate case for aggravated damages, which are meant to compensate for intangible injuries such as distress and humiliation. The employer had knowingly provided false reasons for the firing to the Premier’s office, the court stated, and it should have expected those falsehoods would be made public. The plaintiff’s dismissal was wrongful, in that there was no cause for it. He suffered from “a form of public humiliation” and was therefore entitled to damages for mental distress.” In my case, contacting and influencing next employers by providing false statements regarding my complaints and to label me a “troublemaker” to influence the repeating of items in Human Rights Complaints with malice and reckless disregard for my Charter Rights from 2002 to 2004 through 4 employers in a row, three of which are named as defendants in this suit plus the participation by OHRC staff.

    This humiliation campaign started at Watts in 1998 and included addresses by Linn Shea of “hi trouble” and later moving this address through the work group like a virus with selected individuals, and Linn Shea’s address of “sucks to be you” and later moving this address like a virus through 4 employers in a row. Also I was subjugated with comments in my presence of “can’t do that that’s sexual harassment.” The most humiliating harassment that I received occurred in December 1998 with a room full of managers involved in what I would call entrapment tactic and this incident is a reflection of the condoning of sex in the workplace as corporate culture at Watts Industries. I was requested to go to the IS manager’s office under pretext of work related problem, and when I arrive the IS Manager exposes me to sexual animated cartoon of Bill Clinton and Monica in the Oval Office in the act. In this room laughing was: VP of Finance (Dan Bowes), Accounts Payable manager (Linn Shea), Accounting manager (Lili Murphy), and across the hall watching in the doorway was the Payroll manager (Glen Griffith), and HR manager “Malcolm). This incident was obviously willfully planned and intentional with malice and reckless disregard for my employee rights, and feelings. Furthermore, when we return to work in January the HR manager Malcolm did not return, and I was the first one given the sexual harassment policy written up by Mr. Fifer, the president, to sign. This too shows how this corporation condones breaking the rules by management for sport and later when fear of being challenged or exposed they image themselves as promoters of the rules and hide behind their sexual harassment policy to basically harass selected employee. I also received this form of imaged internal due process at Xentel, Lyman, Laurentide group of companies, and the investigation staff at the Ontario Human Rights Commission.

    The coworker in the receivable department at Watts thought it would be fun to subjugate me with another sexual picture on the anniversary of the first, and she did this in December 1999 with managements backing. The entrapment tactic was used again to request my attention under false pretext to her desk and then she subjugates me with email close up picture of a penis and her desk is directly across from the HR manager’s office with open door and the HR manager Michelle sitting in her office. Furthermore, Dan Bowes (VP of Finance) walks by and sees the penis image and all he does is say “what was that”. This behaviour did not give me the confidence that Dan Bowes or HR manager took the sexual harassment policy serious nor the corporation as a whole but rather hide behind their policies to harass employees for sport. I filed sexual harassment complaint against this employee, and afterwards the mobbing increased and I filed Human Rights complaint in fall of 2000 as they would not stop the mobbing. They continued to sexualize my work environment which also included my male supervisor promoting me to look at papers in his lap with question how I would handle that credit problem, VP of Finance and VP of Drain Sales standing by my desk grabbing their groin in my presence, followed by Thomas Ho continuously coming to my desk to fiddle with his belt even after I complain to him, female employees gesturing around their breast to encourage leering at the gestures around their breast and one female staff walking by me sticking out her chest.

    I also received while employed at Watts the following additional hostile mobbing anti-social behaviour of derogatory comments in my presence directly and indirectly to induce me to quit or injury to my health to breach the contract at Watts Industries that they are passing to my next employers of: sucks to be you, hi trouble, you couldn’t leave us alone, there’s Claudette we don’t need her, are you going to job interview well you should, your still here boy you must be one tough lady (VP of Sales), I enjoy irritating people (by Sherry), whatever (by Sherry), I want to say something sexual (by Sherry), I would like to take a course on selecting porn sites (by Sherry), I saw it (by Sherry), Oh God Oh God Help me (by Sherry), I’m a shit disturber (by Sherry), we would not want to make any mistakes and get away with it, loser loser (supervisor Lili Murphy and Beth), there won’t be a next time, I should check this to make sure you’re not ripping the company off (supervisor Lili Murphy), oops can’t do that that would be sexual harassment, I was told you no longer work there, I’ll be charged with harassment, Claudette leave I’m tired of looking at you (by supervisor Diane Horten), here comes the evil woman, are you having fun yet (after misapplication tactic), this has your name on it can’t deny its yours, I’m in denial, in case you want to work today, I’m up here to harass your employees, a pile of money would be nice (HR manager), it may get worst before it gets better (HR manager), Sherry told me to do it, fuck, tattoo on male friend’s penis, I’m receiving preferential treatment (by Sherry gloating about herself), I should pick on someone else (by Sherry feigning victim hood), it is hard to get respect around here (by Sherry to mock comment I made), I have to be good (by Sherry after my harassment complaint against her), etc. These were persistent disparaging remarks disguised as jokes in my presence to mock and harass me and my convictions that sex does not belong in the work place by several members of the work group including managers demonstrating a corporate culture of condoning mobbing behaviour and sexual harassment.

    The above derogatory comments fits the definition of defaming one’s character due to filing an internal sexual harassment complaint causing others to treat that person with contempt and ridicule for that complaint and conviction. The non sexual items are used as camouflage to image me as delusional to give the appearance I complain about everything and to conceal the real conflict behind this campaign that of mocking my conviction that sex does not belong in the workplace. These disparaging remarks disguised as jokes that I find hostile or mocking/ridiculing and treating me with contempt was repeated at Xentel, Lyman, and the companies under Laurentide Manufacturing which I call a form of modus operanti/calling cards and demonstrates intentional serial mobbing in a vain attempt to control me into submission. That is now 4 employers in a row after my employment at Watts Industries and 2000 Human Rights Complaint, and the fifth employer after filing my suit against Watts and MMP Limited in the Superior Court of Justice. There is precedent in common law of corporate cultures disregarding sexual vexatious behaviours in the work place and imaging internal due process as in case of Clark v. Canada. What I am experiencing demonstrates that the law is not working to deter this anti-social behaviour and it is a sport in our authoritarian work system.

    5. I plead that I signed the 2000 settlement agreement and indemnification release form under duress with threat by Watts’ Human Resource manager’s comment in February 2001 of “it may get worst before it gets better’ and bribe “a pile of money would be nice”. I also received the additional threat in May 2001 in the form of a fabricated warning notice by my supervisor, Lili Murphy, that I did not sign and sent challenge to commission showing this notice to be an example of differential treatment with an email of badgering and use of double speak communication from Sherry Khan with copies to Lili Murphy just prior to receiving this warning notice for my allege abuse of use of email. Also, Watts requested the commission dismissed my 2000 complaint under section 34 of the Code for being frivolous, vexatious, and in bad faith showing to be a breach of fiduciary duty and attempting to again label me a “troublemaker.” Watts again requested that my 2004 reprisal complaint be dismissed because I signed this indemnification release under section 34 and the commission did not dismiss my complaint because of my arguments that Watts signed in bad faith and are hiding behind this release form to further harass me like it’s a license for additional character assassination, and because I signed under duress.

    The duress includes a separation from my husband in 2001. My husband requested that we separated because the abuse at Watts caused me to isolate and I refused to socialize as an anger management tool not because of fear and this bothered my husband plus my overwhelming anger at that time. I started with the suicide ideation perhaps by end of 2000 and vocalizing these thoughts to my husband. The separation on top of the work abuse at Watts pushed me over the edge to attempt suicide in May 2001. My husband than had me committed to psych ward to protect me from myself. I was released in July and I signed the 2000 settlement in October 2001. I was not healthy enough to refuse the settlement nor to request the commission to move to the investigation stage as I was still separated from my husband with no support system living in an apartment by myself on Watts’ benefit program should I proceed further plus now had the added disadvantage of a misdiagnosis of a delusional disorder of persecution type. I had no lawyer to assist me with my damages or properly advise me of this indemnification release. I agreed under duress to mitigate my damages to my injury to health to prevent additional injury. Unfortunately, Watts signed in bad faith and continued their harassment at Mackay in 2002 and it only took 5 months of repeating the same mobbing anti-social behaviour to get me back into that helpless reactive depression state with suicide ideation and attempt in August 2002 proving that I was not completely recovered the injury to my health by Watts.

    Watts signed this settlement agreement in Bad Faith and is behaving unlawful, and has a corporate culture of breaking rules and condoning sexual harassment, discrimination, scapegoat, mobbing and bullying, and complete disregard for employment law and human rights code and imaging to authorities that they abide by these laws when exposed. There is evidence of bad faith and unlawful actions by the defendants Watts and therefore the settlement agreement of final release of the 2000 complaint does not apply. The settlement by Watts also included a letter of assurance: provided assurance that they have and will continue to provide training to staff in an effort to insure compliance with the letter and spirit of the Code. The spirit of the Code also includes reprisal action which this letter of insurance is only another example of corporate imaging by Watts that they will abide by the Code similar to providing me a sexual harassment policy after a room full of managers subjugate me with sexual picture. I have abided by the release of claims up to that date and arising out of my work abuse experience at Watts from 1998 to 2001 by not filing common law remedies of a constructive dismissal suit and tortious actions against staff at Watts for the abuses that I received while employed from 1998 to 2001. My agreement to this release does not include additional harassment in 2002 to 2004 in the form of defamation of character per se of unchaste woman or unfit to work, interference with employment relations, inducing breach of contract at next employers, conspiracy to injure, intentional emotional distress, injurious falsehoods, wrongful interference with employment relations, inducing breach of fairness by the Ontario Human Rights Commission, and collusion with the commission. There is precedent for interference in employment relations and conspiracy in law in the following cases: Ahmad v. Ontario Hydro (interference), and Chahal v. Khalsa Community School (interference and inducing breach of contract, and conspiracy to injure).

    6. I plead that what I experience at Watts from 1998 to 2001, and MMP in 2002 is being repeated also at Xentel from January to September 2003, and Lyman from February 2003 to March 2004, and at 3 companies under Laurentide Manufacturing at 111 Brockley from September 13th to November 15th 2004. Each of these employers inducing and breaching the contract and wrongfully dismissing me after their failed attempts to induce me to quit by providing me with a poisoned work environment that instead induced me to make more internal complaints to do with sex in the work environment. This action has resulted in the need for an additional law suits on top of additional Human Rights complaints. This is authoritarian work abuse system of work group harassment called mobbing and blackguarding/scapegoat, blacklisting and bad references between employers four of them in a row and coworkers.

    I commenced the following suits against the other conspirators, Xentel and Lyman and intake staff at the commission in Small Claims Court in 2004 that now needs to be moved up to the Superior Court and be joined to this suit: wrongful/constructive dismissal complaints against Xentel and Lyman employers including tortious actions against 5 managers plus tortious actions including Misfeasance of Public office claim against intake staff at the commission and the commission. My material facts listed in these suits will demonstrate this continuous connection back to Watts, my Human Rights Complaints, and my misdiagnosis of mental illness in 2001.

    There is precedent in law of this form of harassment of mobbing in Human Rights cases calling it “poisoned work environment” and now the new psychological harassment law in Quebec. Employment and tort law still lacks a remedy for this form of harassment specifically and needs to advance further beyond the tort of intimidation, conspiracy to injure, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and sexual harassment to include the tort of work group mobbing to penalize the work group for condoning this anti-social behaviour to intentionally wear down target to discredit them with mental illnesses which intentionally causes psychiatrict injuries such as PSTD to deter further abuses in the future. It is because there is no law prohibiting mobbing that mobbing is now a sport in our work environments.

    Today mobbing is a sport in our work system because it gets rewarded by silence as most targets fear retaliation, are ignorant of the law that can protect them so they walk away without exposing this anti-social behaviour and because the legal system is too expensive. I would like to see a tort on mobbing created from my cases as there is a desperate need to deter this form of workplace harassment by the work group system and I can prove that fact by 4 employers in a row after my Watts “2000” complaint mobbing me, treating me with additional contempt and ridicule, mocking my convictions that sex does not belong in the work place, and by retaliating by defrauding me of employment after I complain when previously I was highly praised by managers and staff. The current employment law system needs to advance in this area to stop this trend of corporate culture abuses and abuse of authority as severe mobbing/bullying and use of regular mocking/teasing tactics can lead to more violence that of suicide and homicide (Ottawa OC Transport) resulting in deaths.

    7. I plead that per my documentation of the anti-social behaviours by my fellow coworkers at Xentel DM Incorporated, Lyman Custome Brokers, and KINROS/Laurentide will demonstrate work group mobbing/psychological harassment as per Professor Kenneth Westhues’ definition (University of Waterloo). Kenneth Westhues’s definition of mobbing that describes what I am experiencing and complaining about in my statement of claims and Human Rights complaints is: mobbing can be understood as the stressor to beat all stressors; it is an impassioned, collective campaign by co-workers to exclude, punish, and humiliate a targeted worker; initiated most often by a person in a position of power of influence, mobbing is a desperate urge to crush and eliminate the target; the urge travels through the workplace like a virus, infecting one person after another; the target comes to be viewed as absolutely abhorrent, with no redeeming qualities, outside the circle of acceptance and respectability, deserving only of contempt; as the campaign proceeds, a steadily larger range of hostile ploys and communications comes to be seen as legitimate; workplace mobbing is normally carried out politely, without any violence, and with ample written documentation; yet even without the blood, the bloodlust is essentially the same contagion and mimicking of unfriendly, hostile acts toward the target; relentless undermining of the target’s self-confidence; group solidarity against one whom all agree does not belong; and the euphoria of collective attack; humiliation of daily loathing from one’s peers. Kenneth also states the vulnerable position the target is put in is like “the worker has grabbed a hot wire and cannot let go, despite the pain and injury it inflicts” and he mentions in this article that targets “in the past been misdiagnosed as having paranoid delusions.” The material facts demonstrating this psychological harassment at KINROS/Laurentide are listed at #8, #10, #15, #19, #20, #21, #26, #27, #28, #29, #42, and #46-105. The material facts demonstrating psychological harassment at Xentel DM and Lyman are listed in the Small Claims Statement of Claims that I intend to join this suit, and in my Human Rights complaints and evidence. Mobbing is an abuse of power contest of abnormal stress endurance and the law needs to advance to deter and to protect the weak from the strong ganging up via mobbing and psychological harassment to helpless position in the work place to breaches of contract by committing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

    8. I plead that Bullying and Mobbing is a course of conduct to conspire to injure target with intentionally infliction of emotional unnecessary stress and is the tort of intimidation such as in the case of Boothman v. R. I refer to judge’s comment in Boothman: “However, the recent Boothman decision on which the plaintiff relies concerned a course of harassing and intimidating conduct over a seven month period which caused a severe mental breakdown that was ongoing at the time of the trial seven years later. Noel J. found the defendant, who supervised the plaintiff and who was her sole coworker, had hired the plaintiff because of her emotional vulnerability, exploited it in order to dominate her and, when that failed, drove her to break down and quit. He concluded that the supervisor’s authority had been exercised wrongfully to inflict mental pain and suffering, to harass, humiliate, interfere with and assault the plaintiff. He found willful injuria of the Wilkinson type, combined with malicious purpose owing to knowledge of the plaintiff’s psychological fragility, and awarded damages for assault and intentional infliction of nervous shock, in addition to exemplary damages.” In the Boothman case the supervisor used direct threats of dismissal, insults, yelled profanities, threatened her with physical violence, and said to her “What do I have to do to get you to do what I tell you? Bash your head in?” with a hammer visible in the room to the plaintiff. These are overt methods of intimidation.

    My suit is made more difficult but results in the same affect by use of indirect covert uses of intimidation such as repeating items from a 2000 Human Rights Complaint over and over again through four employers in a row, with the work group refusing to stop even after I complain, and when they feel their mobbing tactics will not work to control me into submissive state or induce me to quit resort to wrongful termination. For me the repeating of the Watts 2000 complaint of “sucks to be you” and sexual picture that poisons my work environment is similar to what the hammer visible in the room represented to Boothman. My allegations are further validated when at Xentel they wrongful terminated me in a meeting about sexual and none sexual complaints in September 2003, when Lyman after imaging internal due process on July 16th 2003 refused internal due process for my sexual and none sexual complaints after July 16th and terminated my employment on March 19th 2004, and with Laurentide companies they terminated my employment only 3.5 hours after handing Laurentide management my second complaint letter. With Laurentide they alleged change in business for terminating my employment, and later committing the tort of deceit again in their rebuttal to my Human Rights Complaint for Kinros stating they never received this letter till after I was terminated. Therefore, these actions by the defendants demonstrate that I was hired at Xentel, Lyman and Kinros/Laurentide for my psychological vulnerability to intimidate me by continuing Watts’ scapegoat campaign joined now by MMP, which is the tort of conspiracy to injure, intimidation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

    At Xentel on first night and management did not offer me the normal introduction and training in the lunch area as other new hires but quickly sat me down with Connie to expose me with a sexual picture that first night. My employment at Xentel ends with a meeting about another sexual incident, Barb’s sexual vexatious comment of over my desk “my name is VD – Venereal Diseases”, where John says to me “if you had it so bad why did you stay” and John alleges I have fears of “people on the floor not out to get you” in writing of memo dated September 15th 2003. This letter demonstrates knowledge of one’s perceived or real vulnerability of a delusional disorder and misuse of that information. At Lyman the owner’s son makes comment of removing sex off the computer but does not move to the computer to do this task in the first week of my hire. This is followed by a serious of sexual vexatious behaviour and repeating items in my human right complaints from Watts and MMP to induce me into complaining or entrap me to condone sex in the workplace to discredit my sexual complaints. This entrapment game to discredit my complaints at Lyman resulted in one bold email stating this fact to my supervisor Mike Batchelor that was ignored by management in October 2003. My evidence will show that after July 16th 2003, management refused internal due process with any complaints that I made after this meeting regarding David Lyman’s sexual vexatious comment of “I got to call phone sex” in my presence. In November management retaliated with a fabricated discipline meeting over my work related emails and subsequent fabrication of unsuitable employee conduct charge. My employment ends with fabrication of closure of a division and shortage of work by my supervisor Mike Batchelor and then he rehires his friend and ex- employee Treena to do work I could be doing.

    At Kinros/Laurentide the sexualizing game now includes the repeating items in all of my human rights complaints including my Xentel and Lyman complaints because this makes me look delusional per material facts listed at #46-105. On second day, the service person Paul who is the owner’s daughter’s work buddy comes to my desk to subjugate me with comments of “boobies and prick”, and later follows this up with the Watts’ modus oparenti of “sucks to be you”. Also, Paul is the only person there who repeated in my presence the “2000” complaint hostile comment “sucks to be you”. The tactics starting heating up after I noted the first two employers in this campaign in default in November 2004 which included the repeating of the address of “Charlotte” out of my Xentel and Lyman complaints at Laurentide just before my termination. My employment ends here after handing to management two written complaint letters of sexualizing my work environment and management refusing internal due process. Instead management retaliates after 3.5 hours of receiving second complaint letter with termination of employment with pretext of change in business only after 2 months employment. This behaviour pattern demonstrates hiring me for my vulnerability for the sole purpose of continuing Watts’ scapegoat campaign and is the tort of conspiracy to intentionally inflict emotional pain and suffering, to harass, humiliate, interfere with employment relations and intimidate the plaintiff like the Boothman case to control her.

    9. I plead that I have been mitigating my losses caused by Watts Industries deliberate defamation campaign that is still going on today to destroy my reputation and career, and interfere with my employment relations to publicly humiliate me for blowing the whistle on them and to cause injury or image that I have a persecution disorder or in the alternative attempt to get me labeled with a “vexatious litigant” charge. The continued blacklisting today serves another purpose to insure the plaintiff does not have funds to pursue legal actions against the defendants or hire a lawyer. This is a repeated violation by Watts of the criminal code section 425.1 because I filed a Provincial Act claim against them in 2000. Also now it is a violation of the criminal code section 425.1 against MMP, Xentel, and Lyman to join in with Watts’ interference campaign with specific items only in their Human Rights complaints being repeated at KINROS/Laurentide. Those items would have had to be passed on to Watts by these employers and/or the commission staff or directly by them to Laurentide management.

    There is also precedent in law of this form of scapegoat and blackguarding by employers contacting next employers to ruin the employee’s career and I refer to Mackenzie v. Cuddeford (September 5, 1986), Doc. Penticton 810 (B.C. S.C.): “Proudfoot J., as she then was, awarded general damages of $20,000 and punitive damages of $5,000.00 to a young woman whose ex-employer had blackguarded her. In the learned Judge’s words describing the slander: Thereafter the Defendant embarked upon a deliberate campaign to ruin the Plaintiff. He phoned the past employer, the potential or present employer, her instructor at the vocational school and indicated to them plain and simply that the Plaintiff was a thief and that a substantial amount of jewelry was missing.” In my case, the defamation is per se of unchaste and unfit to work, and that I am a troublemaker because I complain.

    This interference I infer has affected my relationship also with past employer. I infer that my former manager Mr. Bill Foye from Rentway is currently shunning my efforts requesting the promised proper reference letter since January 2003. I had contacted Mr. Bill Foye in 2002 for a reference and he contacted me in 2003 via he left a letter and his business card in my mail box in Stoney Creek that he would be happy to provide me with a reference. He sent me an email copy of letter for my revue in 2003 and since has failed to provide me with this written signed reference letter. I have written letters and emails many times in 2003, 2004, and now in 2005 and he is now ignoring my communications which is an example of shunning. People avoiding me or shunning me like this is a symptom of defamation. I can prove the contacting of next employers being MMP, Xentel, Lyman and Kinros/Laurentide by my documentation and my Human Rights filing for each employer with each one of these employers repeating specific items in my Watts 2000 Complaint particularly exposing me to a sexual picture and subjugating me to disparaging remark disguised as joke of “sucks to be you” that I complained about in my 2000 Watts complaint and its various variations.

    I do not have a proper reference letter from these 5 employers to use for future employment making it difficult to find a job which is additional evidence of defamation. I worked for Marshalls’ after Watts and before MMP in 2002 for approximately 3 months and they treated me with respect and provided me with the only proper reference letter that I can use from my employment experience from 1998 to 2004. In fact, I was interviewed by Centrex Human Resources Centre at 124 James Street South Suite 200 in Hamilton in 2004 and Laurie advised me that the reference letter I received from Lyman Custom Brokers is not a proper reference letter. This type of reference letter is a red flag to potential employers. Plus I can demonstrate ongoing blacklisting and defamation of my character to injure me financial with no work offer by my job search results today in comparison to my job search results in the past. I do advise potential employers to contact Mike Batchelor at Lyman, and no one at Watts Industries or MMP or Xentel. In fact Centrex sent me to one interview in 2004 and never called me again for any more interviews which is a form of shunning and symptom of defamation. I faxed them a letter on April 6th, 2005, asking why I never received additional calls for positions and to date I have not received a response. The difficulty I am having with my job search is a result of defamation by this authoritarian work abuse system of employers: Watts Industries, MMP Limited, Xentel DM Incorporated, and Lyman Custom Brokers, Laurentide group of companies and the OHRC.

    10. I plead that Watts Industries is interfering with my employment relations to have next employer provoke me with sex in the work place to provoke me to complain knowing that I will in attempt to relitigate to discredit me that I make vexatious complaints or am delusional. This includes psychological harassment of items not covered by the Code such as addressing me as “Charlotte” because I documented annoyance incident at Xentel and Lyman to create the poisoned work environment, and when I complain terminate my employment wrongfully. It is a known fact that bullies in the work place repeat their tactics because it worked to annoy the target in the first place and bullying/mobbing is a game to provoke annoyance to control the target and nothing but that. And this is the reason to repeat the address of “Charlotte” in November at Laurentide just before my termination. My material facts and evidence are also my Human Rights complaints against each employer. There is a norm of silence in the work environment and if you break it you will receive retaliation and be scapegoat this includes lack of confidentiality and privacy violations towards the target. There is also precedent in law of this corporate culture of scapegoat employee for dismissal, to get rid of complainer, with fabricated cause who makes sexual harassment complaints and I refer to Campbell v. Wellfund Audio-Visual Ltd. (1995) where the male manager was requested by management to terminate his female staff by fabricating incompetence after she made sexual complaint.

    At Watts, I was constructively dismissed for making internal sexual harassment complaint for exposure to two sexual pictures and later filing Human Rights Complaint against them and after HR manager threatened me that “it may get worse before it gets better”. At MMP Limited, my termination letter reads because my WSIB claim was denied and my allegation was not substantiated after I complained to WSIB of poisoned work environment including two sexual harassment complaints resulting in civil suit against them. At Xentel, I infer that both Watts and MMP are interfering with my employment relations by passing information in both Human Rights Complaints to be repeated. My employment was terminated on September 15th 2004 in a meeting about my sexual and psychological harassment complaints. Management were intentionally creating a poisoned work environment again because I was challenging their written warning notice for performance without any verbal warnings that my performance was a problem that I only received after requesting Diane at the commission on July 14th 2003 to send me the Human Right’s forms. I asked to be given a copy of their company policy on performance and none was forth coming instead the harassment in the work place was increased. Part of this increase is the incident on September 6th 2004 where management provoked Barb, a full time employee who rarely worked on Saturdays, come into work on Saturday to sit near me to subjugate me with sexual comment of “my name is VD-Venereal Diseases” and provoked Wil to sit near me to make loud mocking comment of “their discriminating against us now” for me to hear after I made complaint to John regarding noise disturbance by Will for another incident. I complained and management set up a meeting on September 15th to resolve my complaints and fished for more complaints. I advised management at this time I was seeking third party involvement and John did not want me working there while seeking third party involvement so then he imaged that I was being terminated for performance issues. John assumed at this point that my mentioning third party involvement meant I was suing him when third party involvement could also mean having third party involved to ensure collaborative conflict resolution skills to resolve the discrimination I was experiencing.

    At Lyman, I infer that both Watts and MMP are interfering with my employment relations by passing information in both Human Rights Complaints to be repeated, plus Lyman and Xentel coordinating coincidence tactics with repeating specific words during my work shifts at both places. My employment was terminated at Lyman under false pretext of closure of Chicago Division and shortage of work only after 13 months of repeating items in these two complaints, causing me to make numerous complaints for sexual vexatious behaviour, and challenging one unsubstantiated progress discipline meeting and warning of unsuitable employee conduct for sending work related emails of harassment that I was receiving that I am allowed to do. After my termination Lyman hired two ex employees to return and do work that I could be doing without placing an ad in the Hamilton Spectator proving no shortage of work existed, retaliatory discharge and violation of criminal code 425.1, and creating Wallace Damages.

    At Kinros/Laurentide, I infer that Watts is now being joined by MMP, Xentel DM and Lyman to interfere with my employment relations by passing information in all four Human Rights Complaints to be repeated because this makes me look delusional per material facts listed at #8, #10, #15, #19, #20, #21, #26, #27, #28, #29, #42, and #46-105. My allegations is further proven by my employment being terminated after 3.5 hours after I handed management my second complaint letter where they refuse to give me internal due process for my complaints. On November 15th I was approached by my supervisor Jim Westman outside of the office to sit in his car to be asked why I did not come to him regarding my complaints and right after this statement hand me my termination letter alleging change in business as reason. Then in their rebuttal to the commission, Kinros commits the tort of deceit again and breach their fiduciary duty to me by making false statement to mislead the commission to avoid accountability of wrongdoing that they never received this complaint letter till after I was terminated and never received my first complaint letter at all.

    I can show additional interference by Watts with the OHRC and the investigation department by fabricating insufficient evidence for the Xentel and Lyman complaints and refusing to do their statutory duty to refer my prima facie complaints to Tribunal to avoid my evidence getting into a court room. My material facts shows that at each employer I was subjugated to a sexual picture which proves poison work environment and automatic breach of the Human Rights Code 5 and 7, and yet the investigation staff fabricates insufficient evidence of discrimination with Xentel and Lyman, and reprisal by Watts at these two employers. The material facts are listed in the Small Claims suits for Xentel and Lyman that need to be joined to this suit. I believe this collusion and protection by the commission influenced the additional interference by these employers at Laurentide group of companies from September 13th to November 15th 2004. If the legal authorities refuse to hold these employers accountable for their wrong actions this is like handing them a license to continue the same harassment with the same complainant indefinitely.

    11. I plead that to this day Watts Industries is continuing their blacklisting campaign as since being defrauded of employment again at Kinros/Laurentide on November 15th 2004 I have submitted my resume to approximately 90 job positions, and I have received about 20 interviews with no job offer. It’s now six months since being wrongfully terminated at Kinros/Laurentide with no job offer in sight to affect my ability to sue Watts Industries and to be able to afford legal representation. This has resulted in the need for me to teach myself the law in order to sue and put a stop to this scapegoat campaign to ruin my career because my attempts to date to stop this behaviour through the OHRC is not working and only creates additional retaliation and violation of the criminal code section 425.1.

    I can demonstrate blacklisting by the results of my job search in 2004/2005 compared to earlier job search. During the unemployed period after Lyman from March 19th 2004 to being hire at Kinros/Laurentide on September 13th 2004 I had submitted my resume to 66 job positions, and I had received 16 inquiries and/or interviews until I was selected by Kinros/Laurentide only for them to repeat items in my Human Rights complaints. When I left Watts Industries and after the time off for disability leave it took me one month of a job search before I was hired by Marshalls Transport who laid me off in January 2002 with no repeating items in my Human Rights complaint of exposure to sexual picture or sucks to be you comments. Again it only took me approximately one month of looking for work before I was hired by MMP Limited in March 2002 only to repeat items in my Watts Industries’ 2000 Human Rights Complaint and wrongfully breaching of contract in January 2003 and directly violating the criminal code 425.1 with termination letter with cause because my WSIB was denied and my allegations not substantiated. Again it only took me one month from starting my search in December 2002 to be hired by Xentel DM Incorporated for part time telemarketing position in January 2003 only to repeat items in my Watts Industries and MMP Limited Human Rights complaints followed by breach of that contract on September 15th 2003. While employed at Xentel for part time telemarketing position it only took me one month to find replacement full time accounting position at Lyman starting on February 2003 and only again to repeat items in my Watts and MMP Limited Human Rights Complaints with the OHRC colluding and passing additional information to Lyman and Xentel. Again my contract was breached wrongfully by Lyman on March 19th 2004. This pattern alone demonstrates a persecution order because I blow the whistle on sex and discrimination in the work place otherwise known as scapegoat campaign and conspiracy to injure by Watts Industries after my 2000 Human Rights complaint against them to ruin my career, reputation and health.

    12. I plead that I am experiencing significant loss of gross income because of Watts Industries interference with my employment relations and career since 2001. My income tax return from 2001 to 2004 demonstrates the financial loss of gross income as a result of Watts Industries’ scapegoat campaign to ruin my career: 2001 $43,004 (includes 4 month settlement from Watts), 2002 $20,748, 2003 $38,887 (combine income from Xentel and Lyman), and 2004 $24,654.02. Currently my net income from 2005 is $3,640.00 from E.I. which my last pay cheque from E.I. was on March 23rd. By the end of 2005 if this Watts induced blacklisting and defamation continues my damage from loss in gross income will be approximately an additional $35,000. I went to an interview in 2005 where the interviewee advised me that she has had other candidates for bookkeeping positions looking for remuneration of $50,000 a year. My potential to reach that level of remuneration is being sabotage by Watts Industries and the employers that they influence to repeat items in my Human Rights Complaints of MMP, Xentel, Lyman, and Laurentide companies. This lost and difficulty holding or getting a job is a result of defamation of my character by Watts Industries, followed by MMP Limited, Xentel, Lyman, and the Ontario Human Rights Commission.

    13. I plead that the misdiagnosis of a delusional disorder is behind the additional harassment at Xentel, Lyman, and the 3 companies under Laurentide Manufacturing, and the commission obstructing natural justice of referring prima facie complaints to the Tribunal as per the fabricated case analyses that I received on December 3rd 2004 for Xentel DM, Lyman and reprisal by Watts at Xentel and Lyman. My behaviour of complaining to the authorities does look like the behaviour per the definition of delusional disorder in the mental health book, and I infer the reason for the commission of fabricate insufficient evidence and slant the case analyses with only the diagnosis of delusion disorder and leaving out the other assessment of anxiety to discredit the complainant as an attempt to put a stop to my strong evidence ever reaching a court room. My claim of a scapegoat campaign to induce a mental illness of persecution type at additional employers of Xentel, Lyman and the companies under Laurentide Manufacturing is further substantiate by the material fact that John Docherty from Xentel makes bantering comments of “people on the floor are not against you” repeating similar banter by manager at MMP which he later changes in a September 15th 2003 letter to “people on the floor not out to get you”, and Susan Koehler from Lyman bantering of depression, paranoid of a turkey, and “Oh God Persecution” in my presence. At Kinros/Laurentide there is an absence of bantering of disability of persecution disorder, however, in their rebuttal to my Human Rights complaint they alleged that they have no knowledge of any of the incidents that I complained of in my Human Rights Complaint against Kinros which gives the image of a disability of delusional persecution disorder that I imagined all these harassments and is breach of fiduciary duty. Also, the investigation staff slanting the case analyses with the misdiagnosis of a delusional disorder and leaving out the material fact that in 2001 this assessment was a “working assessment”, that the psychiatrist who made this misdiagnosis closed the misdiagnosis file on September 19th 2002, that the 2002 psychiatrist did not make an independent assessment, and that I received the correct assessment of Anxiety with depressed moods that is acute in October 2002.

    Watts Industries received letter from St. Joseph’s hospital in 2001 that I was under their care for this disorder in order to receive benefits from them which alleges I have great fears of being judged or harassed. That assessment in this 2001 letter is contradicted by my repeated efforts to blow the whistle showing I have no fear of being judged or harassed but anger and want it to stop. MMP Limited also had knowledge in 2003 of this misdiagnosis of persecution disorder per my WSIB August 2002 claim and Human Rights Complaint against them which was filed in November 2002. Both Watts Industries and MMP Limited combined have reason to continue this scapegoat campaign to discredit me with mental illness at Xentel, and Lyman as I had a Human Rights complaint filed against them in 2002. In 2004, Watts, MMP, Xentel, and Lyman combined have reason to continue this scapegoat campaign to discredit me with mental illness at Kinros/Laurentide to do permanent damage to my health, and reputation, and defraud me out of employment again for filing both Human Rights Complaints and Civil Suits against them prior to my employment there in September 2004.

    Prior to working for Watts Industries, I had perfect health with no mental disorder or depression. My OHIP records from 1997 to 2004 show that I seeked attention for anxiety the first time on March 18th, 1999, while employed at Watts. This conspiracy to injure campaign at Mackay did in fact prove effective as I was hospitalized in August 2002 and the psychiatrist misdiagnosed with a delusional disorder of persecution type again because I told him I was being bullied at Mackay. This psychiatrist violated my rights under the mental health act section 15 (2) in that he did not make an independent assessment and therefore did not look at all the facts in making his assessment. After this last hospitalization I received correct assessment from Psychologist of Anxiety with depressed moods that is acute and no more visits with these ty

  55. 14. I plead that Watts committed the tort of conspiracy to injure me with a mental illness through these employers with persecution type is due to me being a complainer and effective whistleblower and that the “mental health” trap is a popular employer weapon of discrediting routine against whistleblowers. There is a history of cases of whistleblowers being defamed with mental illnesses after they blow the whistle or complain. I refer to the article “Giving Workers the Treatment – If you raise a stink, you go to a shrink!” by Peter Downs: “Donald Soeken, a former U.S. Public Health Service psychiatric social worker who used to be in charge of giving fitness-for-duty exams, says the psychiatric exams almost always are shams. “The doctor will go into all the areas that could discredit a person,” Soeken says. “He’ll ask early life questions, late life questions, sexual questions, whatever he wants to ask, and then write it up and give it to the boss or law firm. Any doctor worth his salt will find something wrong, or even make up something, and if you don’t answer one of his questions, then you are uncooperative and you can be fired for that, too. What they are trying to do is put a person out on a psychiatric disability. If they succeed, you would never work again in your lifetime.” I infer these psychiatric exams almost always are shams are similar to what I received from the investigation staff of a sham investigation to image insufficient evidence and to slant the case analyses towards a mental illness of delusions for the sole purpose to discredit the complainant and shows a bias towards the discriminating employers. This is an authoritarian work abuse system with a known practice that employers’ use the “mental health” traps to get rid of and to discredit employees particularly those who complain. My evidence demonstrates this discreditation of mental illness routine where two managers, one from MMP and one from Xentel, two employers in a row use a bantering of a delusional disorder of “people out to get me” fears in writing to hand to authorities being the OHRC.

    This article goes on to give an example of another female employee similar to my situation of making sexual harassment complaints and the employer attempting to discredit her with mental illness: “Maria Buffa, a former salaried employee in the personal department at Ford World Headquarters in Dearborn, Michigan, said she, too, was sent to a psychiatrist after she filed a sexual harassment complaint in February 1999 against a woman co-worker. “You think, maybe I am the problem, else why would they be sending me to a psychiatrist,” she said. The psychiatrist Ford selected, Dr. Edward Dorsey of Midwest Health Center, made a report that said the only psychiatric symptom Buffa displayed was anxiety. Dorsey’s report said that the referral came from Ford’s medical department and was at least in part due to her complaints of sexual harassment. He also noted that the Ford doctor who referred Buffa cited a couple of “incidents”: She was seen yelling at someone, and she had shown up at a fitness center “wearing less than the usual amount of clothing for that physical activity.” I too am a female whistleblower of sexual harassment, and also of discrimination and I have been misdiagnosed with a delusional disorder after my American own Employer, Watts, with American culture values of “you complain you go to a shrink” manufactured thoughts of stalking via anti-social behaviours that I documented while employed at Watts and later continued this campaign through my employment that includes 4 employers in a row after I blow the whistle on their unlawful actions in 2000 repeating items in that complaint.
    There was one incident that highlights this tactic while I was employed at Watts where a female temp came to me to ask who in the Accounts Receivable department was going on sick leave and that management advised her that someone was. I advised her that no one was going on sick leave. There was one incident at Lyman in 2004 where Cindy advised me that she caught two female coworkers of hers sending emails around to each other about how they can make Cindy crazy today. Therefore my thoughts that repeating of items in Watts’ 2000 Human Rights complaint to create coincidences to image me paranoid is to manufacture persecution thoughts back to Watts to discredit my whistleblowing behaviour. The law needs to advance to stop this form of harassment to discredit whistleblowers with mental illnesses and make those anti-social personalities accountable instead of rewarding them for this behaviour. I feel I have a society duty to bring all of my complaints against these employers in the legal arena for playing this sport on me, an effective whistleblower, in hopes of deterring more employers from playing this sport on whistleblowers in the future.

    15. I plead that in the alternative that this Watts Industries campaign is also to image me a “vexatious
    litigant” because I make complaints that I am allowed to do by law, by Charter, and my material facts and evidence will demonstrate this pattern of labeling my complaints vexatious. Watts Industries attempted to dismiss my 2000 complaint under section 34 and label my 2000 complaint as being vexatious, frivolous, and made in bad faith. They did not succeed and have retaliated ever since with each new employer attempting as well to dismiss my Human Rights Complaint under section 34 for being vexatious, frivolous and made in bad faith, all refusing to tell the truth and all failing at a section 34 dismissal request. I would also infer that it is also a poor attempt to relitigate vexatious claim from items that I complained about in my 2000 Watts complaint through convincing next employers to repeat same items with variations and again label my complaints vexatious. This vexatious claim includes exposure to sexual picture at each employer which proves I do not make vexatious complaints and have a right to work in an environment with no sexual pictures.

    In 2004, MMP Limited attempted to dismiss my civil suit against them for being abuse of process and was denied that motion. Lyman Custom Brokers attempted a similar motion in May 2004 for no cause of action, frivolous, vexatious, abuse of process, and attempted to label me a “vexatious litigant”. Deputy Judge R. Nairn dismissed their motion in September 2004. He made one small error in fact of law. I did file 4 separate suits in Small Claims that arise out of the same set of facts that should be joined into one suit either in Small Claims Court or Superior Court of Justice, like the decision by judge in Burlington Small Claims Court for MMP suits. I refer to Rules of The Small Claims Court of 6.02: a cause of action shall not be divided into two or more actions for the purpose of bringing it within the court’s jurisdiction. I did not intentionally file separate suits to bring it within the court’s jurisdiction or for double recovery; I filed these separate suits out of lack of legal knowledge at that time regarding actions arising out of same set of facts. I was denied that opportunity to join these suits into one by the judge at the Pre-Trial for the Wrongful Dismissal Suit against Lyman when I requested a discontinuance so I can resubmit correctly. Later in September I received Deputy Judge R. Nairn’s request for Lyman to file their defenses. Also, there is another error in law found in the law of tort of conspiracy does not permit an action against an individual defendant who has caused injury to the plaintiff, the law of torts does recognize a claim against them in combination as the tort of conspiracy if: 1) whether the means used by the defendants are lawful or unlawful, the predominant purpose of the defendants’ conduct is to cause injury to the plaintiff; or, 2) where the conduct of the defendants is unlawful, the conduct is directed towards the plaintiff (alone or together with others), and the defendants should know in the circumstances that injury to the plaintiff is likely to and does result. Lyman’s lawyer brought this fact in law up in this motion and therefore the correct decision would have been to allow me to amend my statement of claims into one suit. I will be submitting an order to transfer these suits and join to this one under the Courts of Justice Act section 110.

    Since the Human Rights section 34 arguments for these employers failed to dismiss my complaints, Watts then enlist the aid of the commission investigation staff to provide me with a sham investigation and to fabricate insufficient evidence to not refer my prima facie complaints to the Tribunal under section 36 (2). My reconsideration application arguing this fact that I received a sham investigation to image to authorities that I received a proper investigation and that I do not have sufficient evidence of discrimination resulted in the Chief Commissioner’s decision to reconsider under section 37 (2) of the code around February 24th 2005 for the complaints against the following employers: Watts, MMP Limited, Xentel and Lyman. That was in February 24th and its now May 18th and I have not received response to my application which leads me to believe a breach of duty of fairness again from the commission that the respondents are receiving more than the 15 day limit to respond to a section 37 (2).

    Furthermore, in 2005 I filed complaints against the 5th employer Kinros owned by Laurentide Manufacturing and sister company Laurentide Custom Woodworking, and reprisals against Watts, MMP Limited, Xentel, and Lyman. This time the commissioner attempted to not deal with all of these complaints except the Kinros complaint under section 34 for alleging my complaints being vexatious where previously the commission staff never attempted a section 34 with any of my other complaints. I infer this is a symptom of defamation that these employers have convinced the commission to treat me with additional contempt. I again submitted arguments that the commission has no grounds for a section 34 for being vexatious and the Chief Commissioner quickly sent me back his decision in favour of my arguments and forward all of these complaints to the respondents under section 37 (2) around the first week in April 2005.

    Now I have an order to set aside a stay of proceedings for my Small Claims Suit against Commission staff to move forward on defendants’ motions to dismiss this suit and these defendants now opposing the setting aside of stay because they do not want to go forward on their motions after receiving my arguments in my factum why the motions should be dismissed with cost. One of these motions is from Susan Koehler at Lyman to dismiss her part in this suit which is similar to the same motion she filed in May 2004 that was dismissed and may qualify for an issue estoppel matter of trying to relitigate same issue.

    What this demonstrates is that I am extremely credible and that there is an Authoritarian Work Abuse System through these employers and the commission to image that I am not credible or mentally ill via tort of deceit, conspiracy to injure, defamation of my character, and Misfeasance of Public Office. As a result of this defamation that there is a campaign to harass me to get me to complain about everyone to image that I am delusional with a persecution disorder and if that does not work than to label me and my complaints vexatious or fabricate insufficient evidence.

    16. I plead that Watts Industries, Xentel DM Incorporated, Lyman Custom Brokers, and the companies from Laurentide Manufacturing intentionally made misleading statements to the staff at the Ontario Human Rights commission which is additional tort of deceit to avoid accountability of wrongdoing. Therefore, this suit is for additional tort of deceit that defames my character with the Ontario Human Rights Commission by these employers. For Watts for interference at Xentel and Lyman and Laurentide companies. For MMP, Xentel and Lyman to join in on the interference with my employment relations at the Laurentide companies. Also for Xentel and Lyman for tort of deceit by making false statements to mislead the commission that there is insufficient evidence of discrimination and harassment.

    These misleading statements, the tort of deceit, resulted in injury of another wrong that of the investigation staff fabricating insufficient evidence in their December 2004 fabricated case analyses for these employers, slanting the analysis to put the discriminating employers in better light than the material facts and the complainant in poor light by concealing her material facts and evidence, and by controlling witnesses who would provide adverse outcome. Some of the material facts not included in the Xentel case analysis are: I was subjugated with sexual picture on first night an automatic breach of code 5 and 7, I was provided with poisoned work environment, providing me with a poisoned work environment may substantiate poor performance therefore dismissing allegation of incompetence of low sales, John Docherty condoning my alleged poor performance from January to August 18th and only after I called the commission on July 14th 2003 for the forms providing me with warning notice with no prior verbal warning, and lastly John Docherty’s bantering of a persecution disability of “people on the floor not out to get you.”

    Some of the material facts not included in the Lyman case analysis are: I was subjugated with sexual picture an automatic breach of code 5 and 7, I was provided with a poisoned work environment with a serious of sexual vexatious comments, I received no internal due process for my complaints after July 16th meeting that includes my supervisor drawing me into sex talk in back office, bookkeeper asking me to look at the hole in her crotch and talk about it, my supervisor continuing to harass me with touching his belt after I made formal complaint, I submitted email evidence of an attempt to charge me with unsuitable employee conduct with management’s refusal to provide substantial and quantifiable evidence of this unsuitable conduct, that this fabricated discipline meeting in November constitutes an act of differential treatment when my complaints are being ignored, that management retaliated with fabricated dismissal for reason of shortage of work and then after I was terminated hired two ex-employees to do work that I could be doing without placing add in paper, and that 3 managers committed the act of perjury in their affidavit to Small Claims court denying any harassment that is contradicted by other documents where they admit I made numerous complaints and that they dealt with them to their best of their ability. The manner in which I was terminated at both Xentel and Lyman warrant Wallace damages for termination in bad faith. Also, these three employers induce the commission to breach their duty of fairness.

    17. I plead that this interference at my employments at Xentel, Lyman, and Laurentide companies is to repeat items that I complain about in my human rights complaints particularly hostile remark out of my 2000 Watts complaint of “sucks to be you” resulting in all of these employers breaching the contract with wrongful termination in a row after I make sexual and non sexual harassment complaints and this action is a violation of the Whistleblower legislation where reprisals against Whistleblowers a general criminal indictable or summary offence per section 425.1 of the Criminal Code. It clearly states no employer or person acting on behalf of an employer or in a position of authority in respect of an employee of the employer shall take a disciplinary measure against, demote, terminate, or threaten to do so, adversely affect the employment of such an employee, or threaten to do so (b) with the intent to retaliate against the employee because the employee has provided information referred to in paragraph (a) to a person whose duties include the enforcement of federal or provincial law; (2) Any one who contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of (a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years; or (b) an offence punishable on summary conviction. This criminal action supports by civil claims for the tort of interference of employment relations and is also the breach of the implied terms of contract to treat me with “respect, civillity, and dignity”. These employers have a duty to provide me with work environment free of items that I complained about in a 2000 Watts Human Rights complaint and not take disciplinary action (repeating those same or similar items, fabricating discipline meetings and warnings, and wrongful terminating my employment) such as adversely affect the employment of such employee who has provided information to a person whose duty is the enforcement of provincial law such as the Human Rights Code.

    18. I plead that by passing information in my complaint Watts has breached their fiduciary duty in the 2001 settlement with the commission at #2: The Corporation has written a letter of assurance to the Ontario Human Rights Commission in the form attached hereto as Appendix “A” and has provided assurance that they have and will continue to provide training to staff in an effort to insure compliance with the letter and spirit of the Code.” Watts breached their fiduciary duty in this settlement by passing on to Xentel, and Lyman my misdiagnosis and that I get offended with behaviours such as: comments of sucks to be you (or similar), exposure to sexual picture, being addressed as “Claude” or “loser”, use of double speak to confuse me and to cause errors in my work, etc. The spirit of the Code includes reprisal which in common law is the remedy for interference with my employment relations, defamation, and conspiracy to injure.

    19. I plead that I was hired at fifth employer, Kinros/Laurentide, in Bad Faith with false promise of a full time permanent accounting/bookkeeping position to continue the mobbing and psychological tactics per all of my Human Rights Complaints to discredit me with a permanent delusional disorder or vexatious litigant which ever w